

# *El tamaño del espacio* and the Non-Existence of the World: Lugones and the Ontology of Fields of Sense

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**Abstract:** This article establishes a dialogue between *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) by Leopoldo Lugones and Markus Gabriel's ontology of fields of sense, starting from the question of whether the world exists. While contemporary ontology denies the world as a unified totality, Lugones develops a conception of space that combines sensory experience, mathematical abstraction, and metaphysical reflection. Through his analysis of relativity, finitude, and the dependence of space on position and movement, he destabilizes the notion of a given world. Rather than anticipating its nonexistence, Lugones opens an ontological field where the world emerges through perceptual and symbolic operations.

*Keywords:* Leopoldo Lugones, ontology, fields of sense, space, world

## The Question of the World

Does the world exist? Formulated in this way, the question may seem trivial or excessively abstract; however, it condenses one of the most persistent—and at the same time most re-worked—ontological problems of modern and contemporary philosophy. Far from referring simply to the existence of the entities that populate everyday experience, it interrogates the very status of the world as a totality, as a unified horizon that would contain, order, or ground the appearance of the real. In this sense, asking about the world is not equivalent to asking what there is, but rather what it means for there to be something like a “whole” of what there is, and under what conditions such a whole can be thought, affirmed, or denied.

In contemporary thought, this question has acquired a particularly radical formulation through the ontology of fields of sense developed by Markus Gabriel, whose central thesis maintains that the world does not exist. With this claim, Gabriel does not deny the existence of objects, facts, or domains of appearance; rather, he rejects the possibility of an ultimate ontological totality that would encompass them. The world, understood as the set of all sets or as the absolute field of what exists, thus reveals itself as an inconsistent metaphysical construction. This negation does not entail a dissolution of the real, but a displacement of the problem: what exists always exists within multiple fields of sense, irreducible to one another, none of which can claim the status of a closed totality.

At first glance, this position might appear far removed from certain essayistic texts of the early twentieth century, in which science, metaphysics, and aesthetic reflection coexist without the systematic self-consciousness of contemporary philosophy. However, *El tamaño del espacio* (*The Size of Space*, 1921) by Leopoldo Lugones offers a singular terrain on which to reopen the question of the world from an unexpected theoretical constellation. Far from constituting a mere work of scientific popularization or an enthusiastic commentary on the theory of relativity, the text unfolds a sustained reflection on space, perception, movement, and the finitude of the universe that destabilizes the classical notion of the world as a stable and prior container of beings.

In *El tamaño del espacio* (1921), Lugones articulates forms of knowledge drawn from physics, mathematics, physiology, and metaphysics in order to challenge the intuitive evidence of Euclidean space and, with it, the idea of a world given in itself, homogeneous and infinite. Space does not

appear there as a neutral framework within which things are simply located, but as a notion dependent on position, movement, perception, and rational abstraction. “To take a position or to carry out a movement is to engender space,” Lugones affirms, thereby shifting the problem of the world from an ontology of substance to an ontology of operations. The world, consequently, ceases to be a self-sufficient totality and becomes the unstable effect of sensible, rational, and symbolic coordinations.

The hypothesis guiding this article is that Lugones does not deny the existence of the world in the radical sense proposed by Gabriel, but he does profoundly destabilize its ontological status. In *El tamaño del espacio* (1921), the world does not appear as an absolute totality or as an unconditioned background of the real, but rather as a configuration always mediated by the subject’s perceptual capacities and by the instruments of mathematical reason that organize the understanding of the universe. This conception does not lead to the nonexistence of the world, but it deprives it of its character as immediate ontological evidence and exposes it as a fragile, historically situated, and conceptually revisable construction.

The encounter between Lugones and the ontology of fields of sense is productive precisely at this point. Reading *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) in light of a contemporary ontology does not imply turning Lugones into an anachronistic precursor, nor forcing a conceptual equivalence that the text itself does not sustain. On the contrary, it allows us to recognize in his essay a singular philosophical intervention that, from different coordinates, puts into crisis the idea of a single, totalizable world given once and for all. The ontology of fields of sense offers here a conceptual framework that renders legible the ontological potency of a text habitually relegated to the domain of popular science or essayistic prose, without neutralizing its historical specificity or its anthropocentric imprint.

