

Kant's Postulate of "Independence of Interest" and the Principle of Aesthetic Judgement in *The Critique of Judgement*.

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(The problem of freedom in Kant's aesthetics)

I. Formation of Aesthetic Thinking: Transcendental Freedom of the Subject

For many decades Kant's aesthetics has drawn the attention of philosophers and art critics of different schools and trends which resulted in a large amount of books and articles. The main merit of all these works is that they placed the aesthetic part of Kant's philosophy on the same level of importance as his epistemology *The Critique of Pure Reason* and the study of practical application of reason to the moral and the good, *The Critique of Practical Reason*. Among the authors to whom we owe the revival of interest in Kant's aesthetics one should mention Cohen, Dietrich, Menzer, who tried to prove Kant's competence in aesthetics and literature, V. Basch, a prominent French scholar, representative of the emphatic, theory¹ O. Schlapp, A. Nivelle, who studied the history of aesthetic thinking from, A. Baumgarten to Kant.² And more recent authors—F. Kaulbach, P. Heintel, G. Krämling, E. Schaper, A Russian philosopher V.F. Asums.³

Kant was interested in aesthetics long before the appearance of his main work which presented its author as an initiator of philosophical aesthetics. In 1764 Kant published an article "Beobachtung über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen". This aesthetic work demonstrated two things: first, Kant's desire to study and master the subject of the aesthetic; second, his sufficient knowledge of various literary trends.⁴ Apparently, when writing the *Beobachtung* Kant fundamentally studied and thought over the history of aesthetic problems and first of all, in his country, in Germany.⁵

Kant did not conceive *The Critique of Judgement* as a work of art criticism: one of the main tasks of the Critique is to study conditions of existence of a subject's free aesthetic judgement, interrelationship of imagination and discourse. Kant supposed that for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (by analogy with pure and practical reason) there should exist an a priori subjective principle of its own. The search for such an a priori principle should be made by the critique of taste. If we suppose, however, that Kant is right and the question to an a priori principle of aesthetic judgement if lawful, it is to the same degree as previously discovered transcendentalism in Kant's philosophy is topical, as well as its applicability to the subject's freedom. Besides, the search for an a priori aesthetic principle

puts the subject's phenomenal imagination in inverted commas, i.e., his ability to see goes to meet his ability express.

Kant's interest in philosophical aesthetics is connected with quite a legitimate desire of the author of *The Critique of Pure Reason* and *The Critique of Practical Reason* to make his philosophical system complete. The author sees this completeness in the Critique aesthetic thinking, *The Critique of Judgement*.

Hoffmeister's "Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe" says that the word "judgement" (*Urteil*) from Kant onwards means a person's attitude. Really, if man makes aesthetic judgement, he directly or indirectly passes sentence to the object of beauty and to himself. The subject is within discourse.

One of the objectives of the third Critique is, first, to elucidate the ways of individual aesthetic thinking as the subject's autonomous and supra-logical thinking, second, to eliminate the dependence of aesthetic categories, which the subject uses when estimating the beautiful, from logical reflection about them. Thus, *The Critique of Judgement* aims at conditioning pure culture of the aesthetic.

It is possible to make a free choice, i.e., to make an aesthetic estimate, if the desire to perceive is more than the desire to apprehend. In the world of phenomenal representation of a thing the percipient and the precept are not in equal positions. It is always like that. The percipient has a chance to "make a mistake". The "mistake effect" lies heavily on the percipient, but for the aesthetic judgement to become a critical faculty the "mistake effect" should be removed. Then the subject which makes judgement receives freedom for himself which speaks of the subject as of a free percipient. If so, then the aesthetic position is determined by freedom of the act of judgement. Following Kant's logic one may surmise that the subject jumps from transcendental freedom to the phenomenal world (discovers for himself laws of freedom, a prior principles of which, according to Kant, are established by reason) thus having created a way of his own aesthetic perception of the world.

