

Types of Interpretation and the Work of Art

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Most discussions on interpretation of art tend to deal either with normative issues, namely, the criteria of the right or preferred method of interpretation¹, or with the general logic of interpretation namely, whether it has a status of a statement, or of an expression of impression or of a prescription of how to approach the work². There is yet another important question concerning the role of interpretation in the total experience of art and the range of views extend from that of Croce³, that art is not to be interpreted, but directly apprehended, to that of Danto who sees art essentially as an object that has to be interpreted⁴.

In this paper I will not deal with any of these important questions, but rather with a more modest one : what types of interpretation there are and how each of them relates to art.

The preoccupation with the more general questions left only meager attention to interpretative typology. One might get the impression that all interpretative activities share exactly the same problems, and that they are all relevant to art in the same way. My view is that although there are common features to all interpretative activities, which justifies putting them within the same category, there are significant differences among the various types which are worth considering. The understanding of interpretative activity cannot be complete, I believe, without such a typology. It would enable one to distinguish between problems that are pertinent to interpretation in general and problems that pertain to a certain type only.

In a short paper, Hampshire examines several uses of the word interpretation, focusing mainly on the different circumstances and various fields to which the word is applied⁵. Hampshire distinguishes among six uses of "interpretation", and claims that only two of them are relevant to art interpretation. I claim that four of those six types presented by Hampshire,

are actually of the same logical structure, and that this logical structure is relevant and applicable to art just as it is applicable to other fields Hampshire described.

In her recent book *On Interpretation*⁶, Annette Barnes mentions this issue, but avoids presenting a clear typology. She approaches the subject by describing several questions whose answers require interpretation⁷. These questions follow a similar line of thinking found in Hampshire's article, and I will refer to both while presenting my typology. The point they share, which I agree with, is that there are various activities concerning interpretation. It does not necessarily follow, however, that different activities differ in their logical structures.

As I do not discuss the general nature⁸ of interpretation here, but only my understanding of that nature, I will point out briefly that I take interpretations to be about the non-obvious features of the interpreted object⁸, and that I see the possibility of alternative interpretations as essential to this activity⁹

I distinguish among five types, but I cannot and do not claim this to be the definitive typology or the only possible one. This is a suggestion that may need further development beyond this presentation. The titles I have given them may also need improvement.

1. *Interpretation of Signs*

Any interpretation of the following form, even if in different fields, is a "sign interpretation". When X, which is present is a sign of, or indicates, or hints at, or represents or refers to, or is a symptom of Y, when Y is not present, then X is interpreted as a sign of Y. The presence of X in the interpreter's direct experience, indicates the presence of Y either in a remote time or place or simultaneously with X, either as a physical or psychological or intentional entity (which does not occur in time or space). X and Y are, in such a case, separate entities which can be apprehended or experienced separately and independently of each other, and are connected in various ways: by causality, conventions, or by a theory which suggests some inner relations (not obvious in experience), and so on.

Let us examine a few cases which Hampshire presents as distinct types, while according to my typology they belong to the same category:

1. Hampshire's first type of interpretation is interpretation of symptoms¹⁰. A political event is interpreted as a symptom of intentions or future events,

and the same is the status of clouds as a sign of rain. Clouds and rain are separate entities, we may apprehend them and experience them separately, they are connected by causality, or if one prefers a more careful way of putting it, by constant and often repeated connection in experience. From the presence of clouds we conclude the (future) presence of rain, just as from the presence of a certain political event the historian concludes possible further developments (not yet present), or intentions (hidden).

2. Interpretation of ulterior motives¹¹. This, in my view, is not a different type from that of interpreting symptoms. It is the actual and revealed (present) behavior which is interpreted as indicating or hinting at some hidden motive. The interpreter infers Y (the motive) from a given data X (the action). The relation between motives and actions are not different in their general logical structure from that of the relation between clouds and rain (omitting, of course, the intentional element).

3. Psychological interpretations of dreams or free associations¹². Here, again, I fail to see a different logical structure from that underlying the interpretation of symptoms. Methods may be different, theories about the relations between the present interpreted data, and the non-present event suggested by the interpretation may vary (causality, resemblance, transference and so on), but the logical structure is basically the same: X (the dream) is interpreted as pointing at, hinting or indicating Y (the hidden feelings).

