The Strata Model in Poetics (Schichtenpoetik)[1]

WOLFGANG RUTTKOWSKI

Summary
Here, for the first time in English, one of the most fertile models in the theory of art and literature is being presented and explained: the strata model. At the same time, the theories of its most important proponents (Nicolai Hartman and Roman Ingarden) are being reconciled with each other. Lastly, the advantages of the strata model are demonstrated by a clarification of open questions: 1. How can *art* be differentiated ontologically from other objects? 2. How can the various *kinds* of art be defined ontologically? 3. In what relationship does the strata model stand to Marxist art theory? 4. How can the concepts of *structure*, *genre*, and Aristotle's *Three Unities* be explained in view of the strata model? 5. How do "artistic values" differ from "aesthetic values"? 6. Where can literary values be located within the strata model?

Zusammenfassung
Hier wird zum ersten Mal in englischer Sprache eines der fruchtbarsten Denkmodelle der ·Kunst- und Literaturwissenschaft vorgestellt und erläutert. Zugleich werden die Anschauungen seiner wichtigsten Vordenker (Nicolai Hartmann und Roman Ingarden) miteinander in Einklang gebracht. Danach werden Vorteile des Schichten-Modells exemplarisch an der Klärung von einigen noch immer offenen Fragen demonstriert: 1. Wodurch unterscheidet sich Kunst ontologisch von anderen Objekten? 2. Wie lassen sich die Kunstarten ontologisch voneinander abgrenzen? 3. Wie verhält sich das Schichtenmodell zur marxistischen Literaturtheorie? 4. Wie verhalten sich der Strukturbegriff, der Gattungsbegriff und die "drei Einheiten" des Aristoteles zum Schichtenmodell? 5. Wodurch unterscheidet sich "künstlerischer" von "ästhetischem" Wert? 6. Wo sind literarische Werte im Schichtenmodell anzusiedeln?

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I. The Strata Model

New concepts and models of thinking can precipitate new insights by giving a fresh direction to our observations and showing us what to look for. One very productive model for viewing complex phenomena in literature is the "strata" concept, a way of distinguishing in literature layers or levels, similar to geological strata. To our knowledge, **Plato**[2] was the first to use a strata model for his description of the psychological functions of man, in which he uses the metaphor of a chariot driver. Since Romanticism we encounter traces of strata models more frequently, especially in psychology. **Sigmund Freud**[3] made them famous with his strata of the id, the ego, and the superego. He realized, of course, that such spatial models are imperfect means for describing psychological processes and relationships The German philosopher, **Max Scheler,**[4] used the model in

1916 for a description of emotional life. His pupil, **Nicolai Hartmann,**[5] finally built a complete ontological, ethical, and aesthetic system of philosophy on the strata model. In addition to depth psychology and philosophy, strata models have been used successfully in other areas. In 1938, **Erich Rothacker**[6] gave us a summary of their application to anthropology and characterology. Many other disciplines (like brain physiology, biology, and pedagogy) also adopted the strata model.[7] For the analysis of literature in particular, it was first used in large scale by **Roman Ingarden,**[8] the Polish philosopher and pupil of the founder of Phenomenology, **Edmund Husserl.**[9]

The application of a strata model to the analysis of literature is mainly pragmatically motivated. The literary scholar or the interpreter of literature is less concerned with philosophical insights than with an objective comprehension of the literary work. Beyond that, s/he wishes to understand other, mainly psychological, phenomena observable within a literary context. Thus strata poetics is justified as a tool of cognition and systematization only insofar as it yields insights that could not have been gained otherwise. The philosophical dispute as to the justification of strata models as such will be of no concern in this paper.

Strata models are systems of categories that *we* project upon phenomena in order to make sense of them. They correspond to a synthetic mode of thinking, which attempts to strike a balance between the observation of universal laws and the description of individual characteristics. Like most concepts in the humanities, they do not limit, but rather serve to accentuate observed phenomena. They group together certain aspects of literature into unified strata of systems which can be said to stand in a relation to one another comparable to that of psychological strata within the human personality.

