

Bakhtin and Heidegger on Word and Being

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Mikhail Bakhtin and Martin Heidegger are two of the twentieth century's most influential thinkers in the philosophy of language, particularly with respect to the ontology of language or the relation between Word and Being. Heidegger, for instance, is famous for his statement that "language is the house of Being,"¹ and in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* Bakhtin argues that "an overwhelming part of reality is contained in the form of a still 'latent, unuttered future Word.'"² Much more than Heidegger, however, Bakhtin emphasizes the importance of the interaction between speaker and listener in his approach to the Word or discourse. His concern lies with the event of the Word--both uttered and unuttered---while Heidegger's thinking generally addresses the metaphysics of language and the notion of Being. Both thinkers, nevertheless, subscribe to the idea that any sense of being or reality we may generate issues not from observation but from articulation. As we shall see in this essay, a comparison of Bakhtin and Heidegger reveals that Word and Being reside neither "in here" nor "out there," neither in the mouth of the speaker nor in the mind of the listener, but *in between*. To create this "between is to create a space for human being, and it is the fundamental task which confronts every living I who stands before a living Thou. Let us consider, then, what underlies the task, what it entails, and what is at stake.

The Word and The Between

Where does the Word come from? It emerges from the Between, from what

Heidegger calls *das Zwischen*.³ And the Between, in turn, arises from the Word: one goes with the other, just as the mountain goes with the valley. Says Voloshinov/Bakhtin in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, the Word "is precisely a 'product' of the 'interrelation between speaker and listener'"⁴ ---not a product of speaker and listener, be it noted, but of the interrelation *between*. Speaker and listener stand at the poles, and they are indeed indispensable to the event of the Word. But the Word itself rises up in the polarity, in the passion, between an I and a Thou. Heidegger claims that the passion from which the Word is born is gratitude, which he defines as "the echo of the kindness of Being."⁵ The thanksgiving which may form the wellspring of the Word, however, is a gratitude not only for blessing but for trial, if it is indeed an echo of Being. And trial occurs wherever there is an encounter with what is alien or other. The other is the one who brings us to the edge and situates us at the pole, drawing us into the tension between the poles.

It is in this connection that we hear Bakhtin declare, "The word is shaped in dialogic interaction with an alien word."⁶ And: Discourse lives, as it were, on the boundary between its own context and another, alien, context. . . . Dialogic interaction becomes, as it were, an event of discourse itself" (*Dialogic*, p. 284). The Word is an event which occurs at the threshold of relation; the Word is forever at the threshold, not what is uttered but what is about to be uttered, pulsating between *was* and *yet to be*. Conceived as discourse (a concept included in the Russian *slovo*), the Word is a portal through which we pass to encounter the other and ourselves in a space between both. Recall what Heidegger notes in *Being and Time*: "In accordance with its spatiality, Dasein is never in the first instance Here but is rather *There*, from out of which it returns to its Here" (pp. 107-108). The *There* Heidegger refers to must be understood as the between; Dasein--being there--means being between. Each I, every Thou, arrives at his Here by way of a discourse that is between; the Between is the realm of discourse. The movement from the Between to Here is what Heidegger has in mind when he says, "We not only speak *the* language, we speak *out of it*" (*Unterwegs*, p. 454). And we are able to speak out of language because what we are is never settled, and something of what we have to say is always yet to be said.

One way of thinking about the relation of the Word to the between is to say that the tie which binds them is the *yet to be*. "Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken," Bakhtin writes, "the word is at the same time determined by that which has not been said but which is needed" (*Dialogic*, p. 280). This brings us to an important relation between silence and the Word, for it is in silence that

what is needful is revealed. Silence is the vessel of the yet to be. The notion of prayer may shed some light on this point. Prayer is the language of silence and the substance of language. In the silence of prayer we live in relation to the Word, to the external Thou, to the call of being. In the silence of prayer we encounter the silence of the Between, where the Word dwells as "that which has not been said but which is needed," as that which constitutes the call of Being. To be sure, Heidegger has asserted that "the call speaks in the uncanny mode of *silence*" (*Sein*, p. 277). This silent summons of Being is what vibrates in the polarity of the yet to be between speaker and listener. The Word, moreover, is born from that polarity *between* not only as summons but as response. Hence we find Heidegger declaring, "Man speaks insofar as he responds to language. This responding is a hearing. It hears insofar as it listens to the summons of silence" (*Unterwegs*, pp. 32-33).