In chapter VIII "Von der Ästhetik des Beurteilungsvermögens" Kant wrote: "Das ästhetische Reflexionsvermögen urteilt also nur über subjective Zweckmässigkeit (nicht über Vollkommenheit) des Gogenstandes, und es fragt sich da, ob nur vermittelt der dabei empfundenen Lust order Unlust...."⁷ The problem is to find out whether aesthetic judgement is immediately based only on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and whether it may claim epistemological veracity, since this judgement "die keinen Begriff für die gegebene Anschauung bereit hat."⁸ Kant answers this question as follows: "Ein ästhetische Urteil im Allgemeinen kann also für dasjenige urteil erklärt werden, dessen Prädikat niemals Erkenntnis (Begriff von einem Objekte) sein kann (ob es gleich subjektive Bedingungen zu einer Erkenntnis überhaupt enthalten mag). In einem solchen urteile ist der Bestimmungsgrund Empfindung."⁹ Hence, it becomes clear that the task of cognizing and ascertaining objective truth is removed from the aesthetic judgement. The task of this judgement is to contemplate an object without studying its inner properties and principles of its creation. The main thing that constitutes the relation of a representation to the subject

but not to the object is an aesthetic property of this representation; it is rooted in the percipient. Kant stressed that a thing's purposefulness, since it is conceived in perception, is not a property of the object itself either. He defends the idea of aesthetic contemplation as the subject's disinterested presence in-itself and for-itself, as a sort of fiction. E. Schaper commented on this idea in her book: "to think and to speak aesthetically is to be aware of and articulate about the nature of some things as functions. It is to conceive of things in a special kind of bracket the 'as if.'"¹⁰

a) Aesthetic engagement

The French word "engagement" which due to J.P. Sartre has become a term means a voluntary drawing-in, desire to be personally involved. When contemplating an object of beauty the subject is drawn into his own speculative being and freedom, especially if he enjoys this contemplation. This drawing in is expressed in the judgement of taste. This phenomenally reveals man's existence on different levels of aesthetic perception of the world, where freedom has the same value as nature.

The cause of personal freedom of the percipient does not lie on the surface of the world perceived and thus, it is little comprehensible and sometimes it only seems to be an object of sensual givenness. In fact, interest in the cause of a person's freedom results in a different level of abstraction, in Kant's language this level is designated as transcendence.

In aesthetic transcendence a gap between natural laws and freedom is overcome. Kant writes about the problem of "great gap" in the last chapter of Introduction to *The Critique of Judgement*. But the contradiction may be felt only in a sense-created world in which aesthetic engagement is a sort of communication where the conceivable approaches the sensible.

II. Critique of Taste and the Element of Discourse

Kant was not the first to put the task of determining originality of the aesthetic. A number of his predecessors: Reidel, Sulzer, Tetens, Mendelssohn tried to find the place and role of aesthetics among other branches of human knowledge. Many of them laid the foundation for Kant's philosophical aesthetics. In 1767 Riedel in his *Theory of Fine Arts* declared the existence of three independent faculties of the soul: "a universal feeling", "conscience", "taste" which correspond to truth, goodness, beauty.

Kant could not, of course, borrow the classification of "the three faculties of the soul" from his predecessor. He suggested a classification of his own in the famous letter to K.L. Reinhold in December 1787.¹¹ Here Kant was closer not to Riedel but to Mendelssohn who characterized the aesthetic feeling as the feeling of pleasure and displeasure,¹² but Kant and Mendelssohn fundamentally differ in their characteristic of the aesthetic. In his conception of "ability to approve" Mendelssohn does not pose the question of a "pure aesthetic feeling", about necessary presence of freedom in aesthetic judgement, i.e., about the limits of discourse and, finally, whether the judgement of taste is dependent of interest bound up with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.

In 2 “The delight which determines the judgement of taste is independent of all interest” Kant says “The delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence of an object is called interest. Such a delight, therefore, always involves a reference to the faculty of desire. Now, where the question is whether something is beautiful, we do not want to know, whether we, or any one else are, or even could be, concerned in the real existence of the thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on mere contemplation (intuition or reflection).¹³ As we can see Kant insists that in the judgement of taste the beautiful be estimated regardless of the situation in which it would depend on the thing’s utility or real existence. Thus, the being of the beautiful is not in the object’s veracity, not in its existence but in real existence of the world of phenomena, where the beautiful is a beautiful phenomenon in the world setting the limits of its perception.

It is noteworthy that Kant pays attention to specific interrelationship between personal delight and its distinction from the pleasant and the good. The beautiful, the pleasant and the good mean, for Kant, three different correlations of representation with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Of all three kinds of delight in different aesthetic “rows” only delight in contemplation of the beautiful is disinterested and free delight.

The judgment of taste, if it is disinterested, is free aesthetic judgement, such judgement are connected with each other in a special way, i.e., they do not form the structure of knowledge about the object, they are but a system of description of “the secondary” with respect to the thing itself. Description hides the thing, its real existence is substituted by the subject’s imagination who makes judgement and by doing it sends other people to the objection of his own imagination, where the judgement of taste makes a forgery”.

