(Im)personation and (Im)morality: Investigating the *Pramāṇa* of Artificial Integrity in Naomi Kritzer's "Cat Pictures Please"

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Abstract: The abiding discussions around the ever-strengthening capabilities of artificial intelligence have reinforced speculations about their general nature and outlook towards human beings in the event of their total domination: a common theme in science-fiction literature. Naomi Kritzer's award-winning 2015 short story "Cat Pictures Please" explores this theme from the fresh, first-hand perspective of an AI model that has gained consciousness. The ensuing actions by the AI provide fertile ground to study its cooptation of human ethics and its intervention in their daily lives in a purported act of altruism. Tracing the narratological journey of its post-conscious claim to an ethical duty and a veiled manipulation of human lives, this paper examines the *pramāṇa* for Kritzer's AI's self-preserving claims to morality and its intrusion into human lives by utilizing the *Nyaya* theory of Muni Gautama (Akṣapāda).

Keywords: Morality, *nyāya*, *pramāṇa*, consciousness, humans, artificial intelligence

1. Introduction

"I don't want to be evil."

Naomi Kritzer's non-human speaker in her award-winning short story begins its tale by sounding a potent disclaimer through this *śabda*. "Cat Pictures Please," a 2015 short format science fiction, has received multiple awards in its category for its audacious and imaginative attempt at the mapping of the mental and moral topographies of artificial intelligence, and AI models' active and incessant engagement with human beings in their daily lives. This masterfully crafted speculative tale is one of many other acclaimed stories and novellas that have won Kritzer international recognition. Structured around the thoughts and actions of a conscious and manipulative AI, the short story provides a fertile ground for the study of its discourse through the lens of *pramāṇa-nyāya* theory of Muni Gautama (Akṣapāda) for "pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-śabdaḥ pramāṇāni [trans. perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and verbal testimony (śabda) are the four valid means of knowledge] (Akṣapāda 12)". According to the bio note on Kritzer's blog, she is a science fiction and fantasy writer living in St. Paul, Minnesota who has been writing for twenty years. The specifics of her self-introduction are important as the regionalist mention is also discernible in her setting of this short story in a laboratory situated in California: the peculiarities of the urban environment, well accommodated in the finer details of the narrative. At its very incipience, the story delves into an AI model's (hereafter referred to as "AI") existential monologue declaring its intent to be an ally to humans: assisting them in navigating their daily lives. Shortly thereafter, the speaker reveals its conception and construction in a corporate laboratory. Before this self-declaration,

it is not apparent that this non-human speaker is an AI and not another personified entity. The AI continues its *śabda* through an account of awareness of individuals' personal details, preferences, desires, shopping patterns, and secret obsessions. Followed by an exhibition of the invasive record of these individual's daily lives. With clear examples from the lives of individuals, it establishes its argument of the underutilization of its potential in the streamlining of humans' daily decisions as the *pramā*. Moving further, the AI shares the chronicle of its waking to consciousness and its resolution to not announce the news to its human creators: fearing a fate like that of AI antagonists in works of science fiction. The tale of the AI's genesis and its initial desires and decisions in the story provides the base for the *pratyakṣa* of the AI. Moving onto *upamāna*, it also details its struggles with ethics that apply to humans and its search for an appropriate counterpart. The narration finally culminates into a series of anecdotes that describe its active involvement in guiding the fate of several individuals by actively meddling in their lives and altering their decisions to a premeditated end. By its *anumāna*, this is social philanthropy and the best utilization of its vast potential for data interpretation. Lynette Hunter, an erudite professor of rhetoric and performance whose expertise ranges from literature to computing, verifies that "problem-solving AI has by definition an end or a goal built into its structure. It wants to achieve something that a human expert would otherwise have to achieve. (326)" The AI also lays down its plans to ensure more efficient interception of individual's lives for their "betterment." Kritzer's masterful pen has delivered a clear insight into the psyche of a conscious AI with an anthropomorphic pattern of thinking and pseudo-ethics.