4. Interpreting oracles or horoscopes¹³ is also like interpreting signs and symptoms, though methods may vary. It is once more the basic structure of one present object which is interpreted as hinting toward another (non-present). The interpreted object and its interpretation exist separately and can be apprehended separately, even if they depend on each other for their actual existence. I may understand and experience my fortune without even knowing about the signs which indicated it (such as horoscope, prophecies and so on), and vice versa. Different theories in different fields suggest various links among events or phenomena, and the theory chosen by the interpreter does not change its basic logical structure.

Signs may be divided into two kinds¹⁴:

a. *Conventional signs*¹⁵ such as words, road signs, or flags which are usually agreed upon through conventional procedures, and need no interpretation: the sign and its conventional meaning are both known and given to all members of the same society; only an outsider needs explanations. Conventional signs usually do not allow alternative meanings. A convention

which has different meanings would make a useless convention. Road signs, for instance, would be useless if they had alternative meanings. Even a deconstructionist would not want to be run down by another deconstructionist driver who insisted on interpreting road signs in his own way. In such a case there is no room for interpretation. The meaning of conventional signs can be *described* and *learned*, but not *interpreted*. Of course, a convention can be ignored and one can insist on interpreting a road sign in an idiosyncratic way, but to do so is not interpret the conventional sign itself but to give a new meaning (create a new convention) to the signifier. By ignoring the conventional meaning of the word "right" and treating it as a sign for "left", one is not interpreting the English word "right", but creates a private language. Unfamiliar conventions need *decoding*, not interpreting, because as such they are supposed to have one correct meaning only.

b. *Natural signs*

These are natural events which are interpreted as indicating other no-present natural events. These are not real signs since they are not conventional and not intended to function as signs (unless one believes that natural phenomena are signs of God's intention, as it is said about the rainbow), but are interpreted as if they were signs, by analogy with conventional signs.

Physiological symptoms are interpreted as signs of health or illness, (as if nature hints and signals its hidden intentions): the color of the fruit indicates ripeness, cloudy sky is a sign of rain, and the rainbow is a sign that there will not be another deluge. As I have argued, when we believe an event to have one meaning only, we do not interpret it but describe it, and in many cases it does seem that natural events have more than one possible meaning. A dream, for instance, may be interpreted as sign of future events (the way Joseph interpreted Pharaoh's dreams,) and it may be interpreted as a sign of unconscious wishes (the way dreams are interpreted in psychoanalysis). Are we interpreting nature or describing it? The answer depends on the epistemological theory adopted rather than on the nature of interpretation. Whoever believes that there is only one right theory about nature must claim that we describe nature, and our description is either right or wrong. But if more than one theory is possible, then nature is interpreted by each of them.

Between conventional signs with fixed meanings and natural signs whose interpretation, may be proven right or wrong (and as such are more

likely considered discovered or decoded than interpreted, there are signs which were originally conventional but became "natural-like" through the interference of natural processes (social, psychological, historical, and so). Such signs are the most typical candidates for sign interpretation.

Words and other conventional symbols which, through natural procedures in everyday use developed a range of possible meanings in different contexts, are interpreted rather than just decoded. The specific meaning of a word often depends on its context and on its integration with other words. This type of interpretation occurs very often in art. Symbols of different kinds are often used in art, but even those which have fixed meanings in their daily use, may gain new meanings in the context of a work of art. Road signs in a painting, for instance, can be interpreted differently than in their regular context. A word in a poem is interpreted not just by decoding its conventional meaning (as explained in the dictionary), but by considering the whole context and that word's function in that special context.

The same is true for all kinds of cultural symbols, which tend to be flexible and develop more than one definite meaning. There are also private symbols of certain artists which are learned directly from their works, or indirectly from other sources. These symbols may occur in works of art, but their interpretations do not form a special kind of interpretation which is relevant to art only, and their logic is the same as any interpretation of signs, although methods may differ.

There is another kind of sign interpretation in art, when we interpret one element in the work as a sign for another within the work, and the meaning they acquire does not originate in non-artistic conventions, but in the context of the work itself. A description of a cloudy day, for instance, may be interpreted as a sign of the characters mood, although in everyday life, we would not say that the clouds signify mood (they may influence it, but not hint it).

Interpreting various components of a work as signs does not necessarily mean that a work of art as a whole is a sign or symbol of something beyond it.¹⁶ I cannot go deeper into this matter in this context, only like to suggest a distinction between two lines of interpretation: one which interprets elements in the work as signs, and one which interprets the whole work as a sign. From a psychological point of view, for instance, a work of art may be interpreted like dreams, as a sign of hidden feelings. The two lines are independent, and not contradictory, but the decision whether the

second is relevant to art (as art), depends on what we believe to be the essence of art.

