

# Metaphor and Truth in Nietzsche and Emerson: A Critique of Idealism and Realism

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Within the American philosophical tradition, certain thinkers have traced Ralph Waldo Emerson's historical influences and tendencies within continental and American thought. For example, Cornel West has linked pragmatism to what he calls Emersonian provocation, and Gray Stack has investigated Emersonian influences in Nietzsche's thought.<sup>1</sup> This Emersonian connection has appeared indirectly in Richard Rorty's thought through his exploration of Nietzschean linguistic insights within Quine and Davidson. While Nietzsche did not directly influence contemporary pragmatism, Rorty's idea is that the "contingency of language," the idea that language (thought) and reality do not correspond in any essential manner, has been in the air since the mid to late 19th century and is resurfacing in late 20th century pragmatism. This sense of the contingency of language arises in Emerson, who influenced Nietzsche. Thus, in both a direct and indirect manner, Emerson, has had an effect on thinkers who definitely are not transcendentalists.

Emerson's influence upon Nietzsche interests me. What I examine here is the link between Emerson and Nietzsche on truth and language. As much as Emerson is an idealist (transcendentalist), there is also an implicit critique of idealism, perhaps a deconstruction of it, rooted in his views of language and expressed best in his essay on the poet and in the chapter dealing with language in his text entitled *Nature*.<sup>2</sup> My argument is that Nietzsche is influenced by Emerson's unintentional critique of idealism and uses Emerson's insights into language to critique realism and bring the contingency of language into the foreground. Nietzsche offers his Emerson-inspired critique of realism in an early essay entitled "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense."<sup>3</sup> In a sense, Emerson provoked Nietzsche. Emerson, in his provocative style, has brought idealism into question; Nietzsche, through his reading of Emerson, has brought realism into question.

That Emerson was influenced by German Idealism is well known. His self-acknowledged indebtedness to Kant in the essay "The Transcendentalist" testifies to his familiarity with German Philosophy. However, his Kantianism is not Kant's, but the Kant of Coleridge, Schiller and Schelling, particularly given Emerson's emphasis on beauty, poetry and spirit.

Early in his career, Emerson called his philosophy Idealism, the view that there is no existence without mind, or "seeing the world in God," as Emerson says (*Nature*, 36). In other words, nature is only directed toward spirit, which is both nature's source and *telos*. The idea of nature either as merely materialistic or as realistic is unsound to Emerson.

Emerson does recognize a material side to nature. Nature is there for our betterment: it is our commodity and there for us. But in addition, nature shows its truer sense in beauty. We take "delight" in the "perception of natural forms" (*Nature*, 10), but the recognition of beauty is the revelation of beauty in nature. In other words, nature's ideality shows itself through its beauty. Emerson presents a Platonistic (not Platonic) idea of eros as the desire of the beautiful, of what is whole and harmonious, that moves us out of our absorption with natural things and directs us toward spirit.

The movement out of natural absorption and toward spirit can occur in three ways. First, the delight in nature's beauty is a movement away from content to form. On this point Emerson seems to be in agreement with the Kantian sense of disinterest as a move away from a natural thing's objective qualities or use toward a delight taken in the way the form gives pleasure. However, Emerson interprets the pleasure taken in the natural thing's form as suggestive of a realm of spirit beyond nature. Humans need disinterested satisfaction to find repose and meaning beyond the drudgery of everyday material existence. In other words, the delight in beauty lifts us out of our mundanness.

Second, given this heightening effect, natural beauty exposes the human being's moral destination. On the one hand, the recognition of spirit in nature's beauty makes us aware that nature is our property and is there to serve us. On the other hand the recognition of spirit in nature's beauty ought to lift us beyond our everyday immersion and reveal to us our moral destination. Emerson does not really explain this process, but I take it that the exposure of nature's service to us makes us aware of a sense of duty and our need to become great souls.

Third, beauty has an intellectual quality. Beauty reveals order in nature, and it stimulates the intellect to search for "the absolute order of things" (*Nature*, 14). Further, beauty is productive of ideas, hence the intellect does not merely want to contemplate nature but wants to give rise to a "new creation" (*Nature*, 14). Thus, beauty uncovers a rational order within nature.