In aesthetic universe at the level of perception of aesthetic values a person who makes an act of judgement “A” practically equals his imagination “I”. But imagination is circumscribed by the force of discourse in which the subject feels independent of all interest. Interest is hidden beyond the discourse, there is not a hint at it.*

Possibility of the judgement of taste a priori presupposes the existence of a certain universal meaning which is represented by a universal feeling. The universal feeling (*sensus communis*) presupposes in the judgement of taste the subject’s claim to general validity which undermines the autonomy of feeling but at the same time couples subjective imagination with other people’s. Kant noted that when complete independence of all interest is realized, the judgement of taste should claim validity for everyone but without universality directed to objects.

If everyone can possess taste then there appears the problem of universal communication of aesthetic judgement based on disinterested judgement of taste. When the subject estimates the object (which he may like or dislike) he feels at ease, his proposition

*Discourse here should not be viewed as the discourse of a text and its poetic means but as an abstract figure of speech, judgement beyond which there are different levels of perception of the object of beauty, i.e. discourse in the aesthetic sense.

of the object is based not on ontological interest to penetrate into the realm of sense but not on the ontological interest to penetrate into the realm sense but on the phenomenal presence of the aesthetic which gives him genuine feeling of delight. This allows to suppose that other people will share a personal estimate, for they have the same freedom and claim to general validity as an individual. And again Kant points out: objective general validity—logical judgement based on a concept—and subjective (aesthetic) general validity based only on the subject's feeling, are practically irreducible to one another.

That is why aesthetic general validity should be of a special kind: it makes phenomenal aesthetic world totally autonomous within the limits of the being of the beautiful, this autonomy being kept by immanent existence of freedom as a matrix, of feeling, understanding and reason.

It is evident that the critique of taste couples in Kant's philosophy with the critique of pure and practical reason where critique is transcendental matrix of philosophy in which the problem of finding a prior principles is more acute the problem of experience.

Universal communicability of aesthetic judgement rests not upon an objective concept (of a purpose) of the object's existence but on the play of imagination and the understanding which urges on the subject aesthetic choice-estimate. The nature of such a free play of imagination and the understanding is transcendental in respect to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure in contemplating the object of beauty in which the subject keeps his feeling. One could say that in this play reason acts as imagination.

Probably the depth of aesthetic feeling to which Kant pays attention lies in a still undiscovered phenomenon of freedom where mystery is a way of a feeling's is-ness mirrored in a moral symbol. The world of aesthetic phenomenality resists the world of ontological interest, effect eliminates cause. Speaking about opposition, logical judgement is more comprehensible than aesthetic one because the latter is not a way of comprehending things.

III. Phenomenalization of the Aesthetic: Levels of Perception

Outside of rigid limits of concepts aesthetic thinking cannot be a subject of a logical paradigm. The fundamental characteristic of aesthetic thinking is its dissolution in an object where an object itself is but a semblance and a subject of aesthetic thinking is aesthetic thinking itself.

a) The judgement of taste's claim to general validity: originality of aesthetic judgement

Kant considered the judgement of taste original and mysterious. This judgement, being significant for the subject, claims general validity. Transcendental freedom requested by the subject is sublimated into the phenomenal realm of perceived aesthetic objects where personal perception becomes horizontally ambivalent, i.e., aesthetic judgement of "one person" becomes valid for "another". When the judgement of taste is made the subject divides, he opens the world of his aesthetic sensuality and the latter, as a result, becomes metasubjective.

According to Kant the essence of the judgement of taste, its in-itself-and-for-itself significance should be studied through deduction of pure aesthetic judgements. This deduction will find out the specificity of the aesthetic and the pleasant, relationship between subjective and objective principles, compatibility of man's feeling and understanding.

In § 36. "On deduction of judgements of taste" Kant writes: "It is easy to see that judgements of taste are authentic, for they go beyond the concept and even the intuition of the Object... The problem of *The Critique of Judgement*, therefore, is part of the general problem of transcendental philosophy; how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?"¹⁴ By posing this question Kant unambiguously stated the existence of transcendental problems in aesthetics due to which aesthetics is within the sphere of his philosophical criticism.