2. *Substitutional interpretation*

Y is a substitutional interpretation of X when Y is suggested as a proper substitute for X for a certain function. In other words, X fulfills a certain function for which Y is interpreted as satisfactory replacement. Such an interpretation involves claims about the relevant function (s) of the interpreted object, and about the qualities of its substitute. But these claims are not necessarily verbal: they are implied in the mere *action* choosing the substitute. By replacing one object with another, one implies that the replacement functions as a suitable substitute for the original and that the original is thus interpreted by its substitute. That implied claim may be challenged either verbally or by an alternative action of replacement.

In the case of substitutional interpretation, X does not lead or hint toward Y, but they are linked by the similarity of the function they are supposed to fulfill. In those cases where the substitute is obvious, we do not actually interpret, but automatically switch from one object to another, as it is in simple cases of translations, e. g. "translation" (English) - "übersetzen" (German).

There are, of course, cases when the translation is not obvious or when we see alternative possibilities from which we have to choose. Our choice does not have to be better than the original object, nor is it meant to be identical to it, but it is believed to be a better alternative. It is meant to *fulfill the same functions* as the original, namely, be *equivalent* to it.

This kind of interpretation often occurs in more complex instances of translations. The classical case for substitutional interpretation is that in which the original has more than one simple defined function, and the substitute has to fulfill a complex of functions. Translations of literature, and poetry in particular, are typical substitutional interpretations.

In poetry, where very often one cannot separate the specific words and their functions in the poem, translation is not an automatic act, it is not just the outcome of a set of linguistic rules (and maybe most sensitive translations are not), but rather the act of finding the right equivalent which will function in a way similar to the original. The words in the poem function sounds, symbols, and they create a certain rhythm, have certain connotations and so on. It is not easy to find the right substitute in a

different language. Sometimes, the translator/interpreter has to compromise and decide which function of the whole complex is more essential to the poem and which function may be given up (because she cannot find the ideal substitute), and choose the substitute accordingly. Such a decision may be challenged by alternative interpretations (other substitutes) for one of two main reasons : it is either a disagreement about what the essential functions are, or if those are agreed upon, it may be a disagreement about the offered substitute and its ability to fulfill those functions.

Substitutional interpretation can be found in other fields besides translation which are not considered typical cases of interpretation. A description, for example, may supply information only but it may also serve as a substitute for immediate experience. A journalist may describe an event in order to create a substitute for the reader who could not attend it himself, trying to make him feel as if he were there, but he may also describe an event just for the sake of information. The description will be evaluated differently in each case and that will indicate an understanding of different functions : an informative description is expected to be precise and clear; an experience - substitute has to create a certain atmosphere, effect the reader's feelings and so on. A photo, too, may function as a substitute when one looks at the photo of her love ones in their absence, and as source of information when one looks at the photo in order to get an idea about what that person in the photo looks like. Choosing a photo for a certain function also involves interpretation when it is not obvious which photo is the best substitute.

Representations are also substitutes. X represents Y means, not that X resembles Y (at least, not necessarily,¹⁷ but that X fulfills a certain function of Y, e. g. a lawyer represents his client in court not by being identical or similar or even by believing the same facts, but by taking his case and pleading for him, in his stead. Resemblance becomes one function which is sometimes required. but not always. A word represents an object (through convention) because it functions as if one pointed by finger toward the object. If there is only one word to point to a certain object, no interpretation is needed, but if there are more, interpretation is involved in most cases.

Substitutional interpretation may be relevant to art interpretation in two different way :

1. Just as a work of art may have signs and symbols among its components it may also have substitutes of reality among its elements. For

instance, a description of a place or of a historical event in a novel, is not in most cases, merely informative but functions as substitutional interpretation within the work : they are meant to give the reader a feeling as if she experienced it directly, they arise feelings as if they were the "real" things and so on, and as such their function is compared with the function of the real things or events, and evaluated for their success as substitutes, sometimes compared to other works in which a similar substitution occurs. Of course, it is in itself a matter of interpretation, whether a certain description should be evaluated for its function as substitute or for any other quality (not every description is considered a substitute of the described object).