This study therefore does not aim to reconstruct the history of science in Argentina, nor to assess the accuracy of Lugones’s scientific interpretations, nor to provide an exhaustive exegesis of Markus Gabriel’s ontology. Its objective is strictly philosophical: to inquire into how two heterogeneous conceptions of space and of the real make it possible to reformulate the question of the world and its ontological limits. In this sense, the article deliberately adopts a controlled anachronism, understood not as a methodological error, but as a reading strategy that opens up new fields of sense.

The argument proceeds as follows: first, the ontology of fields of sense and the thesis of the nonexistence of the world are presented in a synthetic manner; then, *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) is contextualized at the intersection of science, metaphysics, and essayistic writing; next, Lugones’s notions of space, perception, and movement are analyzed, along with his critique of the intuition of the infinite; finally, a comparative reading is proposed that allows for an evaluation of convergences and divergences between the two positions and for the extraction of certain ontological consequences from this dialogue. In this way, the article seeks to show that the question of the world, far from being closed, remains an active philosophical problem, capable of being reconfigured through unexpected encounters between distant traditions and texts.

### **Markus Gabriel and the Non-Existence of the World**

The ontology of fields of sense, developed by Markus Gabriel in the series of texts that make up his widely read book *Why the World Does Not Exist* (2015), presents itself as a critical intervention in the landscape of contemporary ontology, aimed at dismantling some of the most persistent assumptions of modern metaphysics. Its point of departure is not the negation of reality nor the dissolution of objects, but rather a questioning of the status of the world understood as a unified ontological totality. In this sense, the provocative thesis according to which “the world does not exist” should not be read as a nihilistic gesture, but as the result of a systematic critique of naturalism, correlationism, and ontological monism, which—albeit from different directions—have tended to conceive the real as an ultimate, closed, and totalizable domain.

Against naturalism, Gabriel rejects the identification of reality with the domain of the natural sciences and, in particular, with the scientific image of the world as a set of physical–material facts.

This reduction, he argues, not only impoverishes ontology but also incurs a performative contradiction: the affirmation of naturalism is not itself a natural fact and therefore cannot be justified on the terms it prescribes. Likewise, the critique of correlationism—heir to the post-Kantian tradition—targets the idea that we have access only to the correlation between thought and being, without being able to affirm anything about what exists independently of that relation. For Gabriel, this position leads to an unnecessary closure of ontology by conflating the conditions of access to being with the conditions of existence of what is. Finally, the rejection of ontological monism is directed against any conception that posits a single fundamental reality—whether material, mental, or neutral—from which all others would derive.

In response to these positions, the ontology of fields of sense proposes a radical reformulation of the ontological problem. Its central concept is that of a *field of sense*, defined as the domain in which something appears as something. This is not a mental space nor a subjective framework of representation, but an ontological structure in which objects can manifest themselves in specific ways. Everything that exists exists in a field of sense; yet there is no ultimate field of sense that contains all others. This irreducible multiplicity of fields constitutes the core of the ontological pluralism defended by Gabriel.

Within this framework, an object is not a material thing in a restricted sense, but any entity that can appear in a field of sense: a stone, a number, an institution, a literary character, or a mental state. Appearance should not be understood here as a subjective phenomenon, but as the ontological fact that something is accessible, determinable, or identifiable within a specific domain. That an object appears does not mean that it is created by consciousness; rather, its existence is always situated: there are no objects “in themselves” floating outside all fields of sense, but neither are there objects reduced to mere subjective constructions.

Gabriel’s central thesis—the non-existence of the world—follows directly from these definitions. If everything that exists appears in a field of sense, and if fields of sense are multiple and non-totalizable, then the world cannot exist when understood as the set of all fields of sense or as the absolute horizon of all appearance. The world, in this sense, is neither one object among others nor a privileged field of sense, but a metaphysical idea that seeks to gather what is irrecoverable as a unity. To affirm that the world does not exist thus amounts to denying the existence of a closed ontological totality functioning as an “ultimate container” of all that is real.