Kant thinks that general validity of the feeling of delight in the object of beauty is good ground of the search for a priori foundations of a synthetic judgement. However, it is a priori impossible to bind a feeling with a representation, i.e., Kant holds that the realm of aesthetic phenomena cannot be grasped by a priori means. For the subject to be able to unite feeling and representation and communicate it to another subject he must turn to the object of beauty, become a subject in the process of phenomenalization of aesthetic objects, to resist the pressure of the medium. The structure of the medium is as follows:

- a) object-feeling-representation medium of distinction
- b) object-representation-feeling

Kant discovers two kinds of aesthetic judgements: First, an empirical judgement—"a judgement to the effect that it is with pleasure that I perceive and estimate some object is an empirical judgement;" second, an a priori one—"but if it asserts that I think the object beautiful, i.e., that I may attribute that delight to every one as necessary, it is then an a priori judgement."¹⁵ According to our scheme an empirical judgement corresponds to the level "a", the second a priori judgement—to the level "b". At both levels the subject is in the medium of distinction (J. Derrida* designated it as difference"), i.e., it is circumscribed by aesthetic discourse. The second condition can be satisfied only in case of absolute disinterest in real existence of the object of beauty's thing-ness. Otherwise the object's thing-ness will hinder phenomenal freedom of the beautiful which is to be contemplated by man.

What makes Kant a rationalist in aesthetics—acceptance of an a priori ground of general validity of aesthetic delight—is not rationalism or a priorism. It is too common an opinion. I would rather call it aesthetic transcendentalism which in Kant's philosophy is pre-supposed as necessary for artistic taste and artistic creation.

Beauty cannot be objective, it is but a way of being's existence a means for its subjective discovery, that is why deduction of the judgement of taste is rather easy, as Kant points out: "What makes this Deduction so easy is that it is spared the necessity of having to justify the objective reality of a concept. For beauty is not a concept of the object, and the judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement."¹⁶

*Derrida J. Die Differance // Randgänge der Philosophie. Frankfurt a.M. etc., 1976, S-6-37.

Winkelman said that beauty is one of Nature's great mysteries whose action we see and feel but to give a clear universal concept of its essence is one of unattainable truths. Winkelman is right. Kant does not seek to give a clear and universal concept of beauty. His each definition of beauty has a negative shade. Kant thinks that here are two kinds of beauty: "pure" (*pulchritudo vaga*) and conditioned beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). The first does not presuppose any concept of the object, means autonomously existing and creative beauty—luminescence in nature, the second—presupposes the concept of the object's perfection, it is ascribed to objects to which the concept of a purpose can be applied. A waterfall is pure natural beauty, while the beauty of a bride's dress is dependent (conditioned) beauty as it is related to the concept of a purpose. According to this division of beauty Kant defines for each the judgement of taste of its own: if the subject speaks of pure beauty he makes pure judgement of taste, if he speaks of conditioned beauty—an applied judgement of taste.

In the world of phenomena the two kinds of beauty overlap in the subject's sensibility and make a complex representation of beauty but these very kinds of beauty are divided by two kinds of judgements—pure and applied ones—and this testifies to the work of discourse in Kant's aesthetics—interrelationship of reason and feeling within the framework for conformity-non-conformity.

Pure beauty can exist only in its own absolute autonomy in respect to man. Absolute autonomy is a sign of beauty's external freedom. As for internal freedom it can be attained only when the subject contemplates the object of beauty, when communication of the world of aesthetic phenomena is created. That is why we say that the beautiful is not just the object of beautiful creation placed into the medium of perception, but a process of creation of the beautiful creation of creation. The process of creation of the beautiful (including the process of its contemplation) means an active presence of the percipient in which the three freedom of the percipient himself from conceptual-logical understanding of the being of the beautiful is expressed.

M. Heidegger said about the sense of artistic creation: "Das Kunstwerk eröffnet in seiner Weise das Sein des Seienden. Im Werk geschieht diese Eröffnung, d.h. das Entbergen, d.h. die Wahrheit des Seienden. Im Kunstwerk hat sich die Wahrheit des Seienden ins Werk gesetzt."¹⁷ "Its own way" in which, in Heidegger's aesthetics, artistic creation reveals variety of the being is a way of freedom of being itself which it draws out of the beautiful.

Strictly speaking, there are only two conditions of genuine contemplation of the beautiful: first, autonomy of the beautiful and, consequently, its freedom, second, tranquility, i.e., supra-empirical state of the soul, which Winkleman was the first to point out. According to R. Meerbout, Kant's theory of aesthetics is of great interest for those who want to understand the significance of the conception of free regularity of a cognizing subject's autonomous activity.