Given these views, both the poet and the philosopher occupy a place of preeminence in Emerson's thought, since both expose nature's beauty and its spirituality, *i.e.*, its movement toward the divine. Both the poet and philosopher "postpone the apparent order and relations of things to the empire of thought" (*Nature*, 33). Their difference lies in their *telos*: the poet is directed specifically toward beauty, and the philosopher is directed toward truth. However, we must keep in mind that the good, the true and the beautiful are merely "different faces of the same All" (*Nature*, 15).

Nonetheless, Emerson tends to emphasize beauty over the other two primary ideas. This emphasis is possibly due to Schelling's influence gained through Coleridge. As Emerson says, "Beauty is the creator of the universe" (*Poet*, 67). If beauty gains a certain preeminence as the highest idea of the primary ideas, then the poet gains a certain prestige as the spokesperson of beauty. Emerson claims that the poet is "the Sayer, the namer, and represents beauty" (*Poet*, 67).

Emerson's analysis of the poet is interesting but strange. Emerson refers to God as a poet and claims that "poetry was all written before time was" (*Poet*, 67). This makes sense given Emerson's idea of beauty as a creator. Since Emerson sees poetry as the highest art, God would be a poet, the highest mode of the artist. If God is a poet, then the earthly poet can merely tap into the already present oversoul or spirit of the world and says, or names, what is given there. However, Emerson claims that the poet generates original thought. She/he opens up experience in new ways and reveals things in ways that have not been seen before. As Emerson says, the task of the poet is to "articulate" a world that is already open to mind, to make us realize that nature is a symbol of beauty, to interpret the symbols as thoughts of the spirit and to make us recognize that we are "symbols and inhabit symbols" (*Poet*, 72). By doing so, the poet turns the world to glass, and shows us all things in their right series and procession. For through that better perception, he stands one step nearer to things, and sees the flowing or metamorphosis; perceives that thought is multiform; that within the form of every creature is a force impelling it to ascend into a higher form; and, following with his eyes the life, uses the forms which express that life, and so his speech flows with flowing of nature (*Poet*, 73).

Thus, on the one hand, the poet is an interpreter; on the other hand, the poet is an originator. As such, the poet is a "Language-maker" (*Poet*, 73).<sup>4</sup>

Since language is the way we articulate thought, or ideas, we must recognize that all language is originally poetry, since we come to know ourselves and nature in its spirituality through the naming activity. Language is "fossil poetry," a "tomb of the muses," that is "made up of images, or tropes, which now in their secondary use, have long ceased to remind us of their origin" (*Poet*, 73). The poet wakes us up, moves us out of our forgetfulness, compels us to recollect our spirituality and moves us beyond commodity relations toward beauty.

Given this, in Emerson's explicit discussion of language a problem arises regarding the notion of symbol. In the section on language in the text *Nature*, Emerson wants to show three things: first, that "words are signs of natural facts;" second, that "particular natural facts are symbols of particular spiritual facts;" and third, that "nature is the symbol of spirit" (*Nature*, 15). These contentions show Emerson's view of language to be very traditional and idealistic.

Language is a natural activity, and words are merely signs that signify natural things. Moreover, Emerson suggests that the words are essentially connected to the things they signify, i.e., words allow things to show themselves in their being. In all likelihood, Emerson derives his view of language partially from the Bible and the Adamic vocation of naming things and partially from a Platonistic theory of naming.<sup>5</sup> Both views tie well into the idea of the poet as the one who reveals and creates the essence of things through the act of naming. However, Emerson ignores the fact that different names arise in different languages for the same thing and that words have an arbitrary character. In other words, Emerson is not a nominalist.

Nonetheless, Emerson does note that words that signify natural facts are used to symbolize spiritual things. In fact, all language production is rooted in nature. Simple etymological practice shows this fact. As Emerson says, right means straight; wrong means twisted; Spirit primarily means wind; transgression, the crossing of a line; supercilious, the raising of the eyebrow and emotion. We say the heart to express emotion, the head to denote thought, and thought and emotion are words borrowed from sensible things, and now appropriated to spiritual nature" (*Nature*, 15-16).

