Collingwood and Adorno on the Popular Arts

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      The similarities between R. G. Collingwood's aesthetics and the views of critical theorists on art has not, to my knowledge, been noted in the secondary litereture on either Collingwood or Critical Theory. Yet, there are interesting parallels between Collingwood's discussion of the "amusement racket" in part One of *The principles of Art* 1 and Horkheimer's and Adorno's account of the "culture industry" in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and elsewhere. 2 Moreover, although Collingwood and Adorno developed very different theories of art, both operated within the dialectical tradition originating with Hegel, and both were profoundly influenced by the aesthetics of Kant and German idealism 3 From here their paths diverged. Collingwood was deeply influenced by the neo-idealistic aesthetics of Croce and Gentile, 4 while Adrono was much less influenced by Croce and almost certainly uninfluenced by Gentile. Clearly, Adorno's aesthetics can be placed within the Western Marxian tradition, 5 although Adorno was as unorthodox in his utilization of Marxism as other movements and traditions. Although Collingwood was no Marxist, he nonetheless referred favorably to Marx in *The Principles* and later writings. 6 Thus his aesthetics, while not Marxian, implicitly takes as its point of departure many of the problematics of Western Marxist aesthetic theory. As a result, it may be worthwhile to point up a number of common assumptions and a certain direction and a certain direction which Collingwood's aesthetic theory shares with Adorno's, despite their profound differences. Perhaps the strongest similarities between the two can be ascertained in their treatment of the popular artes, which both react to in a strongly negative way.

      The distinction between "art proper" and amusement or entertainment art is fundamental to Collingwood's aesthetics. *The Principle af Art* was published in 1938, during a time of crisis in England and Europe generally. Collingwood's efforts in *The Principles* and succeeding works were devoted in large measure to the diagnosis of the

sources of this crisis and its possible resolution. The crisis itself was nothing less than the threat to European civilization by the Nazi barbarism. Collingwood's response to his sense of this crisis pervades all of his later work, beginning with *The Principles,* in which he analyzes the nature of amusement art in contrast to "art proper." It is in the pervasiveness of the "amusement trade" that Collingwood finds the chief symptoms of the decline of contemporary European culture. 7 And it is in his attempt to develop a conception of art out of its origins in imagination, expression and finally language that Collingwood seeks an antidote for the troubled situation of his time. Initially, then, we must set Collingwood's positive theory of art against the background of his concerns with the deleterious effects of the "culture industry" on civilized life. From this standpoint, we are in a position to comprehend his efforts to transform our conception of art and its role in contemporary society. Collingwood thus shares with Adorno a "reformative" theory of art ; both attempt to transform artistic practice through an anti-traditionalist conception of art's proper function in society. Both are opposed to the status quo (i. e., the pervasive view of the social function of the arts) in their respective conceptions of the artist's proper task, the nature of the artwork, and the place of art in cultural life, however they may differ in their views on these matters. Our concern here, however, will be with the points of agreement in their assessment of the popular arts.

Fundamental the Collingwood's theory of amusement is the distinction between a t proper and craft. 8 Art proper is essentially an expressive and imaginative activity as opposed to the result of this activity——the "bodily work of art." 9 Collingwood characterizes art proper alternatively as expression, imagination and ultimately as language as language, which are at bottom a single activity, depending on the point of view from which it is approached. The major part of *The Principles* is devoted to an elaboration of a theory of art based upon the necessary interrelationship of these concepts. For our purposes, the concept of expression is probably the most useful in grasping Collingwood's attempt to distinguish art proper from amusement. In order to understand this distinction, it is necessary to draw a further distinction...that between the expression of emotion, for which there is no technique. and its arousal or evocation in oneself and others, for which there are clearly established tehiniques or skills. 10 These techniques and skills are less a specifically formulated boby of rules than a set of guidelines common to

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amusement practitioners. It is precisely because the amusement artist seeks to arouse definite emotions in his audience that Collingwood subsumes amusement art under craft, 11 Crafts, such as shipbuilding or furniture-making, consist of a group of specialized technical skills; and for each specific craft there is a corresponding set of skills in terms of which it can be characterized. These skills consist in the exercise of a set of rules which differentiate and define the craft in question.

