

Philosophy Manifesto

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Αθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοί ἀθάνατοι...¹

Heraclites

मृत्युश्चरणंप्रपन्नोऽमृतं...²

Chandogya Upanishad

Theme

Philosophy is neither the explanation of the world nor the way to change it. Philosophy is the world in its original sense. The source of philosophy is death. In it philosophical idea characterizing the very nature of the human being reveals itself.

Around thirty thousand years ago, in the epoch of the Gravettian culture, man sets up ceremonial burials (the “polished” skulls *Homo sapiens idaltu* discovered in Ethiopia are to be considered as the practice of ritual murder). Death becomes the element of consciousness; humans start not just being conscious of death, they think death.

Death, having entered the human consciousness, brings about philosophical reflection. We don't know what were the feelings of that far-off man building the grave for his siblings: Was it sorrowful or delightful to send a close to the safer world or, sending him there, he knew that the separation will not last long. Importantly, death, entering consciousness, changed the mode of human thinking forever. Transcendence results from reflecting death; God is secondary to the proto-philosophical act of thought, to the consciousness that devoured death.

Burials are the primal act of philosophy, the first judgment about abstract things. Inventing the burials for his siblings, the human being initiated his thought to the incomprehensible and mysterious. The understanding of the latter can happen only within philosophy, for it is impossible to comprehend death in the concepts of existence.

Why do the dead need burials? To this childish question one can give a following answer: burials are the living being's business. Someone may say: “philosophy, then, is necessary just in order to understand death which conditions the first one...” Objection: philosophical consciousness is indeed the condition of death, however not in the sense that philosophy makes death possible but that it recognizes death as such. Death doesn't come to someone who has no idea of dying.

Freud wrote about death and studied it as one of his chief subjects; in Freud it

remained the cause of anxiety. In the Freudian psychoanalysis death is an ‘empirical’ proof of the unconscious. Man's inmost anxiety is to die, i.e. this anxiety resides in the unconscious. But it is not yet a skill to think death. Jim Morrison would have said “Fuck death” that in no way implies desire, like in the case of mother. “Fuck death” means only this: *Get rid of it, Go to hell*, etc. Someone can find in it a tautology since “fuck” and “death,” at the level Freud was concerned about, are the synonyms. In spite of all attempts, before and after the classical psychoanalysis, to comprehend death, the Western vision of it as absence did not help in solving the problem. The apophatic model, taken from theology, even if it was effective in the case of the transcendent, is not applicable to death. At first glance, God is unknowable as death; his presence opens to one who becomes God himself (not haphazardly that the Islamic mystic Mansur al-Hallaj, who said “I am God,” and the Azerbaijani poet ‘Alī ‘Imādu d-Dīn Nasīmī, who repeated these words, both paid their lives).

In the beginning gods suffered, vanished and died like men. Thus at the beginning of history Dumuzid the Shepherd, a Sumerian god, died. The literary sources inform that Dumuzid dreamed of his own death and tells Ngeshtin-ana, who tells him it is a sign that he is about to be toppled in an uprising by evil and hungry men coming to Uruk for the king. Married according to his wish, Dumuzid was sent to death by his wife, more precisely to the eternal death. He managed to escape several times but the underworld's cruel messengers captured him. The story of Dumuzid is probably the first dramatic narrative about the ineluctability of death.

When Nietzsche said “God is dead” he meant something else: the end of *the* God, the very idea of the divine, but afterwards this saying got a more sophisticated meaning. Man lost his ability to think of death and such a disability closed down his consciousness for philosophy. The search of salvation, being the pinnacle of all the world religions, ended in Europe. Death took over the man without coming *de facto*. Today the twice-dead settle Europe: those who know they will die and those who turned away from philosophical reflection.

Axiom 1: There is no consciousness desiring its death.

The understanding of an individual death and the idea of God is the most fundamental revolution that ever happened to the human consciousness. Today we are on the threshold of the next revolution: to conceive death as a mental event. It means to do the maximal philosophical action possible for consciousness. As a result we will see the radical transformation of death and God.

Poor minds can't manage without these two appealing to illusory ontology which seems better than the renewal of the foundation of consciousness. Those who nowadays strive for salvation in that illusory way should go on leave. The revolution of consciousness is not to apperceive death (and God) but to *abperceive* it; thus the human being will recreate himself anew. The end of history, oft-debated for the last three decades, will be replaced by the abperceived death.

The history of consciousness began with two fundamental tasks: to apperceive death and the transcendent. Remaining incomplete, however, these two tasks defined

the very nature of consciousness. To solve them is to grasp the nature of consciousness itself. We are not talking about the Hegelian ‘ablation’ of the idea of death and God, but about the *abperceiving* which removes their existence.

Axiom 2: The apperceived doesn’t exist, i.e. not subjected to death, the existing is not apperceived.

Death takes place beyond consciousness, into existence, but not beyond the possibility to conceive it. The complexity of death is for us that it has no its proper ontology to be deprived of, however this paves the way to its non-ontological understanding: neither as an object nor as an event but as the defined time of consciousness itself. Metaphysics, being generated by the mind wholly directed at death, gives such data.

What does it mean to think death? The paradox that eluded metaphysics is as follows: thinking death we think indeed only our dependence on it creating thus a thanatological subject. As to death, it escapes from consciousness which sees itself existing. *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes is insufficient to get rid of the death dependence. This is why the essential insufficiency of consciousness consists in its existential self-perception.

So, today’s mission is to *abperceive* death and to remove all the ontological obstacles linked with the idea of existence.

More philosophico

Man cannot be deprived of philosophy since it is not a property at all; philosophical activity always directed at its source because everything else is of relative importance. Rigorously speaking, philosophy has no subject, and this is what the majority of philosophers deny, since being, essence, etc. are not its subject but the positions of consciousness determining the degree of consciousness’s bond to existence. Then, can philosophy outstep its own limits in a way to become the radically other? No, because philosophy has no “other” or “beyond;” in others words it knows no non-philosophy. If we talk about a genuine philosophy, any “other” is another possibility of consciousness. If it is a spoof then any “other” will remain just the clumsy exercises of narcissistic minds (cf. below).