Bakhtin adds to the light which Heidegger sheds by pointing out that every utterance of discourse is an active response and not an isolated assertion. "Every speaker is himself a respondent," he writes in "The Problem of Verbal Genres." For he is not the first to speak, not the first to breach the eternal silence of the universe."⁷ Further, "the perception and understanding of the meaning of speech simultaneously assume an active, responsive position in relation to speech (fully or partially), filling it out . . . Every understanding of living speech, of living expression, bears an actively responsive character" (*Estetika*, p. 246). Coupling Bakhtin with Heidegger, we see more clearly that the Word is the means by which we not only speak but also hear and understand. Because speaking and hearing are both responsive, they do not take place strictly at the poles of listener and speaker but occur in the between, in the event of dialogical interaction. All understanding is dialogical," we read in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. "Understanding seeks a "counter-word to the speaker's word" (p. 104). In the act of speaking and hearing, I am displaced, lunched into the Between, where I encounter the silence of the yet to be.

Here it should be emphasized that in dialogue not only the listener but the speaker seeks a counter-word or a response to his own word. As Bakhtin expresses it in "The Problem of Verbal Genres," "the speaker himself is situated in precisely such an actively responsive understanding; he awaits not a passive understanding. . . but a response" (*Estetika*, p. 247). Every word calls for a reply, and the call of a given word issues from the Between, from the atmosphere of discourse, standing and outstanding, from which both speaker and listener draw their breath, their presence, and their consciousness. Living consciousness is responsive consciousness, and human presence is presence in the

dialogical Word. "A man never coincides with himself," Bakhtin writes in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. "The genuine life of the personality takes place at the point of non-coincidence between a man and himself. . . The genuine life of the personality is made available only through a 'dialogic' penetration of that personality, (p. 59) In the genuine life of the personality, Within and Between are synonyms. Seeking a response, speaker and listener both seek themselves as one who is in situation, engaged in dialogical interaction. In doing so, they struggle to answer the summons which comes from the Between and which puts to them the question put to the first man: where are you? And the needful response is not so much "here" as "between."

Where I am is what I mean. My ability to respond to the question is my ability to offer meaning. In his "Notes from 1970-1971" Bakhtin observes that meaning is a response to a question (*Estetika*, p. 350). What we encounter in the Between is the question. The word makes itself heard as a question; if every word seeks a reply, it is because every word harbors a question, and this is what gives discourse meaning. Hence it is possible to organize a game in which respondents must provide the question which goes with a given assertion and gives it meaning. What we say and hear, then, is sense, not sound. "In fact," Voloshinov/Bakhtin declares, "we never pronounce or hear the word; rather, we hear truth or lie, good or evil, important or unimportant, pleasant or unpleasant, and so on" (*Marxism*, p. 71). In this regard, however, we must bear in mind one other statement from *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*: "Meaning is not in the word or in the soul of the speaker or in the soul of the listener. Meaning is the effect of the interaction between speaker and listener within the material of a given sound complex" (p. 104). The term *material*, however, may be misleading. "For the word is not a material thing, Bakhtin points out in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, but rather the eternally mobile, eternally fickle medium of dialogic interaction. It never gravitates towards a single consciousness or a single voice. The life of the word is contained in its transfer from one mouth to another, from one context to another, context" (p. 202).

The life of the word is the life of meaning, and meaning is the life of life, the being and reality of life's attachment to life. Where does that reality, that being, reside? Heidegger offers a suggestion: "Being, as itself, spans its own province which is marked off (*temnein, tempus*) by Being's being present in the word. Language is the precinct (*templum*), that is, the house of Being."⁸ Note the phrase "Being spans." Being, like the Word, *between*; present is in the Word Being is present in the Between.

Being and the Between

In order to help clarify a complex notion, let us begin this portion of the

essay by identifying four facets of Being to be considered here: reality, existence, idea, and resolve. If it seems that Bakhtin's thinking dominated the first part of this essay; in this section concepts from Heidegger will prove more useful, especially when they are linked to Bakhtin.