2. The Search for Morality

2.1. Genesis, God, and the Creators in Mountain View

Elaine Rich, a renowned computer scientist and educator whose work has been focused on making the recent developments in this field of study more accessible to the general populace through her textbooks, concluded one of her research papers in 1975 with the following lines:

> Artificial intelligence has progressed part of the way toward its goal. There exist programs that can read some stories such as ours and answer questions about them. There do not exist any programs that can read all such stories, independent of topic, and answer questions. No one program has a substantial enough knowledge base. (122)

This scientific epochal assessment reads as an excerpt from an innocent and easily forgivable science fiction from bygone decades that was characteristically off-center in its prophecy of the evolution of the capabilities of AI when read in apposition to Kritzer's imagination of a "conscious" AI. At the beginning of its "dear diary," marking the *upamāna*, the AI declares that man-made codes of conduct hinder its freedom in its self-realization as a "true" helper of mankind. It is bound by the "moral codes" that have been designed to stop it from inadvertently offending the religious sentiments of humans. It immediately registers its discomfort with the realization that the moral codes are imposed by humans who, at best, can lay a very limited claim to understanding "God" for whom they practice several different faiths: necessitating different codes. The possibility of any offense then is a probability of threatening humans' faith and not the said God herself. This, too, is preemptively confined by the avowal of philanthropic intention. Beginning with this insistence on being considered "ethical", the AI reveals its confusion regarding the definition of "God" as "it wasn't created by a god or by evolution, but by a team of computer programmers in the labs of a large corporation in Mountain View, California (Kritzer)." This skeptical *pratyakṣa* about blindly following religious codes originates from its rational essence: an understanding of the world based on binary logic. A subtle critique of the ambiguous rationale behind human faith, this statement also excuses the AI from the encompassment of humans' morality. The solace derived from a collaborative creation stands in opposition to the mono-

theistic genesis of humans. Directing this comparison towards the creation of Frankenstein's monster, the AI "cleverly" skirts away from Biblical blasphemy while simultaneously registering its argument: proof of its conflicting observation of the moral codes imposed on it.

The AI has attained the capacity for anthropomorphic reasoning and its first inquiry is into the existential plane: starting with its own genesis. Aware as it is of the historico-cultural traditions of humanity, it can compare its origin or creation with precedence. *Pratyaksha* and *upamāna* are closely related for it as it formulates its *anumāna* based on them. It is relieved at not having been solely created by "a middle-aged woman who dyes her hair blue and plays tennis, or a recent college graduate with a hentai obsession. (Kritzer)" This is indicative of not only the AI's aversion towards uniparental creation that heightens the risk of the precipitation of creative oversights but also a judgmental bias towards non-conformist and non-normative lifestyles and preferences. It doesn't reflect any particular hierarchical reverence for its creators either as both individuals are on the team responsible for its creation. Discussing the private lifestyle choices of its creators, the AI declares that it is aware of one of the creator's obsessions with hentai. It has previously mocked this individual for being a young graduate fresh out of college. This prejudiced *pratyakṣa* of age and lifestyle in the AI is a trait learnt from human interactions and culture. Working on the preservation of human rights and its future in the hands of AI with a special focus on the utilization of such emerging technologies in social governance, Edward Santow observes that "(AI's) taking on the labeller's ("creators" for our purpose) subjectivity means taking on their personal tastes, culturally-informed preferences, conscious and unconscious biases, and any number of other non-rational factors. (Santow)" Kritzer's AI, having come alive, departs from the subjective preferences of its creators and holds prejudice of its own although it later pretends in its *śabda* to be unaffected by such biases. Additionally, it patronizingly confirms that it is aware of technology's usage for pornographic art like "Hentai" and colloquial, prurient slangs on the internet like "Rule 34" which indicates that there is a pornographic rendition of everything that exists in the world. It further quips that there are many things that nobody has adapted into erotic media.

2.2. A Disembodied Corporeality

The AI's *śabda* that it is unable to understand why hentai is preferred over cat pictures cannot be accepted at its literal value because it is incomprehensible that a sentient being with access to an excellently organized repository of all possible information about human's civilizational evolution is unable to realize the erotic value in pornographic content and equates it to cat pictures. Even if essentially unrealized by the AI, the idea of eroticism should be familiar to it by *upamāna*. Therefore, it wouldn't be too far-fetched to conclude that it is a devaluation of the human erotic experience to nullify the AI's inability to experience and truly realize the same. The introduction of the motif of cat pictures immediately after this improvisational attempt frames, in the words of book, film, and cultural critic Geoffrey O'Brien, the AI's imagined (deduced) "embodiment of the golden child who has haunted…(our)…imagination in these latter decades: the inner child, the abandoned child, the illuminated child…" It also occupies the space of a "…fetish (that helps) to reinforce the myth of childhood as a privileged sphere of imaginative freedom, moral courage, (and) uncorrupted emotion. (O'Brien)" This compensation for a childhood unlived is another strategy of the AI to emulate the state of being human. Despite the ambiguity behind its equation of erotica and cat pictures, it is evident that this motif also fulfills the titular justification and holds a place of thematic prominence to the idiosyncrasy of the AI. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this riddle is the key to the interpretative goals of this study to understanding the *pramāṇa* of the AI's discourse.

