BOOK REVIEWS

Ananta Ch. Sukla, *Art and Representation: Contributions to Contemporary Aesthetics*, Westport (Connecticut), Praeger Publishers (Greenwood Publishing Group Inc.), 2001, pp. 282.

An understanding of the nature of art—what it means for an object to be an artwork, how an object or event acquires aesthetic significance, or how it embodies meaning—is extremely difficult, if not impossible, without a reasonable understanding of the concept of representation. A thoughtful examination of the history of aesthetic theory and art criticism would, I think, readily show that representation is a primary act of mind in which it seeks to articulate, or make sense, of its experience of the various aspects of the world. Sukla was not mistaken when he wrote: "representation is basically an oracular concept that explains the dualistic nature of human experience. It refers to the relation between two items in our experience—the internal and the external, the mind and the world." (1) Accordingly a study of this concept is *sine qua non* in any serious attempt to explore the meaning and nature of art. This book is "designed to offer a comprehensive view of representation in both its conceptual perspectives and application in understanding various art forms such as painting, photography, literature, dance, music, theater, and film." (20-21) It is comprehensive in four ways: first, it is an exploration of the concept of representation as such: what are the epistemological and ontological dimensions of representation? Second, it contains an analysis of the major art forms: what does it mean to say that a novel, a film, or a dance represent? Third, it is interdisciplinary: how does a philosopher, a historian, a painter, a literary figure, or a sculptor view representation? Fourth, it is cross-cultural: how do scholars from different cultural backgrounds analyze the concept of representation?

The Introduction is one of the most important contributions to the volume. It is an etymological, historical, and philosophical, discussion of the concept of representation as such. It is, moreover, an account of the evolution of this concept in its relation to our knowledge of the world and the artistic process; it delineates its career from Plato and Aristotle to Rorty and Derrida. The book is divided into two parts. I shall spotlight some of the chapters in both parts. My aim is to provide the reader with as clear an idea as possible about the topics, problems, and accomplishments of the book.

The first part is a critical exploration of the epistemological foundations of the concept of representation. John Llewelyn (University of Edinburgh) begins this exploration with the following question: how can we represent how language represents?" (30) Is language amenable to representation? Does it defy representation? Should we not distinguish representation as saying from representation as showing? But, is the representational function of language pictorial? Llewelyn discuses these and related questions in Wittgenstein, Locke, Derrida, Heidegger, Davidson, and Derrida in the background of Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine. In chapter 2 Robert S. Sharpe (University of Wales) rejects the view that a sentence, or a thought, is a representation, for otherwise representation in art would not be cognitive or educative, but it is. He argues that, as it is used in aesthetics, "representation" is close to the Greek "mimesis"; however, it is not mere imitation, even though an artwork may imitate an object or event in the world. On the contrary, an artwork is a creatively made object; it is an original. But the main focus of Sharpe's essay is the following question: "how do we learn from representation?" (59) He argues that we can learn from representation, and the way we learn from it is not, as he argued earlier, by example but "by showing us to construct representations ourselves. By being shown narratives, we learn how to

narrate and these narrations end with imagined primitive reactions." (65) This implies that the aesthetic experience is an act of imagination and as such creative. In reading a novel or seeing a film I construct the action of the novel or film in my imagination; I undergo the experience the artist underwent during the process of artistic creation. In this way I intuit the insight or knowledge potential in the novel or film. In chapter 3, F.R. Ankersmit (Groningen University) offers an enlightening and provocative discussion of representation in history and politics. He points out that the Greeks did not have a concept of representation; their democracy was direct, participatory. The people directly participated in the political process. Representation was a medieval idea; certain assemblies represented the three social classes: the nobility, the clergy, and the masses. Ankersmit begins his discussion with a clarification of the concept of representation. In aesthetics a representation contains two elements: resemblance and substitution.

