

BOOK REVIEWS

T. W. ADORNO. *Aesthetic Theory*. Translated by C. Lenhardt. Edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. Pp x + 526.

Aesthetics has become a central area for Marxist thought in twentieth-century Europe. Among prominent Western Marxist philosophers the names of Georg Lukacs, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Theodor W. Adorno immediately come to mind. It is not clear, however, whether Marxist thought has entered the mainstream of contemporary Western aesthetics. In addition to unavoidable politico-economic barriers, a blockade of ignorance and hostility has prevailed between Anglo-American and Continental philosophy. Although less rigid in aesthetics than in philosophy of science, this blockade has often prevented productive dialogue between Western Marxists and leading figures in Anglo-American aesthetics. As the blockade relaxes, one can expect such dialogue to grow, even though Lukacs, Sartre, and Adorno have died.

Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* is perhaps the most original attempt at a comprehensive philosophy of the arts within the Western Marxist tradition. For the Frankfurt School (Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse,

Adorno, Jurgen Habermas), this book constitutes a *summa aesthetica*. An English translation has long been overdue. First published in German in 1970 one year after Adorno's death the book soon appeared in French (1974) and Italian (1975). For years it has been debated and used on the European continent. Until recently, however, *Aesthetic Theory* has received little attention in the English speaking world. The publication of Lenhardt's translation in 1984 makes a wider reception possible.

This reception will not be easy or smooth. The book is complex and provocative, just as its author was brilliant and controversial. An Hegelian Marxist critical of both Hegel and Marxist-Leninism; an assimilated German Jew exiled for more than fifteen years in England and the United States; a polished modern musician who subjected Schoenberg and Stravinsky to ideology critique; a sophisticated philosopher better known for his work in sociology, psychology, and communications than for his studies of Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Heidegger—Adorno was as complex as his published work, which fills some 20 volumes of *Gesammelte Schriften*. According to Martin Jay, Adorno's writings occupy

an historical force field. The field includes Western Marxist, aesthetic modernism, mandarin cultural despair, and Jewish self-identification, as well as the more anticipatory pull of deconstructionism. (Adorno, Harvard University Press, 1984 p.22). No one force dominates Adorno's work. The forces exist in creative tension. In *Aesthetic Theory* they become explosive.

This explosive character carries over into the smallest details of organization and style. The "Editor's Epilogue" (493-498) tells of Adorno's determined efforts to match form and content. Although his duty prevented a final revision, the editors have tried to honor Adorno's intent. The result is a paratactical text containing 12 chapters and 168 sections. Many suppressed premises are left for the reader to figure out. Some help in this task comes from the "Draft" Introduction" (456-492), which presents Adorno's leading concerns. Even so, Adorno's thoroughly dialectical method makes a first reading difficult. Fortunately Christian Lenhardt's translation is outstanding. Lenhardt has captured Adorno's gist in idiomatic English without missing crucial nuances. Lenhardt has also broken the original single-paragraph sections into smaller paragraphs and supplied additional endnotes, thus making the book less formidable. It is unfortunate, however, that the translator has not been allowed to include a glossary and an introduction. These would have provided helpful entries into the text.

Adorno's aesthetics turns on a central conflict and follows a specific methodological principle. The conflict is one between modern art and advanced capitalism. Adorno's methodological principle is "to shed light on all art from the perspective of the most recent artistic phenomena..." (491-492). Interpreting modern art as the "social antithesis" of advanced capitalist society, Adorno generates a general thesis about the arts: they derive from a larger social process, oppose it, point beyond it, and yet remain within that process. Chapters 1 and 12 try to show how art simultaneously "dissociate itself" from society and "belongs to" it (358). In these chapters Adorno solidifies his positions about art's connections with politics, ideology, and social production.

Adorno's approach to "modern art" (Picasso, Schoenberg, Beckett) is both controversial and original. Unlike Georg Lukacs, Adorno, defends modern art. Unlike the view sometimes attributed to Adorno, however, his defense is critical rather than apologetic. This defense assumes a dialectic between modern art and so-called popular art. Chapter

2 portrays modern art as providing a balance with a Kantian emphasis on partial corrective to the ideological logic of the indeterminacy of specific works. functions of "popular art." But "best Adorno also uses Hegel's emphasis on cause modern art also has ideological artistic production to correct Kant's Kant's functions, Adorno says "it becomes notion of taste, but criticizes both impossible to criticize the culture authors for misreading the collective industry without criticizing art at subjectivity expressed in authentic the same time" (26). Furthermore, works of art. A similar treatment of Nietzsche and Marx occurs in the within modern art Adorno distinguishing chapters on "beauty" (Chapters 3-5). shes between authentic and inauthen- Here a Nietzschean dialectic of Apollonian and Dionysian undermines Marx's emphasis on rational mastery over nature, while Marxian categories counteract aesthetic irrationalism. In general Adorno appropriates traditional German aesthetics in order to determine the significance of modern art within a capitalist society.