This position requires a careful distinction between existence, reality, and totality. To exist means to appear in a field of sense; the real is not reducible to the physical or the empirically verifiable, but encompasses everything that can appear in some way; totality, by contrast, does not designate an entity or an existing domain, but a claim to ontological closure that cannot be satisfied without contradiction. There is, therefore, no totality of what exists, even though there are infinitely many partial, local, and heterogeneous realities.

The ontological consequences of this thesis are decisive. First, it affirms a strong ontological pluralism: there is no single way of being and no unique fundamental level of reality. Second, it rejects the idea of an absolute ontological framework that would guarantee the unity of the world. Ontology thus ceases to be the science of being *qua* being and becomes instead an inquiry into the conditions of appearance of what exists, without thereby lapsing into a relativist perspectivism.

### The Size of Space

*El tamaño del espacio* (1921) emerges at a moment of intense reconfiguration of the scientific and philosophical imaginary, marked by the early reception of the theory of relativity and by the crisis of classical models of space, time, and causality. The empirical verification of Einstein’s predictions during the solar eclipse of 1919 had an impact that extended far beyond the domain of theoretical physics, projecting itself onto cultural, metaphysical, and epistemological debates on a global scale. In the Río de la Plata, these bodies of knowledge circulated with particular intensity through lectures,

newspaper articles, partial translations, and essays that sought to mediate between the technical complexity of the new theories and an educated public eager to interpret their philosophical consequences.

It is within this climate that Lugones's text must be situated. *El tamaño del espacio* is neither a scientific treatise nor a systematic exposition of relativity, but neither is it a mere work of popularization. It takes the form of an essayistic lecture in which science functions as the trigger for a broader reflection on the status of space, the limits of perception, the scope of reason, and the position of the human being in the universe. Lugones does not write from the standpoint of the specialist, but neither does he write naïvely; his gesture is that of someone who understands modern science as a metaphysical event, capable of destabilizing the fundamental categories through which the world has traditionally been thought.

The hybrid status of the text—halfway between the public lecture, the philosophical essay, and metaphysical speculation—is central to understanding its scope. Lugones does not merely transmit scientific contents, but reinscribes them within a constellation of heterogeneous forms of knowledge that includes contemporary physics, mathematics, biology, astronomy, idealist philosophy, and elements drawn from theosophy. Far from reflecting a lack of rigor, this combination constitutes a deliberate intellectual strategy: space cannot be thought from a single discipline, because it is not an object among others, but rather the very condition of possibility of all objectification.

Lugones's relationship with modern science is, in this sense, both ambivalent and productive. On the one hand, he expresses explicit admiration for figures such as Einstein, whom he presents as Newton's heir and as a reorganizer of the conceptual universe. On the other hand, he resists reducing the consequences of relativity to a merely technical change in physical equations. Science appears in his writing as a privileged mode of access to the deep structure of the real, but not as its final word. Where sensible experience and spatial intuition prove insufficient, mathematical reason opens an indirect access to dimensions of the universe inaccessible to the senses. Yet this access does not close the problem; it multiplies it.

This openness is reinforced by the persistent presence of an idealist metaphysical matrix, visible in the centrality granted to reason, universal harmony, and the correspondence between the structures of thought and those of the cosmos. Lugones conceives mathematics not only as a descriptive instrument, but as the revelation of an ontological rationality that permeates the universe. At this point, his thought approaches Neoplatonic and Gnostic traditions, reinforced by the influence of theosophy, which allows him to articulate modern science and spiritual speculation without perceiving between them an insurmountable contradiction.

The style of *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) is inseparable from this position. Lugonian writing proceeds through analogies and comparisons that do not fulfill a merely rhetorical function, but a conceptual one. Brownian motion, vertigo, the horizon, the heart of the planet, or the polyhedral mirror of reason are figures that make it possible to think what cannot be directly grasped: the structure of space, its immeasurable finitude, its relation to movement and to life. These references should not be read as literary ornament superimposed upon scientific content, but as a mode of thought appropriate to an object that exceeds the capacities of literal representation.