An artwork should, at least to some extent, resemble the object it is supposed to represent. But thinkers such as Gombrich emphasized the element of substitution: "representation is a making present of what is (again) absent; or more formally, A is a representation of B when it can take B's place, can function as B's *substitute* or as B's *replacement* in its absence." (70) Ankersmit then proceeds to apply this understanding of representation in politics. He defends the thesis that "representative democracy as we know it is the mostly unlikely marriage of Athens and the Middle Ages." (69)

The representation model of knowledge, "the view that true beliefs represent or correspond to reality," (113) was strongly attacked by postmodern thinkers. Prominent among these thinkers was Jacque Derrida. The target of this attack was metaphysical essences and epistemological certainties. These essences and certainties were the foundation of representation. Accordingly if they were discredited then the basis of representation would actually crumble. And this is exactly what Derrida and other postmodernists tried to show. The critique of foundation in epistemology and metaphysics gave rise to a number of views such as "coherence and pragmatic theories of truth, social constructivists theories of reality, conventional theories of meaning, and cultural relativist theories of rationality. (Ibid.) But Horace L. Fairlamb (University of Houston-Victoria) valiantly and constructively argues that the " postmodern critique of foundations has proven ambiguous at best, and at worst self-contradictory." (Ibid.) By universalizing their own conclusions the postmodernists offered an alternative foundation of knowledge. It may well be the case that the traditional view of foundation is defective in some respects, but this is no warrant for dismissing the idea of foundation in explaining the possibility of meaning and knowledge. Fairlamb thinks that "the problem of traditional and modern epistemology, in other words, was not foundations, but the idea of reductive foundations. But in that case, postmodern skeptics may be right that no single ultimate foundation exists, yet wrong in concluding that there are no ultimate foundations at all." (114) The point that deserves mention is that the critique of postmodernism itself needs, indeed presupposes, a foundation. To be a valid critique it should be grounded in logic, objective truth, and the contingencies of history. Adorno provided this notion of critique.

The second part of the book is devoted to a study of the concept of representation in the various art forms. Dieter Peetz (University of Nottingham) leads this study with a discussion of the realist theory of pictorial representation. He tries to shed a light of understanding on the following question: "what is it for that particular canvas covered in configurations of oil paint by Constable, say, to be a pictorial representation of Wivenhoe Park? What is it more modestly for that configuration

of colored lines and circles to represent the routes and stations of the London Underground? And even more modestly, what is it for that configuration of dots to represent, say, fields of magnetic force or even a triangle?" (137) Peetz begins his analysis with a critical evaluation of the conventional, intentional, realist, and aspect theories of representation. He then develops his own theory of projection out of the aspect theory. In contradistinction to this theory, Peetz holds that "X is a representation of Y for X if standardly, without any belief by Z that X is Y, Z sees X as containing the projected Y-aspect, and the overall Y-aspect is successfully projected by their means." (144) Peetz finally launches a sharp criticism against Wolterstorff from the standpoint of his theory of projection.

Stephen Davies (University of Auckland) advances in chapter 11 a lucid, illuminating analysis of representation in music. He argues that music "is limited in what it can depict." (194) It is" not primarily a depictive art form, and the value of musical works is not mainly concerned with representational achievement, even where representation occurs." (202) Music is a temporal, dynamic process. If it depicts at all, it depicts temporal processes. Can it depict emotions? In some cases "where what is expressed is the emotion of a character in a work, that emotion is represented. But where it is the piece that is expressive, the emotion is not also represented." (196) One can certainly ask: can we really say that the expressed emotion of a character in a work is an instance of representation? I think not, because by its very nature, emotion resists depiction. From a phenomenological point of view, emotion is an event; as such it is more susceptible of expression than depiction, regardless of the context or standpoint from which we view it. Davies's argument and the conclusion of this chapter are worthy of detailed analysis. They are insightful.

