

penchant for assuredness characteristic of the analytic tradition: “The latter claim can only be denied if one maintains that ‘reality’ is only what the physical sciences reveal, the position we questioned in terms of the notion of ‘world’. The very fact that such a claim can so dominate philosophical debate, and has effects in many domains of social, political, and cultural life, is itself a symptom of what this book has sought to question. . . . this claim itself is not a natural scientific claim and so involves metaphysical commitments outside its own scope, as well as having social and political effects by obscuring the kind of truth that is only accessible through art” (207–08). Whether claims regarding scientific objectivity are meant to extend beyond the parameters in which some fact may be understood as objective within the scope of such parameters and whether that claim remains intelligible “outside of its own scope” remain separate affairs. Although Bowie is right to point out that the particular world picture tacitly envisioned by such claims is not always made explicit, the direct contact between truth as it appears in this framework and “the kind of truth that is only accessible through art,” as well as the means by which the conceptual shape of the former can take hold of and obscure the non-conceptual shape of the latter remains to be elucidated.

This does not, however, outweigh the scholarly merit of the book, which is prominently displayed in the chapters devoted to Heidegger and Adorno. As is frequently the case, Bowie’s acumen on Heidegger is displayed with prominence. This comes to the fore directly through the focus of the book’s sixth chapter on the Heidegger–Cassirer debate, its reception and the ecological components of Heidegger’s discussion of the strife between earth and world in “The Origin of the Work of Art” in tandem with a number of additional topics in Heidegger scholarship. Bowie’s longstanding eminence on Heidegger’s relationship to aesthetics indirectly provides the reader with a newfound clarity that demystifies Heidegger’s claims while separating them from the plausible interpretations with which they are often conflated.

This penultimate chapter makes apparent the philosophical accomplishment of *Aesthetic Dimensions of Modern Philosophy*. More broadly, Bowie’s shrewd grasp of the history of philosophy allows him to highlight the repetition of philosophical debates whose recurrence often owes to a mistaken understanding of this history as an antiquated moment bereft of contemporary significance. “Again,” he writes, “we end up with versions of materialism/realism versus idealism. . . . and with the impasses of much modern epistemology” (35). Bowie takes care to delimit the scope of this problematic, often doing so through an extended engagement with the lexicon of Jürgen Habermas — a gesture which proves particularly useful when partitioning between cognitive and aesthetic judgements. Such an approach ultimately offers a substantive contribution to one of the central questions of the book and of our philosophical moment: “How, then, can we understand the sense that makes aesthetics so important, in ways which do not merely relegate it to the arbitrarily subjective, but also do not seek to give it the same objective status as warranted scientific claims?” (7).

MICHAEL BARR  
*Stony Brook University, USA*

**BUDDHIST ETHICS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION.** By Jay L. Garfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. 249 pp.

**I**n the Preface to his *Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration*, Jay L. Garfield suggests to the reader that the frame through which we are to read his work explicitly avoids a comparative approach to ethics as broadly construed in Eastern and Western philosophy. This is a subtle point that reads as a mere suggestion before it does an intention that foregrounds and directs his project. However, as the book progresses it not only becomes clear that the latter holds sway but, by exten-

sion, that for this topic in particular to hone and deploy a methodologically non-comparative approach requires as much intellectual rigor as does the explication of the topic itself. Though Garfield's intention "to introduce Western philosophers to Buddhist thought...in order that they might be better equipped to address Buddhist literature" is by no means unique to the Buddhist Philosophy for Philosophers series in which it appears, his attempt to avoid "systematically identify[ing] Buddhist ideas with Western ideas" is an accomplishment in philosophical erudition and instructional clarity that proves worthy of attention (ix).

One of the more laudable examples in which Garfield carefully avoids construing this distinction in terms of opposition occurs within his account of moral phenomenology. His initial clarification of what falls within and outside the scope of this notion proves to be as interesting conceptually as it is useful to the novice reader. Garfield devotes a footnote to this task, part of which he uses to distance himself from similar applications of the term in different disciplines: "I am using the term *moral phenomenology* in a very specific sense here, denoting an approach to ethics in which the goal is the cultivation of a distinct way of experiencing oneself and others in the world, or a mode of comportment toward the world" (pp. 21-2, n. 6). A lot proves to hinge on the experience and mode of comportment that, for Garfield, are cultivated in and particular to the structure of Buddhist ethics. Moreover, Garfield's explication of moral phenomenology through these constituent parts animates his additional claim that, even more so than metaphysics or epistemology, it is the domain of ethics that animates our ordinary experience of the world. Garfield suggests that "the initial state" from which this phenomenology begins "is one of bondage by psychopathological confusion about one's own nature and the nature of the world around one" (25-6). Yet the path one follows through the course of this experience "culminates in a state of awakened existence" — a state in which what is finally cultivated is the capacity to experience and perceive the world through an ethical lens that he reminds us is singular to Buddhism (26).

An example offered in the sixth chapter of Shantideva's *How to Lead an Awakened Life* elucidates the purview of awakened existence and intertwines neatly with his claim that ethics underwrites our perception of the everyday. Shantideva, for Garfield, "argues that we can come to see those who appear to harm us as in fact benefiting us by offering us the opportunity to practice patience, issuing in a response of gratitude rather than a reaction of anger" (26). Cultivating the ability to augment one's immediate situational comportment is not simply a mental phenomenon. Because it is adaptive to the present in which it is practiced, Garfield observes that such an ethical lens interacts with the present in which it is deployed and thereby alters the outcomes eventually brought forth. "Ethical practice," Garfield writes, "is about the transformation not in the first instance of what we *do*, but of how we *see*" (23). In other words, because the path that leads to awakened existence offers a view so radically different from our ordinary situational perception we might not register this experience as similar in any regards and, as a result, can find a different way of engaging with it.

Though this is just one applied instance of Garfield's framework for moral phenomenology, I have included this case study in order to highlight his capacity to differentiate between ethics in Buddhist and Western philosophy without collapsing this distinction into comparison or opposition. Here, like many other moments in *Buddhist Ethics*, Garfield is able to maneuver between one tradition and another by pushing the terms with which the reader is acquainted to point at which further clarification requires recourse to an external vantage point. Articulating the limits of the familiar provides a point of departure that keeps in sight the vast difference between both approaches to ethics — an accomplishment that, fittingly, echoes the goal that he suggests lies at the heart of Buddhist moral theory "not in the...the development of new ways of *acting*, but rather new ways of *experiencing the world*" (32).

MICHAEL BARR  
Stony Brook University, USA