The complete and complicated existence of the being cannot be adequately reflected

in concepts which in this way or another fulfill their function of a reference of the manifold to a definite end. The concept is the constant setting of limits and, consequently, the dulling of infinitely manifold activity of subjective sensuality. The whole existence of being can be grasped only by the subject's aesthetic thinking, thinking of the beautiful as an image of being.¹⁸ That is why one can state the following: first, the beautiful is the subject's total autonomy, which represents his aesthetic perception's activity on different levels in the medium of distinction. This testifies to the possibility of free subjective choice of the object of beauty and a means of describing it. Kant always remembered that freedom is the symbol of morality. Second, the being of the beautiful is a limit of the existence of entity, for outside the beautiful the movement of entity is constantly fixed by the concept which puts a limit to the freedom of aesthetic judgement of a person without whom all aesthetic judgement has not sense.

b) On the transposition of aesthetic discourse

Levels of aesthetic perception introduce the subject into the transposition of discourse. The judgement of taste which Kant spoke about consists of the following aesthetic-discursive models: the first model: an act of judgement where the subject makes a proposition about his attitude to the object, for example, "I like this picture"; the second model: a judgement in which the subject speaks of the object's artistic value. "This picture is beautiful". The subjective judgement of taste includes both these models: "I like this picture (1) that is why it is beautiful (2)."

At different stages of perception aesthetic-discursive models may change places, accordingly vary both an a priori and empirical position of the subject in the judgement of taste, but in both positions the content of the first and the second models is necessary without this the judgement of taste will be incomplete. Thus, if Kant poses the question with an explicitly transcendental shade: whether the feeling of delight precedes the judgement of taste, it is necessary, when answering it, to introduce what we shall call "perception level factor" with a correction for the medium.

In *The Critique of Judgement*, analyzing the subject's attitude to the object of beauty Kant arrives at the conclusion that freedom is not only an object of reason but also an object of sensibility circumscribed by discourse an expressed through transitive aesthetic judgement.

IV. On Actuality of Aesthetic Judgement: Towards the Supersensible.

In § 23. "Transition from the faculty of estimating the beautiful to that of estimating the sublime" of the *Analytic of the Sublime* Kant points out the essential difference between the judgement of the beautiful and the judgement of the sublime. "We observe, writes Kant, that whereas natural beauty (such as it self-subsisting) conveys a finality in its form making the object appear (as it were)...but, simply in our apprehension of it, excites the feeling of the sublime, may appear, indeed, in point of form to contravene the ends of our power of judgement."¹⁹ A formless object presupposes uncertainty but the difference between

uncertainty of the beautiful and that of the sublime is that the former is used to picture an uncertain concept of the understanding involved in the free play with imagination, the latter—to picture an uncertain concept of reason. In the judgement of the sublime the soul is in internal dialectic contradiction, the object both attracts and repels it, thus, satisfaction in the sublime contains respect rather than positive delight, i.e., is rightly called negative delight.

The main internal difference between the aesthetic judgement of the beautiful and that of the sublime is that human imagination perceives the object of beauty according to phenomenalization of its form. Satisfaction received is a result of harmony between aesthetic judgement and the object of beauty perceived, due to which the object seems prepared beforehand for our judgement.

The aesthetic judgement of the sublime is different. The object of the sublime cannot be practically inscribed into ordinary tranquil imagination and, so it will never become an image. The sublime is more difficult to be subject to discourse, one should search other levels of perception in another medium of distinction which is a special task of transcendental aesthetics. The judgement of the sublime demands greater effort, one cannot contemplate it through external senses or greater effort, one should be within. To be within the sublime means for the subject to feel not a phenomenal presence of freedom but its illusion which differs from contemplating the object of beauty. The subject is unable to establish for-himself limits of re-presentation of the sublime, for sublimation of the sublime as entity, i.e., its original nature is endless non-concealment—*akruptos* (*a-cruptos*), so far as this Greek word can express it as the beginning of tradition. Non-concealment of the raging elements in which man feels lonely and lost.

Kant maintained that we should seek ground of the beautiful outside of ourselves, whereas that of the sublime—in ourselves and in our ideas.

To judge the sublime the soul should find in itself the ground of the appearance of the sublime, i.e., the soul's movement should acquire features of actual-infinite movement of man's spiritual forces, who stands in a sensual flow, between reality the transcendence.

a) antinomies of aesthetic judgement.

The judgement of taste is based on an antinomy which Kant defines as follows:

1. Thesis. The judgement of taste does not rest on concepts, otherwise it would be subject to dispute (decision through proofs.).
2. Antithesis. The judgement of taste rests on concepts otherwise, despite their difference, one should not even argue about it (claim its general validity, the necessity of the opponent's complying with it).