In chapter 13 Thomas E. Wartenbeg (University of Mount Holyoke) points out that film "puts us in touch with the world in a distinctive manner." (210) How does it do this? Suppose we view Jimmy Stewart's 1939 movie *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*. He looks very handsome in this movie. Do we see him here as a young man, or, do we see a representation of him? The question that Wartenberg discusses in this chapter is "whether film, like other art forms such as painting, involves the representation of the object it presents to its viewers. Or does it, because of its basis in photography, show us the objects themselves?" (Ibid.) In his attempt to answer this question Wartenberg critically evaluates in some depth the realist position. He takes into consideration the views of Andre Bazin, Kendall Walton, and Noel Carroll. Then on the basis of this evaluation he constructs a special concept of representation in film. He argues that film does not relate us \directly to objects in the world; it is an image of these objects. That is, what we experience when we see a film is not a scene in nature, an event, or a person but a representation of anyone of these. This representation may affect us cognitively or emotionally in certain ways but it is not a direct presentation of this scene, event, or person. Still the question remains: what is the ontological relation between the representation and the object represented in the film? Wartenberg avers that an answer to this question deserves a more detailed treatment due to limitation of space. We must view his contribution as a prolegomenon to a further discussion of this issue.

No inquirer into the nature of art in general and the concept of representation in particular can afford to neglect this book. It is a compendium of arguments, insights, views, and challenging ideas and ways of thinking about the nature of art. Although the authors who contributed chapters to these scholarly projects dealt with different questions concerning the concept of representation and how we should analyze it they were all united in focusing their attention on the most important aspects of the question of representation. This feature is missing in most of anthologies. I am confident that the present volume will remain a serous reference for research for decades to come.

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S.K. Saxena, *Hindustani Sangeet and a Philosopher of Art*: Music, Rhythm and Kathak Dance vis-à-vis Aesthetics of Susanne K. Langer, Delhi: D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd.,2001, pp.383.

Saxena's philosophical analyses of different aspects of Hindustani Music and Kathak dance published during the last four decades have remained exemplary in the history of cross-cultural aesthetic scholarship. The most attractive feature of Saxena's aesthetic analyses of the performing arts he handles is his intimate acquaintance with the arts by way of direct experience and understanding of all their technicalities—an experience and understanding undoubtedly rare in contemporary critical practice.

The central thesis of the book is the application of Susanne Langer's philosophy of art(as a symbolic form of human feeling) to the analyses of both Hindustani music and Kathak dance. In the first section he outlines some of the essential features of Langer's theory of art. In the next two chapters he discusses music along Langer's ideas and in the last chapter Kathak dance is interpreted along the same line.

As everybody knows, Langer is a devout follower of Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic form on which she draws her philosophy of art—"expression of conceived feeling". Saxena elaborates upon Langer's idea of art as expression by answering three major questions: What does expression mean? What is it that art may truly be said to express? How exactly does expression becomes artistic?

The Art Symbol, for Langer, is different from the symbols it builds upon not only in respect of what they mean, but also in respect of how they mean—the object and the way both are to be considered. In this respect art symbols do not function like word symbols: what they mean is something beyond what they present in themselves. But the art symbol "does not stand for something else nor refer to anything that exists apart from it...Its import is seen in it; not like the meaning of a genuine symbol, by means of it but separate from the sign." To put it precisely, in an art symbol the signifier and the signified are identified. In fact, this is the very gist of Pata®jali's view of the Vedic language as it is different from the common language(Sanskrit). Common language(*laukika bhcsc*) is empirical whereas the Vedic language is transcendental in the sense that in the common language the signifier stands for the signified arbitrarily—no natural relationship is there between them as they stand in their conventional relationship. But the representational system in the Vedic language is natural not in any iconic pattern, but in an organic one where the representation is the represented itself. Thus Bhart'hari's notion of Sabdabrahman might be construed as a model of Langer's view of Art Symbol.

The living or organic form and expressive form are closely related in Langer's theory as she writes: "(A poem is) not a report or comment, but a constructed form; if it is a good poetic work it is an *expressive form* in the same way that a work of plastic art is expressive form." But here arises a major disagreement of the philosophers who define art in terms of ontology. Particularly, Abhinavagupta the most celebrated critic of classical India vehemently opposes the equation of poetic art with the plastic art. In his commentary on Bharata's notion of the theatrical performances he distinguishes among plastic arts, verbal art and performing arts like the theatre, music and dance. He strongly argues that they cannot be defined in any single term since they vary radically in their ontological status. Reasonably enough, the Aristotelian sister arts theory has been rejected by the recent ontologists(including Abhinava). Dance and music cannot be interpreted in terms of any common symbolic(semiotic) system, because semiotics of physical gestures cannot be ontologically equivalent to the semiotics of vocal modulations.