Philosophy is distinct even from an elegant mathematics which works with formalized abstractions. Let’s give some examples:

α) Dedekind cuts whose purpose is to provide a sound logical foundation for the real number system. A set partition of the rational numbers into two nonempty subsets S_1 and S_2 such that all members of S_1 are less than those of S_2 and such that S_1 has no greatest member. In other words, Dedekind realized that the straight line is more “filled out” than the set what gives the idea of continuum. The idea was to articulate that a real number α intuitively is determined by the rationals smaller than α and those larger than α . Dedekind cuts are the abstract generalization of intuition.

β) Georg Cantor made a similar observation when he generalized the features of natural numbers by his set theory. Cantor’s radicalism consisted in his demonstration of some objects lying beyond the human intuition.

γ) Ricci flow, the background of the Poincaré Conjecture solution: every closed, smooth, simply connected 3-manifold is diæomorphic S_3 or simply a sphere. Ricci flow is a process that deforms the metric of a Riemannian manifold in a way formally analogous to the diffusion of heat, smoothing out irregularities in the metric. Ricci flow is a geometric “time” describing the curvature of surface as long as it curves. A trivial case is a wineglass whose neck shrinks into the point under Ricci flow.

Even such a complicated mathematical device as Ricci flow, dealing with probably the most speculative matters, is very distinct from philosophical reflection. Ricci flow and noetic flow in phenomenology differ from each other as to the first one is a means helping to solve a task and the second is the possibility to set a task. Setting a task means thinking of something as a task but it doesn’t mean understanding its very possibility, i.e. the consciousness of the thinking one.

Philosophy doesn’t seek for an ideal language based on an illusory logical syntax, as it was imagined by the Austrian positivists, the intellectual hobos who took themselves for the inquisitors of metaphysics. They have seen in science what it has never been: salvation. By reducing the variety of meanings to a set of basic concepts and rules they snuffed out the possibility of setting any philosophical task. Philosophy left them, science closed its doors.

It is worth remembering the positivist lesson since it shows the case of “non-philosophy” when the thinking subject makes an attempt to exorcise his own thought.

Philosophy goes beyond physics. By posing the question about the beginning it time and again finds itself in a metaposition regarding the content of the question. If physics seeks and tries to prove the existence of a hypothetical element, say, Higgs boson, philosophy inversely treats existence only as a concept. This is why the beginning of philosophy is that moment when the human being apperceived death, i.e. something that doesn’t exist. Any attempt to ground philosophy on its own concepts is doomed to failure; such attempts are based on the wrong intuition to ontologize consciousness. Kant studied this type of intuition in the opening chapters of his *Critic of Pure Reason* (1787) having come to a conclusion that consciousness is a reflecting contemplation. One of Kant’s feeble points is the following: his theory of *a priori* synthesis says nothing about the conditions under which consciousness apperceives intuition, how the latter becomes the subject of consciousness?

How to omit the conversion of intuition into ontology? The question seems to have even bigger significance nowadays laying out illustrative historical examples before us: the Hegelian being, the Marxist master-class or the various shapes of *Dasein* and Δντοϛ appropriate consciousness *within* existence and, more importantly, *as* existence. It began with Aristotle and his doctrine of οΠσά. Everything that exists, says the philosopher, *ex-ists* the οΠσά; to this unfinished actualization the subject’s consciousness owes its own existence.

Ontological presumption articulated by the Sarvāstivādins in India and by the realists in Europe weakens the faculty of consciousness to think the out-existing other. Consciousness is not linked with being otherwise than by the acknowledging of

its existence. But such acknowledging is not yet knowledge in the true philosophical sense or abperceiving; the latter doesn't exist. Indeed, it can't exist since it apperceives the existence itself as non-existence.

The greatest philosophical problem today is to learn thinking out-essentially: the way, we believe, God thinks. The time came when philosophy can replace God. This is why the key to immortality lies not in the death of God, as Nietzsche once assumed, but in the apperceiving of non-existence. The Yogācārins view it as the appearing-disappearing dharmas. Dharmas appear and disappear without having such a feature as existence.

Axiom 3: Consciousness slips off from existence; it ceased to exist when it starts abperceiving what it is.

Thus we got the idea of the highest philosophical action. A thought, capable to abperceive everything including itself, creates philosophy and the out-based thinking field where thinking is not an activity directed at a thing – a thought which is not the subject of consciousness – but an act freed from the metaphysical system within which consciousness is bounded to essence.

We call it “the sacrificial nature of consciousness.” Its origin, let's stress it once again, goes back to Aristotle.

Finally, metaphysics converted the consciousness of the primitive sacrificator into onto-epistemological concepts. Trying to talk to gods by sacrifice, the man finds himself before a fundamental problem as to how one can overcome death. In history consciousness has been trying to solve this problem by sacrificing the very idea of death; death was apperceived as a complete stranger to consciousness. It was an epistemically wrong skew, for as existence death is ungraspable. The man didn't manage to think death because thinking it has turned out the essence of death itself.

Axiom 4: The sacrificial consciousness can't apperceive death due to its ontic connection to the latter.

Philosophy breaks down this connection.

Indo-European Philosophy

In Europe the deathful is not only included in the culture production, it stays closely to the divine. Death and God are homologous for the European mind. Nietzsche bamboozled his contemporaries: if God is dead, how can we bury him? How can we bury someone who is the cause of burials? So, consciousness was faced with the necessity of apperceiving its own omniabsence.

