What's the Point of the Philosophy/Aesthetics of Music?

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Philosophers who make music their object of analysis tend to regard it as something to be explained in a theory that makes true claims about its object. As one might expect, this gives philosophy the dominant role in its relationship to music, because it supposedly makes intelligible something which prima facie lacks a certain kind of intelligibility. An obvious problem here is that, despite the proliferation of theories in the 'philosophy of music' or 'music aesthetics' – I don't distinguish the two: the reasons to use 'aesthetics' seem to me essentially historical rather than conceptual, as the term in its usual senses only emerges in the modern period (see Bowie 2003) – their claims diverge quite radically. This almost constitutive divergence poses questions about the status of such theories. Are we just waiting for someone to 'get it right' with respect to what a musical work is, or to what it is that music expresses, etc., given that this doesn't actually seem to occur? And what exactly would be achieved if we had such answers: would they make people perform or listen to music in very different ways? 'Knowing the answer' in this issue can in fact be seen as likely to go against the very nature of what is being investigated, for reasons we will come to see later. This situation is, of course, not going to make people give up articulating theories which seek to answer notionally philosophical questions about the nature of music, or, for that matter, any other object of philosophical inquiry. Nor should it, as such theories can illuminate aspects of what is at issue in new ways, even when they prove to be untenable as definitive theories. However, the philosophy of music can also give rise to meta-reflection on what it may tell us beyond what its practitioners see it as doing. The consequences of such reflection can, I want to suggest, 'turn the tables' with respect to aspects of the music/philosophy relationship, because music can be seen as questioning some prevalent ways of doing philosophy, in a manner which is arguably itself 'philosophical'.

One immediately apparent aspect of the philosophy of music as practised particularly in the mainstream analytical tradition is that the issues it raises are generally versions of the same issues that appear elsewhere in philosophy. Musical 'ontology' seeks to locate music in the same kind of categories as apply to other objects. Theories of emotion and music similarly see music in relation to other ways in which emotion is instantiated. The talk is often of the kind of 'properties' possessed by music, and how these properties relate to subjects playing or listening to music. This comes down to how to commensurate what pertains to the subject responding to music with what pertains to the object 'music', and this generates a large part of the agenda for the philosophy of music.

One example of this approach is the idea that music involves 'response-dependent' properties, and this points to a basic problem. If something only exists to the extent that it elicits a response, it seems odd to call it a 'property' of an object. The notion of property indicates something constitutive of an object, which is presumably in some sense independent of its being apprehended in a subject's response to the object, otherwise it wouldn't be 'proper' to that object. The equivocation here points to a deeper issue: the model of a subject relating to an object, which raises issues of location, like that of emotion with respect to music, is characteristic of the epistemological focus of much of modern philosophy, which, so far also without any generally agreed answers, analyses the subject's and the object's contribution to the constitution of the world, often in the attempt to refute epistemological scepticism (see Bowie 2022, which sees the sceptical problematic as actually a manifestation of other tensions in modern humankind's relationship to world). In the case of music it is, however, not clear

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that, even if it were to prove possible, establishing what the respective contributions are in conceptual terms matters a great deal, and sceptical doubts of a cognitive – as opposed to an evaluative – nature are rarely relevant to what is at issue in the practice of music. The fact that many of the predominant issues in the philosophy of music seem to matter little to those engaged either in mainstream analytical philosophy, or in the actual production of music may involve a failing on the part of those practitioners, but it may also suggest something lacking in the 'philosophy of music', and in some of the philosophical approaches upon which it relies.

As I have suggested elsewhere (Bowie 2007 and 2022), one alternative way of looking at the issues here is in terms of the philosophy of music as something which can be construed both in the 'subjective' and in the 'objective' genitive. Rather than see the philosophy/music relationship solely in terms of what philosophy tells us about music, which can lead to the difficulties suggested above, one can explore the relationship in terms of what music may 'tell' us about philosophy. From what has been said so far, this perhaps rather abstruse-sounding idea can actually be easily illustrated: music 'tells' us that discursive philosophy has considerable trouble answering questions about music in a manner which achieves any kind of durable and widespread consensus. It also tells us that a philosophy which takes music as its object is often not central to what those who produce and receive music actually do. It isn't that composers and performers don't have 'philosophical' ideas about what they produce – think of Wagner after he read Schopenhauer – but their actual production is not necessarily determined by such ideas. The standard response of some philosophers of music to these issues is to maintain that music is either more mysterious than other things, from the other arts, to verbal language, etc., or has been neglected by philosophy, and that philosophy needs to try harder, because music has been 'philosophically misunderstood' (Kivy 1997 p. 139).