The correspondence between the stratification of the human personality and that of its products, especially the work of art, can be understood in psychological terms: when an artist creates a work of art, he does so under the influence of the various strata of his personality. These strata can participate in differing degrees (creating more "emotional" or "cerebral" art, for example). In the process of reception, corresponding psychological strata in the audience will resonate in varying degrees (e.g., the work of art will have a mainly "emotional" or "cerebral" impact). In this way it can be explained that not all art appeals equally to any receiver. A degree of "readiness" granted by a correspondence in the strata-structure between artist, work of art, and receiver will promote the reception of art.

Because of the comparability of the stratification of the literary work of art on the one hand, and of the personality of the poet and of the receiver on the other, strata models point beyond the literary realm. If strata are to be viewed as categories applicable to both the human personality *and* its products, they must correspond to ontological as well as to psychological laws.

II. Hartmann and Ingarden

Hartmann and Ingarden are the only two thinkers who applied strata models systematically to aesthetic phenomena, but neither compared his findings with the other's in a constructive manner.[10]

While systematic studies of the "ambiance" of literary works and of certain

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relationships in style between various arts gained more and more acceptance, a *theoretical* inquiry into *ontological* questions as to the different modes of existence of various forms of art was generally avoided. However, it is only in comparison to the ontological structure of *other* kinds of art (that is. their varying "stratification") that literature can be *fully* understood.

Roman Ingarden has had a notable impact on literary theory, starting with the so called "immanent interpretation" school[11] in Germany following World War II and continuing in some American publications that look back to Husserl's phenomenology and its usefulness for the cognition of literature.[12] Nicolai Hartmann, on the other hand. seems to be forgotten for the time being.[13] His works on ethics are known to some specialists in religion, but his theories of aesthetics, based on the same ontological strata model, seem to be widely unknown. Even works in cultural anthropology that use the same model, or a very similar one, mention him only sparingly or not at all. Considering the importance of his basic premises and the richness of his observations, this is an injustice and should be corrected.

The attacks that were occasionally aimed at Hartmann's *general* ontology should not apply to his aesthetics: Since, according to him, the aesthetic object exists only for the recipient of art (contrary to the object of cognition), a discussion of Hartmann's "realistic ontology" and its epistemological assumptions[14] can be here omitted. Neither should we lament the somewhat scarce treatment of societal determinants, which **Georg Lukacs.**[15] who otherwise thinks highly of Hartmann, accuses him of. For an aesthetics, which understands itself as an ontology of art, societal factors belong only in so far to the work of art as they have been *integrated* into it, just as do psychological and philosophical factors. They certainly become part of the strata of the work described by Hartmann.

In spite of their very different reception, Hartmann and Ingarden have much in common[16]: They both stood in the middle of the idealism-realism controversy, and both decided in favor of realism by insisting that epistemology would have to be re-constructed out of ontology, and not vice versa. That is in Hartmann's case surprising, since it meant opposing the German idealistic tradition.[17] For Ingarden, this decision has been explained with the influence by the Polish analytical school, from which he came.[18] Both were influenced by **Scheler** as well as by **Husserl**'s phenomenology. Both, however, did not follow the transcendental idealism of the later Husserl (and even less **Heidegger**'s existentialism), but rather insisted on a patiently detailed analysis of existing objects (to which both counted art objects), that is to say, on a kind of phenomenological realism.

Both saw the work of art as an "intentional object" (Ingarden's term). based in reality and therefore lasting. but depending on the creative act of the author as well as on the act of reception by the audience. Both saw it mainly as a "stratified object" and both saw the problems in using such special metaphors. Lastly. both saw the relationship between the general ontological strata model and that specifically focused on literature. Hartmann, however, much more so than Ingarden, and that is, where their differences start:

One of the first problems one encounters in comparing these two attempts at a

stratified theory of art is whether one should design *individual* strata models for each art (music, painting, sculpture, literature, etc.) or, instead, one comprehensive model accommodating *all* of them. The former method was used by Ingarden whereas Hartmann used one comprehensive model.[19] It seems, however, that one of the greatest benefits of "Strata aesthetics", namely the possibility of comparing, describing, and defining the arts according to the way they *use* the available strata, would be lost if we used different models. For the purpose of comparative analysis *one* comprehensive system serves us better than many since, as stated previously, strata models are merely systems of categories, which we project upon phenomena in order to better distinguish them.