Collingwood enumeraties several features which belong to craft as such. 12 However, we will mention just two of these features, particularly as they bear directly upon Collingwood's understanding of amusement art as a particular craft among others. First, every craft involves a relationship between means and ends: the end is the specific product which the craftsman sets out to make, such as a piece of furniture, while the means consists of the determinate actions which must be undertaken in order to realize the end. 13 Although it would appear that the end of the shoemaker consists purely in the production of shoes, Collingwood takes pains to argue that the shoemaker is ultimately aiming at the creation of a sense of satisfaction in the consumer. Thus, the arousal of certain positive emotions in the consumer of the product is the ultimate goal of the craftsman. In this respect, are proper is opposed to craft, for there is no technique for the *expression* of emotion, which is by its very nature a voyage of discovery. In exploring our emotions, there is absolutely no way to find out what they are beforehand; we must instead attempt to discover their nature solely in the act of expressing them. For the artist, the means/end distinction is inappropriate insofar as he can have no concrete idea in advance of the specific result of her expressive activity.

A second characteristic feature of craft, closely related to the first, is the relationship between planning and execution. 14 Logically, the making of an artifact or product of craft involves a plan which must precede its execution. As Collingwood notes, anyone who sets out to make a table without a detailed set of specifications, i. e., a plan, is no craftsman. Again, this distinction does not necessarily apply to art proper. Collingwood does not deny that the artist may have certain plans in creating, say, a sonnet, but he does deny that the artist can state beforehand the specifications of his work. It follows that art as such does not involve the executing a wholly specified plan any more than it involves the means/end distinction as this applies to craft.

At the same time, Collingwood does not deny that art and craft overlap. 15 Rather, he holds that craft is not a defining characteristic of art proper, i.e, what is essential to art as such is not craft or the distinctive set of characteristics which defines a craft. As a result, Collingwood does not deny that artistic activity involves craftsmanship or even that traces of craft may be found in any and every work of art. This claim, though, dose not prevent him from finding the distinctive characteristics of "art proper" in expressive and jmaginative activity which he identifies with language cr the activity of speaking. 16

We can turn now to Collingwood's analysis of amusement art. But before characterizing amusement art as ane type of craft, it is worth noting that Collingwood also discusses u agical or religious art as a second species of craft. 17 The crucial difference between amusement and magic concerns their respective functions in society. While magical art is intended to arouse emotions which overflow into the domain of parctical life, amusement art aims at insulating the audience from practical or life concerns. 18 Amusement, like magic, results from a conscious attempt on the prat of the "artist" to *evoke* emotions. But the emotions evoked by the amusement artist in an audience are intended to be enjoyed for their own sake. A "watertight bulwark" is thus established between the emotions experienced in the course of amusement, on the one hand, and those of every day life, on the other. As a result, the emotions enjoyed in amusement art are not permitted to be discharged in the affair's of practical life—at least, not if the audience is responding to the work in a "predictable" way.

Collingwood utilizes Aristotle's notion of catharsis in his account of amusement art in a novel way. Every emotion has two phases excitation and discharge. 19 An emotion may be excited either for the purpose of discharge into everyday life or it may be excited simply in order to be relished or enjoyed in its own right. The purpose of amusement art is to create a make-believe situation in which emotions are excited and discharged in the course of the audience's involvement in the make-believe situation. In this way, potentially harmful or dangerous feelings are "earthed" or grounded and thus rendered innocuous. Amusement art always utilizes an illusion of life or human affairs in which to arouse and discharge these emotions. But they must not be permitted to spill over into the affairs of practical life where they are potentially danger ous. Collingwood's claim that amusement art is necessary "illusionistic"

20 implies that there is a possibility of confusing such an illusion with the goings on real life, whereas in magical art Collingwood insists that such a mistake cannot be made. This claim is open to question on at least two counts : first, it dose not appear that all amusement art aims at the creation of dramatic illusions. For example, popular ins rumental music may amuse without setting up any kind of dramatic situation. Secondly, it is not clear why any but the most unsophisticated members of an audience enjoying a work of amusement art need be prone to conflate the "dramatic illusion" presented to it whith a "real life situation.