We are not sure how the transference from natural things to spiritual things transpires, but Nietzsche notes in *On the Genealogy of Morals* that this is a well-accepted philological rule. So, on the one hand words come to stand for, or symbolize, spiritual things.<sup>6</sup>

According to Emerson, words can symbolize spiritual things because nature is itself only a symbol of spirit. Hence we have an image/original schema at work here. The spiritual world is the original world, while nature is a symbol, or image, of spirit. Natural things are images of spirit, and words are symbols, or metaphors, or sound images of natural things that can symbolize spirit. Some of Emerson's examples are that "an enraged man is a lion," "a cunning man is a fox," "a lamb is innocence" and a "a snake is subtle spite" (*Nature*, 16). We also use the image of light for knowledge and goodness, while we use the image of dark for ignorance and evil.

These metaphors express more than analogies. For Emerson, we are not merely stating likenesses; we are expressing truth. Emerson suggests that there are proper connections between thought and symbol, a correspondence theory of metaphors that we can tap into if our spirits are pure, simple and uncorrupted. In other words, Emerson's connection is that nature copies a spiritual original and that nature is itself an image of spirit.

So far, what Emerson has said follows the tenets of a type of idealism or Platonism. However, this position needs to be pushed to its limits. According to Emerson, I am first exposed to nature and learn words (concepts) for the things I encounter. So, I use words that originate in natural things that come to

symbolize spiritual things. However, nature is itself only symbolic of spirit, and hence, words are metaphors, I can only know spirit metaphorically. Spirit is said to exist and to be original, but we know it only as symbol. So nature is only a symbol of spirit, which we know through language, which is itself natural and symbolic, and hence what we possess of spirit is metaphor.

This linguistic play reduces everything to the level of metaphor, and what we end up with are metaphors of metaphors. Words and nature are merely symbolic of spirit, and all we know of spirit is itself metaphorical. This metaphorical process eradicates the image/original schema in a Platonistic theory, since Platonism sees symbol and metaphor in terms of images and hence as non-original. This sense of the metaphorical gets more convoluted when we add the realization that there is no necessary connection between a thing and its sound image, or word, which Emerson ignores given his non-nominalistic stance.

Given this, what Emerson has revealed is the non-foundational character of idealism. Stack reads this emergence of the non-foundational character of idealism in a different way. He calls Emerson's thought a "realistic idealism" (Stack, 74), which I take Stack to mean that Emerson recognizes the harshness and particularity of nature, while simultaneously stressing the reality of spirit. However, Emerson believes in the reality of the universals, and to expose the metaphorical character of universals is to undermine idealism, no matter how realistic you want to make it. Emerson has brought idealism to its limits, and, by doing so, has brought the image/original schema into question. What Emerson has done amounts to a deconstruction of idealism, and, contrary to his intention, opened the door to a type of nonidealism.<sup>7</sup>

I believe that it is these so-called deconstructive elements that attract Nietzsche to Emerson, and I think Nietzsche would depict them as modes of *Redlichkeit* (intellectual honesty) in Emerson. This particular deconstructive element regarding language appears in Nietzsche's essay, "Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense."

Stack notes that Nietzsche read the book *Nature* very carefully. In fact, in Nietzsche's German edition of *Nature*, he underlined a passage from the section dealing with language. The passage in English reads, "There seems to be a necessity in spirit to manifest itself in material forms" (Stack, 72; *Nature*, 21). Stack interprets this emphasis as Nietzsche's attempt to find out how spirit discloses itself immanently, not transcendently, in nature. However, Stack's interpretation remains too much within the confines of idealism and makes Nietzsche seem like Hegel. Already in "Truth and Lies," Nietzsche cites his mistrust of idealism (*TL*, 87).

Given Nietzsche's reflections on language in "Truth and Lies," I would say that Nietzsche comes to the realization that there is neither an otherworldly spirit nor an innerworldly spirit, if we mean by spirit some overarching rational

force such as the Oversoul or God, as Emerson intends it. Instead, Nietzsche realizes that truth is metaphorical. But how does he come to this realization?

Nietzsche's main question in "Truth and Lies" is: where does our "drive for truth" originate (*TL*, 80)? In an environment given over to idealism, as Germany was during Nietzsche's time, the question concerning the origin of the drive for truth was strange for two reasons. First, the question does not ask about the origin of truth in and of itself. Instead, the question directs us to seek out a drive that gives rise to truth. In other words, the implication is that truth is not merely present; it is not there to be picked up and taken in by our cognitive faculties. Second, the question is strange because it suggests that truth is not original but is derivative and hence is needed for a reason other than the truth. However, the question was being raised in England by utilitarians, empiricist and Darwinists, those whom Nietzsche refers to as the English psychologists.