Such a unified system should also be based on the *ontological* strata model, encompassing inorganic, organic, emotional, and spiritual levels of existence in the world, since works of art are anchored in reality. We project the same categories simultaneously on art as well as on its surrounding reality. By using the same strata, we are enabled to compare art objects with other objects in ontological terms. The simple division into four levels of existence (material, biological, psychological, and intellectual, or whatever they may be called) can be further subdivided for aesthetic considerations, but *its sequence cannot be changed.* This claim may be justified by the following quotation from Hartmann: "The same strata that could be shown in the real world can also be found in the work of art and have to be run through by the spectator: first a material level (in the work of art, probably two), then one of life[lyness], then one of emotion, and finally a spiritual one."[20]

Another reason for following Hartmann in this respect is the fact that Ingarden, in contrast to Hartmann, finds his strata simply by a phenomenological analysis of the arts. In Ingarden's later book, *The Recognition of the Literary Work of Art,*[21] he describes the ways in which we realize the various strata. However, he never goes so far as to demonstrate points of *correspondence* between the strata in the personality structure of the artist and the receiver on the one hand, and the aesthetical structure of the work of art on the other hand. One reason for this is that Ingarden, at least officially, was not interested in the *psychological* aspects of literature. He also did not apply strata models to human beings, which had been the main concern of psychology and anthropology for quite a while, as best demonstrated by Rothacker's book. Rothacker even indicated points of correspondence in strata between human beings and their world of experience as stated in the following quote: "... substantial strata, characterized by autonomous laws, correspond to their correlated 'environments' ... zones of meaning, aimed only at them, which they derive from reality according to their intrinsic organization, and which offer them stimulation."[22] If we consider that not only art but also nature, and even inanimate environments can provide us with an aesthetic experience, we can better understand Rothacker's meaning. "Manipulated" nature or environments (such as gardens, flower arrangements, or architecture) form a transition from art to "real" (or un-manipulated) nature.

Hartmann, as mentioned before, bases his complete ontology on a strata model. This allows him to see the work of art as "just another" stratified object. Granted, this object may have a more complex stratification than any other kind, but nevertheless it is

based on the ontological model. We will later see that this enables him and us to more clearly define so far unexplained phenomena through the use of points of correspondence in the particular strata between author, receiver, the work of art itself, and the world in which it participates.[23] In this way, we attain a system whereby the strata are connected in two directions, namely "from the bottom up" (each stratum is *supported* ontologically by the one "below", its existence made ontologically possible by the one beneath it) and "from the top down" (each stratum is structurally *determined* by the one above it).

We cannot detail here the other problems connected with establishing a model of this kind.[24] It suffices to state that one of Ingarden's strata[25] had to be discarded entirely, since it did not seem to have ontological validity. It is important though that those strata that were retained (or newly established) obey the two ontological laws agreed upon by Ingarden and Hartmann. These are, in short: 1 The strata can be subdivided in varying degrees, but their basic order may not be changed. 2. The lower stratum is always stronger and autonomous, but supplies the material for the higher level, which in turn has room for higher principles.

III. Synthesis of Hartmann's and Ingarden's Strata Models

The following is a brief sketch of a combination of Ingarden's and Hartmann's strata:

(1) The first stratum, the **Material** of the work, corresponds to the *inorganic* stratum in ontological systems. Under "material" one understands color, stone, clay, etc., and in literature the words of language, which are already "objectified spirit"(Scheler), this making the strata relationship in literature especially complex.

(2) The **Order** *in material,* its coordination and the mutual relationship of its parts, which makes possible and determines the appearance of other strata, but must not be confused with the formation of *all* strata.