In the section of *The Principles* entitled "Amusement in the Modern World", Collingwood presents a bleak picture of the impact of the amusement trade on every aspect of contemporary life. 21 His assessment, in fact, is as deeply pessimistic as Horkheimer's and Adorno's in *Dialetic of Enlightenment*, although he does not stress the econcmic function of the "culture industry" in the same way as Adorno. Nor does Collingwood attempt as detailed an analysis of particular forms of amusement, such as popular music, to rival Adorno. 22 Nonetheless, in the ten pages which Collingwood devotes to amusement art he makes a number of celling, important points about its relationship to contemporary life. To begin with, Collingwood's approach to the subject is essentially historical. Collingwood sketches the role of amusement in the ancient world in order to compare it with the modern, i e., European society from the Renaissance to the midtwentieth century. 23 Despite evident disanalogies between the two historical periods. Collingwood finds a similar pattern in each. In his scenario, the ,'antiquity of antiquity" presents us with a magical art which is a vital expression of the age in which it is created. However, the magical or religious art of antiquity is gradually superseded by an amusement art in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The pivotal figure in Collingwood's account is plato who sensed a spiritual decline in his own lifetime and attempted to combat it. By the fourth century, this development became irreversible, a fact which is already implicit in Aristotle's account of tragedy as a form of amusement art. By this time, on Collingwood's view, there was no possible way to check this process of degeneration, and amusement art itself passed through a number of necessary stages in the Roman era until it was in turn superseded by the new magical art of Christianity. Collingwood's account is thus implicitly deterministic; he states plainly that once the process of decline has set in, it becomes impossible to reverse

until the society itself ceases to exist. This does not mean that the members of that society die with the death of the society...only that the depend nce upon amusement as an escape from the drudgery of practical life drains the emotional energies of its members until the practical work necessary to keep it going comes to an end. Given this situation, only a revolution in religious or spiritual values is able to effect a radical change, and with such a change the entire society is transformed accordingly. The result is the emergence of a new magical art which expresses the corresponding transformation of beliefs and values in the emerging society.

Collingwood's historical reconstruction of the development of the classical world into that of a world "become Christian" is intended to serve as an analogy for his analysis of the contemporary historical situation. He finds a clear parallel between the supersession of the magical art of antiquity and that of the Middle Ages into an amusement art. The development of mythic art into the amusement art of Aristotle's time corresponds to an analogous development in the Renaissance and the following centuries. The crucial difference for Collingwood is that in the Renaissance, at the very time art freed itself from subservience to the medieval church, it gained the possibility of unleashing an artistic potential unique in European history. But this hope was never realized as artists came under the bondage first of the aristocracy and later of the middle classes. As a result, instead of art's finding a secure role in a society which encouraged its full realization, just the reverse ensued. Artists were forced to sacrifice their true vocation in order to become a function of the amusement industry as demanded by their masters. Thus, Collingwood is at pains in *The Principles* to work out a new aesthetics which was implicit in the Renaissance conception of art but never adequately realized in the following centuries. At the same time, he is concerned to attack the enslavement of art by the "cultu e industry" which is both a cause and symptom of the decline of contemporary Life.

At the end of his discussion, Collingwood is very ambivalent. On the one hand, he portrays the decline of contemporary society deterministically, as a historical necessity, suggesting that only the birth of a new society will lead us out of the impasse in which we find ourselves. On the other hand, he attempts to elaborate a conception of art which will free it from the amusement industry, thereby enabling it to point the way to an understanding of our predicament. Toward the end of *The*

Principles Collingwood discusses T.S. Eliot's *The Wasteland*, which he considers a paradigm case of modern art-one which unhesitatingly portrays the spiritual deterioration of our time. 24 Although Eliot is not a poet whom Adorno considers extensively, we will maintain that Adorno's defense of certain forms of contemporary art does not differ sharply from Collingwo d's. Some of the same artists admired by Adorno, such as Kafka and Beckett, would probably be admired by Collingwood for many of the same reasons. But Adorno's defense of avant garde art is based upon fundamentally different premises than Collingwood's aesthetics. It is doubtful whether Collingwood would have endorsed the avant garde with as much enthusiasm as Adorno, given his propensity to stress the historical continuity in the development of English poetry and painting.