The anthropocentrism that runs through the text—expressed in statements such as that of the subject who recognizes himself as the “center of the universe”—does not amount to a simple or naïve reaffirmation of human centrality, but rather functions as an index of an unresolved tension. On the one hand, space appears as conditioned by the limits of the senses, by physiology, and by the perceptual structures of the subject; on the other, mathematical reason makes it possible to conceive spatial and temporal dimensions that radically exceed human experience. The world thus does not present itself as a neutral and independent stage, but as a problematic field in which perception, movement, reason, and symbolization intersect.

In this sense, space occupies a decisive place in the essay: it is not the passive background against which bodies are arranged, but an ontological problem in its own right. To think the size of space is to interrogate the conditions of existence of the universe, the possibility of its finitude, the relation

between energy and matter, and the status of totality. Lugones does not offer definitive answers to these questions, but he displaces the problem of the world from intuitive evidence toward a zone of conceptual indeterminacy in which space ceases to be a container and becomes the effect of relations, movements, and cognitive operations.

This displacement is what makes *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) particularly relevant for a dialogue with contemporary ontology. Far from being a belated or merely circumstantial text, Lugones's essay constitutes an early intervention in the crisis of the classical concept of the world. Without denying its existence, it subjects it to a series of torsions that prevent it from being thought as a stable and self-sufficient totality. Precisely in this ambiguity—between affirmation and destabilization—lies the philosophical potency of the text, which enables its rereading from current ontological frameworks without reducing it to a mere antecedent or historical curiosity.

### **Space, Body, and Perception: The World as an Effect of Position and Movement**

In *El tamaño del espacio* (1921), Lugones formulates one of his most radical claims when he asserts that “to take a position or to perform a movement is to engender space.” This thesis condenses the ontological core of the essay and decisively displaces the classical conception of space as a prior, homogeneous datum independent of bodies. Space does not appear here as a neutral extension in which entities are located, but as an effect that emerges from the relation between body, perception, and movement. There is no space without orientation, without a bodily reference, without an operation that actively produces it.

This approach entails an explicit—though not always systematic—critique of the idea of space as an entity in itself, conceived as the absolute container of the universe. For Lugones, space does not precede experience; it is constituted through it. Position is not a mere geometrical fact, but an existential condition: to be in a place is to organize a field of relations, to establish directions, distances, and equilibria. Movement, in turn, does not simply modify positions within a given space, but transforms space itself by reorganizing the system of references that renders it intelligible.

Perception plays a central role in this process. Space does not present itself as an immediately accessible totality, but as a progressive construction that depends on the coordination of the senses and the body. Lugones insists that spatial extension is ultimately measured in terms of the organism's perceptual and motor capacities: sight, balance, gait, orientation. Space is thus articulated as a vital function, inseparable from the conditions of existence of the body that perceives and traverses it. It is not a pure abstraction, but a mode of ordering the world linked to survival, movement, and adaptation.

At this point, the essay unfolds a profoundly dynamic conception of space. Stability is not its original feature, but a secondary effect of relatively constant perceptual habits and motor coordinations. Vital equilibrium—the capacity to orient oneself, to anticipate trajectories, to maintain a stable relation with the environment—produces the illusion of a fixed and objective space. Yet this illusion breaks down once the relativity of movement, the variability of points of reference, and the dependence of space on the observer are introduced. The world ceases to appear as an immobile stage and is revealed instead as a mobile web of relations.

Lugones's anthropocentrism is inscribed precisely within this framework. When he claims that the subject is the “center of the universe,” he is not simply reaffirming a traditional metaphysical hierarchy, but indicating that all spatiality is organized around an embodied point of view. The center is not an absolute ontological privilege, but a structural function: each body constitutes a center from which space unfolds and acquires meaning. The universe has no center in itself; it has one only in relation to a concrete position, to a situated organism.

From this perspective, the world cannot be understood as a preexisting, closed, and self-sufficient totality. What we call “world” is the result of perceptual, rational, and symbolic operations that articulate a coherent field of experience. Space does not contain the world; it is one of the forms through which the world is constituted as possible experience. Lugones does not deny the reality of

the universe, but he deactivates the idea that this reality presents itself as a given whole, independent of the conditions of appearance.