(3) The **Representational Aspect** of ordered material, the apparent objectivity, corresponding to the *organic* stratum in the ontological system.

(4) The appearance of **Motion** and **Life** in (at least partially) representationally ordered material, corresponding to the *biological-animalistic* world.

(5) The (still momentary) **Psychological Aspect** in lifelike, representationally ordered material, feelings and moods together with their expressive character, corresponding to the *psychic* stratum in the ontological system.

(6) **Action** or the **Temporal Continuum** in psychologically expressive, lifelike, representationally ordered material.

(7) Depiction of **Personality** in material which is experienced in a temporal continuum, and is psychologically expressive, lifelike, and representationally ordered.

(8) The **Symbolic, Significant, Supra-personal,** and **Supra-temporal** aspect (which concerns us all) of the **Fate** of a personality (see above). corresponding to the *intellectual* stratum in the ontological system.

(9) The general **way of feeling about the world, the attitude toward it, experience of it,** and **ideas** ("Weltanschauung") of the poet. expressed by the exemplary nature of the

fate of a personality, (as above).

Read from "front to rear"(as presented here), the nine strata of this model become increasingly abstract and general. As I have attempted to express in my formulation, *each stratum makes the subsequent one ontologically possible.* At the same time, *the forming of the more abstract strata determines the forming of the strata that sustain them.* For literary works of art, the foreground and middle strata are decisive. The background strata concern psychology and philosophy just as much as they do aesthetics. This model should be applicable to all forms of (at least partially) *representational* art, though not to art which is completely non-objective.

IV. Advantages of Strata Models

The advantage of strata models lies in their clarification of abstract relationships of characteristics and complexes of characteristics. There is, however, the danger of interference by geological or biological notions. The concept pairs "high-low", "above-below", "exterior-interior", or even "outer-inner" or "shallow-deep", may suggest incorrect ideas of space. The character of literature as art consists precisely in the *appearance* (Erscheinen) of several qualitatively different strata, one behind the other. Therefore, it might be more appropriate to speak of *foreground, middle,* and *background* strata.

The only justification for a system of this kind lies in its *usefulness,* which can be ascertained by asking: what can it make us see that we could not see without it? – Below a few examples for possible applications starting with insights of a general scope and ending with more specific observations.

V. The Question: What is Art?

In comparison to other kinds of objects (e.g., a *practical* object or commodity like a chair, or a *pragmatic* literary genre with mainly *informative* functions, e.g., a scientific treatise), the work of art can be now defined in its ontological uniqueness.[26] It differs, at least potentially, from all other objects in the *richness of its stratification.* Our special relationship to art can be explained by the fact that only art has as many strata as our own personality structure. Our *aesthetic experience* consists in penetrating several strata, from the texture of the foreground to the last strata of meaning. In contrast, the contemplation of a chair carries us, at best, through three strata: (1) the material, (2) its order, and (3) the function, purpose or usefulness of the object. A scholarly tract might present us with something that resembles eight of our strata, however *in a different relationship.* In art (e.g., a novel) one stratum *appears* behind another, as in real life (e.g., meaning behind the mimic expression of an agitated face), whereas in *pragmatic* language, the contents of other strata are merely "talked about" or "referred to", one at a time. The strata are not "built" on one another.

This circumvention of mediating strata is *only possible in language* because of the *double function of its first stratum,* material. The material of the other arts (color, clay, tones, etc.) is mere "material" and only gains meaning in its configuration in later strata. On the other hand, the material of language, namely the words, is already charged with meaning, or as **Max Scheler** would have said, it is already "objectified intellect". This

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kind of meaning, adhering to our words by long established convention, is also used for non-artistic, theoretical statements. Language can therefore be used in two ways: one resembles the use of color to *build*, stratum by stratum, a world that acquires meaning. The way is a linguistic system that *combines* symbols with pre-established meaning.