In *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* Voloshinov/Bakhtin argues that the reality of the word resides between individuals (p. 19), & reality is precisely the reality of the word. Or better: the reality which is, born of the word. As Heidegger expresses it, "where the word fails thing" there is no (*Unterwegs* p.163). In the beginning is the Word: first we have the world of words, and then the world of things falls into place. Yet at the same time it must be said that in the beginning is the Between, for the world of words and its concurrent reality are, again, between speaker and listener. But before we go on, we should recall a point which Bakhtin makes in his book on Dostoevsky. Quoting Dostoevsky, he writes, "Reality in its entirety is not to be exhausted by what is immediately at hand, for an overwhelming part of this reality is contained in the form of a still *latent, unuttered future Word*" (p. 90). And the realm of the future word is the silent but eloquent Between. Because every word calls for a reply, reality is that which is forever unfinished; it lies not only in what is uttered but in what is forever on the threshold of utterance.

If silence speaks, it bespeaks a reality. And if the word frames a reality, silence opens up an unbounded reality. A distinction is called for here: reality framed is the world, while open and unbounded reality is Being. In this sense, Being is what Heidegger refers to as the Open. But if, as he asserts, "language alone brings what is, as something that is, into the Open" (*Poetry*, p. 73), so too does silence as unuttered discourse; silence becomes a mode of speaking (cf. Heidegger, *Sein*, p. 165). It must also be noted that, contrary to what may seem to be the case at first glance, the Open--infinite and unbounded--is the Between; that which is limited lies in the speaker and in the listener. The infinity of Being, of uttered and yet-to-be-uttered reality, teems in the Between. What Heidegger says in his book on "Holderlin is true: "Only where language is, is there world."⁹ for only where language is, is their silence between two, an unbounded space where the world of reality juts up. This action of jutting up is what Heidegger means when he says, "The world never 'is'; it 'worlds.'"¹⁰

Only where there is Dasein or "being there" is there world. Being there moreover, entails relationship within a structure, so that being there means being with. Two points should be noted in this connection: first, Dasein, or the living individual, encounters the reality of himself by way of relationship within a structure; second, his relationship within the structure turns on the word, on a

process of speaking and response. Thus we hear Heidegger saying, "Speech is a constitutive feature of Dasein's existence as an existential condition for the disclosure of dasein" (*Sein*, p. 161). For the living individual, being there means having a voice; his existence is the existence of his voice as a response to another voice. The thing he is with, then, is another voice. And so, Bakhtin declares, "two voices is the minimum for life, the minimum for existence" (*Dostoevsky*, p. 252). Where there is Being, there are two voices. The existence of one voice rests on a relation to the other which is to say, it rests on the Between. Where there is Being, there is the Between.

Because Being is rooted in relation, it is not something given but something generated, not something we have but something we achieve. Where the Between is lost and relation fails, we have the nothingness of isolation. This miscarriage occurs wherever the Thou, who is the other voice, is reduced to an It in what Heidegger terms "The saying work of the still covetous vision of things." Listen "The hard thing is to accomplish existence. The hard thing consists not only in the difficulty of forming the work of language, but in the difficulty of going over from the saying work of the still covetous vision of things, from the work of the eyes, to the 'work of the heart'" [*Poetry*, p. 128]. The needful thing to accomplish is existence in a movement inward, toward the "man within the man," where we encounter the love that constitutes relation. "Only in communion," says Bakhtin, "in the interaction of one person with another, can the 'man in man' be revealed, for others as well as for one self" [*Dostoevsky*, p. 252]. Again, Between and within are synonyms. To exist is to love. For love is the stuff of Being. Void of love, we live in the void.

In the opening paragraph of this section we associated Being with idea. Here it must be said that the idea which is a dimension of Being is more a passion than a thought, more along the lines of revelation than speculation. Speculation is the "work of the eyes" cited by Heidegger above; revelation is "the work of the heart," inclined toward what there is to love. The thing revealed is the Between, out of which come the summons and response which signify the presence of the two voices of relation. Hence we find Bakhtin saying, the idea *lives* not in one person's *isolated* individual consciousness--if it remains there only, it degenerates and dies. The idea begins to live. . . only when it enters into genuine dialogic relationship with other ideas, with the ideas of others" [*Dostoevsky*, pp. 87-88]. And, he adds,

The idea is a *live event*, played out at the point of dialogic meeting between two or several consciousnesses. In this sense the idea is similar to the *word*, with which it is dialogically united. Like the word, the idea wants to be heard, understood, and 'answered' by other voices

from other positions. Like the word, the idea is by nature dialogic. . . (p. 88)

The living idea of dialogic relation is not speculative but revelatory: Being is dialogical. The thing which threatens Being is isolated speculation, what Heidegger describes as "the evil and keenest danger" when he says, "The evil and thus keenest danger is thinking itself. It must think against itself, which it can only seldom do" (*Poetry*, p. 8).