This displacement brings his thought partially closer to certain contemporary critiques of the model of the world as an ultimate container. As in the ontology of fields of sense, the idea of a spatial totality functioning as the absolute horizon of all that exists is rejected. Yet the convergence is only partial. Whereas in Lugones the production of space is anchored in the human body, in perception, and in a reason that retains a privileged place, contemporary ontology formulates this critique from an ontological pluralism that does not grant constitutive centrality to the subject.

The difference in grounding is decisive. In Lugones, the world appears as the effect of vital and cognitive operations that, although relative, retain an aspiration to unity and harmony. The space engendered by movement does not fragment the universe into multiple incommensurable domains, but ultimately refers to a rationally thinkable totality, even if it is never fully graspable. Thus, the world is destabilized as a given, but not dissolved as a horizon.

This tension—between the critique of space as a given in itself and the persistence of an ultimate unity—constitutes the most fertile point of the essay. It is here that the philosophical potency of *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) resides: the world can no longer be thought as a thing among things, nor as an absolute stage, but as an emergent configuration dependent on positions, movements, and modes of appearance. Precisely where Lugones does not go so far as to deny the existence of the world, he nevertheless succeeds in putting its classical ontological status into crisis, opening a field of problems that engages productively with contemporary ontology.

### Against the Intuition of the Infinite

In *El tamaño del espacio* (1921), Lugones's critique of intuitive space reaches its most systematic point when it draws on mathematics as a means of dismantling sensible evidence. If in the previous sections space appeared as the effect of position, movement, and perception, here a decisive shift is introduced: intuition, far from offering privileged access to the reality of space, is revealed as a persistent source of illusion. Spatial infinity, as it is imagined in everyday experience, is not a feature of the universe but an anthropological projection derived from the limits of perception.

Lugones insists that the intuitive representation of space spontaneously tends to conceive it as unlimited, homogeneous, and continuous. This image corresponds less to the structure of the universe than to the organism's inability to conceive a definitive limit. The mind indefinitely prolongs the experience of extension because it lacks a direct experience of an absolute boundary. In this sense, infinity is not an ontological property of space, but the result of a psychological extrapolation: an illusion produced by reason when it remains bound to sensibility.

Mathematics then intervenes as a device of rupture. Unlike perception, which organizes space from the body, mathematical abstraction makes it possible to think spatial structures that directly contradict intuition. Non-Euclidean geometries—associated by Lugones with the theories of Riemann and Lobachevsky—and the cosmological consequences of Einsteinian relativity undermine the idea of an absolute and infinite space. Space ceases to be the universal stage of entities and becomes a formal construction, dependent on internal relations and specific conditions.

At this point, mathematics fulfills a precise ontological function: it does not describe what space "seems to be," but frees thought from the tyranny of appearance. Lugones conceives abstraction as a non-sensible access to the structure of the universe, a path that allows thought to grasp the real where intuition fails. Reason, when emancipated from immediate experience, reveals that space can be finite without edges, curved without a center, limited without an exterior. Finitude thus ceases to be a defect or a lack and becomes a structural feature of the universe.

The affirmation of finitude has a central ontological relevance in the essay. A finite universe can no longer be thought as an absolute whole that contains everything without remainder. Finitude implies closure, but also the impossibility of spatial transcendence: there is no "outside" of the universe,

nor a totalizing point of view from which it could be grasped. The world, understood as a spatial totality, thus loses its claim to infinity and, with it, its status as the ultimate foundation of the real.

Lugones clearly identifies the illusory character of infinity when he links it to a human need for the absolute. Infinity appears as a symbolic compensation for the fragility of the body and the limitation of experience. To think space as infinite is to project onto the universe a desire for endless continuity, an aspiration to permanence that contradicts the finite structure of existence. In this sense, infinity is not a scientific or ontological category, but an imaginary figure that reveals more about the subject than about the world.