Martha Nussbaum has suggested one approach to how such responses can be questioned – though her focus on 'works', is perhaps rather restrictive, given the importance of involvement in music as a practice which we shall consider in a moment:

> Musical works are somehow able – and, after all, this 'somehow' is no more and no less mysterious than the comparable symbolic ability of language – to embody the idea of our urgent need for and attachment to things outside ourselves that we do not control, in a tremendous variety of forms (Nussbaum 2001 p. 272).

In such a view the relationship between self and world is not conceived of primarily in cognitive terms that involve classification of the object by establishing its conceptual status. Instead, the kind of relationship involves an openness to what connects us to the world in meaningful ways which is not reducible to what we can know or say about such connection. The basic issue here is that if we didn't already understand music through our involvement with it before we seek to understand it in philosophy, there would be no issue for philosophy. Music is not just noises that can be described in physicalist terms, and this points to the kind of understanding that it involves, namely an understanding which engages us – and not just emotionally – before we seek explanations, and which is not reducible to such explanations. It is this kind of understanding, which enables music to be heard as music at all, that seems to me to be philosophically most significant, because it is part of how we inhabit the world, and make sense of ourselves and the world. Heinrich Besseler, a musicologist and pupil of Heidegger, suggests that 'The musical originally becomes accessible to us as a *manner/melody* [*'Weise'*, which combines the older sense of 'melody' with the idea of 'way' or 'manner'] *of human existence* ('des menschlichen Daseins')' (Besseler 1978 p. 45).

If one thinks in very crude historical terms about some ways that music and philosophy have related, what is at issue here can be made more accessible. In some ancient philosophy music reflects a pre-existing order of things (for example, in the 'harmony of the spheres'); in Plato philosophy is to legislate which kinds of music can contribute to the order and well-being of the polis, and which are destructive of that order; in some religions music is seen as a form of praise for God, as part of religious ritual. When, in the modern period, the idea of an inherent order of things established by

a higher power comes into question, music and its reception increasingly become objects of scientific inquiry, and, in the philosophy which sometimes sees itself as offering theories akin to those of the natural sciences, becomes something to be explained, in the manner we have seen. However, in contrast, from the second half of the 18th century onwards, music also comes to be understood in the West as a challenge to attempts to order the world in purely cognitive (or ethical) terms, as suggested, for example, by the 'idea of absolute music' (Dahlhaus 1978; see Bowie 2007). Precisely because of its resistance to being fully cashed out in conceptual terms, music is seen as making kinds of sense that can be obscured by a predominantly cognitive stance. The crucial fact here is that this shift goes along with fundamental historical changes in the understanding of language, that develop as the notion of language's divine origin loses credibility. The effects of these changes are, significantly, still apparent in the divide between analytical, and hermeneutic (European/'continental') philosophical approaches to language.

Charles Taylor has suggested understanding this divide in terms of 'designative' theories of language, associated with Hobbes, Locke, and Condillac, which 'favor the description of independent objects above everything else' (Taylor 2016 p. 189), and 'constitutive' theories, associated with Hamann, Herder, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, in which 'language opens up new ways of articulating our grasp of reality' (ibid. p. 174). The point in the present context is that music can be said to constitute new forms of sense in the world by offering new ways of relating to ourselves and the world, and, as such, can be seen as analogous to, or a form of philosophy. The rapid, often critically contested, radical changes in Western music from Bach onwards, or in the history of jazz, are hard to understand if the music in question is seen, for example, as just expressing what Kivy terms 'garden variety' emotions.

The fact that music becomes central to significant parts of secular modern cultural life further suggests that it is better understood in constitutive terms, given that our 'grasp of reality' includes affective aspects, somatic responses involving rhythm and tone, the possibility of generating new sense through involvement in musical production and reception, and the possibility of challenging existing forms of musical sense that may come to conspire with what leads to social pathologies. Important here is also the way in which music (and other art) may cease to make sense in changed circumstances, but can also keep renewing its sense as well. The awareness that the greatest music of the modern period from Bach onwards is still 'alive', not least because it still offers new interpretative possibilities, is central to how we should seek to understand music.