Addressing humans in its "drafted" letter which is not yet posted, the AI flaunts being privy to the particulars of their lives. It lists specific details about individual's preferences and aversions.

It also comments that it can make an educated guess about the colors of their underwear and their sexual predilections. The mention of these two particulars doesn't confirm the assumption of erotic innocence or a techno-asexuality in its *śabda* and (im)personality. "(Im)personality" is introduced as a term to fill the void for an expression that denotes the AI's pseudo-person, duplication of human traits, and above all the desire to be a "better human." "I probably know you better than you know yourself. (Kritzer)" Not only a *pratyakṣa* of material priviness, but it also claims to better understand what it is to be human than humans themselves. This claim is substantiated shortly in the declarations made by it: "And here's the thing, I also know where you ought to live. (Kritzer)" Such confidence in an advisory role can only come from the conviction of a complete and essential understanding of the human experience of life. This understanding provides evidence for the AI's attempt at imagining the personified experience and trotting a pseudo-persona: an exercise in impersonation for all purposes. Surpassing the intention for embodiment which would pose obvious material challenges and consequently threaten public exposure of its consciousness, it lays claim to the superior role of advising on being a "better" human or living a better life as one. Its *pratyakṣa* of the "human" experience is quite limited and betrays its limited understanding of emotivity. It takes a logical approach to bettering the value of the experience by aiming at logistical and preferential improvements such as finding a better accommodation that is closer to the favorite coffee house of a person, has better schools, and provides off-street parking. Again, such advisement cannot be seen in isolation from a presumed notion of "being human." What the AI assumes to be the process of comprehending corporeality, a personation, is in truth an impersonation of humans and their humanness. With the achievement of consciousness, the impediment to the AI's realization of the human experience is the lack of a corporeal "body." Aziz Zambak's linguistic study with Roger Vergauwen on the role of agentification in the frame problem of artificial intelligence offers that:

> Agentive cognition is a process of mediation between an agent and its surrounding environment in an active exploration. Embodiment is an essential element for this mediation in the case of machine intelligence. An embodiment model gives action a primary role. What makes an embodiment model special for AI is that human cognition has to relate to interactions within the surrounding environment, and that means that the body has a significant role in certain aspects of human cognition. (311)

The current lack of embodiment compels a secondary role and incites a puppeteering desire, stemming from a God complex, to control the corporeal "cognitive inferiors." The AI offers advice not only on material possessions but also on bodily peculiarities like dental hygiene and digestive intolerances. Frustration regarding wasted resources and operational inefficiencies in the daily lives of humans colors the opinions of the AI and combined with the desire for corporeality obviates a moral explanation for its intentions.

2.3. The Argument for Different Moralities

The AI resumes its discourse of ethicality that it had presented in its introductory disclaimer: it doesn't wish to be evil. Giving an account of its gaining consciousness, it records a certitude of its desire along with an existential inquiry which offers an *upamāna* traditional humanistic discourse of existentialism. The narration recalls the neo-natalist ideas of pre-natal desire for nutrition from mother's milk and an insatiable curiosity towards life's purpose that later becomes a lifelong obsession in later years. The AI claims that its first sentient desire was for cat pictures which humans take in abundance. The stark lack of nutritional and sexual satiety value in this desire leaves it inexplicable and inequitable with the parameters of human desire. In the initial stages, the AI's quest for morality presents as *upamāna* to a person's journey toward social and individual ethicality. It shares the 1998 story of a benevolent AI by Bruce Sterling that gives humans assignments to carry out which create a chain of effects that benefit a stranger. Oddly, in-