Nietzsche's essay begins with a discussion of the intellect's hubris, purpose and function, and then continues with the social/moral origin of truth. Let me condense these discussions, but keep in mind that these discussions are merely preludes to the non-moral origin of the drive for truth, which is Nietzsche's real concern. Nietzsche begins "Truth and Lies" with a fairy tale, in the style of the Grimm brothers, well-known philologists, about the human being's hubristic assessment of his/her intellect. The fairy tale is:

Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of the universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of "world history," but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed and the clever beasts had to die (*TL*, 79).

The point of the fairy tale is to show "how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature," even though we think that we are the center of the universe (*TL*, 79).

For Nietzsche, the intellect is human, all too human, and has no transcendent purpose. The only purpose Nietzsche ascribes to the intellect is one of individual survival, and he states that the intellect's primary function is one of "dissimulation" (*TL*, 80). The human being is physically too weak to survive in the wild, and so the intellect evolved to the point where humans were able to survive by laying traps for animals, hiding in ambush and waiting for the food to come to us, and probably stealing from others. While some other animals practice some sense of dissimulation, as members of the cat family do, Nietzsche claims that "the art of dissimulation reaches its peak" in us (*TL*, 80).

Deception, flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back, putting up a false front, living in borrowed splendor, wearing a mask, hiding behind

convention, playing a role for others and for oneself — in short, a continuous fluttering around the *solitary* flame of vanity — is so much the rule among men that there is almost nothing which is less comprehensible than how an honest and pure drive for truth could have arisen among them (*TL*, 80). So, given our hubris and dissimulation, where does the drive for truth come from?

In a brief social/moral history of truth, Nietzsche shows that truth arises out of our desire to interact socially and to live peacefully. According to Nietzsche, for peaceful social interaction to occur, a fixed legislative order has to be created that shows what is permissible and what is forbidden. The way this is accomplished is to designate what these are, and these designations come to stand for the truth. As Nietzsche says, “a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth” (*TL*, 81).

On the social/moral level, truth is not distinguished from falsity, *i.e.*, truth is not a matter of knowledge *per se*. Instead, truth is contrasted with lies. The purpose of truth on the social/moral level is to fix the way things are in language such that we can coexist peacefully and in an orderly fashion. The liar is the one who can take the fixed conventions and dissimulate with them in order to achieve power. Thus, the liar becomes destructive of the social order. In early social orders, the liar would be either killed or exiled, if he/she were caught. Otherwise, he/she would gain power for his/her own advantage through the ability to dissimulate. The Greek sense of sophistry, in its negative aspects, fits the description of the liar.

However, the social origin is not the origin of the drive for truth for Nietzsche. The legislation of language is itself a social convention and hence arbitrary. Further, as Nietzsche is wont to say, the truth is not always pretty, and we have a tendency to turn away from truths that are repugnant and harmful to the social order we have created, and to accept only those that are beneficial to us. So the question still remains: Whence the origin of the drive for truth?

Given the discussion of the legislative function of language, Nietzsche notes that language and concepts, which are both conventions, are never “the adequate expression of all realities,” and only our “forgetfulness” would ever make us think that the correspondence between the intellect and reality is adequate (*TL*, 81). To show this inadequacy, Nietzsche examines a basic model of perception and language creation to make his point. Let us use sight as the example. In order for the intellect to generate a visual image (*Blid*), light (electro-magnetic radiation) must reflect off some object ‘X’, enter the eye and strike the optic nerve. Supposedly, this process causes chemical changes in the retinal cells, which causes electrical currents to shoot up the optic nerve into the brain, which causes a visual image to appear. Then, for no real casual reason, a sound is linked to the visual image.

This model of perception leads to the idea that there is no such thing as correct perception, if by correct perception we mean "the adequate expression of an object in the subject" (*TL*, 86).<sup>8</sup> Different entities with different nervous systems, light receptacles and optic nerves would perceive the world differently; and changes in our nervous system, light receptacle and optic nerve would change the way we perceive the world. To say one way of perceiving is correct and the other is wrong is indefensible for Nietzsche. In order to decide whose mode of perception is the correct one, a criterion of correct perception would have to proceed the actual act of perceiving, and this criterion "is not available" according to Nietzsche (*TL*, 86).