Philosophy is not a regional occupation by definition. It became so after World War II. Medieval merchants crossed over the continents for the sake of their business, philosophers opted for safety. The philosophical map of Europe became much similar to parishes in the feudal Germany: pray and cry at place of residence. Only fools and bigoted academic dons may do philosophy today without, say, considering Indian schools. Philosophy, divided into the squares of competence, often justifying the fabrication of meager texts, can't be called contemporary. Doesn't it sound absurd that philosophical work is governed either by political, or politically correct discourse, or

still worse by a meek self-censorship? Today philosophical work is squeezed in the edge stones of comfort, and all they wish from philosophy is the innuocuity.

But there is another “today” stemming from diverse intellectuals tendencies and taking shape of a coherent project: there are the thinkers neglecting the formalistic limitations and tuning their minds on the Indo-European perspective, i.e. including in the work both Indian and European thought. Let's stress: we are not talking about the experts in certain fields or the comparatists but about the philosophers capable of apperceiving their work in such a way that it gets embedded into Indo-European thought, at least. Briefly, we are talking about the philosophy that abperceives death.

In India the question about death became the most severe test for consciousness. From it appears the resistance to death that classical Buddhism transforms into the problem of man-as-the-limit and teaches the ways to eliminate it. The highest aim is to apperceive death not as the givenness that everything will be over one day but as a state of consciousness ignorant about such givenness. The exit to the out-of-death reality where death becomes a mental event, discloses a radical difference between consciousness and being. Śāṅkara and Hegel are mistaken when they identified one with another. Death has no being for there where it is, “is” disappears; easy to understand. This is why the philosophical consciousness is not only a condition of death but also the way to overcome it. If to apperceive death as something without givenness and subjected to consciousness, and thus having no its proper ontology, the result will be not the self-consciousness, always meditating on the human finitude, but the origin of consciousness knowing zero time of death.

Axiom 5: Philosophy is stronger than God.

Axiom 6: Only philosophy can save God from death.

In Europe people buried the dead, in India they buried death which has been kept in the state of constant apperceiving. In Europe, inversely, death keeps consciousness in the state of anxiety. However, these distinctions, indisputably important as they are, should not become an obstacle in bringing both philosophies into unity. This matters little that there is no word “φιλοσοφία” in Sanskrit and the Greek language has no equivalent for “dharma” or “sāṃkhya.” Everyone who thinks philosophically will find the apt concept. Just mentioned ‘bringing into unity’ implies not an historical synthesis but a mental one.

Let's repeat: there is no comparatism here like *ātman-brahman* of the Upanicad with Spinoza's idea *deus sive natura* or St. Thomas' ontology with Mahayanist *tathāgatagarbha* or *saCtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraGa* (Proof of Others' Continuums) of Dharmakīrti with Wilhelm Schuppe's *Solipsist*. We don't compare Krishna Bhattacharya and Ernst Cassirer on the basis of their conceptions of symbolic forms or, together with Hajime Tanabe, the Christian κένωσις and *śūnyatā* on that basis that both ideas lead us, striving for salvation, to the Pure Land (淨土宗 *jōdo-su*), to the absolute.

By the “Indo-European thought” we mean first of all a unified mental field covered with the same set of problems and marked by one super-problem: by means of

intuition and intellectual reasoning to attain salvation. Put it differently, the idea of salvation is so profoundly entrenched in the philosophies of India and Europe that its epistemological impact was very strong. This directedness at salvation within the thinking mind compels the philosopher to see things from this perspective. In other words, philosophy can't go on without the question about its origin.

To begin anew is not to die and resurrect or imitate the Hindu idea of cosmic death and rebirth with no stop; it means to put into doubt everything including the philosopher's thought. There is a good number of such self-renewing. Let's name just three: Nāgārjuna's *madhyamika*, Descartes, Husserl's phenomenology later biased by Heidegger toward his pseudo-theology. One can call this bias "μετάνοια" corresponding to the Japanese 悟 (*satori*) or 見性 (*kenshō*). Hajime Tanabe preferred the word *sange* meaning the roll-over of thinking into existence, the confession in one's guilt. The consciousness of guilt (*sange*) retains the subject within ontology changing not one's consciousness but the apperceiving of one's existence. *Sange* is the closest neighbor of *Sein-zum-Tode* which implies the complete ontologisation of consciousness. *Sange*, confession transforms consciousness into being. The *sange*-consciousness derives from existence and knows itself only as obstacle. Tanabe is a European thinker writing in Japanese; pairing himself with the Judaic prophets, Tanabe attributes to *sange* universal character. It gives an existential understanding of *śūnyatā* fortified by the Evangelic collectivist feeling. The consciousness of guilt liberates the human being not from guilt but from the consciousness itself. The Heideggerian *Sein und Zeit* belongs to this type of confessional discourse where the thought, directed at Being, seeks to justify itself ontologically. Consciousness apologizes for what it is and for being the obstacle to Being. But it is temporarily and will go away as a good servant. This is an illustration of the metaphysics of anti-consciousness that tamed man to worship death and existence.

This is why a collateral job today is to kill Heidegger. And let him to be killed by those who love him. By doing this they will free their heads from his Romantic razzmatazz.

Today and yesterday the European is guilty not because he or his ancestors committed crimes but by the very fact of thinking. Like karmic deeds, he accumulates his guilt by thinking and apperceiving existence. Guilty is not just a man but consciousness as a whole. Such is a metaphysically set up order.

Guilt is neither a state of affairs nor ethical self-fashioning. It's the position of consciousness, a gnoseological mindset. Strictly speaking, only the guilty can apperceive and what he apperceives is his guilt. *Cogito ergo sum* is a confession in the guilt of existence or the expressed readiness to scarify oneself. Kazuo Muto called it 自己批判 (*jiko gisei*) that he compares with the Christian ἀγάπη or *caritas*. The aim of philosophy here is to grasp the consciousness of the individual-in-guilt, his self-consciousness by apperceiving the eternal death of the *ego*, its accomplishment in the absolute. Someone will notice in it the point of conflation between Eastern and Western eschatological projects. There is a special reason for it especially if one remembers

such Pietists as Paul Anton and August Francke who implanted their ideas in Halle. Pietistic education was extremely severe; almost any kind of amusement was considered sinful. The life of a Christian is a permanent confession.