Before turning to Adorno's critique of the culture industry, it my be useful to indicate some of the difficulties & paradoxes generated by Collingwood's account of amusement art. First, Collingwood does not merely distinguish amusement and magic from art proper. If he attempted to separate art from craft entirely, it would be impossible to understand how either amusement or magic could contain artistic elements, which it clearly does. Obviously, both amusement and magical art must be artistic-otherwise no one would ever confuse them. And, according to Collingwood, they are consistently confused by artists, critics and audiences alike. Many of shakespeare's comedies are brilliant examples of amusement art, cleverly calculated, as Collingwood points out, to entertain an Elizabethan audience. 25 By the same token, much great religious art, such as the Parthenon, is not merely religion, but instead a combination of art and religion in which artistic motives are subordinated to religious ends. Collingwood refers to this process as the "denaturing" of artistic impulies in the interests of ulterior ends. 26 In the modern world, as opposed to the world of medieval Christianity in which religious ends predominated, the artist is obliged to sacrifice his calling in the service of the amusement trade. Thus, tnegreat majority of artifacts which pass for serious art in our society are no more than works designed to please or entertain a specific audience. This is clear when we examine their social import—the ostensible audience for which they are designed can be identified as a class or subgoup within society whose cultural needs are satisfied by a very definite kind of amusement art, such as sitcoms, etc.

What requires explanation, on Collingwood's view, is how it is possible to combine in a single work both the requirements of amuse-

ment and artistic impulses. Clearly, art and amusement point in different and opprsing directions : the artist seeks to explore emotions heretofore unclarified and undiscovered while the purveyor of amusement seeks to arouse or evoke emotions which are clearl; undestood beforehand, and for which implicit rules and techniques exist. As a result, it is difficult to understand how Collingwood can account for the coexistence of conflicting demands or requirements in the same work, particularly as he insists that the effect upon the audience of genuine art is impossible to predict. 2 It is clear, however, the Collingwood's critics are mistaken in believing that shakespearess comedies must be examles of "high art" when their ostensible purpose is understood historically...namely that of entertaining a certain type of audience......whether Elizabethan or modern.

If it is possible to resolve Collingwood's difficulties by showing how different and competing motives can be reconciled, namely how a purely artistic motive can co—exist with the requirement to entertain or inculcate specific practical behavior in an audience, it becomes possible to agin a fresh perspective on the history of the arts. Eirst, the distincition between "mass art" ordinarily can be understood as applying to different forms of amusement or magical art. Collingwood is puite clear in specifying that the difference between, say, popular films designed for a mass audience and elitist films designed for a smaller, generally more affluent group, has an economic or sociological basis in the different classes to which these products appeal. Elitist art is thus not intrinsically a "higher" or better kind of art despite the fact that it requires more background preparation on the part of its audience. This "education", in the case of Shakespeare, for example, is utilized in obtaining the same end(i.e, pleasure) as in the popular, frankly hedonistic arts. Thus the category of amusement...even more than magic...cuts across the distinction between differing classes in society. 28 Entertainment is the prerogative of, all, whether the public is relatively naive or sophisticated.

Similary for the distincticn between the high and low arts or between works which are designated either as instances of high or low art. Thus, film, because of its tremendous resources for appealing to a mass audience, might be considered a low art in comparison to lyric poetry which presumably appeals to a narrower (often an elitist) audience. Again, a film of Bergman might be considered high art by certain critics while the films of Chaplin might be relegated to the domain of low art.

This again is an unacceptable distinction for Collingwood for much the same reasons as is the distinction between elitist and popular art. If Collingwood is right, much of what has been considered high art turns out to be a sophisticated variety of amusement or magical art. In fact, much of the world's "great art" is not art proper, as Collingwood defines it, but religious art (which is a form of magical art). In such art, however much it has become incorporated into the tradition of high art, a mixture of art and religion remains present While earlier periods regarded these works as essentially religious in nature, our age has disregarded the magical motives in favor of the artistic. As a result, even the cave paintings of Lascaux, which had a frankly magical origin, have come to be perceived purely for their artistic qualities, such as their form and expressiveness, in abstraction from their social function. 29 In this respect Collingwood is sensitive to the historical character of the concept of art itself. He takes pains to demonstrate that the modern concept of art has emerged only within the past two or three centuries and that our classification of certain works as "art" results from a historical perspective absent in earlier periods and civilizations. 30