This distinction employs the category of artistic truth-content (*Wahrheitsgehalt*). Like many other Adornian categories, "truth-content" arises from his reading of traditional aesthetic through the eyes of twentieth-century art. Because of vast discrepancies between the two, Adorno holds that "there is only one way in which aesthetics can hope to understand art today, and that is not through critical self-reflection" (p. 467). His main sources within aesthetics are Kant and Hegel, mediated by Marx and Nietzsche, and brought closer still by Lukacs and Walter Benjamin. Adorno's critical appropriation of traditional German aesthetics is most evident in Chapters 6, 7 and 9 which concern artistic illusion (*Schein*), truth, and objectivity. In these chapters Adorno tries to move beyond Hegel and Kant by using each to correct the other. Thus, for example, Adorno combines Hegelian notion of art as truth's semi-

Although not well-versed in English language aesthetics, Adorno does undertake a type of metacritical aestheticism. Concepts of art criticism such as form and intention are analyzed in Chapter 8, and categories of art history such as genre and style are examined in Chapter 11. Crucial for both chapters is the theory of the artwork presented in Chapter 10. Adorno describes the work of art as a sociohistorical monad that calls for immanent criticism. Works of art are "monads" in the sense that their internal tensions express the conflicts driving their society. In authentic modern works human suffering is

voiced, and necessary transformations of society are made imaginable. Such works call for neither the purely immanent analysis of formalist approaches nor the purely transcendent evaluation of some ideology critiques. The task of immanent criticism is to evaluate works from within but simultaneously to assess their sociohistorical significance.

Three objections to *Aesthetic Theory* have been raised by sympathetic critics. One is that Adorno's defense of modern art amounts to a retreat from any struggle for social transformation. It is said that Adorno thinks only certain politically ineffectual works can provide an agent for social transformation. A second objection is that Adorno's reflections have become so abstract that they resist concrete testing. A third is that important changes in recent art have been ignored.

Initially each objection is plausible. Further reflection might show, however, that each is also problematic. The locating of agents for social transformation, for example, is extremely complex, as is Adorno's position on art's role in this process. When thought through the criticism of Adorno's "abstractness" usually amounts to a rejection of philosophical aesthetics as such. Seen within the tradition of German aesthetics, however, *Aesthetic Theory* displays

an unusual engagement with the art of its own time. Criticisms of Adorno's outdatedness might also be problematic, for seldom do they explicate criteria for assessing the significance of changes within art.

There is one recurrent objection, however, that might signal a central problem. This objection concerns Adorno's method of reading art backwards. Adorno never fully explains and justifies his methodological principle. He claims instead that a method of interpreting artistic phenomena is "legitimated in its actual use, which is why it cannot be presupposed" (489). The problem with this claim is that the "legitimate" use of a method does not provide a philosophical rationale for that method. In his attempt to correct abstract methodologies whose methods are seldom put to legitimate use, Adorno fails to elaborate sufficiently the methodology attached to his own methods of interpretation. Unsympathetic critics could easily see this failure as a fatal flaw.

That objection aside, I find *Aesthetic Theory* to be one of the most exciting and challenging works in post-war German aesthetics. Aligning aesthetics with recent art and social issues is difficult in any language. By taking on this task without flinching, Adorno has made an important contribution to contemporary philosophy of art.

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Martin Jay, *Adorno*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984. Pp. 199.

