

ignorance: All is not theirs, it seems; / One fatal tree there stands, of Knowledge called, / Forbidden them to taste. Knowledge forbidden? / Suspicious, reasonless! Why should their Lord / Envy them that? Can it be sin to know? / Can it be death? And do they only stand / By ignorance? (pp. 93, 513-19). This sublime introspection operating between dichotomies of being is sublime, both for its brilliance of rhetoric and the soliloquising of supreme dread. See *Paradise Lost and Selected Poetry and Prose*, ed. Northrop Frye (Books Way, 2016 (reprint))

⁵ Clewis cites passages from Burke's *A Philosophical Enquiry* and Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, but I refrain from discussing it here since they are well-anthologized 'sublimators'. Much has been written on their sublimity already.

⁶ Hegel cites his example from the *Bhagavad Gita*. A similar and equally powerful example can be drawn from the confabulations between Yama and Nachiketa in the *Katha Upanishad*, where Yama elaborates upon the nature of the Self which communicates through AUM: "The intelligent Self is neither born nor does It die. It did not originate from anything, nor did anything originate from it. It is birthless, eternal, undecaying, and ancient. It is not injured even when the body is killed. If the Killer thinks (of It) in terms of killing and if the Killed thinks (of It) as killed, both of them do not know. It does not kill, nor is it Killed" (I.ii.18-19, 151-52). It magnifies the individual existent through the universal 'It' and creates his identity through a series of negations, of determinacies. See *Eight Upanishads: With the Commentary of Shankaracharya*, translated by Swami Gambhirananda. Vol. 1, Advaita Ashrama, 2013 (Twelfth Reprint).

⁷ I think Nietzsche is wrong here. The reference to narcotics is an attempt on

his part to imagine intoxication, and he instead concludes with inebriation which is the least desirable form of intoxication. In fact, inebriation beats the purpose of true intoxication – God-intoxication or spiritual awakening and so on. Inebriation is counterproductive to the "sublime" ends of intoxication, since it makes the individual hallucinate and directs the mind to false corners of non-life. See 'Why do Men stupefy themselves?', an essay by Leo Tolstoy who deals with the social aspect of Nietzsche's absurd claim.

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WOMEN AND BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY: ENGAGING ZEN MASTER KIM IRYOP. By Jin Y. Park. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017. 265 p.

Women and Buddhist Philosophy engages literary scholars and academics of theology. Any reader involved with the historicization of narrative or the intersectionality of Zen axiom in cultural and linguistic tradition may find the Buddhist view of the entire universe as methodical and relational. This binary methodology endures in most dharma narrative. Jin Y. Park, professor of Asian and comparative philosophy and religion and founding director of the Asian studies program at American University, engages with how and why women engage with Buddhism. This idea is the underlying query that *Women and Buddhist Philosophy: Engaging Zen Master Kim IryOp* offers to resolve through a discourse of Kim IryOp's life and

philosophy. With support from the Korean Government and Korea University's International Center for Korean Studies, Park presents vibrant and qualitative viewpoints with clarity for the study of women and Buddhism through the lifespan and ruminations of Korean Zen Buddhist nun, Kim IryOp (1896-1971). Park reveals that as a feminist activist with a Christian background perspective, Kim IryOp offers an innovative explanation of how Buddhism as a philosophy and a religion can involve lived experience. IryOp's awareness of gender bias, suffering, and dissatisfaction in the materialistic world led her to explore the Buddhist teaching of absolute equality.

In her comparative study, Park interprets Zen and Huayan Buddhism together with postmodern thought in Continental philosophy, with an emphasis on Jacques Derrida's theory of deconstruction. Park's exploration of modern East Asian philosophy analyzes the advent of philosophy in East Asia and the East-West encounter in this milieu. In her book *Buddhism and Postmodernity* (2008) Park considers Buddhism and continental philosophy on the topics of self, linguistics, and violence. Park also translated a book published in Korean in 1960 by Kim IryOp, a first-generation Korean feminist, titled *Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun* (2014). In this book, Kim IryOp offers an innovative analysis of Buddhist philosophy and tradition with a profoundly intuitive understanding and articulation of the *Jikji*, printed in Korea, a collection of Buddhist teachings by Son (Seon) master Baegun and published in movable type by his apprentices Seokchan and Daijam in 1377.