Nevertheless, theoretical inaccuracy apart, what is most admirably noted in Saxena's analysis is his remarkable skill in the first hand knowledge of the technical titbits and its interpretation in the light of modernist expressionism with particular reference to Langer and her associates. One can confidently assert that no better book can be written on the subject along the theoretical lines the author has adopted. Finally, it won't be irrelevant to point out that although Langer's symbolic expressionism is the central theoretical thrust, the book cries for references to such eminent recent musicologists as Roger Scruton, Peter Kivy, Stephen Davies and Robert Sharpe.

Shrikrishna(Babanrao) Haldankar, *Aesthetics of Agra and Jaipur Traditions* (Translated by Padmaja Punde and the Author), Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 2001, pp.139.

In the glorious traditions of Hindustani music two dominant gharanas—of Jaipur and Agra—have always attracted the attention of lovers and critics of musicology and musical performances. A full-length study of these gharanas was an urgent need for the English readers. Haldankar's English translation of his Marathi text now meets this need.

Regarding the genesis of the gharanas, i.e., the Khayal style of singing(gayaki), the author traces its origin to the seventeenth/eighteenth century. The founder of Agra gharana is Sujan Singh alias Haji Sujan Khan, an eminent musician of Akbar's court, although Nayak Gopal leads the list, whereas Nath Vishwambhar leads the Jaipur gharana next to which Swami Haridas the eminent saint-singer of Brindaban(guru of Mirabai) is mentioned. It is now somewhat clear that the gharanas are the Mughlai modifications of the Classical Indian Raga traditions. The author admits that the gharanas are the styles not of any fixed character. They have been quite flexible(healthily?) as also enriched in course of time. Flexibility of a cultural phenomenon (for example, language) has been appreciated as its liveliness, whereas any fixity is the sign of death. But in case of a highly elevated art form like the classical Raga music, it is very difficult to state how far the Mughlai modifications have *enriched* this tradition notwithstanding its novelty due to the very variations. Thumri is undoubtedly more a mode of entertainment than a form of aesthetic excellence found in the classical Ragas which were originally explored as the modes of spiritual experience(*nadabrahma*), not any medium of courtly entertainment. As the legend says, Mirabai refused to sing to Akbar, since, she said, she was not any courtly singer.

In the chapter on the aesthetics in(sic) music the author's statement that music is the most abstract of all arts is subject to severe critical attack. Presumably he thinks painting is more concrete than music, although modernist painting bears signs of abstractionism. But the ancient Indian masters have considered music as the most concrete of all arts since it is a form of Yogic practice by which one directly experiences the Absolute Reality. The author commits a further serious blunder when he states(p.6) that the experience of music is akin to the pleasure derived from poetry: "...like poetry, the pleasure derived from music is experienced throughout its expression." The statement is simply meaningless without any argument forwarded either by the Indian masters or by the modern Western musicologists. Music and poetry are completely two different media of expressing emotion, and therefore the modes of their experience by the audience are also different. Points of difference are too many to be enumerated here. The author himself is aware of some of the striking features of music when he says: " When an artist portrays a raga he strings together certain notes thereby creating a musical structure." He is also very much aware of the peculiarities of music in presenting the emotive character of a raga.

The theoretical lacunae apart, the book contains excellent descriptions of the two gharanas it handles in both their historical and structural perspectives. The reader gains a wealth of information on the subject matter concerned, although a select bibliography is extremely wanting.

Martha C. Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*, Cambridge: The University Press, 2000, pp.312.