Writing in the summer of 1966, Adorno ended the preface of his *Negative Dialectics* with the declaration: "The author is prepared for the attacks to which *Negative Dialectics* will expose him. He feels no rancor and does not begrudge the joy of those in either camp who will proclaim they knew it all the time and now he was confessing." [New York, 1973, p. xxi] Those two sentences suggest not so much a man with Socratic patience facing his accusers, as a man both embattled and beleaguered. Indeed, Adorno was a cultural critic at war with the two cultures in which he lived, and a philosopher in disagreement with the traditions of German philosophy and with the representatives of modern philosophical thought. He even broke on important points with his closest associates, Max Horkheimer and Walter Benjamin. And it is this man, whose philosophy was marked at once by extreme subtlety and by hardnosed intransigence, who is portrayed with great vitality by Martin Jay in *Adorno*. In Jay's portrait, Adorno's very intransigence becomes a virtue, for it stands as a figure for Adorno's model of the final irreconcilability of moments in dialectics. Adorno liked to speak of a "force-

field," which suggested an interaction between the elements analyzed by philosophy—never unification. And Martin Jay envisioned his study of Adorno's thought as a map of just such a force-field, recognizing the irreconcilable of Adorno's work: "To reveal as best we can the unique phenomenon that was Adorno, we must therefore conceptualize him in a manner which will be as true to the unresolved tensions in his thought as possible, rather than seek to find some putative coherence underlying them." [p. 23] But despite this proviso, Jay's book is an elegant introduction to Adorno's ideas, and at the same it provides a lively sketch of a sensibility. More than that, Jay has succeeded in establishing Adorno—a man who was at war with everyone—not only as a profound thinker but also as an extremely attractive one.

In the crowd around the Institute of Social Research, Adorno was a polymath. Jay describes him as "a virtual microcosm of the Institute's combined staff." [p. 86] And Jay discusses a number of Adorno's major interests, such as his cultural criticism, possibly best represented by the joint book with Horkheimer, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, his work with psychoanalytic concepts, and his aesthetic theory. The man who wrote on Schoenberg and Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Kafka, Beckett

and Balzac is clearly present in Jay's book. But Jay emphasizes most Adorno's "negative dialectics," which he traces from an incipient state in Adorno's early to the publication in 1966 of *Negative Dialectics*. As a negative dialectician, Jay's Adorno stands firmly against totalization in philosophy, and more specifically against the totalization represented by Hegel's dialectics. It is Adorno's resistance to totalization which separates him from most of his fellow Marxists. Although Adorno—with the rest of the Frankfurt School—has often been associated with Western Marxism because of his dialectical turn, Jay points out that Adorno's negative version of dialectics "prevented him from embracing the Marxist Humanist conclusion reached by Lukacs, Gramsci and Korsch. "[p. 85] But if Jay's Adorno was an outsider with regard to Marxist Humanism, he could be embraced by today's post-structuralist as an insider. Jay's book establishes Adorno as one of the pioneers of the anti-totalization of the presentday deconstructionist, even if Jay turns to terms like "proto-deconstructionist" only occasionally in his text. In not pressing the point too hard, Jay probably sensed that Adorno himself would have been uncomfortable as an insider in deconstructionist criticism. Jay, in fact, writes that it is "misleading to argue, as some commenta-

tors, that he was *really* a mandarin in pretending to be a Marxist or simply a deconstructionist *avant la lettre*. We must rather, in a way that is more in accord with the deepest impulses of his own approach, understand him as the shifting nodal point in which all intersect. "[pp. 22-23] And Jay, who writes affectionately of the redemptive side of Adorno's cultural criticism, is fully aware that any simple identification of Adorno with deconstructionism is misplaced. Thus, rather than making Adorno merely into a patron saint of deconstruction, Jay identifies those aspects of Adorno's thought which prefigure important aspects of deconstruction.

According to Jay, the common ancestor of the antitotalization of Adorno and Derrida is Friedrich Nietzsche; and Nietzsche makes frequent appearances in Jay's book. Nietzsche's role is primarily as an influence on Adorno's "negative dialectics." But Nietzsche, I would suggest, had an impact on more than Adorno's ideas; he also greatly influenced Adorno's intellectual style. The Adorno portrayed by Martin Jay is deeply serious, fully worthy of the contemplative portrait reproduced on the cover of *Adorno*. But as serious he was, Adorno was also given to a playful wickedness in his writing, a playful wickedness which resembles

Nietzsche's. When one reads Adorno's discussions of American mass culture, the imprint of Nietzsche is clear. Without question, the clever Adorno talking about the "maestro" in the American concert hall should be located on a genealogical line that runs from Nietzsche to Roland Barthes. There are other aspects of Adorno's intellectual style which might have added to Jay's picture, such as Adorno's commitment to some of the values of the German professoriate. Although Jay acknowledges Adorno's mandarinitis, he is compelled more often to defend Adorno against those who read his cultural criticism as little more than the cranky and snobbish posturing of a mandarin. Still, Adorno's cultural elitism—which is evidenced by his prose, by most of his cultural attachments, by his attacks on jazz and other expressions of mass culture—cannot be dissociated from the mandarinitis of the German academic. Jay may be correct in protecting Adorno from his detractors, but a discussion of the interaction between Adorno's thought and the values of the German academy would have added to the complex picture which Jay produced of so complex a man as Theodor Adorno.