However, this critique does not culminate in a rejection of reason. On the contrary, Lugones assigns abstract rationality an almost revelatory role. Mathematics not only corrects intuition, but also allows a glimpse of a truth of the universe inaccessible by other means. Yet this exaltation of reason coexists with an awareness of its limits. Abstraction can dismantle the illusion of infinity, but it does not provide a definitive image of the world; it produces models, structures, hypotheses that replace one set of certainties with others that are equally provisional.

Here a fundamental tension of the text emerges. Reason appears simultaneously as an instrument of disenchantment and as a new source of limitation. If it liberates thought from sensible evidence, it also confronts it with forms of spatiality that exceed all imaginable representation. The finitude of the universe, thought mathematically, does not lead to a transparent totality, but to a structural opacity: the world is no longer infinite, but neither is it fully knowable.

It is at this point that an unexpected affinity with the ontology of fields of sense emerges. By denying infinity as a feature of the universe, Lugones weakens the idea of an absolute and totalizing world. Yet the distance is equally clear. Whereas the ontology of fields of sense radicalizes this critique to the point of denying the existence of the world as a totality, Lugones preserves the idea of a rationally structured universe, albeit finite and refractory to intuition. Mathematics does not dissolve the world; it reconfigures it as a problem.

Thus, *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) occupies an intermediate position: it rejects intuitive infinity and absolute space, but does not abandon the aspiration to an ultimate unity of the universe. Finitude does not close off thinking about the world; rather, it renders it more complex, more demanding, and more aware of the distance between reason and reality. In this tension—between revelation and limit—lies the ontological originality of the essay and its productivity for contemporary dialogue.

### Does the World Exist?

At this point, the intersection between *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) and the ontology of fields of sense can be made explicit through a shared—though not identical—question in its formulation or implications: does the world exist? In Markus Gabriel, the answer is unequivocal. The world, understood as the absolute totality that would contain everything that exists, does not exist. Its non-existence does not entail the denial of reality or of objects, but rather the rejection of an inherited ontological figure: that of the ultimate container that unifies all beings under a single horizon. In Lugones, by contrast, the world is not denied, but it is profoundly destabilized. It does not appear as a totality given in itself, but as a dynamic organization dependent on perceptual and rational operations.

Both authors converge in a decisive critique: the world cannot be thought as a neutral and absolute receptacle in which things are simply located. This critique runs through *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) when Lugones rejects the idea of an infinite, homogeneous space prior to all experience, and it is radicalized in Gabriel through the denial of the world's existence as a totality. In both cases, what is called into question is the metaphysical inheritance of a "whole" that would precede and ground particular entities.

The convergence becomes even clearer in their shared rejection of absolute infinity. For Lugones, spatial infinity is an illusion born of anthropological intuition; for Gabriel, the idea of an infinite totality is a metaphysical residue that leads to insoluble paradoxes. In both cases, infinity ceases to be an attribute of the world and becomes a conceptual problem. The world resists totalization.

These affinities, however, should not obscure profound and irreducible differences. The most evident is the anthropocentrism that structures Lugones's thought. In *El tamaño del espacio* (1921), the world always appears tied to the subject's position, to the body, to vital equilibrium, and to symbolic capacity. Even as Lugones criticizes space as a given in itself, he does not abandon the idea of a human center from which the universe is organized and acquires meaning. The world, though destabilized, remains a world for someone.

In Gabriel, by contrast, the critique of anthropocentrism is constitutive. Fields of sense exist independently of any subject that might unify them, and objects appear within them without requiring a central instance to organize them. The non-existence of the world implies precisely the impossibility of any total point of view—human or non-human—capable of gathering what exists into a single structure. Where Lugones preserves a center, Gabriel dissolves it.

Another crucial difference lies in the metaphysics of harmony that runs through Lugones's thought. Even when the world ceases to be infinite or stable, the idea of an ultimate coherence persists, of an underlying unity that reason and symbolic language can glimpse. Space may be finite, curved, or relative, but it is not chaotic: it responds to a deep legality that sustains an aspiration toward synthesis. In Gabriel, by contrast, there is no general ontological harmony. The plurality of fields of sense does not converge in a higher unity; reality is irreducibly multiple.