In the first, *artistic*, mode, the artist guides us through one stratum after another. We are made to experience them, each "appearing" behind the other, as in real life. The poet might describe a person in some characteristic activity and make us interpret the psychological meaning of these actions, as we would in an actual encounter. The poet does not formulate the meaning directly. In the *pragmatic* mode, however, an author would theorize about psychological processes by naming them with abstract and precise terms. Of course, both ways can be used in combination, For example, an author can allow a person to theorize and thereby characterize himself. Or an author can sketch reality alternately through description and direct statements. Distinctions of this complexity between poetic and theoretical prose can best be made with the help of the strata model.

VI. The Comparison ("mutual illumination") of the Arts

The special character of any kind of art can be much better described by use of the strata concept. A classic example of a problem that could not be solved before the arrival of strata aesthetics is that of the *special position of music within the other arts.*[27] How many strata does music normally have? Ingarden said only one, whereas Hartmann distinguished several. If more than one, how is it possible that music, as an "abstract art", obviously can dispense with the middle stratum (of representation of appearing reality) without the higher strata collapsing? In general terms: how can music impress us with (and elicit in us) emotion, or even "Weltanschauung" (world view) as in great works such as Beethoven's *Ninth* or Bach's *Passion of St. Matthews,* and yet contain no appearing reality (human beings, landscapes, etc.) in which or "behind which" emotions could appear? What allows us to skip one or more strata and still have powerful emotional experiences?

Careful stratological analysis reveals that this is because in the second stratum in music the material is coordinated in *two* ways, "vertically" (in harmonies that could be compared to color combinations in a painting) and "horizontally" (in motifs, melodies, etc., that develop *in time*). What the painting looses by its static character in the second stratum, it has to re-gain by the concreteness of its third stratum. In the fine arts, *we* have to project (by way of association) movement and the experience of liveliness into the objects and persons depicted in the third stratum. In music, this is not necessary since the sounds themselves move in time (the time of performance), unfold in melodies, increase and fade away in crescendi and decrescendi. The experience of movement, the fourth stratum, is promoted by the musical time structure and can therefore "rest" directly on the second stratum of coordinated material. The omission of the third stratum (of depicted reality) therefore only *seems* to make an exception to the ontological laws of stratification, according to which each stratum has to be supported by the next lower (more concrete) one. Music is the only art that can *afford* to be abstract (non representational) and still convey emotional experience because its very medium is motion in time. Motion for us

contains expression because we are used to experiencing it as the expression of something alive. Fast motions we call "lively". Lack of motion is being experienced as "lifeless". Therefore, we project emotional qualities *directly* into the (real) motion of music, just as into the (associated) motion of depicted reality in a painting. Therefore, in music, the stratum of coordinated material can carry emotional qualities ontologically.[28]

VII. Marxist Theory and the Strata Model

Even *sociological aspects* of literature can be illuminated with the help of the strata model, if we do not limit its application to the observation of phenomena *within* literature (the same is done by psychological and psycho-analytical interpretation). As an example, let us refer briefly to the old topic of discussion between Marxists and their adversaries, whether literature is determined by economics, and if so, how? This questions the kind of relationship existing between the socioeconomic *base* of society and the cultural *superstructure* that includes literature. Let us recall **Marx's** famous statement of 1859:[29] "The ways of material production determine the social, political, and intellectual life process. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their modes of existence, but rather their social existence that determines their consciousness." **Engels** illustrated this in 1845 with an example:[30] "Raffael, as well as any other artist, is determined by previous technical progress in the arts, by the organization of society and division of labor where he lived ... Whether an individual like Raffael is able to develop his talent depends completely on the demand for his talent. This, in turn, is dependent on the division of labor and the resulting progress in education."