Women have been so highly esteemed in the ancient India that an orthodox Indian scholar would never accept the relevance of feminism in the cultural context of this country. Mythical women characters such as – Javala, Anasuya, Lopamudra, Gargi besides Sita, Draupadi and Savitri have been so illustrious that their male counterparts have been often overshadowed. Such great intellectuals in Indian history as Panini and Patanjali are often identified not by their fathers but by their mothers Daksi and Gonika respectively. The philosophical schools of Sankhya and Tantra have so highly idealized/ idolized the feminine sex in their notions of Prakriti and Sakti that a modern scholar of Indology reasonably hesitates to respond to the outcall of feminism developed in the Western cultural studies. Considering at least this aspect of Indian culture the universality of feminism is suspected. But Martha Nussbaum's studies reflected in the present volume compels an orthodox Indian scholar to rethink seriously what he has been thinking throughout. Her studies indeed seductively convince her readers that against the backdrop of all the idealist and abstract theories of philosophy and economics, there does exist a strong concrete and realistic ground for the relevance of feminism in India. Considered from her points of view the universality of feminism needs urgent approval.

Focusing her attention on the conditions of women in the developing countries in general and in India in particular the author argues that political and economic principles in the international level must take up the issue of gender difference as a problem of justice under the strong guidance of philosophy. Her idea of feminism is based on the idea of human capabilities: what people are actually capable of doing or becoming in the real world. The capabilities approach which she applies in this study is her own version of the issue differing from those of the philosophers and economists including Aristotle, Marx, Mill and Amartya Sen. Gender inequality in India is a proverbial phenomenon: " A daughter born/ To husband or death? She is already gone". Or another proverb from Oriya culture: A daughter born is meant for other's family". Of course, ideologically, these proverbs have a strong positive aspect. But in the developing countries like India ideologies are always abused or misused. It is this ideology which in its degenerated or abused form is responsible for the wretched conditions of all the categories of women in a community or society such as housewives, women working in farms, industries and in all the private and public sectors. Housewives are not taken care of properly. Nor are the working women treated properly by the male bosses. Besides, there are also criminal activities like rape. These are all very common features in the developing countries. "I focus throughout on the case of India, a nation in which women suffer great inequalities despite a promising constitutional tradition," writes Nussbaum. In the four chapters of the book she offers a wealth of data-based reports, case studies, arguments, theorizations and analyses on a wide-ranging cross-cultural and inter-disciplinary ground.

In the first chapter she uses her own idea of human capability in mapping and defending the approach to the basic political principles concerned. Next she explains the relationship of this approach to the idea of fundamental human rights discussing certain crucial political and economic

issues such as preference, welfairism, desire justification, political stability and depth of habit. The next two chapters investigate two major problem areas such as religion and family, the issues like rape, sexual harassment and domestic violence coming under these two major areas. The most interesting feature of the book seems to be the conclusion where Nussbaum relieves the heavy burden of the intellectual exercises of the earlier chapters in a lyrical experience: "Women why are you crying? Your tears should become your thought" She thinks that her capability approach has demonstrated a solution to the gender problems in India and other countries by pointing out that whereas earlier, women were crying to list all the miseries of their life, now, they cry to transform their tears to their thoughts and plans: "The capabilities approach in the systemization and theorization of just such thoughts and plans". Outside its context Nussbaum makes us aware that it is the awareness of one's own capabilities that redeems one's own suffering. Indeed this philosophical achievement reminds us the archetypal slogan of the Vedas." Know Thyself"(*ćtmćnam viddhi*) correlating with another saying that this self(*ćtman*) is the ultimate reality(*ayamćtmć brahma*).

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Dipesh Chakraborty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp.301.

Chakraborty's book is a brilliant example of creative historiography. A member of the *Subaltern Studies* group, one among its other illustrious members like Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee, the author has consistently tried to rethink historiography by decentralizing the political, intellectual and linguistic hegemony of Europe, by deconstructing the Eurocentrism that dominated the colonial era.

"European history is no longer seen as embodying anything like a 'universal human history'". He quotes Gadamer, "Europe...since 1914 has become provincialised...." and Naoki Sakai, "The West is a name for a subject which gathers itself in discourse but is also an object constituted discursively; it is, evidently, a name always associating itself with those regions, communities, and peoples that appear politically superior to other regions, communities and peoples. Basically, it is just like the name 'Japan'...It claims that it is capable of sustaining, if not actually transcending, an impulse to transcend all the particularizations."