This difference is also reflected in the function of language. For Lugones, language—and metaphor in particular—possesses ontological power: it does not merely describe the world, but participates in its symbolic organization. The world is articulated, in part, through linguistic operations that reveal analogies, correspondences, and rhythms. In Gabriel, language neither creates nor harmonizes reality; it allows reference to already existing fields of sense without totalizing them. Symbolic function is not generative in the same way.

For these reasons, reading Lugones through the ontology of fields of sense does not entail turning him into a precursor or subsuming him under contemporary categories. Rather, it involves recognizing in *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) another possible ontology of the world—one that does not deny it, but conceives it as effect, as dynamic construction, and as problem, rather than as ultimate foundation. Lugones's world exists, but not as a closed totality or an absolute stage; it exists as an unstable articulation between body and reason.

The productivity of this intersection lies precisely in its character as a controlled anachronism. By placing Lugones in dialogue with Gabriel, the aim is not to establish forced equivalences, but to illuminate zones of tension that allow both bodies of thought to be reread. Lugones thus appears not as a forerunner of contemporary ontology, but as a thinker who, from a different historical and conceptual horizon, confronted a question that remains central: what does it mean to say that the world exists, and under what conditions can that existence be sustained without falling back into the illusion of an absolute totality?

In this way, the question of the world does not close with a univocal answer, but unfolds as a problematic field. Between the non-existence of the world and its dynamic organization, between the negation of totality and its destabilization, a theoretical space opens in which ontology ceases to be a closed doctrine and becomes a persistent inquiry into the very limits of the real.

### Conclusion

Throughout this paper, a dialogue has been proposed between *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) by Leopoldo Lugones and Markus Gabriel's ontology of fields of sense, not with the aim of establishing historical filiations or identifying conceptual anticipations, but rather to interrogate a persistent ontological question from two heterogeneous theoretical configurations: the existence of the world. This trajectory has shown that, although both authors depart from different premises and arrive at divergent conclusions, they share a decisive critique of the conception of the world as an absolute totality and as the ultimate container of reality.

In Gabriel's case, the thesis of the non-existence of the world functions as a precise negative operation. It does not deny the reality of objects or the multiplicity of what exists, but rather dismantles the idea of a unified totality that encompasses everything. The world, understood as an ultimate and exhaustive horizon, does not exist; what exists instead are multiple fields of sense, irreducible to one another, within which objects appear. This pluralist ontology allows reality to be thought without recourse to a totalizing foundation and without falling into relativism or subjectivist constructivism.

In Lugones, by contrast, the world is not denied, but is profoundly problematized. *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) disarticulates the notion of a world given in itself by showing that space—and with it, the world—emerges from operations of position, movement, perception, and abstraction. The world does not precede the subject as a stable stage; rather, it is dynamically constituted through a relation between body and reason. Although this conception retains a marked anthropocentrism and a metaphysics of harmony, it nevertheless prevents thinking the world as an absolute, infinite, or self-sufficient totality.

The answer to the question that runs through the article—does the world exist?—cannot be formulated univocally. From the ontology of fields of sense, the world does not exist as a totality; from Lugones's perspective, the world does exist, but not as a substance or as an ultimate container, rather as a dynamic organization always relative to certain operations. In both cases, the world ceases to be an immediate given and becomes an ontological problem.

The main contribution of this work lies, first, in a philosophical rereading of Lugones that displaces his work beyond exclusively literary, essayistic, or divulgative frameworks. *El tamaño del espacio* (1921) thus appears as a singular ontological intervention, capable of entering into productive dialogue with contemporary debates without being subsumed by them. Second, the article proposes an expansion of current ontological debate by incorporating a non-canonical voice from twentieth-century thought, showing that the question of the world is not the exclusive province of contemporary academic philosophy.

Finally, this dialogue opens up a series of possible lines of research. Thinking Lugones beyond literature entails reconsidering other marginal or hybrid ontologies situated at the borders between science, metaphysics, and writing. At the same time, it invites exploration of how certain philosophical intuitions of the twentieth century, formulated outside the traditional centers of theoretical production, can enrich current discussions on reality, ontological plurality, and the limits of the world. In this sense, the world is situated in an intermediate space: neither an existing totality nor a mere illusion, but a persistent ontological problem.

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