Jay's *Adorno* was clearly written with affection and reverence for one of the most difficult thinkers of the twentieth century. But it was also

written with analytical energy and critical insight. What *Adorno* does for Adorno is to reproduce the vitality of his thought, or more accurately, its passion. As it turns out, it is not Jay's biographical discussion of Adorno which brings the thinker back to life, but rather the sensitive treatment Jay gave to Adorno's ideas

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Barry M. Katz. *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation*. Verso Editions, London, 234pp.

Katz's study of Marcuse is an intellectual biography, authorised by Marcuse, and based not merely on a detailed investigation of his writings, but also on intensive discussions with Marcuse himself. It can thus be considered definitive in its biographical features. However, Katz has forsaken criticism at the expense of an elucidation of Marcuse's life and teachings; as a result, the book impresses the reader for the depth of its biographical detail and for its clear explanations of the origins of Marcuse's doctrines rather than for any critical analysis of them.

Katz traces Marcuse's sixty year career from its origins in Berlin at the beginning of the century to 1979, the year of Marcuse's death. Although

there is no single turning point in Marcuse's career, Katz maintains that a preoccupation with aesthetics constitutes the single most consistent theme running through the whole of Marcuse's work. Thus the author argues that aesthetic theory serves as the framework within which Marcuse's philosophical and political work can be integrated. From his 1922 doctoral dissertation on the German "artist-novel" through to his extended essay of 1967 on *The Aesthetic Dimension*, Katz shows that Marcuse attempted to lay the groundwork of a theory of art that was also a theory of politics and an enduring standard of political criticism. As a result, Katz ties his discussions of such diverse writings as *Reason and Revolution*, *Eros and Civilization* and *One-Dimensional Man* to Marcuse's continuing preoccupation with art and its nature.

According to Katz, the basic problem with which Marcuse grappled during his life concerned the autonomy of art in relation to the external world, and his position shifted according to his perceptions of the power of the established reality to absorb, co-opt, or defuse the radical alienation that distances the art work from society. During the fascist

period, when he contributed to the articulation of the theoretical position of the Frankfurt School, and into the period of "one-dimensional society", Marcuse tended to be impressed by the power of advanced industrial society to transform even its most intractable critics into affirmations of the prevailing order. By the end of his life, however, in his critique of deterministic Marxist aesthetics, he returned to his original position that it is of the essence of the artwork to preserve an element of transcendence which can never be negated. This element, Marcuse maintained in *The Aesthetics of Liberation*, is artistic form which endures as an implicit criticism of the oppressive conditions on contemporary civilization.

Katz's study is invaluable for the reader who wishes to understand Marcuse's philosophical views in their social and historical setting. He is most successful in conveying a sense of the historical context in which Marcuse's social theories evolved and matured in relationship to the constantly changing conditions in which he lived.

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Martin Scofield, *T. S. Eliot : The Poems*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 264.

Scofield's method of interpreting Eliot's poetry will be highly useful to both students and general readers. Such a method is based on uncanny power of perception and analysis and the profound understanding of heterogeneous aspects of an encyclopaedic mind. Scofield finds in Eliot a 'compound ghost', a writer compounded out of many elements of the European tradition.

Quite incisively, the author examines the various strands that are connected with the development of Eliot's oeuvre, and more succinctly to his life and a wider area of philosophical and religious inquiry. He traces, at the same time, the development of the poet's mind with a remarkable clarity. Particularly, the fourth chapter "Poetic Theory and Poetic Practice" reveals the way in which Eliot's literary criticism is largely consequence of his creative activity. Eliot confesses that his best criticism consists of the essays written on poets and Poetic dramatists. Thus, it was a 'by-product' of his 'private poetry-workshop'. On the other hand, in his negative judgments on some writers, he pointed to the qualities which he wished to avoid.