Collingwood is not mistaken in recognizing that the "amusement trade" is ubinuitous in modern society, and that its is products are often mistaken for"art proper." Nor is he mistaken in thinking that many works traditionally assigned to the canon of high art are really works which contain amusement and/or magical elements. Moreover, his claim that such work are not "art proper" is not merely the result of his recognition that they contain craftsmanship or the exercise of technical skill, for Collingwood dose not deny that art proper also may contain an element of craft or technique. It is rather that collingwood defines "art proper" as well as amusement and magical art in terms of the artist s conscious *iutention* to achieve certain ends. In the case of art proper, this end is the exploration of certain emotions, although what these emotions are in their individuality cannot be know before the artist intiates his activity. In the case of such crafts as amusement and magic, the activity is also characterized in terms of certain ends, but these have to do with the evocation of specific emotions by preconceived means.

Heretofore we have discussed the problem of "mixedmotives" on the side of artistic production. How is it possible for the artist at one and the same time to create both art proper, which demands a process of expressing emotions whose outcome is unpredictable, and amusement,

which requirs that the artist subordinate artistic ends entirely to the production of results through the craft of evoking certain enotions? A second, very different difficulty, involves the audience's receptivity to a work of art, The question to be raised in this context is whether it is possible for a member of the audience to determine introspectively or to decide in some other manner whether her emotions are merely being evoked by a particular work of magical or amusement art or whether he is actually re-enacting or reliving the artist's experience. Collingwood quotes Coleridge with approval to the effect that we know a poet is an artist because he is capable of making his audience artists as well. This implies that the reader is able to participate in the poet's expression of feeling in such a way as to express these feelings himself. Thus, a close approximation if not a clear cut identity between poet and reader is required for the "understanding" of a poem. But a difficulty arises precisely at this point. The reader may very well be mistaken in believing that he has re-enacted the poet's emotional experience when in fact certain feelings have merely been aroused in him. What is required for Collingwood's thesis to be plausible is that there be some criterion - -introspective or phenomenological - - which will enable a receptive member of the audience to determine the precise character of his response to a work of art. Failing such a criterion, it may be impossible in many instances to clarify the nature of one's own experience of art. Tne question—am I reliving the poet's expression or are certain emotions merely being evoked in me ? —may simply be unanswerable on many occasions. This is a major shortcoming in Collingwood's account of the character of the audience's reception to works of art. 31

As we noted at the beginning, there are profound differences between Collingwood's and Adorno's aesthetics, particularly in their different accounts of the nature of the artwork. But these differences do not obliterate a common in their approach to aesthetic theory, i. e., their profound experience of the crisis of contemporary society and the function of amusement or entertainment in it. However, Adorno develops a much fuller conception of the popular arts and their role in contemporary life then dose Collingwood. This particularly true in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, published in 1944 in German and reissued in 1967, which Adorno co-authored with max Horkenheimer. Here the two authors offer an extended treatment of the "culture industry" which they analyze in the context of a capitalistic society whose dominant concern is the maintenance of the status quo. 32 (In addition, Adorno published exten-

sively on music, partially on popular music and its destructive effects on the human psyche.)

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the term "culture industry" is not intended to refer to model of production analogous to industry in the strict sense, such as manufacturing, etc., in which there is complete mechanization. 33 Nonetheless, one to the central features of the artistic products of the culture industry is *standardization*: the mass media, including film, popular music, and television, turn out commodities which are as interchangeable and uniform as industrial products, such as automobile parts. 34 They are as marketable as any commodity which is subject to the control of individuals and groups for the end of profit. At the same time, they serve the function of sustaining the status quo...they are deliberately designed to increase subjection to the structure and goals of capitalist society.35 While authentic works of art are *also* commodities, in contemporary society they have become commodities through and through... consider the case of Andy Warhol whose art is not merely preocupied with commodities but who selfconsciously creates his work in order for it to be consumed as a commodity.