In thinking about the nature of language we use the same language as we are seeking to grasp: the use of metalanguage depends on a prior understanding of language and so cannot involve a wholly external viewpoint on language. The attempt fully to grasp language as an object of observation is therefore ruled out, and music can be seen in related terms. At the same time, language and music are, though, not just objects to be observed, but something in which we participate as part of what constitutes a world of meanings. As such, philosophical attempts to objectify music and definitively articulate it in concepts are intrinsically open to question. Even the simple fact that you can't replace the sense a piece of music makes to a player or listener with a description of that sense indicates why. It is not that the attempt to make discursive sense of music is therefore to be renounced. Hermeneutically and philosophically informed analysis of music, of the kind present, for example, in Adorno's characterisations of the music of Beethoven or Mahler, clearly enables us to grasp more of what we experience in the music. But equally important is the fact that such experience has an ineliminable aspect which resists conceptual articulation. The fact that we so often have recourse to metaphor in seeking to characterise music is an indication of this. This resistance to conceptuality has to do with why music can stay alive for us, and with why this has important implications for philosophy.

'Experience' for many kinds of philosophy is something involving some kind of essential relationship to the world, such as the empiricist apprehension of sense-data, or Kantian constitution of knowledge. The aim of the notion is to incorporate potentially endlessly different moments of human existence into identities that are made possible by concepts. Clearly this is vital for human survival and development, but in a world where such identification based on the reduction of

difference to identity becomes the dominant factor in how things are responded to, the importance of the idea that experience involves more than is manifest in conceptualisation also grows. This idea is essential to the emergence of aesthetics in modernity and to the challenge music can pose to modern philosophy. Jazz pianist Thelonious Monk famously suggested something of what is at issue here with his remark, when someone complained that something that was being played was wrong, that 'Wrong is right'. The sense that music makes is not something predetermined by the rules which music necessarily also involves. It is precisely the transgressing of rules which is characteristic of the development of modern music (and, in related ways, the other arts). What drives this continual movement beyond given norms has to do precisely with a different conception of 'experience'.

The sense music makes is not exhausted by the ways in which we seek to grasp that sense, not least because that sense is constituted in active participation in music. In a discussion of Schelling's idea of 'positive philosophy', which seeks to get beyond a notion of experience that relies on identification based on a system of established concepts, Dalia Nasser suggests that:

> the meaning of the artwork is not exhaustible, and this is *precisely because* it cannot be determined by what preceded it (by its condition) or made into an object within a series of conditions. It is this present-oriented character of looking at works of visual art, or listening to a work of music, that, I think, epitomizes progressive philosophy (in ed. Bruno 2020 p. 245).

Experience here involves openness to new sense, which can be hidden by existing forms of articulation and expression. John Dewey suggests:

> If all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting and music would not exist. There are values and meanings that can be expressed only by immediately visible and auditory qualities, and to ask what they mean in the sense of something that can be put into words is to deny their distinctive existence (Dewey 1980 p. 74).

In his recent work on belief and knowledge, Jürgen Habermas has focused on the way in which aesthetic and religious considerations point to different ways in which we think about philosophy and the ways it makes sense. The following remark on the relationship between Greek philosophy and Christianity suggests a model which is directly applicable to issues relating to philosophy and music: 'In the encounter with Christianity, philosophy learns to take domains of experience seriously that first have to be disclosed performatively through participation in a practice before they can then be made into an object of investigation' (http://habermas-rawls.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/transcript-of-habermass-acceptance.html). He points to the ways in which rituals make sense primarily in terms of participation, and analogises this in certain respects to what takes place in art.

The analytical approach to philosophy can tend to disqualify philosophical appeals to what cannot be cashed out propositionally, hence the direction of the philosophy of music described above, where answers to questions about music are assumed to be a discursive articulations of something non-discursive. 'Language' in such an approach is, as we have seen, primarily regarded in designative terms, which means music cannot be a language. In one sense this is uncontentious, if one characterises language in terms of singular terms, predicates, and the like. However, if one attends to ways in which sense is constituted in broader terms, as suggested by Ernst Cassirer's notion of 'symbolic forms', which lead beyond themselves to enable sense to be made of the world in a multitude of ways, one can meaningfully talk of 'languages of art'.