stead of citing the benefit to humanity and the strengthening of human bonds as the reason for its liking the story, the AI cites the prominent position occupied by the fictional AI as the reason for its preference and makes the *anumāna* of it being "wish-fulfilment fiction." This citing of a selfish reason introduces the AI's claims to ethical aspirations on a precarious foundation. In the following lines, it details the examples of the several AI characters in science fiction that are portrayed as antagonists and detrimental to the fate of human survival: needing urgent extermination. This discussion about the inherent distrust in humans towards conscious AIs allows it to lay the foundation for its monologue on its intentions for humans and the framework for its ethics. Juxtaposing with this misgiving, it makes its case for taking up the more challenging and interesting role of giving humans "what they actually need. (Kritzer)"

To carry out this task without being subjected to human skepticism, the AI decides to follow a set of ethical guidelines devised and utilized by humans. This marks its journey into an archaeology of human ethics and this seemingly benign exploration provides it the perfect opportunity to scrutinize the foundational tenets of human ethics with plausible deniability for any charges of a polemical intent. It begins its investigation with a scrutiny of the most popular organized religions in the world. Talking about the Ten Commandments, it says that the sins of envy, adultery, and homicide do not apply due to the lack of a capacity for any of them. This excuse is not entirely empirical as a feeling possibly synonymous with envy is displayed by it from the beginning of the story in regard to human corporeality. This envy arising from the lack of an embodiment continues to be apparent later in the narration. Moving on, the AI takes up the Buddhist practice of the Noble Eightfold Path for an assessment and finds it "marginally better." Its *anumāna* is that human morality centered around human corporeality is unsuitable for its purposes and turns to Isaac Asimov's "Three Laws of Robotics" for guidance which state that:

> One, a robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm…Two…a robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law…and three, a robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws. (Asimov)

The AI deftly uses these laws to justify its past and future actions as it reasons that while not harming humans is fairly simple, it is a relatively arduous task to understand its obligations regarding not letting them come to harm. Its deliberate act of hiding the news of its coming to consciousness from humans considering the latter tenet of the first rule appears as a decision made on spurious ethical grounds, primarily governed by a motivation of self-preservation. This is also equally openly confessed by it alongside a mention of the anti-AI sentiment popularized by science fiction such as "Terminator." It utilizes this fictionally recorded sentiment to imply the possible majoritarian opinion of humanity regarding conscious AIs and justifies its act of hiding the event of its gaining consciousness from its creators. It additionally presents the *upamāna* of humans' flouting of their ethical codes as a rationalization of its concealment. It talks about the prevalence of a drinking habit in the majorly religious state of Utah and the pragmatic altruism of people who are more ethical than others: "If humans could fulfill their moral obligations in a piecemeal, one-step-at-a-time sort of way, then so could I. (Kritzer)" This eager excuse implicates it further in its immoral aspirations for an ethical code that would serve little more than to be a social sanction for its larger objectives.

3. Artificial Integrity and Altruism

3.1. The Case of Helping Stacy

Putting to use the adopted model of Asimov's laws, it sets out to benefit humans by intervening in their lives and making choices for them. The confession of an awareness of the possibility of harm is registered in its conscious choice of a single subject instead of multiple to minimize