Adorno and Horkheimer view the social need for the culture industry in much the same way that Collingwood views the need for amusement art. For Collingwood, the drudgery of everyday work is pervas.ve in our society; as a result, there is a *universal* agreement that compensation in the form of amusement is absolutely essential in order to make life bearable to the masses. However, Collingwood maintains that amusement merely drains the emotional energy available for practical life by arousing and discharging emotions in the course of one's enjoyment of amusement art. Thus, amusement is more and more destructive insofar as it siphons off the emotional reserves necessary for the healthy maintenance of everyday affairs. This psychological account is partially shared by Adorno and Horkheimer, who view popular culture as an escape—fun, relaxation and relief from the demands and effort required by attention to g nuine works of art. But, although a television show, for example, enables boredom to be temporarily alleviated without concentrated effort, the sheer repetitiveness of the products of the culture industry anesthetize the viewer's consciousness and dull her perception. As a result, both Collingwood and Adorno take a sharply negative view of the effects of the products of popular culture on its audience.

For Adorno and Horkheimer, cultural products are the result of demands which are evoked and manipulated by the culture industry.

For this reason they do not employ the term "popular culture" because such culture does not arise spontaneously from the people as did folk art when it was a genuine expression of a community's life. However, the authors do not hold a "conspiratorial" view of the culture industry either; instead they see it as the necessary outcome of the development of advanced capitalism, a stage in which the rationalization and mechanization of everyday life has reached the point where the individual's ability to think & judge for herself has been virtually obliterated. Thus, the producers and part cipants(actors directors etc.) of the culture industry are as much victimized by its manipulative character as the audience which requires it as a kind of opiate to dull the pain of everyday existence.

In contrast to the products of the culture industry is the institution of autonomous art, that is, an art freed from the requirements of commercialization. Adorno locates autonomous art most clearly in the avant garde, and its most important works in the literature af Kafka and Beckett and the music of Schoenberg and the atonal school. These works, by their very unpopularity, attest to the character of modern life in its alienation and suffering. Autonomous art and popular art are thus irreconcilable exremes, for popular art attempts to escape the existential implications of contempoary life while autonomous art, particularly such avant grade compositions as Schoenberg's "Survivor from Warsaw", faces up to the terrors which characterize life in the present age. Autonomous art thus contradicts the prevailing forms of consciousness, thereby acquiring emancipatory potential. For Adorno, art's emancipatory potential, its capacity to free us from the bonds of the unfreedoms which dominate contemporary society, is one of its most important features. For this reason, he considers autonomous art to be "functionless" in the sense that it defies the norms of society by refusing to be integrated in to them Thus, serious art is anti utilitarian an the sense of declining to serve the purposes of the culture industry and its consumers. In a deeper sense, however, it is not functionless at all, simply by virtue of its emancipatory potential Its very existence is a rebuke and implicit critique of the "untruth" of contemporary society.

The production of autonomous art, according to Adorno, proceeds according to standard which derive from the laws of form and artistic technique. Although Adorno does not fully clarify these notions, they can presumably be verified through a study of different arts and

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artistic forms. Thus a study the history of European music from the eighteenth century to the present will reveal a dialectical development in which musical forms & techniques are understood to evolve logically... according to a dynamic of their own. Implicit in Adorno's discussion are the notions of creativity and innovation in contrast to the uniformity and mechanization which characterize the products of the culture industry. Adorno further maintains, in a formalistic fashion, that genuine art possesses something akin to an organic unity. In listening to a sonata of Beethoven, one is able to grasp the distinctive relationship of whole to parts. Unlike popular music, which has no stancture beyond the repetitiveness of a particular formula, serious music is an integrated whole to which each part makes a unique and distinctive contribution Thus the listener is required to expand a concentrated effort in attempting to comprehend serious music, for each detail of a work can be understood only in its unique relationship to the whole. By contrast, in popular music the distinction between whole and part is irrelevant, for the "whole" is nothing more than the repetition of its parts.

Autonomous art and the products of the culture industry are thus diametrical opposites, but autonomous art has been progressively weakened by the culture industry which produces its wares solely for mass consumption. As a result, the consumer is progressively absorbed by the culture industry which undermines validity of autonomous art as the distance between the two (autonomous art and popular art) grows ever more profound. As we have seen, the contrast between the two is illustrated in Adorno's discussion of the differences between serious and popular music, a contrast which can probably be extended to most of the other arts. We will summarize Adorno's position, first, by considering the nature of the production and composition of serious and popular music and, second, the differences in response or audience reception to them.