Thus the author clarifies, the book is not about the region called 'Europe', because this Europe has already lost its integrated image in its being particularized."The so-called "European age" in modern history began to yield place to other regional and global configurations toward the middle of the twentieth century."(p.1)

The plan of the book, as the author clarifies, is not to reject the European thought. "European is at once both indispensable and inadequate in helping us to think through the experiences of political modernity in non-Western nations, and provincializing Europe becomes the task of exploring how this thought—which is now everybody's heritage and which affects us all –may be renewed from and for the margins."(p.16) The book rather takes the advantage of an artificial and faulty division between analytic and hermeneutic traditions in the modern European social thought; and tries to bring two

important representatives of European thought Marx and Heidegger into a conversation in the context of making South Asian political modernity meaningful. The first part(Chaps. 1-4) deals with the topic called "Historicism and the Narration of Modernity" reflecting on the relationship of Marxist ideas of history and historical time with the narratives of capitalist modernity in colonial India. The second part entitled "Histories of Belonging"(chaps.5-8) is organized under Heideggerian ideas presenting certain themes in the modernity of upper caste Hindus of India, particularly of Bengal. Though confined to a particular region, i.e., Bengal the themes are universal in structuring political modernity: "the idea of the citizen-subject, imagination as a category of analysis, ideas regarding civil society, patriarchal fraternities, public/private distinctions, secular reason, historical time and so on."(p.19) The first part deals with the "subaltern", i.e., historical and ethnographic studies of peasants and tribals whereas the second part reflects the history of educated elite with reference to the Bengalis. The concluding chapter envisages a double task: "it acknowledges the political need to think in terms of totalities while all the time unsettling totalizing thought by putting into play non-totalizing categories".(p.21-22) The Heideggerian framework of this chapter holds together the secularist – historicist and the non-secularist and non-historicist engaging the diverse ways of "being-in-the-world".

The theoretical depth and dimension of the book, as noted above, are undoubtedly original exploring new vistas for historical and cultural studies. The author's shrewdness in exploiting the Heideggerian notion of "fragmentariness" for explanation of the historical and political phenomena is undoubtedly unique. The second part of the book carries most relevant themes and events illustrating the ideas the author takes up as the central ones. The barrier between history and literary criticism is lifted up, and the reader is absorbed into an aesthetic awareness where the historicity of history merges into the generality(sedhera'ya) of literary narrative. Although some might point to the Bengali clanism of the author, objectively viewing, there are sufficient grounds for agreeing with him that the Bengali atmosphere of the book is transformed into the Indian colonial atmosphere in general. A reader does not feel that he is dragged into any clanism unwantedly. Historically speaking, colonial modernity began and flourished more in Bengal than in any other region of India. Both colonial and anti-colonial attitudes were rich in Bengali culture. Therefore in illustrating the theories that Chakrabarty expounds, the data from Bengali culture are quite indispensable. The chapters five and seven offer insightful readings of the literary and social concepts like adda, kalamka, pabitra in different literary texts and social sites. History is no more a boring phenomenon or an Aristotelian record of possible and particular events and facts. We are compelled to change our historical views as well as our views of history.

Dipesh Chakraborty presents us a book which it is very difficult to write, whereas very easy and enjoying to read.

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Michael P. Clark(Ed.), *Revenge of the Aesthetic: The Place of Literature in Theory Today*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, pp.251.

The present volume collects ten essays by the most illustrious and influential critics exercising during the last three decades: Hazard Adams, Stanley Fish, J. Hillis Miller, Murray Krieger, Jacques Derrida, David Carrol, Stephen Nichols, Ernst Behler, Davis Donoghue, Wolfgang Iser and Wesley

Morris. The editor explains the principle of coherence he has followed in collecting these essays by several hands: "The essays in this volume argue for the importance of aesthetic values and formal characteristics specific to literary texts." In explaining the title of the volume he quotes Krieger: "The aesthetic can have its revenge upon ideology by revealing a power to complicate that is also a power to undermine"... "It grouped together some influential theorists who often had little in common apart from an interest in the constitutive role of linguistic functions in human experience, and a corollary rejection of humanistic touchstones such as 'Man' and most philosophical absolutes and metaphysical foundations."