Eschatology is, however, a product of the heart. It is impossible to base on it a theory of consciousness. Moreover, any eschatology sees consciousness vanished into the transcendent. In other words, the eschatological mind knows itself more in the beginning than in the end. Such is the position of the deadly threatened being confessing in his or her guilt.

Axiom 7: Guilt is the epistemological platform of the European consciousness.

A new theory of consciousness should be constituted on a totally different ground: not by the apperceiving of one's guilt nor by setting the latter as the transcendental condition for conscious acts but as a theory of consciousness eliminating existence (*tattva*) as its own condition. Thought which doesn't think of itself as existing becomes a philosophical one. All the Indo-European thought aimed at the apperceiving of consciousness, attaining its pure state, is entirely based on the self-sacrificial consciousness. That is, the thinking subject is the sacrificial subject, one who apperceives himself as the sacrificator. But this apperception makes him also the sacrificed.

Philosophical thought is a unified process composed of fundamental mental actions. This can be proved by any examples taken from its history. In India Buddhism revolutionized the Brahmanic doctrine Atman-Brahman, i.e. the idea of the absolute knowledge; in Europe the relativist revolution revaluated the absolute space of classical mechanics. These two intellectual events are of the same order. No matter that they belong to a different historical time that doesn't correspond to the philosophical time. Time is an apperceived element of existence. The ablation or the constitution of the absolute is a philosophical act.

The majority of the Indian systems as well as the European ones are the salvation doctrines. Besides, philosophy should not create such doctrines but be it. To think philosophically already means to practice immortality.

What does it mean then to think philosophically? First, it means thought as such for thinking per se is a philosophical state; there is no other thought save this one. Secondly, philosophical thinking is a resistance giving the human being to make one step further from his present place. This is a way to the abperceiving of death. The essence of death is the absence of thinking. One cannot think in death but can think – abperceive – death. Who does so become *homo philosophicus* and acquires the art to resist the lie overwhelming the contemporary world. This is why the task is to replace today's political world, based on a total lie, by the philosophical one modifying individual consciousnesses. Such would be the revolution of a new type (cf. below).

The Gymnosophists of the post-Alexandrian epoch were indeed the Indian thinkers both as they regarded the world and themselves. One can call their positions the radical critique of the givenness under which the latter is changing. The notorious indifference of the "naked wise" is not as it is usually seen. There is no need to make

a sharp distinction between them and the Pyrrhonian skepticism genetically linked to it: Pyrrho defined the *skepsis* as epistemological position, his *skepsis* is the point of view; the Gymnosophists practiced not the *skepsis* but a negative absolute similar to Buddha's silence. They resisted not only the being of (and in) the world but the knowing of it what make them meta-philosophers and the meta-humans. A most difficult question is whether the Gymnosophists' practices echo one way or another the yoga in the Patañjali sense? Or they stood closer to the Buddhist sangha way of life? One thing is certain: the Gymnosophist was unknown to Europe as the subject of thought.

We are lucky to have the precise date of the beginning of European philosophy: 529 B.C. According to Aristoxenus of Tarentum, in this year, after a very long journey, Pythagoras returns to Croton and start teaching mathematics and philosophy. Iamblichus and the others note the unprecedented success of his lectures gathering more and more participants. Pythagoras established the school in which the few initiated got access to the transcendent truths. These truths – they know it – don't depend on the mortal mind. Philosophy in Europe began by expurgating man from the sphere of the ideal knowledge. The truly philosophical in the early Pythagoreanism was this idea of absolute knowledge whose subject will come much later; in Pythagoras there is no "Subject," one who strives for the absolute knowledge. The concept of the subject appears in metaphysics due to this initial limitation of the subjective.

Just *Timaeus* would be enough to prove Plato's life Pythagoreanism; Plato ciphered in his dear Socrates his true master, Pythagoras. In many late Plato dialogues "Socrates" is Pythagoras. After almost two millennia the Italian monk Luca Pacioli will draw attention to Plato's obsession for the middle as one of the key principles of geometry – *harmonia mundi*, what gave Kepler not just the title for his book but the way of his thought.

Ab ovo

Philosophy seeks for the ultimate knowledge. It is not haphazardly that Democritus who interpreted Leucippus' ideas or Praśastapāda and his commentator Śridhara have been looking for the first elements (ἄτομος, *paramāṇu*) ; Albert the Great, Nicolas Flamel, Roger Bacon have pursued *lapis philosophorum* struggling against death even with the help of alchemy. Through Aristotle and his Arabic exegetics Albert realized that to philosophize means to be directed at death. It was the Scholastics who elaborated the conception of the mortal mind understanding its finitude through the idea of God. The scholastic worlds are analogous and homologous one to another: *Quod est inferius est sicut quod est superius*. The idea of analogy, bequeathed by Aristotle, was used by the Middle Ages as a philosophical tool. It allowed not only to see the invisible, i.e. how the divine mind works, but also to inscribe oneself in the multileveled universe. Philosophers haven't considered their work without the world they lived in; their concept of the "world" was entirely different from ours. Their world was composed not only of material elements – quanta of objectivity, – it was also intelligent and intelligible. The world is not the only the object of perception but also the intellectual partner living his own life. Abhinavagupta, a chief thinker of Kashmir

Shaivism, has described the world as composed of *vr̥tti*, moving ontic elements – perturbations – irritating both the matter and consciousness. The *vr̥tti* are linked together not by existence but by the way of how consciousness produces its own object of perceiving. This knowledge, as well as the primal impulse to philosophy, needs no existential guarantees.