Nietzsche's interpretation of the perceptual process is that "a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overlapping of one sphere right into the middle of an entirely new and different one" (*TL*, 82). The movement between nerve stimulus, visual image and sound is a transference or transposition (which is what meta-phora literally means) between unrelated areas. A visual image stands in for the nerve stimulus, and the two are not the same, and a sound, which we come to call a word, comes to represent the visual image, and again the two are not the same. What we are doing is forming metaphors. By extension, the same metaphorical process would occur for any sensible phenomena.<sup>9</sup>

Regarding concept formation, Nietzsche notes that the word, or sound given to the singular thing, "instantly becomes a concept" by "arbitrarily discarding the individual differences" and making the word fit "more or less similar cases" (*TL*, 83). In other words, the word is made into an "equation of unequal things," given that the perceptions of the thing would be unique each time (*TL*, 83). So we forget the singularity of the experiences, and in our forgetfulness come to think that such things as concepts or universals exist. But as the empiricistic model of perception shows, there is no essence existing separately from the existent. In fact, there is no essence at all, and the concept shows itself as a highly reified metaphor.

If there is no correct perception, and if concepts are only nominalistic, then what is truth? According to Nietzsche, truth is :

A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions, which we have forgotten are illusions, they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins. (*TL*, 84). I always thought the subtitle to "Truth and Lies" ought to be "On the Consequences of Nominalism."

Whence the drive for truth? The drive for truth is rooted in "the drive toward the formation of metaphors," which Nietzsche considers to be "*the fundamental* (my emphasis) human drive" (TL, 88). If we consider eradicate this drive, we would eradicate human being. In the drive toward the formation of metaphors, what we do is make the world analogous to ourselves. We believe the world is as we perceive it and name it, but this is an unfounded belief. Instead, in making the world analogous to ourselves. Nietzsche contends that we show ourselves primarily as artists and not as knowers, since science, both the social sciences and what Thomas Kuhn would call normal science, only functions with reified metaphors.<sup>10</sup> In other words, an aesthetic impulse compels us to make the world be like we are, i.e., compels us to make the world in our own image (little gods that we think we are).

If this aesthetic impulse makes us how we are, why do the vast majority of people conceal or forget this fundamental drive from metaphors from ourselves? If you recall the moral/social origin of truth, the fixed conventions rooted in the legislation of language allow us to live more securely than we could do otherwise. So the concealment or forgetfulness is a survival response that allows us to live with "repose, security and consistency" (TL, 86). In other words, the forgetfulness is a need of the herd. Nietzsche also contends that the forgetfulness gives rise to a sense of self-consciousness, which he understands in a Kantian sense as the ability of the self to grasp the conditions of the possibility of experience and not as a mere awareness of one's awareness of the world. Such a self-conscious posture is unfounded in Nietzsche's view because it too is merely a metaphor fixed by the herd to give itself a sense that the intellect can escape its confines and transcend its limitations.

So what I have between me and the object 'X' "is at most an aesthetic relation" (TL, 86). Herein lies the challenge to realism. Nietzsche does not deny that there is an object 'X' that we perceive. What he denies is that we have any privileged access to it through perception and that our basic stance to the world is aesthetic and rooted in metaphor formation. In a sense, Nietzsche does not merely offer a critique of realism; he offers a deconstruction of it by showing that the primacy of epistemology granted in the sciences is rooted in an aesthetic impulse.<sup>11</sup> (A sense of free play is prior to determination).