Buddhist philosophy involves the concept that "philosophy should draw on lived experience and the fluctuating reality of human existence instead of static theorization" (4). Kim IryOp's writing style is comparable to that of early Buddhist thinkers because her works are confessional in style, and they permeate with her own experiences and inquisition into purpose in life. Park identifies this sort of reasoning as "narrative philosophy" that intensely involves itself with the narrative discussion of day-to-day encounters as an alternative to becoming reliant on "theorization and abstraction" (6). Chapter one, "Between Light and Darkness (1896-1920)," deals with Kim IryOp's childhood and young adult life as they become reflected in works published later in her life. IryOp's legacy is one of the historical influences on progressive women in Korea and on early twentieth-century Korean society. For illustration, IryOp's childminding ended unexpectedly in 1907, when one of her sisters developed a fever and died. The tragedy is the basis of her first poem, "Death of My Sister" (22). The essay "Death of My Sister" appeared in the third issue (March 1920) of *New Women*, a journal for which IryOp served as editor-in-chief. The journal *New Women* introduced Kim IryOp nationally as a philosopher, but she was still "dependent on her husband for finances and security" (8).

In the Korean Confucian society, parenthood is a woman's most important role, but IryOp characterizes life with her in-laws as one of "cruel slavery" and will not endanger herself by becoming ensnared by them yet again (53). Thus, chapter two, "To See and Be Seen (1918-1927)," presents the

lives of three prominent liberalists, Korean New Women, and investigates how they were recognized and influenced IryOp. Most of chapter two deals with the New Women, their lives, loss of life, matrimony, fidelity, and women's distinctiveness, from social duty to feminine sexuality. There are intensely personal revelations and explorations of IryOp's experiences with infidelity, relationships, and suicide that helped lead her into the transition to a Buddhist nun. What is essential for IryOp is transforming herself into an autonomous individual. On an initial level, the book is a significant account of Kim IryOp's life. The chapters continue to develop chronologically, each period examining the progression of her ideas and biography. As an additional level, *Women and Buddhist Philosophy* provides inquiry and discourse on how people create identity, values, and meaning from life events. Park also shows how intensely Kim IryOp engaged with Western philosophers such as comparing the experience of zazen meditation to the philosophy of German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) (59). Additionally, Kim IryOp was influenced by the women's movement in Japan. So, chapter three, "Sense and Nonsense of Revolt (1924–1927)," examines IryOp's shift from public uprising to existential Buddhism. It also explores American and Korean New Women movements and thinkers such as The Gibson Girls and Kim MyOngsun.

Also, it is unsurprising for Park to engage with Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) intuitively and refer to his locale of origin of his philosophy. She believes his understanding of exclusion as an eleven-year-old Algerian-born Jewish

child in France impacted his theories—especially during an era when antisemitic demands forced some foreigners into Nazi concentration camps throughout France. For assessment, Park points out that in July 1924, IryOp published the essay "Our Ideals," and in this work, she suggests three new idyllic visions that New Women should pursue such as the "New Theory of Chastity," a new notion of individuality; and, awareness about the ideal partner (45). The essay shows IryOp was looking for something new to discern the New Women's concept of life from the lives of traditional Korean women. IryOp is not proposing women to wholly disregard "chastity" and "maidenhood" (45). However, she is encouraging them to be active supporters of "femininity" more readily than "passive recipients of the moralistic interpretation of the female body" that her culture and tradition inflicted on women in the name of chastity (48). Park addresses the marginalized status of Asian philosophy in Western academia and highlights the position of women in patriarchal structures inside or outside of the academe. Together, women and Buddhist philosophy are what Park refers to as the sociological term double-minority position. The nonappearance of individuals of double minority status such as women "of color" is obscured by describing Senator Clinton, for example, during the 2008 elections, as the "first woman" versus calling her the "first white woman" and Senator Obama as the "first African American" as divergent to the "first African American man." If the merged ideas of race and gender of the nominees were

a coincidence, then this notion of double minority may be immaterial, but Park highlights the dominant impact race and gender have as material and immaterial constructions of identity. Gender discrimination, combined with philosophical discrimination, is a reality for women who practice Buddhist philosophy in both academic and personal spheres. Their marginalized position reminds people of the power structure related to philosophizing.