Yet again, can philosophy treat the beginning as its object since the 'beginning' is something already invented and existing? The answer might be as follows: beginning or foundations are the object of philosophy in time. Philosophy invests *its* time into it. The idea of time, so fundamental for consciousness, is manifested first of all in the consciousness' attempts to return to its origin. From this point of view, the origin occurred in a certain past, and this is where the grave error lies. The time of returning to the origin is the false time (let's call it the "Hegelian time" since Hegel as anybody else appealed to the necessity to know the origin). Philosophy lives in such false time up to now; this time became its essential property.

Let's stress: the quest for origin turned out not only the constituting principle of metaphysical consciousness, it provided philosophy with the Hegelian time skewing it essentially. Briefly, it was the question with infinite curve.

Axiom 8: Consciousness constituted itself in the false time.

However, it is sufficient to remove this time from the conscious acts and the situation will radically change. The inquired source of consciousness, necessarily alluding to a past, will become spontaneous or timeless. Put it another way, the source of consciousness can reside in any time. This source is the consciousness' action. It is such an action when consciousness doesn't seek, i.e. doesn't reside in the false time but produces its own source.

Here lies the fundamental difference between philosophy and other disciplines: philosophy has no foundation rooted in time.

Still, don't we make a conceptual mistake by asking the question about the beginning of the universe? Doesn't this questioning hide another question about the beginning of the consciousness itself? Because the question about the beginning of the universe is not just cosmological or physical, it results directly from the necessity of consciousness to comprehend its own nature. Indeed, we create for the world a beginning which is one of its possibilities. Did the universe come up from a blown singularity or it bounced from a bigger one? – the idea shared by a number of physicists in the '60s after Hugh Everett's hypothesis. We have no strict answer to this question. One thing is clear: the question about beginning can't be solved only in the framework of a physical theory.

Beginning (αρχή/prabhava) is a mental concept as well as the foundation; the question about the ultimate source sends us back to the metaphysical problem of essence (οὐσία) without any certainty that the universe does have it. The most provocative physical theories, as the loop theory of quantum gravity, are philosophical in their foundations since, following the Greek and Indian atomists, they hold up with the idea of the existence of the 'first element.' The loop or string or *adr̥ṣṭa*, the invisible

force, the immortal within the mortal individuum, are such primal elements. But ἀρχή means a time when God was at rest. The question about beginning has its weak point: being posed, it falls in the frame of existence.

Narcissi

What should have happened to philosophy that it was trimmed down to what so-called “postmodernism”? There are at least two reasons:

Firstly, the ignorance and unwillingness of the majority of post-modern authors to see anything beyond their own wee world. Thus the true philosophical problems have been swapped for pseudo-problems;

Secondly, these authors refused to open themselves to anyone else. They closed the doors of their club. The otherness, postmodernism and deconstruction liked to say, was not a radical philosophical act but the otherness regarding philosophy *per se*.

Deconstruction results from the anxiety before the preceding epoch. Anxiety and envy before the total style of totalitarianism are its true source. Yet, the Hegelian Absolute Spirit, hovering over the post-modern thinkers, the spirit of the end of philosophy has troubled them at most. Still, postmodernism is cutesy, that is inexcusable for philosophy. This cutesiness trace back to the Nazi era for which philosophy should take responsibility. The idea is simplistic: by the cutesy talks and texts we will persuade the wide public in the safety of philosophy, worse in its senselessness. Doing philosophy is like playing cards, sort of killing time.

But philosophy has no need of such lawyers; it doesn't charm the wide public performing that kind of tricks the public wishes to see, philosophy is no Lady Gaga. It never justified itself before those who make no attempt to understand what philosophy is. Justification is not productive. To think that Hitler came as the philosopher and then transformed into murder is a postmodern reflection, i.e. amateurish.

Postmodernism is incestuous, it has no idea of the other. It looks always in the mirror. Its concepts – playing cards – are just a game with itself and for itself. This game proved to be absolutely barren.

Consider just one example: *différance*, one of the key concepts of deconstruction, signifying a free sliding on the field of meanings where meanings are gathering like cottony cones by crossing over the field many times. The problem is that you gather all the time the same meanings or you always gather the meanings you want. That's the deconstructivist comfort making you believe that the damned dichotomy is, hurrah, overcome. Such a spoof has nothing to do with philosophy.

The Yogācārin Asaṅga worked out the conception of the *Dharmakāya* (the true body) that was one of the most thoughtful attempts to overcome dualism. If *différance* is a field of random meanings, any meanings ejected on the surface by the reading of a text, Asaṅga's non-duality exposed in *Mahayanasangraha* is attained by consciousness through the removal of all the random in order to reach the ultimate cause. To play *différance* one needs to relax, the abhidharmist non-duality requests the maximal concentration of intellectual forces.

Antonio Negri noted sarcastically that the body in postmodernism is the only concrete thing, something one should not play with. But in the end postmodernism left the body to the girly journals.

What do we have now? Ashes. In fact, postmodernism is related to philosophy as *fabula atellana* to Euripides' plays. Like Santa Claus postmodernism has something for everybody. Just play. You will never lose. There is no risk. This illusory guarantee of success makes philosophical work meaningless at the outset: throw the dice. But philosophy is never based on the *a priori* impossibility to fail.

Philosophy is inseparable from risk, it is a continuous risk. Consider Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Asaṅga, Śaṅkara, Husserl... The risk resides in the very nature of philosophical thinking. The beginning may bring no results or benefits. The true thinking brings no benefits or leads to a comfort because at any moment one needs to start it again and again.

Descartes realized it clearly when he tried to save the idea of existence by rooting the latter into the act of thought. It is impossible because thinking philosophically implies that you don't think of yourself. When in *Krisis of European sciences* (1936) Husserl speaks of a philosopher capable to remove the world from the field of his thought, he gives no guarantees of existence or mental comfort so dear to postmodernism. The experience of the XXth century showed all the illusory character of such guarantees. Philosophy discovered it much earlier than history moving ahead of the latter, never behind as Hegel has thought.