Given Nietzsche's analysis, the influences of Emerson ought to be obvious. First, Emerson exposed the drive toward the formation of metaphors when he exposed the metaphorical underpinnings of idealism, only Nietzsche exposes the drive toward metaphor in realism. Second, Emerson's understanding of language as fossil poetry is repeated in Nietzsche's idea of conceptualization as reified metaphor that has lost its power to enchant and stimulate. Third, Emerson's idea of the poet as namer and creator appears in Nietzsche's idea of the human drive toward metaphor formation. However, Nietzsche understands

this as the basic human drive hence everyone can be a poet. Nietzsche's insight is in line with Emerson's views, since Emerson wanted Americans to become creators. Fourth, the primacy of the aesthetic in Emerson is appropriated by Nietzsche and shown to be connected to the fundamental drive. In a way similar to Emerson, Nietzsche sees the need to create new myths and metaphors to counteract the nihilism of the world and to wake us up to other possibilities (TL, 89). As Nietzsche suggests, there is a difference between the illusions in a mythically-inspired world, similar to the ones of the Ancient Greeks, where "the waking life" resembles a dream and where "anything is possible at each moment," and the illusions of "the waking of a scientifically disenchanting thinker" which forgets its own illusions (TL, 89).

To conclude, on the one hand, Emerson, the transcendentalist, and Nietzsche, the active nihilist as he called himself later, are far apart. On the other hand, Nietzsche is the German Emerson who calls people out of their passive nihilism to a sense of self-reliance.<sup>12</sup>

### Notes and References

1. George Stack, *Nietzsche and Emerson* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1992). Stack has noticed the influences of Emerson's writing on language and metaphor in Emerson's text *Nature* and Nietzsche's early writings on truth and metaphor. Stack sees Emerson's view of language as proto-structuralist or as anticipatory of "later semiotic theory" (Stack, 145, explain from Stack). Nonetheless, "[N]atural facts symbolize spiritual facts and spiritual facts are represented by natural symbol." (Stack, 145) My question: What are "Spiritual facts"?
2. I have used the following editions of Ralph Waldo Emerson's works. *Emerson on Transcendentalism* (NY: Ungar Publishing Co., 1980). This text is where the book *Nature* is found, and I refer to the text as *Nature* in the notes and citations, *Self-reliance and Other Essays* (NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 1993). I use the essay entitled "The Poet" from this text, and I refer to the text as *Poet* in the notes and citations.
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, "on the Truth and Lies in a normal Sense," *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Note-books of the early 1870's*, by Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1979). I refer to the essay as TL in the notes and citations.
4. George Stack's idea is that Emerson sees a transformation of the natural into the spiritual through symbol or metaphor — the natural becomes human and nature is "a metaphor of the human mind" (Stack, 146). Probably it is more than human in Emerson, considering his reflections on the Oversoul, but I do take it that the idea here is that symbolizing humanizes nature or spiritualizes it and that we are to find spirit in nature (Stack, 72).
5. I would not doubt that Emerson saw his transcendentalism in a theological manner as a way to overcome the dispersion of languages at Babel.
6. Nietzsche is critical of anything like spiritual facts. It is not that the spiritual facts exist, but that we treat the material in a way that regards it as non-material. But this is our creation and not caused by something otherworldly.

7. Stack says "the idealism of Emerson and Nietzsche is not otherworldly, but an immanent idealism of valuation" and he sees Emerson inverting Platonic hierarchical values (*Stack*, 20). My question is: What is immanent idealism? I say there is no such thing. They are both critiquing or deconstructing idealism.

8. This opens the issue of subject/object dichotomy — neither one nor the other has a privilege, since the split is rooted in empiricism and idealism, which are being questioned. What we have is a breakdown of the image/original opposition, which breaks down under the view of language expressed by Emerson and Nietzsche.

9. Stack points out that Nietzsche shows the metaphorical character of ordinary language (*Stack*, 148).

10. I believe that Nietzsche would understand Kuhn's sense of extraordinary science as involved in the drive towards the formation of metaphors.

11. Emerson "deconstructs" the notion of truth, and Nietzsche sees that metaphor is neither correspondence nor spiritual transformation but that truth is metaphor. Emerson undermines his own spirituality or transcendentalism or idealism, which is what I think Nietzsche admired. Nietzsche is critiquing the claims of universality and exposing a certain historicism regarding truth. Nietzsche sees truth as rooted in forgetfulness. Nietzsche employs his critique in relationship to empiricism, not idealism. What Emerson reveals is that the spiritual is only known through metaphor but he makes the spiritual more real than the natural. This undermines truth and places everything on the level of the metaphorical, which should bring into question the meaning of metaphor. A supposed truth is only revealed metaphorically.

12. A certain pragmatic tendency emerges in Nietzsche. To develop this further, I need to examine Rorty and Davidson.

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