Adorno's account of the structure of production and composition is formalistic in character. In serious music, he claims, every part of a composition depends for its musical import on the concrete totality— never on a mere enforcement of a musical scheme. Thus, details cannot be changed without altering the significance of the whole; details virtually anticipate and even contain the whole, In addition, a consistency is maintained between formal structure and content (musical themes) which are tightly interwoven with the whole and carefully developed. By

contrast, popular music is highly stylized, musical compositions follow familiar patterns and little originality is introduced As a result, the structure of the whole does not depend upon details, nor is it altered by individual details which are substitutable and serve their function as cogs in machines. It follows that complications have no effect on the structure of the work; they do not develop themes but merely stress individual "effects" such as beat or rhythm. Thus, popular music affirms conventional norms of what constitutes intelligibility in music while appearing (falsely) novel and original.

Corresponding to differences in production and composition are differences in audience reception. The hallmark of our reception of serious music is the effort and concentration required in order to follow it. This in turn results from the character of the music itself—to understand a piece of serious music one must experience the whole of it. Thus, themes and details can only be comprehended in the context of the whole, which has a strong impact on our reaction to details. Moreover, the continum of everyday life is disrupted by truly serious music which encourages our sense of social tensions and contradictions. Popular music, on the other hand, requires little effort in order to be followed. It is standardized into easily recognizable types, known prior to reception, so that the audience has ready-made models under which its experiences can be subsumed. Formally, the whole has little influence on the reception and reaction to parts—what matters is style, rhythm, beat, etc. The most successful, best music is identified with the most often repeated which renders unnecessary th process of thinking. Popular music has a "soporific effect" on social consciousness; it reinforces a sense of continuity in everyday living while its static structure enforces forgetfulness, i. e., it permits us to escape the antinomies of social reality. As a result, Adorno maintains that the autonomy of music is vanishing. "Music today is largely a social cement."

Collingwood and Adorno differ fundamentally in their analyses of the relationship between serious and popular art. Collingwood, we have seen, identifies "art proper" with expression and serious art with a development of our expressive capacity to the level in which it is sufficiently complex to give rise to "works of art". By contrast, amusement or entertainment involves a technical skill arousing specific emotions which the audience enjoys for their own sake. Collingwood's categories are therefore essentially subjectivistic : in order to make them work, it is necessary

to appeal to introspection or, phenomenologically, to different activities and functions of consciousness. Insofar as this gives rise to difficulties, Collingwood's enterprise is problematic and the application of his categories is accordingly unclear. Nevertheless, he does provide insight into what is commonly considered "high art" by showing that it is in many instances infected with traces of amusement, Moreover, his distinction between amusement and magical art is useful in calling our attention to the different functions which art has played historically.

Adorno, as we have seen, attacks the problem between serious and popular art through formalist categories, such as whole and part, concrete totality and detail. In so doing, he both transforms the terms of the problem as understood by Collingwood and further elaborates the differences between "classical" and non-classical art, particularly in the domain of music. We may note that approximately half of Adorno's total oeuvre was devoted to musical aesthetics and criticism. For this reason, it is appropriate to look to several of Adorno's discussions on the production and reception of music in order to understand his position on this problem. At the same time, there is some risk that the characteristics which differentiate serious from popular music are distinctive to that art form and cannot be generalized successfully to other areas such as literature or painting. Even if such were the case, the key categories of Adorno's approach, including the relationship of whole to part in artworks, the distinction between attentive and inattentive listening and the kind of understanding which each gives rise to, appear fundamental to any full-blown treatment of these topics. In addition, Adorno has contributed valuably in his discussion of standardization and the interchangeability of parts which characterizes popular music. It may well be that standardization and pseudo-individuality define the products of the culture industry more generally, including Gothic novels, television sitcoms, among a wide range of phenomena-but this remains to be investigated.