Ἐποχή, *cogito* or any other radical act, leaving nothing save its own, makes the human being overcome everyday pseudo-thinking. *Abperceiving* (cf. supra) makes him meet the naked consciousness which is undoubtedly the most challenging meeting the human being may ever have since consciousness is always considered as existent – *quod existit*. Consciousness exists neither in the scholastic sense nor as the Cartesian evidence of the existence. Consciousness doesn't exist as something that is given or something referring to its origin, to essence.

Axiom 9: Naked consciousness appears from the abperceived death.

Someone may ask: how should we interpret the Yogācāra's or, in a softer version, Berkeley's or Schuppe's idea that there is nothing save consciousness? The answer is as follows: in the Yogācāra as well as in Berkeley or in Schuppe consciousness has no existential parameter; the 'existence of consciousness' is to be understood as the act of consciousness itself. So, if the existence of consciousness is open to consciousness only, then the latter can remove anything including the idea of existence.

It seems more convenient to define the “existence of consciousness” by the Sanskrit word *āśraya* composed of “*śri* – “to lean, to lay in, to bring support” and the prefix-nominalisator *ā*. In this context one can translate *āśraya* as “footing” that in no way exhausts its Sanskrit semantics. *Āśraya* supports consciousness when it exerts any kind of ἐποχή: retention, ablation, etc. If the Yogācārins aimed to liberate consciousness from all forms of bondage to the external world, to revolve it to itself (*āśraya paravṛtti*), now the goal is to see consciousness in a radically different way.

Axiom 10: There exists (or can exist) only what I don't see in my thinking.

"I" is what apperceives this. The next step is to enter the metahistory unifying both India and Europe including the levels of individual consciousnesses. Both lines of thought have at least one fundamental trait in common: India and Europe set the task of bringing the human consciousness to a superlevel even by sacrificing the thinking subject himself. Some authors, like Aristotle and the composers of the early Upanishads, recognized in it an ontological goal; others, like Clement of Alexandria, Utpaladeva, Ramanuja, Meister Eckhart or Hegel, saw in it the theological challenge; Vasubandhu, ŚāAkara and Husserl, for example, chosen the epistemological way of solving the problem. There is no comparatism here; inversely, we came to a 'metahistorical position' of the concrete consciousness within philosophy neglecting all the possible geographical or, worse, political limits.

It is not enough today to exploit the Indian thought in Europeans categories, even if it had brought certain encouraging results (Hegel, Th. Stcherbatsky). Today the goal seems to be harder: to construct a unified philosophical super-experience which will lead to a grounding reconstitution of consciousness. Such an experience becomes possible only in the superphilosophy where the standard analysis bringing about some historical comparisons is no longer sufficient. In order to see philosophy one needs to neglect artificial distinctions.

Axiom 11: In superphilosophy the division between the East and the West ceases to exist.

Such philosophy should be constituted not as an "historical heritage" but as a conceptual network where the domination of the historical time is left. Consider one example: in *Krisis* Husserl speaks about the recalling intuition (*wiedererinnernde Anschauung*) that shows "the object as-the-just-been in certain perspectives and other appearances but modified in recollection." This, indeed, re-conceptualizes the Buddhist concept *smṛti* (meaning: the recalled item) whose first exploitation seems to have appeared in the *smṛtyupasthāna sūtra* the chief idea of which is that the stabilized mind leads to mental liberation.

Husserl's epistemological procedure gets close to *smṛti*, even the word "perspective" is used not haphazardly, for Husserl, as well as the Buddhist epistemologists, fixes up the origin of that type of consciousness that deals not with the object *per se* but with its residence in consciousness, with its quasi-objective nature.

Husserl and the *smṛtyupasthāna sūtra* speak of the similar thing, and there is no coincidence here. Perspectives, from the historical point of view having different sources, conflate in philosophical action originally aimed at the abperceiving of the object as existent.

"Originally" means in accordance with the very nature of the philosophical thought. Philosophy doesn't try to seize the essential as existent; its goal consists in bringing consciousness to the truth, to *tattvajñāna*.

Axiom 12: Consciousness is not what it apperceives but only what it abperceives.

The *cogito*'s consciousness exists inasmuch as its existence is not abperceived. The true time is the abperceiving of the false one.

How do we know what is consciousness? Indeed, by understanding the *is* as the obstacle and removing it from consciousness. Consciousness attains its ultimate, naked state when *is* gets dropped.

What does it mean, in this case, the truth? It means consciousness that doesn't perceive of itself *as such*. A healthy person doesn't sense his or her working leaver; similarly, consciousness in the state of truth doesn't perceive of itself as consciousness.

Political Ontology

Politics has one indisputable particularity: any political discourse or any talk about politics turns into a lie. In politics Feuerbach's statement *Homo homini duces* is mainly justified since belief in a ruler is similar to belief in God. It is very much so when they delegate to the ruler the right to save the life of the whole nation. Consider the presidential elections of 2008 in the United States. *Yes, We Can* of the Democrats sounded not just as the plea for a radical political change and the choice of the first black president but also as belief in the salvational force of this choice. After the election the hopes began gradually to fade.

President Obama didn't do what his electors wished him to do: miracles. They forgot that the president is a politician and his promises are political promises.

After being elected, Obama willy-nilly had to desacralize himself: from the Savior he became a statesman who performs no miracles but tries to push his reforms in economics. In fact, the disillusion of the Americans came not from Obama but from their own soteriological mind. It was, perhaps, one of the most striking events in American political life. As a political subject the United States depends on its religious patterns in no way less than Europe.

America seems to approach the mental revolution similar to the European one in the last third of the XIXth century what later made politics total in Europe. This is to be considered as the important source of the totalitarian systems.