In the game of "make believe"¹⁸ in which art is so often involved, substitutes play an important role. Substitutes in art are means of creating illusions of real life, and these illusions function within the work and integrate with other non-illusionary components.

Paintings use different technique in order to create a "substitute" for the original model (not every painting, of course), but this does not mean that all the components of such a painting are illusionary or that the main function of the painting as a whole is to create an illusion. Interpreters suggest different functions of such illusions in art and evaluate them as better or worse for their functions, such an interpretation involves beliefs and knowledge about the represented reality, without which the estimation of its substitutes is impossible.

2. A work of art (as a whole) may be interpreted as a substitute of something in real life. There is an essential difference (at least theoretically) between art having substitutes as components within a work of art and the work (as a whole) being a substitute in itself. Since substitutional interpretation assumes that the substitute fulfills the same function as the thing interpreted, seeing a work of art as a substitute involves a general theory about the essential functions of art in our life. For instance, if art is believed to be a substitute for philosophy, then it is believed to fulfill the same function philosophy does; or if art is believed to have a therapeutic function, it may be understood as a substitute for psychological treatment; if art is a substitute of life, it means (or at least, that may be one of its meanings) that art creates experiences similar to real life.

The idea that art in general is an imitation or representation of the real world implies that art is some kind of substitute for the real world and

should be evaluated as such. But in order to defend this claim and make it sensible, one has to define the function of such a substitute and its logic; why does the real world need substitutes ?¹⁹

3. *Classificatory interpretation*

When X is a general concept (law, pattern, principle), and Y is a particular case claimed to be an instance of X, than X is interpreted by Y and vice versa. This is the act of classification.²⁰ This kind of interpretation should be analyzed in two perspectives : a. from the general law to the particular instance; b. from the particular instance to the general law.

a. The claim that a case Y is a good or typical instance of a general idea X indicates an interpretation of X only when the claim can be challenged with alternatives. The law is interpreted in court by applying it to particular cases, and different judges in that act of application may sometimes offer different interpretations. But not every application of a rule is an interpretation of the rule. When the link between the general and the particular seems obvious, it would not be considered an interpretation, but when the link is not obvious we deal with interpretation.

A soldier who was trained to carry out certain orders is not necessarily interpreting them when carrying them out. When the order seems to have one possible application, the soldier obeys in the only way he was trained to, and reacts almost automatically. But when orders have a large range of possible applications, it is up to the individual soldier to interpret them. The fifth commandment to obey and respect one's parents, may have various applications and some cases may raise the question whether they are proper applications. Such an argument involves the different understandings of the rule, its spirit or implied intentions.

b. The same type of interpretation, but from the opposite perspective, occurs when we focus on the object and wonder whether it should be classified in one way or another (should avocado be classified as a vegetable or a fruit ?). The classification of an object implies a claim about what is essential about the object.

Both application and classification are common forms of interpreting works of art. The first is more typical to art theories when the focus is on the general pattern and instances are needed to interpret it, and the second expresses interest in particular works. But they are both ultimately two aspects of the same interpretative activity, namely, the effort to find the link between the general and the particular.

Every work of art may be interpreted through classification, but that does not necessarily mean that the essence of a work of art is exhausted by its classification. The pattern by which a certain work of art is classified may be considered as one of its components which interrelates and integrates with other components and it should be considered in order to apprehend the work as a whole. Aristotelians may argue that classification reveals the essence of the work, just as it reveals the essence of objects in nature. Croce would not agree, of course.

4. *Analytical interpretation*

When X is an object and Y is the set of its separate components, then Y is the analytical interpretation of X. The purpose of breaking X into separate elements is usually to show how it is built, what it is made of, what its structure is, and when it comes to a work of art, it also involves the effort to point at its uniqueness, includes not only claims about what X's components are, but also what kind of relations they have among them. Any object can be analyzed in more than one way. Its analysis is a claim about the object's structure, affected by differences of beliefs, methods, and attitudes.

I believe that to interpret an object through analysis means not only discover its components, but to make a statement about their role in the complete structure of the object. Some components are more central or essential to the whole than others, and some may be redundant or marginal, and so on.

The breaking of the whole into elements does not form a complete different entity: the separation of elements causes the disappearance of the whole, and for that reason, there are qualities of the whole that cannot be apprehended through analysis (Croce and Bergson would claim those qualities to be more essential to the object).