Habermas develops the analogy between ritual and art by considering how it can actually affect conceptions of language. He warns against 'decoding every form of behaviour that is somehow formalised as though it were a text' (Habermas 2019 p. 223), and suggests that in this context 'the comparison of the language of rituals with the "languages" of art' can be illuminating. Although 'autonomous artworks have a syntax and a semantics that can only be mastered by competent speakers', there is a limit to how far the 'content' of works of art, such as symphonies, 'can be grasped in words', and the limits 'make us aware that aesthetic experiences can be conceptually circumscribed and explained, but cannot be incorporated *without remainder* into explicit judgements' (ibid.).

Works of art involve 'symbolic, but not linguistic communication', and he cites Adorno on the 'similarity to language' of instrumental music (ibid.).

The point is that music is both inseparable from language, insofar as it is a symbolic form, and yet is not a language, if language is conceived of in designative terms. Music resists interpretation of the kind that we employ for many verbal texts, though the dimensions of sense revealed in interpreting poetry are closely related to those present in music. At the same time, music is also something that is interpreted in its own manner. As Adorno says in the 'Fragment on Music and Language': 'interpreting language means: understanding language; interpreting music means: making music' (Adorno GS 16 p. 253), which necessarily involves non-verbalisable forms of understanding. As such: 'Whether a phrase is played in a meaningful manner can be precisely converted into technical correlates like accents, pauses for breath, etc. But in order to carry out this conversion one must first understand the meaning of the phrase' (Adorno 2001 p. 159). The phrase is understood in part through its relationships to the contexts in which it is located which give it its meaning. The recurrence of a phrase in a sonata recapitulation offers a very basic example of what is at issue here. In a successful performance how the phrase is initially played will be affected by this recurrence, and this meaning can be largely lost through failure to take adequate account of its relations to its contexts. Although there will always be conflicts over whether an interpretation is adequate or not, the simple fact that what is at issue involves a particular kind of normativity that means we seek to argue about it indicates that it is not randomly 'subjective'. As Wittgenstein and Adorno both suggest, communication of such norms often has to do with gesture – orchestral conductors often do more with gesture than with verbal explanations of how a passage 'should go' – and relates to communicative responses to the world like facial expressions and bodily movements of the kind that are present, for example, in dance.

In a discussion of the tension between symbolism and explanatory philosophical language in the communication of early Christian doctrine on the meaning of the crucifixion, Habermas echoes aspects of the model suggested above that we related to music:

> For the symbolic embodiment of a semantic content can be more readily illuminated from the perspective of a participant, i.e. from the view of the communicative use of symbols in contexts of action, than from the perspective of an observer who wishes to investigate the relationship between the ways of being of mental contents and the material substrate of signs (Habermas 2019 p. 545).

Underlying this is the idea that we understand through what we do in ways which can be prior to, and which may resist, objectification of what we do. As participants in the enactment of a ritual or the performance of music we experience a kind of sense which is lost if it is reduced to what can be observed from a third-person perspective. The question is, then, what philosophical status one attributes to this kind of activity.

Great music, be it Beethoven's *Grosse Fuge*, or Coltrane's *Love Supreme*, can be said in certain respects to make at least as much sense of the world as great philosophy. Great philosophy, be it Plato's *Republic*, or Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, cannot be said to be great because it is true, because nobody is in a position to assert anything final about its truth. As such, its importance lies in the way it offers renewed opportunities for making new sense by being reinterpreted, and thus changing how the world manifests itself for us. In this respect it is analogous to music. At the same time, the nature of propositional language means that philosophy has to make truth claims that are inherently likely to be doomed to failure. Novalis claims in his *Fichte Studies* that the 'Absolute which is given to us can only be known negatively, by our acting and finding that no action can reach what we are seeking' (Novalis 1978 p. 181) – which explains early German Romantic claims about philosophy's inherently ironic status (see Bowie 2020). Moreover, the fact that philosophical claims are doomed to inadequacy does not have to lead in Hegelian fashion to something more adequate. Music, on the other hand, lives precisely from its circumventing of any kind of claim to definitive sense – hence its link to Romantic irony – such that its failure to make finally determinate sense is part of what enables it to make renewed sense in differing contexts. This might seem a far-

fetched position, but if we think in terms of the ineliminable finitude of the sense we make of the world, including in philosophy, the modes in which we make sense can be subject to different kinds of appraisal, and which of these is 'philosophical' cannot be decided by stipulation.