The book gains its significance in its concentration on Eliot's poetry itself; in its attempt to unravel the wealth of hidden meanings in the poems. Most of the sections deal with an elaborate discussion of each major poem or group of poems. The author arrives at the structure of meanings of these poems through Eliot's techniques of personal or masks, his use of musical effects, his symbolism and imagism, and more over, the less hinted elements such as surrealism. While interpreting *The Wastland*, the author is chiefly concerned with the continual interaction between the forces of fragmentation and those of unification. In his study of *Four Quartets*, he is similarly preoccupied with a fundamental aspect of Eliot as a poet: "the question of how much our response to his poetry depends on our response to his beliefs." The author's laudable attempt to clarify the obscurities, to explain the allusions, serves to provide a comprehensive and stimulating introduction to T. S. Eliot's poetry.

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Ellen Dissanayake, *What Is Art For?* Seattle : University of Washington Press, 1988. Pp. xv+249, \$ 20.00.

The author begins by declaring

that her analysis of art will take a "biobehavioral" perspective rooted in Edward O. Wilson's sociobiology (1975, 1978). She thus assumes that "certain ubiquitous behavioral features or tendencies in human life are an intrinsic, relatively unchangeable part of our nature and have arisen and been retained because they contributed positively to our evolutionary success" (p. 19). She defines "art" not as those select categories of objects or performances which a modern critic might choose but instead as all these varied behaviors by which human beings attempt "to form and shape, to make things special, to decorate or beautify, to single out and take pains to present something in a considered way" (p. 61). Finding on review of the ethnographic literature that such behaviour is universal in humans, she assumes that it must have contributed positively to our species's survival and sets out both to trace the prehistoric sources of artistic behavior and to answer the query on the title page—or, more accurately, to determine what art was for in terms of natural selection during the long course of hominid evolution. Her conclusion: that the arts and human aesthetic response had survival value because, being pleasurable, they encouraged early humans to engage regularly in group activities to which they were attached, such as rituals and cere-

monies, and these in turn helped promote group solidarity. In a concluding chapter, she argues that in the modern West the arts no longer serve that crucial collective function, but have instead become the province of a specialized few who substitute detachment for genuine response and the slippery terrain of "deconstruction" for consensual meanings. She deplores this situation as "unnatural" in that it departs from the scenario she has just limned: "what the arts were for, an embodiment and reinforcement of socially shared significance, is what we crave and are perishing for today" (p. 200).

Along the way, Dissanayake offers much of charm and interest. In the first place, her topic—the place of art and the aesthetic response in human evolution—is an important one. While numerous anthropologists, art historians and aestheticians have "talked around" the issue, it has probably not been afforded such undivided attention since nineteenth-century evolutionists like Balfour and Haddon turned their attention to art, working, of course, without benefit of modern genetics, archaeology, and ethnography. Her interpretation of Wilson is so nondoctrinaire and commonsensical, so affirmative of human unity and potential, that it will seem largely inoffensive to even the most intransigent of those "sensitive, well-educated social scientists

and humanist" opposed to sociobiology (p. 32) whom she sets up as her putative theoretical foes. And in the third place, her account balances re-statements of valuable truths, like the intimate connection between ritual, play, and art, with fresh insights like a useful distinction between two kinds of art appreciation: "ecstatic" response to the sensual aspects of a work, and what she terms "aesthetic" response to its manipulations of particular artistic "codes" or conventions (p. 164). For such contributions, and for a clear, jargonfree style of writing that made me want to "buy" her arguments even when I disagreed, one can only be grateful.

But there are problems with the work—problems significant enough to make the thoughtful reader regard Dissanayake's conclusions with caution. First, she makes statements that are, at the very least, open to empirical question. For example, she refers to "dogs or sheep, which have been domesticated at least as long as human beings have been 'cultured,'" (p. 29), implying that pre-Neolithic man lacked culture and/or that the domestication of animals might precede the onset of human culture — both thoroughly untenable propositions. Elsewhere she asserts that "the behavior of animals is largely determined by genetically controlled

mechanisms, so that their responses are more or less automatic" (p. 119) —a baffling statement from an ethologist, since current animal research suggests quite the contrary (see Cowley 1988).