This type of interpretation always involves some of the other types, because any separation of the components involves not only an analysis of the whole, but also claims about the nature of the components (as signs, substitutes, or applications). In an analytical interpretation of a work of art, for example, the classification of that work reveals a pattern which can be considered as one of its elements (being a tragedy, for instance), and the qualities revealed by a certain classification may have various relations with others such as its style or its subject matter.

When interpreting a work of art, analysis is very often the leading practice, while other types of interpretations are subordinated to it. But since the elements of a work are not defined by one universally accepted method, and since the function of art is not agreed upon, its analysis cannot but be different from that of a frog or a chemical molecule.

Analytical interpretations are influenced by general theories about the role of art or its essence, its social historical and other links. Therefore it is obvious one can "dismember" a work into its elements in more than one way: a psychological point of view (where we focus on motivations and feelings); a philosophical point of view (when we focus on ideas); social point of view (when we focus on the reflections of society in the work), and so on.

5. *Complementary Interpretation*

When X is treated as raw material, and Y is the final product made of it, than Y interprets X as having a certain potential which is revealed through its procession. This type of interpretation is the opposite of analysis. It creates a whole out of raw materials while analysis, divides the whole into separate components. The interpreter shows what can be done with some given raw materials, what is hidden in them, and how those hidden potentials are to be actualized. Such a claim is not necessarily verbal: by presenting the final product, the interpreter implies his interpretative claim.

While in the previous types of interpretation, the interpreted object and its interpretation are two separate entities, in this type, the interpreted object (the raw materials) are included in the final product, namely, the interpretation itself. The previous four types interpret different aspects and elements of the work of art, complementary interpretation is actually the creation of a work of art. The artists interpret his raw materials (taken from various sources) and his final product, the work of art, is an interpretation of those raw material.

Hampshire's sixth type belongs to this category: "An actor interprets a role or part. A pianist or violinist interprets the piece of music he plays."²¹ The actor or pianist take an object (the written play, the score) and do something *with* it. They present some new potentials hidden in what are the raw materials, in this case - the original work. Different actors may do different things with the same text and present different final products.

All kinds of objects may serve as raw materials: words, situations, colors, sounds, motions, dreams, ideas, natural materials such as stone,

wood or metals, cultural objects and symbols, previous works of art, scientific knowledge, and so on. Cooking, for instance, is an act in which raw materials are processed and the final product exhibits a certain possibility (a hidden potential) of the raw materials. But not every act of cooking is an interpretation. Most people use recipes, and therefore they do not reveal anything unknown about the materials used they do not interpret, but follow a previous interpretation. When a recipe is followed, cooking is more like carrying out orders or actualizing a pattern when only one possibility exists. Cooking may count as interpreting when a new recipe is invented by which new potentials of the raw materials are revealed.

Almost everyone can learn to play the piano and perform a piece of music according to what he has learned. Such a performance is analogical to cooking according to recipes. To interpret a piece of music, to reveal new potential in it by performing it in an original way, takes more than just the acquired knowledge of reading notes and operating an instrument. The performance of an interpreter is evaluated not for accuracy, but rather for the new potential it reveals, and the way that potential is developed. Such a performance interprets the original score by regarding it as raw material and using it to make something new out of it. Alternative performances may be compared and evaluated as better or worse interpretations of the original score.

Complementary interpretation is a creation of a work of art itself. Not only the performer is interpreting, but the composer of the original work which is being performed also interprets his raw materials, those materials of which the work of art consists. The artist takes those raw materials in which he recognizes some potentials (sounds, rhythm, colors, shapes, words, ideas) and through processing them he reveals new potentials which are actualized in the final product, and the worth of his work is evaluated accordingly: were those potentials really hidden in those materials or did the artist fail to sense the right or important potential of the materials he has chosen (is he really playing Beethoven, or is his performance totally strange to the original work)? Did he succeed in actualizing those potentials (the performer may have revealed some "right" hidden potentials, but did he or did he not succeed in creating a complete whole)?

Not only the musician or the actor interprets works of art, but also an author who is using parts or structures or situations of previous literature. Stories from the Bible are often interpreted into novels, poetry or drama. A painter interprets his model, a sculptor interprets the stone or wood his

work is made of, as well as the model and the idea behind it. Two sculptors working on the same model and with similar materials are likely to interpret them differently and present two different works of art.