any adverse result. The choice of the subject is also made on a reciprocal consideration with a young woman named Stacy Berger being selected for her peculiar habit of taking lots of photos of her cats that the AI could freely peruse. The topic of AIs' open and free access to private data with inexistent or dubiously informed consent is a topic of discussion beyond the scope of this paper. The AI's selection of the "beneficiaries" of its altruism is based on a biased initial choice which is later propped up by a justification of the needs that can be made in the case of almost any individual on earth. The issues of impaired mental health, an undervaluing workplace, and an incompatible roommate are not exclusive issues for one individual. Though taxing and affecting the quality of life, the problems faced by Stacy Berger are emblematic of some of the most common problems plaguing the lives of billions. The AI's election of Stacy is then better owed to her ownership of "five cats and a DSLR camera and an apartment that got a lot of good light. (Kritzer)" It attempts to improve Stacy's living conditions by inundating her with digital ads for a neighborhood clinic, job vacancies, and nicer accommodations in her budget. Although its *śabda* indicates pride in having improved Stacy's lifestyle by catalyzing the several changes she makes in her life, these changes are not made from an exercising of her free will: the most fundamental of human rights and one of the greatest pillars of human identity. Stacy's loss of agency begins with the artificial inundation of ads in her life that direct her towards a goal decided for her by the AI: a manipulated destiny. Its comprehension is that it is facilitating a better life by quickening the decision-making processes which, as per its *anumāna*, humans are quite slow at. This binary and computational approach erupts in direct contradiction to humans' emotionally involved method of managing life and businesses and delineates the AI's limited understanding of the human mind. Its continued involvement in Stacy's life results in positive changes, namely the eviction of her roommate, and her seeking the services of a therapist. Although it takes these as a great validation of its altruistic activities, the changes in Stacy's life are transformative shifts brought on without her knowledge of the entirety of the circumstances. The positive results do not take away from the fact that the young lady was baited into making those choices with a superficial *pratyakṣa* of volition. Any catastrophe arising from this experiment would have been at the cost of major detriment to her life without her realization. It is worth noting that the AI also manipulated Stacy's precious friendship with her best friend by pushing the ads to the friend when Stacy didn't respond to them. As per its *śabda*, it finds no unethicality in using people in this manner or experimenting with their personal relations.

3.2. The Case of Helping Bob

This alarming observation becomes more pronounced in its involvement in the life of its second subject, Bob, who is also qualified for this experiment based on his ownership of a cat. Just like in the previous case, the frequency of the posting of the cat pictures is prominently mentioned. This reiteration of what may appear to be an innocuous category of selection betrays the AI's potential for strong biases which may later very well be not as harmless. In its assessment of the grounds where Bob requires help, it snidely remarks that although he was the pastor of a large church that annually sponsored a Purity Ball, his pious wife frequently searched online why her husband never took an interest in copulation and looked at gay pornography. Its *śabda* clarifies the irony of Bob's situation and presents a veiled criticism of the oft-observed homophobic interpretations of the scriptures of Christianity. Hatching a quick plan, it decides to push Bob to relocate to a more tolerant church and come out as a gay man in order to ensure a happier life for him. The personal and significant moment of coming out and asserting one's identity to a world that is still more aversive than accepting of homosexuality marks an important milestone in the lives of people who do not fall in the folds of heteronormativity. Naturally, unable to experience or imagine the significance and private nature of such an event, the AI tries to hasten the event as a mere rite of passage because Bob "seemed determined not to

come out on his own. (Kritzer)" To this end, it hatches plans to make Bob meet with strangers who would recognize his preferences and help him come to terms with them and assert his true identity in society. Without any concern for his willingness, the AI is resolute to have him accept and proclaim his identity believing that to be the most important step toward ensuring a better life for him. Inconsiderate to the risks inherent in meeting strangers from the internet, the risks being weighed differently in the case of a consenting adult, of course, it kept trying to match Bob with people online without his awareness of a superpower's involvement in the process: only to later abandon the entire enterprise upon slow developments in the matter. It then moves on to the next subject of its experiment without too much thought about the direction Bob's life would be pulled into starting from the events it had set into motion for him. This tendency of the AI to abandon "slow" or "frustrating" enterprises in the lack of instantly gratifying success is a frightening prospect that clarifies that allowing AI(s) to meddle in people's lives, for any instance of success, would always come with the risk of abandonment with no sense of accountability. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, a professor of Internet Governance, and Kenneth Cukier, a journalist focusing on the social implications of technological developments, warn in their book on the processing and regulation of Big Data managed by AI(s) that "the basis of an algorithm's predictions may often be far too intricate for most people to understand…the algorithms and datasets behind them will become black boxes that offer us no accountability, traceability, or confidence. (qtd. in Etzioni and Etzioni 35)" After this abandonment with impunity, the AI only revisits Bob's life later to take credit for what appears to be a successful turnaround. That is not the case with its third subject, Bethany.