As for humans, Dissanayake endows them with contradictory "instincts" a common pitfall among those who seek biological blueprints to explain the species that in a single century has brought us Babi Yar and the Salk-Sabine vaccine, Idi Amin and Mahatma Gandhi. On one page she describes human as "conspicuously unwilling to love or try to understand their neighbors" (p. 30), and on the next, as possessing a "universally observed penchant for actively seeking out and enjoying the company of others of one's kind" (p. 31). Quick to assume that widespread behaviors are universal, she ignores obvious exceptions; thus "the infant's smile... 'releases' protective and fond emotion in whoever witnesses it," an evolutionary imperative that was apparently lost on Nazi soldiers as they herded Jewish mothers and babies to their deaths. Another "universal behavior" which she cites as "human nature" is "investing power in those of greater age" (p. 21)—an arguable trait at best, given a vast literature on the subordination of the aged in industrial society (e. g., Ewen 1976) and

in many traditional societies (e.g., Amoss and Harrel 1981). Also, though she stresses repeatedly that our "species being" was forged in a hunting-gathering context and that our natures and our art are adapted for that type of society (see p. 109), she devotes surprisingly little space in her text or her references to works on hunting-gathering life. Had she done so, I doubt that she could have posed the rhetorical query, "why are torture, cruelty and killing so easy to instill and so hard to eradicate?" (p. 16), implying that these are all part of our inborn heritage, for none of those behaviors are typical of hunter-gatherers. Indeed, a comprehensive perusal of the literature on hunter-gatherer arts might have opened her central thesis to question. There is plenty of evidence for the importance of purely secular, non-ceremonial aesthetic activity among hunting gathering peoples (Mbuti singing and dancing, Gwi instrumental music, and !Kung story-telling come to mind), making "art for art's sake" as plausible an evolutionary scenario as "art for ceremony's sake."

Still more bothersome is Dissanayake's insistence on a qualitative "break" between the cognitive patterning of persons in preliterate cultures and those in postliterate cultures. Following C. R. Hallpike (1979) and,

before him, Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1910, 1966), she characterizes people in the modern West as logical, rational, and aware that no single point of view enjoys monopoly on truth, in contrast to their traditional, non-Western counterparts. But by what yardstick does one judge as "logical" and "rational" the culture which perpetrated Auschwitz and Hiroshima and which is now cheerfully carrying out the wholesale destruction of the world ecosystem? And how is it possible for an author presently living in Asia (Sri Lanka, to be exact) to maintain that it was the modern West which first proposed that the world we perceive with our senses may be illusory, and that there is not one "truth", but many?

Even more perplexing is Dissanayake's refusal to include the popular arts and mass media in her discussion of Modern Western culture, or to draw on the rich literature on those topics in the field of communication studies—especially in view of her insistence that, when discussing "art" in other cultures, she is emphatically not restricting herself to what critics regard as "good" or "high" art. When discussing non-Western societies, she includes as "art" such activities as face-painting and scarification, arrangement of temple offerings, decoration of grain bins and

the like. But when she turns to the contemporary West, she inexplicably narrows her focus to "high" or "gallery" art, ignoring the influential areas of fashion, advertising, architecture and design, not to mention vibrant local movements in dance and theatre and multi-million industries based on television, films and pop music. In effect, the aborigine carving pleasing shapes on his boomerang is held up for contrast with Oscar Wilde, Marcel Duchamp, or some other aesthete out to *epater les bourgeois*; little wonder that modern Western "art," so narrowly defined, seems elitist and non-"collective." Perhaps more disturbing, she never alludes to the complex politico-economic developments which would render comprehensible the marginalization of the modern Western artist; indeed, she skirts the whole issue of class stratification as a possible factor in the erosion of "socially shared significance" in the contemporary nation-state.

Finally, though her synthesis is original, many of the individual points Dissanayake offer as "new"

have, in fact, been said before. Although she cites a wide and eclectic range of source material, she is either unaware of that fact or has deliberately chosen not to credit some eminent precursors. It's difficult to see, for example, how her key notion of "making special" (see p. 99) differs in any substantive way from Jacques Maquet's (1971) concept of "non-instrumental form," or why, in an extended discussion of "oceanic feelings" being traceable to experience in the womb, she ignores the work of Trigant Burrow. A long digression on psychologist Howard Gardner's research on "modes" and "vectors" as sources of our response to art is really a recasting of the old Lipps-Worringer "empathy hypothesis". Even her central points, that art and ritual are often intertwined and that art (like much ideational culture) functions to make us want to do what we must do in order to survive, have been stated many times by many authors.

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