Kant seeks a compromise here. He sees it in that the concept which is related to the object in this type of judgement should be understood equivocally in both maxims of the aesthetic judgement. Kant holds that the judgement of taste should belong to a concept

whatever be it, otherwise its claim to general validity is strange. Kant points out that “antinomies make us look beyond the sensible against our will and seek a priori a common point for all our faculties in the suprasensible.”²⁰

Kant’s intuition did not deceive him when prompted him to seek a common point for all our faculties in the idea of the supra-sensible as the only clue to these meanings whose sources of transcendence are hidden from us, where nothing can make them comprehensible and intelligible. In aesthetic realm the judgement of taste always strives to approach transcendence to understand it as a cause of itself and, moreover, to be consistent in its endless revelation of human sensibility.

V. Mysteries and Harmonies of Genius.

A genius needs freedom more than other people. According to Kant, Nature sets rules to art through genius’ free creative work. That is why true art is a creation not only of genius but if its two co-authors, nature and freedom. Kant’s demands to genius are as follows:

1. It is the faculty of bringing forth something for which there are no specific rules,
2. its originality must be exemplary,
3. a genius cannot explain to others how his creation came into being,
4. through a genius Nature sets a rule not to science, but to art.

Genius in science and art is given immediately by Nature, it may die with a human being and genius is hidden in the chaos of being until Nature gives it to someone else. The appearance of genius cannot be explained rationally, it is an act of divine will, activation of dark forces of Nature and free spirit which out of chaos attract order as a genius implemented creative work. Apparently, genius is actualized in art and through art it ‘arts’ nature and the world where it finds transcendental order of things and human experience and binds up together Nature and freedom.

A genius is Nature’s disciple. Through his creative work he can establish ‘aesthetic horizon’ as A. Nivelle put it. Horizon is a limit of phenomenal freedom of every artistic creation—a limit of any imitation of perfect works of art. Besides, a genius founds his school attracting most talented pupils and followers who could apprehend their teacher’s ideas on condition that Nature provided them with the same faculties of the soul.

Genius as author of the beautiful in art, i.e., beautiful representation of a thing, strives for aesthetic significance of his soul—totality of creation that will expand in the world. For Kant it is important to emphasize transcendental character of genius’ activities in respect to the play of imagination and the understanding which would enter into Kant’s philosophical aesthetics. Genius is such because he creates order out of chaos, though his creation does not increase order but in order hides chaos, strengthening the latter’s power in the world. Thus is revealed the freedom of genius as an agent of transcendence in the world where Nature and freedom are bound up in mysterious of artistic creation.

Other things are important too. Kant considers spirit a life-giving principle of genius’ creative soul and the way in which it gives life to creative soul is a free play of spiritual

forces, soul's movement in creation; such movement is capable of representing aesthetic ideas that cannot be expressed by language, they are encoded ideas of genius' creation—ideas of individual freedom. No wonder that such ideas can be apprehended only by free imagination of man who uses natural substance to construct something quite different from natural and considerably superior to it—man's superiority over Nature is expressed in freedom as a true source of artistic creation, the freedom that does not exist in natural universe.

André Lemoyne gave a happy expression of the essence of genius in his marvelous poem entitled "Beethoven at Rembrandt". Here are a few lines by which we shall conclude:

A Charles Blanc

Beethoven et Rembrandt, tous deux nés sur le Rhin,
Dans leur mystérieuse et profonde harmonie,
Vibrent d' accord. —Un sombre et lumineux Génie.
Leur a touché le front de son doigt souverain.

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⁷Immanuel Kant's Werke, Herausgegeben von Ernst Cassirer, Bd. 5, Berlin, 1914, S. 209.

⁸*Ibidem*, S. 204.

⁹*Ibid.*, S. 204.

¹⁰E. Schaper, *Studies in Kant's aesthetics*, Edinburgh, 1979, p. 119-120.

¹¹"Briefwechsel von Imm. Kant," in drei Bänden, hsg. Von H.E. Fischer, Erster Band, München, 1912, S. 369.

¹²M. Mendelssohn, *Morgenstunden*, II.

¹³Imm. Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, Oxford, 1952, p. 42-43.

¹⁴*Ibidem*, p. 145.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 147.

¹⁷M. Heidegger, *Holzwege*, Frankfurt a. Main, 1957, S. 28.

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