This is the main difference between the interpretation offered by an art critic and the interpretation offered by the musician, the actor or the singer. The performer of a play or a piece of music interprets it by creating a new work of art, while the critic classifies, analyses or interprets symbols, but does not create a new work by his act of interpretation. The interpretation offered by the critic serves to better the understanding of the interpreted work, but the complementary interpretation of an actor or a musician creates a new work. This new object is also to be interpreted by critics, and it has an artistic value of its own which is not derived from the value of the original interpreted work. The critics work exists as a separate entity different from the interpreted work; the musician's interpretation does not exist apart from the original score he is interpreting (nor does an actor's interpretation or a singer's). The complementary interpretation includes the original interpreted materials, and when I listen to a pianist playing Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, I listen at the same time to Beethoven's original work.

To sum it up, I would say, that the critic says something *about* the work of art (interprets signs and substitutes, analyses and classifies), while the performer (the artist) does something *with* the work of art. But this sharp distinction is theoretical only, since in actual experience these activities are not so simply differentiated: criticism at its best at least, has certain artistic qualities as well; it is not only "about" art but it also does something new and creative *with* art.

The five types of interpretation offered here, present theoretical distinctions which may not be found in actual experience in their pure forms. They should be considered observations of elements in any actual activity of interpretation, and as such, they present means to deal with actual interpretations and not a final and complete description of it.

References

1. Debates on the relevance of artistic intention, for instance, occupied many of the philosophical discussions of interpretation. Among the most famous recent debates is that between E. D. Hirsch and M. Beardsley.
2. R. Schusterman described and summarized the main views on this issue in "The Logic of Interpretation", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 28 (1978), 310-324.
3. Since art is defined by Croce as intuition, many activities which are typical of art interpretation (and are presented later on in this paper) are irrelevant to the apprehension and appreciation of a work of art: classification, analysis, and translations. See in *Aesthetic*, trans. D. Ainslie The Noonday Press, New York, pp. 22-60
4. A. Danto claims that "the moment something is considered an artwork, it becomes subject to an interpretation" "Artwork and Real Things" *Art and Philosophy*, ed. W. E. Kennick, St. Martins Press, New York, 1979, p. 108.
5. S. Hampshire, "Types of Interpretation", in Kennick (ibid), 200-205
6. Annete Barnes, *On Interpretation*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford and New York, 1988.
7. Barnes, *ibid*, pp. 158-166
8. Here I follow Barnes's line that one does not interpret the obvious. *ibid*. pp. 8-9
9. By that I follow J. Margolis's point of view, that an interpretation can be plausible but not proven true, and therefore allow alternatives. See in *Art and Philosophy*, Atlantic Highlands, 1980. Hampshire holds a similar view: 'True interpretation' is an unusual form" (*ibid*, p. 205).
10. Hampshire, *ibid*, p. 201
11. Hampshire, *ibid*, p. 201
12. Hampshire, *ibid* pp. 201-202
13. Hampshire, *ibid*, p. 203
14. Saussure distinguishes among: icon, index, and sign. Icon involves resemblance, index involves causal relations and sign is conventional. My distinction (for my purposes) is a little different: I include icons in signs, because even resemblance functions as sign only by convention (not every case of resemblance is a sign); and indexes are named here natural signs.
15. I do not go into the question of how conventions are made, or what are the interrelations between a signifier and its signified.
16. A theory such as S. Langer's is not a necessary conclusion if one

accepts the relevance of symbol interpretation to art. The acceptance of Goodman's theory, for instance, means the acceptance of art "made" of symbols, but the idea that the work as a whole symbolizes or signifies anything beyond itself is not a necessary conclusion.

17. Goodman, I believe was right about disconnecting representations from resemblance, but it does not necessarily mean that anything may represent anything. There is a certain function (a different one in each case), which has to be fulfilled.

18. The "make believe" aspect of art is presented in details by Kendall L. Walton in his recent book *Mimesis as Make-Believe*, Harvard University Press, 1993.

19. As Goodman quotes: "Art is not a copy of the real world. One of the damn things is enough." *Languages of Art*, Hackett Publishing Company Inc., Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1976, 1976, p. 3

20. Barnes implies, that to interpret is basically to classify. (ibid, pp. 7-8 . I do not agree. Classification is only one form of interpretation.

21. The critic's work and the performer's are sometimes compared and classified as if they belong to the same category. See for instance, Margaret McDonald, "Some Distinct Features of Arguments Used in Criticism of Art", in *Aesthetics and Language* ed. W. Elton, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, pp.114-130.