In the introductory chapter the editor provides a comprehensive account of the history of literary theory since the World War II, since the contextualist formalism of the American New Criticism till date through the deconstructive trend of post-structuralism. Along with this historical account he also stresses the centrality of Murray Krieger's critical contributions to the debate about the status of literary and aesthetic form. He mentions that he has deliberately chosen the critics of this volume who "insist on some form of dialectical relation between work and world that confounds simplistic distinctions between these two realms, and that contests the facile elevation of either work or world as the determining factor of literary experience", despite the great variety in their topics and the historical range of their examples.

According to the editor, Krieger has consistently focused on the ironic nature of literary illusion as the key element that distinguishes the unique status of literary work and that constitutes its importance to the world of lived experience. Literary work, says Krieger, presents an illusion of and to the world; but unlike the dogmatic proclamations of ideology, literature presents illusion as illusion." In doing so literature projects its relation to the world as well as the status of all other illusions that would appear as truth.

Stanley Fish deals with this work-world relationship by interpreting Andrew Marvell. He argues that Marvell's poetry might be read as an "art of disappearance" in both reforming and rejecting the world of which it is a part. This reading suggests a theory that literature is suspended between "poetic freedom and worldly constraint." Fish's reading of 'ambivalence' in Marvell might be compared with Krieger's "self-confessing illusion" of poetry in general, as Hazard Adams shows it. This relationship between the aesthetic form and the world concerns every other contributor of the volume. Wolfgang Iser thinks that human experience is situated in between these two, and that situation is the focus of what Iser describes as "literary anthropology". Iser agrees with Krieger that literary fictions represent the world only as if it were present to the author and reader. Also, literary fictions "deliberately disclose their fictionality"—they "function as a means of disordering and disrupting their extra textual field of reference," creating gaps rather than bridging them. Derrida thinks, as Krieger has described, that bearing witness to an event has much in common with the poetic experience of language. The poetic experience is characterized by poem's capacity "to play the unmasking role—the role of revealing mask(or illusion) *as* mask. This act of revealing becomes successfully poetic. For Derrida this paradoxical relation of the poem to the act of its own formation, which is its poetics, establishes the specificity of a poem and, at the same time, leads the poem onto something beyond its linguistic confines—to the other, to whom the poem is addressed, as also to the world.

Wesley Morris thinks that the failure of aesthetic forms to close their relation to the world is the product of a symbiotic relation between modernism and postmodernism. He argues that anti-

formalism was irrevocably bound to the organic formalism it opposed. Hence both the movements—modernism and postmodernism are profoundly anti-historical in their rejection of the materiality of the world and the pressures of the past that emerges out of it. Denis Donogue argues for an alternative to spatial models of form, an alternative he derives from Paul de Man's elevation of allegory over symbol as the defining trope of poetic language.

In the final chapter Krieger himself offers an autobiographical account—both a prospect and a retrospect—of his critical career which he started as a very young army returnee just after the World War II. He writes: "So, I look back at where I have been and think of where I am. I am still claiming that the aesthetic—together with the literary read within its terms—performs a number of indispensable functions and our culture. Like Wolfgang Iser, I claim for the literary a primary anthropological function in helping us see and feel beneath our systematic and generalized languages, and thus in protecting us from being misled by them".

To bring a galaxy of representative critics under the framework of a single critical principle, i.e., of Murray Krieger's, without any possible controversy or misunderstanding is not a joke. The editor Clark has performed such a very risky job, without any risk. He therefore commands our gratitude for exhibiting a dominating critical phenomenon in the contemporary climate which would have been overlooked otherwise.

Sanjay Sarangi
Anchalik Mahavidyalava
Birasal

Jean-Marie Schaeffer, *Art of the Modern Age: Philosophy of Art from Kant to Heidegger* (Translated by Steven Rendall), Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2000, pp.352.