What is required for thinking to think against itself, against the threat of nothingness? Passionate resolve. This resolve is the substance of Being and the support of the Between. It is what Heidegger calls *will* when he says,

The Being of beings is the will. The will is the selfconcentrating gathering of every *ens* unto itself. Every being, as a being, is in the will. It is as something willed. This should be taken as saying: that which is, is not first and only as something willed; rather, insofar as it is, it is itself in the mode of will. Only by virtue of being willed is each being that which, in its own way, does the willing in the will. (*Poetry*, pp. 100-101)

The movement of gathering myself into myself is a movement toward the Between where I hammer out my being through my power of relation. I am what I will to become, and the process of becoming which characterizes Being occurs in the Between. Conceived of as will or resolve, moreover, I am *not yet* what I am; the project of forging myself is forever incomplete, forever in question. If my thought is to think against itself, I must refuse the temptation to what Heidegger calls tranquilization (*Sein*, p. 347) or coming to a stop. Further, because I am one whose being is grounded in resolve, I am responsible for what I become or fail to become. An essential feature of my being, then, is the ability to be guilty (cf. Heidegger, *Sein*, p. 297); I am guilty to the extent that I fail to achieve a dialogical presence in the Between through lack of resolve. This *lack* is nothingness, and the thing which announces it is dread. Thus we hear Heidegger saying, "Dread opens up nothingness" and "steals the Word away from us" (*Wegmarken*, p. 9).

When dread eclipses resolve, the idle talk of Das Man or the They takes over the word of the individual, so that he is no longer dwelling in the Between of Being but is languishing in the void of nothingness, no longer speaking but spoken. Here we may recall Bakhtin's remark in *The Dialogic Imagination*, where he says, "The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes 'one's own' only when the speaker populates it with his own intention" (p. 293). Where Bakhtin writes *intention* we may read *resolve*. In resolve the individual becomes the place of the Word, and the Between becomes the place of the individual: Being is achieved

when the word is spoken with one's whole being. The individual offers himself in the word he offers to another individual and thus becomes who he is. The highest example of the word spoken with one's whole being is the example invoked earlier: prayer. In prayer we gauge the Between as 'between god and man,' and "only in this Between," Heidegger writes, "is it decided as to who man is and where his existence lies" (*Erläuterungen*, p. 43).

Hence the relation between two human beings—the relation which constitutes Being—entails a relation to a Third, through whom the measure of the Between is taken. This brings us to our third point of consideration.

The Third

In *Aesthetics of Verbal Art* Bakhtin writes, "Every dialogue proceeds as though against the background of a responsive understanding of a Third who is invisibly present, standing above all the participants in the dialogue. The Third referred to here has nothing to do with mysticism or metaphysics. It is a constitutive feature of the whole expression" (p. 306). The Third is the one for whom all things are possible, the infinite horizon of possibility for summons and response. As such, the Third is the unfinalized Truth which sustains the way of the dialogue and the movement in the Between. The Third is the presence that abounds in the opened Between, what Heidegger refers to as "the gods" when he asserts that "the word takes on its naming power only when the gods bring us to language" (*Erläuterungen*, p. 42). If language is the house of Being, the Third is the builder of the house.

The third is the constitutive feature of the dialogical relation generated by the word. The word, therefore, is transindividual, to use Bakhtin's term:

The word (any sign in general) is transindividual. Everything said or expressed lies outside the 'soul' of the speaker and does not belong to him . . . The author (speaker) has his inalienable rights to the word, but his rights are also the listener's rights; his rights are the rights of those whose voices resound in the word offered by the author . . . The Word is a drama in which three characters participate (not a duet but a trio). (*Estetika*, pp. 300-301)

The speaker, again, is not Adam, not the first to disturb the silence of the universe. His every utterance is replete with a host of words within the word, with the presence of the Other who listens and summons. The Other is what Bakhtin deems the "Over-I" when in his "Notes from 1970-1971" he writes, "The overman, the Over-I—that is, the witness and judge of every man (of every I)—is therefore not a human being but the Other" (*Estetika*, p. 342). In *Being and Time* Heidegger alludes to the voice of the Third as the call of the Other when he states that "the

call comes *from me and from beyond me*" (p. 275) and that "the call is.....something like an *alien voice*" (p. 277). It has been suggested above that Between and Within are synonyms ; now we may go a step further—or a step back—and say that Within and Beyond are synonyms, recalling Heidegger's statement that "the midst of two is inwardness" (*Unterwegs*, p. 24). The midst is the beyond, and the beyond is the Third or the Other.