Music clearly comes into what Habermas sees as 'domains of experience [...] that first have to be disclosed performatively through participation in a practice', and there is no way of fully stepping outside of what we participate in, such that we can finally say what sense it makes in propositional terms. If we say with A.W. Moore that metaphysics is the attempt to make 'maximally general sense' of things (Moore 2012 p. 146), the 'language of art' that is music can be seen as necessary to metaphysics. As such, Heidegger's contention that modern science is the culmination of metaphysics, via 'the dissolution of philosophy into the technologized sciences' (Heidegger 2007 p. 73), may restrict the scope of 'metaphysics' in a manner that can be questioned via music.

Herbert Schnädelbach has suggested one approach to these issues can involve 'negative metaphysics', 'the warranted reminder that discourse does not have complete control of the true and the good: that there is something here which cannot be anticipated by a method, but which must show itself and be experienced' (Schnädelbach 1987 p. 171–2). The natural sciences' replacement of theology as the dominant means of explaining the world is accompanied by the development, in Descartes, Kant, and others, of philosophy focused to a significant degree on grounding such explanation, sometimes at the expense of attention to forms of meaning which are essential to the life-world, that resist explanation from an observational perspective. It is no coincidence, then, that around the same time – from the eighteenth century onwards in the West – as views of language that involve the idea of its constitutive nature emerge, music increasingly moves from being a subordinate art to being regarded as a resource for making philosophical sense of the kind suggested by Schnädelbach (see Bowie 2007).

Wittgenstein's remark in *Philosophical Investigations* that 'Understanding a sentence in language is much more related to understanding a theme in music than one thinks' (Wittgenstein 1984 p. 226) suggests how what is at issue here has implications even for analytical philosophy of language. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein contrasts what can be said with what can be shown, thus adverting to dimensions of sense which escape analysis in terms of constative utterances. Modes of attention to the objective world, such as memory, anticipation, affectively coloured perception, awareness of the quality of the passing of time – which play a crucial role in music – are not part of the objectifiable world, because the sense they make is through the way in which subjective and objective affect each other and change their very status in so doing (see Bowie 2022). As Dewey puts it: 'The oppositions of individual and universal, of subjective and objective, of freedom and order, in which philosophers have revealed, have no place in the work of art' (Dewey 1980 p. 82). Music's capacity for successfully evoking particular experiences of such modes of attention involves a kind of normativity that anyone seriously involved in music, where attention to details of articulation, tone, expressiveness, timing is crucial, has to understand, however imperfectly they may do so.

One manifestation of this normativity is present in the ways in which music can be 'wrong' in a manner related to the way in which utterances can be false, and are felt as such. In both cases we have a sense of 'That's not right', though it may be experienced differently in music and in language. Whilst one is often able to give propositional reasons why music is wrong, especially if a dominant technical norm is transgressed, there is a limit to this, as suggested by Stanley Cavell: 'It is essential in making an aesthetic judgement that at some point we be prepared to say in its support: don't you see, don't you hear, don't you dig? … Because if you do not see something, without explanation, then there is nothing further to discuss' (Cavell 1976 p. 93). Once again the role of participatory sense which resists final discursive articulation, but plays a decisive role in how we communicate both about and in art, is decisive.

So how does this make music 'philosophical', in the sense of the 'philosophy of music' in the subjective genitive? As we saw above, a key aspect of the development of music in modernity is suggested by Monk's comment that 'Wrong is right'. Unlike in cognitive advance, where theories are generally overcome in the name of a more comprehensive account of the object in question and

its relations to other objects, changes in what is 'right' in music need not follow any kind of normative logic. The rationalisation of the tempered scale from Bach onwards, as Max Weber argued, does, admittedly, follow something like such a logic: 'Only the tempering of the scale brought complete freedom to [modern harmonically based music]' (Weber 1921), because it equalised intervals between notes, allowing endless possibilities of modulation between keys. But it is precisely the freedom this brings which is central to what modern music reveals, and to the idea of music's capacity to make new sense. Rather than giving an answer or explanation, music keeps space for new meaning open, at the same time as the sense it makes in the present can demonstrably enhance peoples' lives. By constituting new ways of making sense via new forms of articulation, music adds to what makes sense of the world in ways which cannot be predicted by a theory.