"What do we want?" asks Negri and answers: "We, of course, want world democracy, democracy for all." Even if he is honest, Negri honestly lies, and this is also the paradox of political discourse. The concept "world democracy" is meaningless since there is no political subject who could take it as *modus vivendi*. As recent history showed, any forced export of democracy to the countries showing no will to accept this, is doomed at the outset. Islamic states, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and some others, whose socio-religious patterns rooted in *ṣarī'ah*, will not leave their model for the sake of the Western democracy for one simple reason: democracy is redundant to *ṣarī'ah*. Everyone who is familiar with Islamic political doctrine knows that the concept of *ṣarī'ah* implies totality, or the unification of politics and religion, unknown to the West. Unlike the countries of the caliphate, the European model has always balanced between the royal and papal power. King and Pope composed the social binary structure organizing not only all European state institutions but also the European social mind.

It is hardly believable that Kim Jong-Il would have delighted to see his regime,

“democratic” in the North Korean sense, spread all over the world. This is a reptilian model opposed both to Islam and to the Europe. Paradoxically or not, the Kim statecraft with its *Songun* principle, articulated again in the 2009 Constitution, borrowed much from Italian fascism: the state is a primary value of the nation. The nation in North Korea is viewed as the pure subject, a sort of the Husserlian transcendental subject made of blood and bones. The North Korean democracy is one-dimensional with no extension whatsoever.

The largest lie (or illusion) of Negri’s idea resides not in the word “democracy” but in “we,” for this “we” constitutes the empty subject into which any political content can be implanted, any political power can hide behind this emptiness. The authors of *Empire* (2000) hint on it asking a Hobbes question: Is it possible at the same time to keep the empire – the quasi-imperial structure of the contemporary world – and to eschew multiplicity capable to trigger the war? How to strengthen the desire of the common people that fills out the individuals and transform it into the state power?

Obviously, whatever political institutions would have been invented, whatever democratic ideas were embedded in them, will not liberate today’s man from the anxiety of his own consciousness guilty in history itself. The political man will always long for world democracy as well the medieval man had longed for life after death. Since certain epochs we live within the discontinuous states that are in us as an *idée fixe* of themselves. The state wants us to remember it all the time, and this memory takes shapes of our duties, both real and symbolical. The *state-memory* is a new type of mental fatigue.

Such an omnipresent memory about the state compels us to lie, especially those who are inclined towards such a lie. When Giorgio Agamben compares contemporary society (state) with the concentration camp that conducts bio-political experiments depriving the man of his “symbolical skin,” Agamben construes the lie of the second order; he speaks of the political practices as if they had an anthropological goal. The critic’s reflections have much in common with the courses of aerobics for the retired taking care of their physical shape and also killing their leisure time. That might even sound pretty, if the critic has not lied to his audience what whittles away any philosophical content of his texts. Agamben perfectly knows that the contemporary Europe, where he circulates as a teacher of wisdom, is all but the concentration camp. It works neither at the metaphorical level. The concentration camps, if he means the Nazi ones, needed no reflections, they were banned there. Moreover, the contemporary Europe leaves no room for *homo sacer*, Tamil tigers or the Dalits; “*homo sacer*” is a concept showing the impossibility of its author to think otherwise than in political terms. In fact, *homo sacer* returns and politics takes the sway over more and more living space. Agamben is the first who should be happy of this fact since politics is his living space. In fact, the bourgeois author criticizes the bourgeois society for letting him to criticize this society. One more detail: Agamben explains that the Jews in the Nazi concentration camps were *homini sacri*, this is a conceptual error. Unlike the “inferior races,” the Jews were bowdlerized from humankind by the Nazi propaganda.

Axiom 13: Lie is the ontology of politics.

This is why the “philosophy of politics” has no sense. A philosophical reflection on politics undoes the philosophical reflection itself, for philosophy vies for the truth and politics for its truthful partisans. In politics there is no and can’t be truths, its reasoning is essentially stranger to the truth, to the philosophical reasoning. Politics has no thinking subject, instead it has certain “nothingness” or “we,” imitating the thinking. “We” is an illusion created by politics, Śaṅkara’s *māyā*; with little historical difference “we” is always a political variant of salvation.

“You can’t or don’t want to think, become “we,” and everything will be good.”

“We” know they are immortal. Lenin was right when he asked his intellectual fellows to convert philosophical abstractions into the real actions; he was also right at criticizing Hegel who subjected politics to the Idea.

Axiom 14: Politics has only one idea, that of masses who believe only in politics.

These two similar illusions are generated by the same drive: to do what religion failed to do. To pave the way for salvation. The total politics was born as a soteriological idea.

The Western civilization, based on the anxiety of death, doesn’t know to think – abperceive – the latter. The West, living on the political cinders left after the World War II and constituting from it its contemporary history, is a result of the Western incapacity to think death; in other words, it results from a suspension of the philosophical thought. Western man sought the salvation in the exterior, i.e. in self-redemption before God.

The consciousness of guilt brings the person in constant state of waiting for punishment or mercy. The existential platform of the European man is the quest for mercy, the epistemological – the apperceiving of his guilt. In *Alcestis* of Euripides the Thessalian king Admetus for his hospitality is granted by Apollo freedom from death, but Admetus must find someone to take his place when Death has come to claim him. The time of Admetus’ death comes and he still has not found a volunteer. His father, Pheres, is unwilling to step in and thinks that it is ludicrous that he should be asked to give up the life he enjoys much as part of this odd deal. Finally, Admetus’ devoted wife Alcestis agrees to be taken in his place because she doesn’t wish to see her children fatherless. The death of the young woman provokes in the king the deep sense of guilt torturing him for the rest of his life. The king blames everybody, including himself, for this sacrifice.

The consciousness begging for mercy is not the philosophical, for it is impossible to think philosophically waiting for punishment.

Axiom 15: The Western anxiety of death results not from death itself but from the inability to think it.