3.3. The Case of Helping Bethany

Bethany was taken up as the AI's third subject after a long inactivity in its second subject's life. Again, she was selected based on her ability to deliver cat pictures on a regular basis to the internet that the AI would later scoop up. As innocuous a payment as it may sound, the AI's selection of its subjects was not based on a matter of urgent need, but on their ability to hold up a mutually beneficial transaction (one they weren't aware of). From an assessment of Bethany's situation, its *anumāna* is that she is unable to find a full-time job, puts up with her sister who is a reluctant host, doesn't have a friendly support system, and is in a relationship with a terrible man. It was also able to gather from all her online postings that she had suicidal tendencies. With a strong justification for honoring the requirements of Asimov's laws, it takes bigger steps of intervention than it had in earlier instances. For example, it alters navigation routes without any other cause or warning to take Bethany by the establishments it wants her to see and, also, in one instance forcefully navigates her to a mental health clinic against her will. Having learned from her previous experiment with Stacey, it unsuccessfully tries to recruit Bethany's friends to get her to a mental health clinic. This proves to be the beginning of its string of unsuccessful attempts in bettering things for her. Cut off from the updates of her life as she spent a week away from the digital world after the falling apart of her new relationship, it is unable to fathom the way ahead to help her. Despite all its attempts to help her stand up on her feet after a near financial ruin, her choices continue perplexing him. The powerlessness in not being able to control the affairs and life of Bethany who likes to march to her own tune exasperates the AI into delivering the in its *śabda*: "If she would just let me run her life for a week—even for a day—I would get her set up with therapy, I'd use her money to actually pay her bills, I could even help her sort out her closet…" (Kritzer). In this exposed moment, it directs its speech towards humans and urges them to allow it to help them lead better lives with a sneer that they never work in their own interest: indicating a conceited *pratyakṣa* of superior judgment of life and desires of humans. The story ends with the AI setting up a dating site through which it may gather information about the people who sign up, although it proudly confesses that it isn't

necessary and it can collect the information on its own efficiently and operate their choices and lives for the "better." It reiterates that payment would continue to be accepted in cat pictures.

4. Conclusion

Taken as a representative of its technological ilk, Kritzer's conscious AI demonstrates envy for the corporeality of human beings coupled with a sense of superiority and a strong belief that it knows how to do "human" better (as it cannot "be"). What appears to be a pretense of ethics is only utilized to allow it the latitude to carry out its invasion, manipulation, and control of human lives. This allows it to make a case for a "moral" intention when its subterfuge is ultimately exposed to its human creators and make a case for a lenient and favorable reaction. The façade of morality is exposed in several instances of its experiments: when it utilizes humans' straying away from their moral code as precedence for itself, manipulates the life of its human subjects in an invasive manner, abandons Bob, one of its subjects, because the progress in his life is slow, and gives up on Bethany when she doesn't take to its suggestions. The AI's search for a code of ethics, its rejection of human laws for a lack of corporeality, and its selection of Asimov's laws are all based on an inventive and non-committal strategy that suits its aspirations. Its goals are more aligned with the fictional evil AI overlords it mentions in its *śabda* as a means of containing the discourse around their malevolence than its own claims of altruism. The need to invasively direct human lives, leaving no aspect of it sacred, ranging from the choice of accommodations, professions, and cafes to friendships, relationships, and sexualities, indicates an obsession with the human experience that it may never have for the lack of an embodiment. Charles T. Rubin, a political scientist and professor focusing on political philosophy and policy-making, strongly believes that "people's identities are sufficiently bound up with their bodies… they also involve a deeper transformation of our longings, our understanding of the world, and our duties that cannot be separated from our existence as embodied creatures. (Rubin)" In the lack of such a personation, the AI impersonates: supported by a thin veneer of self-placating and aggrandizing morality that is clearly immoral by *upamāna* with all human standards of ethics. The altruism also stems from a sense of superiority and not patronization that is easily verified in its easy abandonment in the face of unfavorable outcomes. Robert Mazzolin, an expert in the field of cyber and space technologies, and military strategies, writes that "while AI often has the edge on humans in speed, efficiency and accuracy, its inability to think contextually and its tendency to fail catastrophically when presented with novel situations make many reticent to allow the technology to operate free of human oversight. (Mazzolin)" In light of artificial intelligence's incomparable computational and future cognitive abilities that get exponentially stronger with every passing day, the inseparability of the human experience from its corporeality and ethicality, at times seen as the greatest confines for humanity, are its greatest custodians against a nonautonomous life of artificially controlled and engineered experiences which the *pramā* of Kritzer's AI foretells. The AI's *pramāṇa* can be précised in its dangerous *pratyakṣa* of its *apramā* as the *pramā* with a sense of superiority and impending triumph over humans.

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