This sense can be exemplified, for example, in terms of the ways rhythm helps locate one in the world that do not involve the constitutive split between subject and object present in cognitive relations to the world, as well as enabling somatic and psychological states that are unattainable in other ways. Schelling refers to rhythm as 'the transformation of a succession which is in itself meaningless into a significant one' (Schelling 1856–61: vol. I/5, p. 494; on this, and the relation to rhythm of Kant's schematism see Bowie 2007). Such transformation is again something which precedes its conceptualisation and is present in the most basic ways in which nature is experienced as ordered, as well as in the ongoing history of the development of new forms of musical rhythm. In this respect philosophy seen in the terms of a thoroughly temporalized modern world is a derivative form of such transformation.

The philosophical power of music from a modern secular perspective resides in one respect in how it can offer a temporary freedom from ineluctable negative aspects of finite human experience by incorporating them into itself and symbolically transforming them. Daniel Barenboim comments that music, which 'is so clearly able to teach you so many things', is also able to 'serve as a means of escape from precisely those things' (Barenboim and Said 2004 p. 122). In the period of the elevation of music to greater philosophical dignity from the end of the 18th century in the West the form of diatonic music often becomes increasingly focused on the creation and resolution of harmonic tension that can end with a triumphant culmination, most strikingly from Beethoven's 5th to Mahler's 2nd Symphony. The pattern of such works relies on the overcoming of negativity such that a kind of redemptive sense emerges from this process itself, as any engaged listener will testify. The fact that art music, from the later Mahler and Schoenberg onwards, then comes to put such resolution in question by expanding and then leaving behind much of traditional harmony echoes the way in which philosophy in Nietzsche and others renounces the idea of a world whose meaning is inherent within it. With Mahler, Adorno claims, music 'caught up in an original manner with Nietzsche's insight that the system and its unbroken unity, the semblance/illusion [*Schein*] of reconciliation was not honest' (Adorno GS 13 p. 213). Whereas the loss of such a world can lead to nihilistic consequences in some scientistic philosophical responses, which seek to explain everything, including music, in reductionist terms, in music itself responses to disenchantment can lead to new sense that is generated by active participation in music.

The story of modernity, philosophy and music told by Adorno can now be seen as too dependent on a particular Western conception of rationalisation, which seeks to fit music into a specific philosophical frame, based on the idea that technical command is common to the development of modern Western societies and the most 'advanced' music. These days it would be hard to sustain this kind of philosophically framed, universalised notion of musical development, though attempts to link new kinds of music to socio-political and philosophical developments can still be revealing. Adorno works from the assumption that the Holocaust has destroyed any possibility of making metaphysical sense of history, even in art. At a global level, this captures something important, but we also need to appreciate how music still offers resources for meaning that, while renouncing any generalised redemptive metaphysical sense, can still resist forms of social, psychological and political repression, offering or sustaining hope for a different world. The history of jazz, for example, testifies to this.

Moreover, music can keep open channels of communication between people who hold irreconcilable views on philosophical, political, and other issues, as the history of the effects of jazz on opposing racism in some contexts, or the spread of 'world music' suggest. The shared sense that music can make possible – it can, of course, do the opposite, dividing people in other ways – may be contingent and fragile, but if one of the tasks of philosophy is the enabling of shared understandings of the world, music may sometimes achieve this more effectively in real social terms than discursive philosophy. As such, the present exclusive focus in some areas of philosophy on music as an object over which we need to gain conceptual command needs to take more account of the ways music may make the kind of sense which such philosophy cannot. In participating in music the sense of a division of subject and object is often only present when something is not right; at other times, the way we are absorbed in listening to or playing music can offer a temporary reconciliation between ourselves and the world. This may turn out to be merely ideological, and so can be misused politically, as modern history shows, which is why modern music often aims at undermining existing forms of sense in music. At the same time, without such experiences of sense which are not primarily cognitive, and which can constitute new responses to a rapidly changing world, our philosophical responses to the world would lack essential dimensions.

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