Nietzsche was perhaps the last European thinker who meditated on death. Freud sealed death in the unconscious. Paradoxically, the lethal XXth century passed under the tabooing death.? Anyway, the capacity to abperceive death entirely belongs to the living consciousness. To abperceive signifies neither pessimism nor escape

from life. It means, indeed, by means of consciousness to go beyond the innate finitude given to the human beings by their nature. The fact that the being has its physical and mental limits is to be understood as a metaphysical clue; the abperceiving consciousness will see them. It suffices to recognize that consciousness can't be identical to the being. Hegel was wrong identifying the being and consciousness and thus endowing the latter with ontology. Husserl, who had no knowledge about the Yogācāra, managed to purify consciousness from ontology. It was definitely a serious impact.

Axiom16: Consciousness is not what is conceived but left after the conscious act.

It doesn't become being because the latter sees no its limits. Being appears only within certain limits.

Political man

Today we can state with absolute conviction: both Nazism and communism failed to construct the superman; the first took ethnicity as a matter of fact, the second tried to embody the superman in the working class, non-intellectual by definition.

Why did the project fail? Obviously, both ideologies contained epistemological errors.

"Nation" and "class" are the set-up parameters identifying man according to his external features. Both were political projects with soteriological content, both lacked philosophical thought. They ended politics *per se*.

What we call today 'politics' is a set of minor wars for the corporate influence and money. From a political tool money is transformed into the political goal. The contemporary politicians aim at increasing capital. The economy nowadays is entirely based on the selling of time. Credit became the ontological basis and the cause of the soteriologization of money. There is no longer time one can't buy; as a consequence there is no eschatology and salvation.

If any time can be sold, nothing can save us any longer.

Axiom 17: Today, money as salvation is salvation enough.

Thus is the religion without philosophy. One can buy not only the historical time but also the time *after* the end of history. If to paraphrase Nietzsche: God is sold.

Today, money saves itself transforming into credit derivatives, the virtual money or CDS (Credit Default Swap). It is a bilateral agreement between the buyer and the seller: the buyer makes a series of payments to the seller and in exchange he receives a payoff if his loan defaults. Such is an ideal ontology of credits derivatives. In fact, the received payment is substantially less than the face value of the loan. CDS plays a most significant role in the systemic crisis of the world economy. The credit derivatives changed the currency market into a financial Chernobyl. Nobody knows the total amount of them whose approximate value is more than forty trillion dollars. In fact, credit derivatives are the modern man's path to immortality, the ambrosia for the humankind that sold almost all its time.

The credit derivatives don't exist in the sense as its owner but it gives to the latter the existence not only on the present but in the quasi-future. This odd time

seems to exist by itself. The credit derivative is based on the pagan belief in its omnipotence. The market ceased to be real; in other words, it became the only reality where any mortal can find his or her place. From this place, however, the person moves directly towards death. The market lets us accumulate the derivatives but this is not the capital as at Marx's time. Today such accumulation means the sacralization of the capital. In order to complete this sacralizing process the capital must become transcendent to itself. The capital thus acquires the function God ceased to fulfill.

In the actual world political thought no longer exists. It has nothing to do with a more or less efficient planetary order or with the ramshackle axe of "super-powers;" the actual absence of politics is due to the lack of goals having philosophy as their basis. Political goals are replaced by political interests, more precisely, by their financial equivalent. Unlike the philosophical subject, the political "We" manifests itself as the knowing but never thinking.

Axiom 18: Politics knows, philosophy thinks.

This "We" removed individual reflections; the political *cogito* is a Cartesian transvestite.

We are entering Armageddon between politics and living thought taking shape above all in philosophy. In the XXth century politics offered their paths to salvation. The mission impossible at the outset since the political soteriology always served the interests of a small group of the ruling mandarins at the moment. Such a project is ontologically false.

Politics is a lying tantra. Nowhere the amount of lie is bigger than in a political statement. The most honest was Leo Strauss, a quiet American of the Heideggerian origin, whose ideas gained success among neo-conservatives. In order to be effective one should convert politics into the esoteric, i.e. to provide the simultaneous existence of the "noble lie" and the "hidden truth." Meaning: you can lie to the masses but never to yours, to your inner circle ruling the first ones. Strauss' honesty consists in revealing this to his men who then applied this principle to political practice. One of the recent examples of the noble lie is Iraq's chemical weapons. Needless to say, the noble lie always protects democracy and liberty.

Axiom 19: Political power seeing itself as the guard of supreme principles is fake and hypocritical.

Masses go on to believe that, in the end, political power works for their good. They believed in the ruler's good will, in his noble lie. They let the ruler become a semi-divine figure disseminating promises that will never become true. Anything goes.

Beginning with the 1930s the soteriological idea entered politics that is a mark of profound despair felt by the Western mind. Later, after the 1945, the totalized politics began to spread over cultural and intimate spaces. Today we trust politics as the medieval people trusted symbols; both are magical forms of our existence. In fact, in the West the political took power over consciousness during the Renaissance when Girolamo Savonarola has organized public debates on the Venetian squares. At the time politics becomes the fourth dimension competing with philosophy for the shape of man.

Kant could allow himself to believe in politics as if he viewed the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), the second Peace of Westphalia or a proto-UN, when European countries made an attempt to create a structure stabilizing the world order. Later the anti-militarist goals of the agreement were dropped and it was used to suppress the 1848 riot. In Kant's time, however, politics was the part of the Napoleon reconstruction of the world.

It would suffice to increase the number of thinking people and the present will radically change. Now, when the loosely composed university programs transform philosophy into a fast-food and its place within sciences diminishes dramatically, now we feel at most its necessity. What else can counterbalance the barbarity of the totalizing today's man's mind? Like in the epoch of the Italian Scapigliatura, nowadays we see a havoc of devastation feeling ourselves deprived of the time of consciousness. Many of our tamed intellectuals see philosophy as the servant to certain political groups or to their own pernicky purposes. This is coming to an end. Philosophy is regaining its force.

Axiom 20: The human being with no philosophy is no human being.

NOTES

- 1 Mortals are immortal, immortals mortal.
- 2 I found a shelter in death. (II. 22:4)

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