The French have reflected on art in terms of two apparently contradictory phenomena: the first is a singular aggravation of the legitimation or identity crisis and the second phenomenon is the renewed interest in Kantian aesthetics. In the six chapters including the concluding one the book traces the emergence of a speculative theory of art from Kant to Heidegger through Novalis, Schlegel, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Neitsche. The trend originates in Novalis' statement that poetry is the sublimation of metaphysics. According to Novalis poetry was called upon to replace philosophy in decline, a statement that reminds Arnold's statement that poetry is a substitute for religion. Novalis dwindles between three theses: (1) philosophy must transcend itself in poetry, (2) it must form a synthesis with poetry, (3) poetry must replace philosophy. The definition of poetry is intimately connected with a theory of the productive imagination—imagination or einbildungskraft being the unification power of mind, the esemplastic function of mind can replace all other senses.The romantic theory of literature constitutes the initial step in the construction of a speculative theory of art. In Schlegel's definition of art, "Generally we include within literature all the sciences and all the arts that act through language: poetry the oratorical art, and history as well, insofar as its presentation is part of the oratorical art...Poetry the oratorical art and history and philosophy are part of the genre that acts through language." Hegel also defines art "both as a speculative enterprise opposed to the prosaic knowledge of the understanding and as an ecstatic being-in-the-world opposed to the empirical being-in-the-art. But there is a difference between art and reason—between art and Pure Thought or philosophical speculation. As the unity of the sensuous and the spiritual art arises from a two-fold

impulse: sensuous reality which enters into the artwork as an appearance only, not as materiality and weight, is transformed into an ideal sensibility which is spiritualized: "Art liberates the true content of phenomena from the pure appearance and deception of this bad, transitory world, and gives them a higher actuality, born of the spirit." As a romantic theory, Hegel's theory of art is an aesthetics of content. The unity of art is guaranteed by the universality of its content, which is common to all the arts. Because of the speculative character of art, hence because of its participation in the sphere of absolute spirit, this content is the same as the philosophy and religion. The difference among these three—art, philosophy and religion—is a difference due to diversity of semiotic forms, the common content being the Idea, the Absolute Being.

Schopenhauer deviates from Kant insofar as he seeks to found a philosophical doctrine of beauty, which was denied by Kant for whom Beauty is not an ontologically stable phenomenon. Thus Schopenhauer says to his students that he does not propose an aesthetics but a metaphysics of Beauty. So also is the view of Nietzsche who considers art as fundamentally a metaphysical act. Neitzsche offers not a single, but almost four definitions of art: (1) a cognitive definition : art is an ecstatic knowledge of the inner being of the world, of its Dionysian heart; (2) an effective-ethical definition: art is a consolation that allows us to go on living; (3) an ontological definition: art is a semblance, an illusion; (4) a cosmological definition: art is the game that the universe plays with itself. The difficulty in Neitzsche's theory of art is the identification of two opposite varieties of art—the Dionysian(music) and the Appolonian(representational arts).

Heidegger's general philosophy does not share with the early German romantic idealist philosophy. Heidegger distinguishes between metaphysics and "the thought of Being". He develops his conception of the work of art in a framework of distinction between the thing, equipment and the work. The work of art occupies a privileged place that has the ability to reveal Being; the being-work brings about the truth of the Being of beings including its own. Through a circular procedure Heidegger arrives at the central thesis of the speculative theory.

In the concluding chapter the author states that artistic modernity is inseparable from the conceptual framework provided by the speculative theory of art—may it origin in romanticism or symbolism. In fact Rene Wellek has long back traced the characteristics of modernism in symbolism, and the inherent idealism of modernism is reflected in several other activities of this era such as language studies, philosophy and literary theories and aesthetics as displayed in Cassirer, Langer and the Anglo-American New Critics, the Chicago critics and even in Northrop Frye. This inherent idealism is destroyed by Derrida who claims that he has gone far away from Heidegger in pioneering deconstruction of logocentrism. The destruction of an Idea or Logos has been the major function of the postmodern era. This iconoclasm is reflected in a very powerful wing of postmodernism which is named as postcolonialism that challenges any kind of hegemony in cultural activities such as literature, politics, economics and all other sociological relationship.

Schaeffer's book works out in all details an analysis and history of speculative theory of art that developed during the romantic and post-romantic modern age.

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