Like IryOp, Derrida's thinking shows how philosophy does and should draw on lived experiences. If that knowledge becomes conveyed, then a new type of philosophy must be established. Derrida shared a new mode of philosophy through the practice of deconstruction. For illustration, in "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority," Jacques Derrida rejects the possibility of subliming the violence of law in reconciled social relationships. He perceives the fundamental danger of government is the disavowal of the violence, technology, and time of law in the narrative of a considerable society or delusions of peaceful and diplomatic resolution in the present.¹ So, Derrida asserts the aporetic character of socially constructed identity. The two periods of Kim IryOp's life—as an author and advocate for women's independence and as a Zen Buddhist nun—show a constant refrain: a pursuit for autonomy. Therefore, the book naturally deals with her contravention of the silence of nearly thirty years after she joined a Zen monastery. Her book *Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun* (1960) narrates this quest.

To elucidate her journey from political activist to a prominent Buddhist intellectual, chapter four, "I Who Have Lost Me (1927–1935)," deals with Kim Iryop's encounter with and descriptions of Korean Buddhism. This record and the qualities of Korean Son/Zen Buddhism explain the kinds of tradition to which she was accustomed. The position of women in Korean Buddhism also "demonstrates the role that IryOp played when Korean Buddhism began to establish a monastic education and practice for Buddhist nuns" (10). Similarly, chapter five, "Time for Reconciliation: Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun (1955–1960)," explores IryOp's understandings of Buddhism in the book *Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun*. Recognizing the idea of Buddhism's, no-Self, IryOp differentiates amongst the "small self" and the "great self." The former is the self, which is restricted by the concept that entities have a fixed identity. The great self is the self, which recognizes that it has no ample real meaning. Buddhism calls this self "non-self"; IryOp calls it "the great self." Next, in chapter six, "At the End of the Journey: In Between Happiness and Misfortune (1960–1971)," Park responds to Iryop's critics and considers the relationship between Buddhism and society and the relationship between the sacrosanct and the materialistic. The chapter also explores further how Iryop's inimitable model of thinking unifies with what Park calls narrative philosophy. Finally, *Women and Buddhist Philosophy* engages with what the two have in common. The book investigates what metaphysical and theoretical model clarifies and justifies their

relationship and IryOp's engagement with Buddhist thinking. By responding to these points and inquiries, eventually, chapter seven, "A Life Lived: Women and Buddhist Philosophy," allows readers to contemplate the vestige of IryOp's lifetime at the intersection of gender, history, narrative, Buddhist philosophy, and the formation of meaning.

There are not many works about women and Korean Buddhism, although Martine Batchelor did publish *Women in Korean Zen: Lives and Practices* in 2006. From 1981 she served as Kusan Sunim's interpreter and accompanied him on lecture tours throughout the United States and Europe. She also translated his book *The Way of Korean Zen*. Even so, outside of Batchelor's narrative work and translations, there is not much literature in English about Korean Buddhism. To fill this gap in knowledge, Park provides readers with a well-conceived and intellectual monograph of intuitive insights about women, Buddhist philosophy, and construction of the self to further engage with the junction of women and Buddhism. This work is beneficial for readers interested in furthering their depth of knowledge about Korean Buddhism and how a Korean woman employed the philosophy as a belief and a tool for the relinquishment of clinging-aggregates.

Works Cited

Park, Jin Y. *Women and Buddhist Philosophy: Engaging Zen Master Kim IryOp*. University of Hawai'i Press, 2017.

Notes

¹For more information about Derrida's ideas about justice and equality, see Derrida, Jacques. "Force of law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority." *Acts of Religion*. Edited by Gil Anidjar, 228-98. New York: Routledge, 2002.

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ADORNO AND POPULAR MUSIC: A CONSTELLATION OF PERSPECTIVES. By C. Campbell, S. Gandesha and S. Marino (Eds.). Milano-Udine: Mimesis International, 2019. 148 p.

It would be difficult to claim that the thought of Theodor W. Adorno is under-represented in current academic research. Monographs and articles on the multi-faceted oeuvre of the stern German thinker are countless, as the enthusiasm for, or at least the interest in, Frankfurt critical theory in its entirety does not appear to be experiencing any decline whatsoever. However, as it often happens, just when one is left wondering what else could be added to scholarship on such a discussed author, then a new book appears that makes you reconsider many aspects of his philosophy, either through philological-historical inquiries or through productive thematic displacements.

The present book, *Adorno and Popular Music*, edited by Colin J. Campbell, Samir Gandesha and Stefano Marino in the 50th anniversary of Adorno's death, belongs precisely to