The call to Being comes from the Third ; the Third is the origin of Being and of the Word. It summons us to the presence generated by the Word, and it is an alien voice because our presence is always in question, always has to be re-established. That is why the Third is the judge, as well as the witness, of every being who says I. Thus every I stands in a relation not only to a Thou but to a Third, an eternal Thou, who dwells between I and Thou. There is no relation of an I to a Thou without the relation of the I to the Third, who addresses the I through the Thou and to whom the I responds by answering the Thou. When the relation to the Third fails, we fail to attain Being and are turned over to nothingness ; when that relation fails we lose the light of the Between and dangle in the darkness of the abyss. And when does that relation fail ? When we fail to speak with our whole being ; when we fall from dialogical relation to monological recitation, calculation, and negotiation ; when we have lost the question that moves us toward the truth and are lured into the sediment of fixed phrases and ready answers that become our tomb.

The relation to the Third constitutes the presence—the word and being—of the I by bringing the I to the threshold. This relation is an important part of Bakhtin's concern with Dostoevsky, and it leads him to see in Dostoevsky what Heidegger never brings out in the German poets. Says Bakhtin, "Dostoevsky always represents a person 'on the threshold' of a final decision, at a moment of *crisis*, at an unfinalizable—and 'unpredeterminable'—turning point for his soul" (*Dostoevsky*, p. 61). And what is the soul ? Bakhtin offers a cryptic definition in "Author and Hero" : "The soul is the spirit unrealized for itself, reflected in the loving consciousness of another person, God)" (*Estetika*, p. 98). Where Bakhtin writes "person, God" we may read "Thou, Third." In the first section of this essay we invoked the image of polarity as a metaphor for the presence which pulsates in the Between. With Bakhtin's concept of the soul and his notion of the Third, we may identify that polarity as spirit. If, as Heidegger has said, the Between is the measure gauged between God and man (*Erläuterungen*, p. 43), the thing which gauges the measure is the spirit or the love of the loving consciousness. Such a responsive consciousness of the Thou arises only when it is also consciousness of the Third.

In "Author and Hero" Bakhtin goes on to say that "the soul is the gift of my spirit to the *Other*" (p. 116); again, we may understand the Other to be the Third and spirit, moreover, to be love. Like love, the soul is mine only to the extent that I am able to give it to another, and I offer my soul to the Third by offering it to a Thou, to the human being before me, with whom I am gathered in the name of the Third. To be gathered with another in the name of the Third is to offer and receive the Word uttered in love and gratitude. If we recall Heidegger's assertion that the Word arises in gratitude, as the echo of the kindness or favor of Being (*Wegmarken*, p. 105), we see more clearly that this is where the Word's connection with Being unfolds. The Word is not the vessel of Being; rather, Being rises up in the offering and receiving of the Word between I and Thou, between I and the nameless Third. The *event* of giving and receiving, of speaking and responding, is spirit; it is the movement of a constant return into myself by way of the Third. Because my spiritual life is characterized by this movement, I am never coincident with myself. As Bakhtin expresses it in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, "a man never coincides with himself. One cannot apply to him the formula $A=A$ " (p. 59).

In order for a man to penetrate himself, he must go through the Third or "the witness and judge of every man" (*Estetika*, p. 342). In the light of what has been said about the relation to the Third, we can see that the mediating role of the Third creates a tension between the soul and spirit. Bakhtin brings out this tension when he says, "The soul is an image of the totality of all that is truly experienced, of all that is at hand, in the soul in time; the spirit, however, is the totality of all meaningful significance and direction in life, of all acts issuing from itself" (*Estetika*, pp. 97-98). If the Third is the witness and judge of every man, it weighs the constant disparity between the totality of all that is at hand and the totality of all meaningful significance and direction in life. Because the Third is there, the disparity is there. And because the disparity is there, "the definition given to me lies not in the categories of temporal being but in the categories of the 'not-yet-existing', in the categories of purpose and meaning, in the meaningful future, which is at odds with anything I have in the past or present. To be myself for myself means yet becoming myself (to cease becoming myself means spiritual death)" (Bakhtin, *Estetika*, p. 109). The ultimate Word between I and Thou is forever yet to be uttered, and the relation between I and the Third is forever unsettled.