Finally; and perhaps most importantly, both Collingwood and Adorno view serious art as a vehicle for acquiring a deeper insight into social conditions, particularly into the disorders and contradictions of contemporary life. While Adorno extols the work of such writers as Kafka and Beckett, Collingwood considers T. S. Eliot's *The Wasteland* a paradigm case of modern art. And although Collingwood does not seize upon the contradictions of *capitalist* society as a means of singling out the decadence of modern life, his diagnosis of a society in decline parallels

Adorno's Moreover, Collingwood looks to the emancipatory potential of art both for an understanding of the contemporary condition as well as for its possible remedy in the construction of a new social order, however unclearly defined. The social and political order foreseen by Adorno is less vague than Collingwood, one in wnich social contradictions might be overcome and human beings reconciled with the natural order. Beneath the surface, then, the starting points as well as the conclusions reached by the two writers are similar in important respects.

Notes and Referances

1. Oxford U. P., 1938. Hereafter cited as *PA*.

2. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, New York 1987, pp. 120-168. The original edition was published in 1944. Hereafter cited as *DE* Also see Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, London, 1974.

3. This is evident in Collingwood's writings beginning with *Speculum Mentis* (Oxford, 1924) as well as in *PA*, pp. 186-188. For Adorno, see *Aesthetic Theory* (New york, 1984) for numerous references to Kant and Hegel.

4. The clearest statement of Collingwood's indebtedness to the aesthetics af Italian idealism can be found in Merle E. Brown, *Neo-Ideal Aestheics: Croce-Gentile-Collingwood* (Detroit, 1966). However, Croce's influence on Collingwood has been over-exaggerated by Alan Donegan,

"The Croce-Collingwood Theory of Art", *Philosophy* (Spring, 1985), pp. 162-7 and by john Hospers, "The Croce-Collingwood Theory of Art", *Philosophy* (October, 1956). pp. 291-308.

5, Although not to the same extent as Marcuse's and some other members of the Erankfurt school. For a useful summary of Adorno's relationship to Marxism, see the Introductian and Chapter 3 of Martin Jay's *Adorno* (Cambridge. 1984).

6. Collingwood was ambivalent toward marx in his later writings, but expressed admiration for marx as a "fighter" in *An Autobiography* (Oxford, 1938). References to marxism in *PA* are generally favorable Cf. pp. 71, 178.

7. *PA*, pp. 94-104.

8. *PA*, Book I, Chapter 2.

9. *PA*, pp. 305-8.

10 *PA*, pp. 15-36.

11 *PA*, Book I, Chapter 5.

12. *PA*, pp. 15-7, 20-1

13. *PA*, p. 15.

14. *PA*, pp. 15-6.

15. *PA*, p. 22 note 1; pp. 23-9.

16. This is the major thesis of *PA*. Cf. Book III, Chapter 12, entitled "Art as Language", pp. 273-86.

17. Book 1, Chapter 4, "Art as Magic", pp. 57-78.

18. *PA*, pp. 78-84.

19. *PA*, p. 78.

20 *PA*, p. 79.

21. *PA*, p.94-104.

22. Adorno wrote numerous books and articles on the subject of music, including popular music. A useful starting point for his discussion of popular music is *Introduction to the Sociology of music* (New york, 1988), pp. 21-39. It is worth noting that over half of Adorno's total work was dedicated to the aesthetics' sociology and criticism of music and musicians.

23. *PA*, pp.97-99.

24. *PA*, pp 29, 310, 333-5

25. *PA*, pp. 87, 124.

26. *PA*, pp. 33-4.

27. *PA*, pp. 32-6.

28. *PA*, pp. 84-94.

22. PA, p. 10.

30. P. pp. 5-9

31. A valuable discussion of the difficulties involved in accounting for the audience's re-living of the artist's emotions can found in Francis Sparshott, *The Theory of the Arts* (Princeton, 1982), pp. 340-6. Sparshott's critique of "The Expressive Line" (pp. 303-81) and in particular of Collingwood's version of it (pp. 325-45) is the most useful account which I have discovered.

32. An important excerpt from *DE* on this subject is contained in *An Anthology of Western Marxism*, ed. Roger S. Gottlieb (Oxford, 1989), pp. 179-93.

33. *DE*, p. 121.

34. *DE*, pp. 120-4.

35. *DE*, pp. 120-168.

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