At the beginning of this section the Third was described as an infinite horizon of possibility. Looking to Heidegger's remarks about the *not yet* of Dasein, we may now view the Third not only in terms of possibility but of potentiality.

Says Heidegger, "If the existence of the being of Dasein is determined and its essence partly constituted by its potentiality for being, then as long as it exists as such a potentiality Dasein must *not yet be something*" (*Sein*, p. 233). Heidegger's "potentiality for being" may be understood as Bakhtin's "all meaningful significance and direction," that is, from the position of the Third. The Third holds sway over the something which I am not yet. As long as I exist, the meaning of my life is in question, and the meaning in my life rests on the movement I make toward what I am not yet; that is to say, the meaning in my life is grounded in my relation to the Third, which is the realm of spirit and of my spiritual life, the realm of the Between. In this relation I find my depth; living in the spirit, to use Bakhtin's words, "I live in the depth of myself through faith and hope in the ongoing possibility of the inner miracle of a new birth" (*Estetika*, p. 112). For the potentiality of what I am not yet is the potentiality of a new a birth.

And who is the new being I am born into? It is the Third, God, if you will. Or better: it is God as absolute love. Still better: it is the absolute expression of God's love in the God-man or the Christ. In the Christ, Bakhtin writes, "for the first time appears an infinitely profound 'I-for-myself'.....immeasurably good to the other, rendering the whole truth to the other, revealing and confirming in all its fullness the precious originality of the other" (*Estetika*, p. 51). The Christ reveals the I-for-myself which constitutes my highest potentiality for being. He is the one who summons me from his Third position to a new birth through a relation to the other, to the Thou. Hence, Bakhtin goes on to say, "that which I must be for the other is what God is for me" (p. 52). But I am never yet what I must be for the other. The truth and the word I offer are never quite whole, and I am constantly between myself and the other, myself and the Third. Once again it is from the depths of this Between that Being must be continually reaffirmed through the relation of the I to the Thou, of the I to the Third, a relation which inheres in the Word.

Conclusion

Bakhtin and Heidegger help us to see that the Between is the seat of Word and Being: it is the realm of the spirit, where Word and Being are one. The task which faces human being is to move into that realm, to respond to the summons that come from the Third, who is both within and beyond. The task which faces human being is to become whole in the relation is another which opens the way to the Between. The task is to become present in an apotheosis of presence, so that when we are called we may answer, as Abraham answered,

“Here I am,” where here is *between*. And it is a matter of spiritual life or spiritual death.

How can we make sense of this? Where can we point and say, “There is the Between”? Nowhere. Or the inner somewhere, which, the intellect wants to declare, is nowhere. We cannot say the Between is in this place or that but only that it is near, closer to us than we are to ourselves, and that in the saying itself the nearness of the Between—of the spirit—is given (cf. Heidegger, *Unterwegs*, p. 219). In order to reach it, we must set out, again like Abraham, without knowing where we go, leaving behind all the calculation and fabrication we engage in whenever we attempt to create the illusion of a guarantee. In short, the movement into the Between is a movement of faith. Thus we hear Bakhtin saying, “We can live and realize ourselves neither ‘with a guarantee’ nor ‘in a void’ but only ‘in faith’”. Life (and consciousness) from within itself is nothing other than the realization of faith; the pure self-consciousness of life is the realization of faith (*Estetika*, pp. 126-127). In a leap, suddenly, faith takes us into the Between, where life finds its attachment to life in the wholeness of the I’s relation to the Thou. For an instant eternity shows its face. Word and Being announce themselves in a single voice, in the utterance of Word and Being: I Am That I am.

Notes and References

1. Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Tubingen: Neske, 1959), p. 254. All translations are mine, unless indicated otherwise.
2. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, tr. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 90.
3. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 2nd Ed. (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1929), p. 374.
4. V. N. Voloshinov, *Marxizm i filosofiya yazyka*, 2nd Ed (Leningrad, 1930), p. 87. Since there is some question as to whether this is the work of Bakhtin or Voloshinov, I have referred to the author as Voloshinov/Bakhtin in the text.
5. Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), p. 105.
6. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, tr. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 279.
7. Bakhtin, *Estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva* (Moscow, 1979), p. 247.
8. Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, tr. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 132.
9. Heidegger, *Erläuterungen zu Holderlins Dichtung*, 2nd Ed (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1951), p. 35.
10. Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons*, tr. Terrence Malick (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 103.

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