Originally, our consciousness was seen merely as a reflection of the outside world. However, as **Lenin** noticed, this reflection of reality in our consciousness is "not a simple, unmediated, mirror-like, dead activity, but rather a complicated, ambiguous one in zigzag-curves that entails the possibility of phantasy evading life."[31] Later, in 1890, Engels refined his economic determinism when he admitted that economic conditions couldn't *directly* influence the intellectual life of a nation. They can only affect the political stratum next to them and will reach the cultural level only via intermediaries. **Peter Demetz**[32] summarizes these more sophisticated visions:

"Engels' letters of his late years sketch a hierarchically ordered conception of economies and creative intellect. The economic basis seems to be expanded through the influence of Taine's concepts; the superstructure unfolds into a surprising complexity of intellectual fields. The relationship between foundation and superstructure is now characterized by the possibility of mutual interaction; moreover, this interaction is subject to the scientifically indeterminate effects of 'a whole series of accidents'. There is no longer a direct contact between more distant spheres; economics may exert its influence upon the neighboring area of politics, but it can no longer force the more distant sphere of literature directly under its tyranny. The more abstract fields of the superstructure are only lightly touched by economic impulses. which, in turn, are subjected to serious metamorphoses on their way through the intermediate levels. Undoubtedly the creative intellect acquires a new dignity: the higher its achievement rises above the economic basis,

the more freely the laws of its own being will operate once more."

It is remarkable that here also the ontological laws of stratification are valid, i.e., that each stratum has to "rest" on another, and that none can be skipped. Which strata could be distinguished was indicated in 1955 by **S. W. Plechanow**:[33] "The artistic activity is one of those which are most removed from the economic base. [...] We have here the following: 1.the state of productive forces, 2.economy, 3.social order [...], 4.psychology, and 5. ideology". How much these strata resemble the ontological ones does not have to be shown. In a similar manner, Engels analyzed the relationship in 1890. For **Stalin** these stratified interactions were too complicated.[34] He denied any intermediary steps between base and superstructure. Sophisticated Marxists, like **Georg Lukacs**, even recognized the possibility of a twofold determination: an ontological one "from the bottom up", and a structural one "from the top down". Once the upper strata have been established, they have a life of their own to a certain degree, and can influence the lower ones. All kinds of tension can develop between cultural strata, i.e., those that have no real base any longer in the lower one, and the socioeconomic base. But finally, according to all Marxists, the lower strata are going to win out. After so many refinements have been built into the basic Marxist doctrine, even many "bourgeois" scholars would probably agree.

Among the more narrowly defined problems that Strata Poetics might be able to offer solutions to, the following might be representative:

VIII. Structure

By now it becomes apparent that what we usually call "structure" in a literary work of art is nothing but the interaction of its strata as described above. Analysis of structure is therefore really analysis of strata, and this doubtlessly was in **Wolfgang Kayser**'s or **Emil Staiger**'s mind when they explained the concept of structure. Herman Meyer phrased it as follows: "Form and content are both material in the literary work of art ... they belong to its structure insofar as they interact and help constitute the esthetic order of the work."[35] The distinction of subject (theme or topic), from form and content (meaning or message) is not contradictory to the strata model. In comparison, however, it is rather coarse-meshed. Nicolai Hartmann has opened our eyes to the fact that even the *form* of art is always graded or stratified;[36] that is to say, each stratum has its own form. This is evidenced by the fact that we can ask about each stratum (from material to world experience) with WHAT as well with HOW. If, for example, we deal in the second stratum of poetry with sensibly ordered word material, we would still have to ask *how* it is ordered (style). The various levels can only exist in a certain form, be it good or bad. It is therefore as inappropriate to ask for *the* form of a literary work of art, as it is to confuse the content with the material of poetry. The content has, according to our model, at least four levels. Formation can apply to the psychological as well as to the representational level or the word material. Even meaning can comprise four to five levels.

Structural analysis has always rightly stressed the *interaction* of levels more than the levels themselves. Hartmann shows that "the formation of a single stratum, isolated, taken for itself, is not esthetic formation at all ... The latter only begins with the succession

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of formations of various kinds."[37]

If for a moment we take as the "meaning of poetry" its last three levels, we would have to ask: how is it conveyed? The answer is: *as in life*. It is usually not stated directly, but *appears* in the external behavior of man, often merely in a small but typical segment of his environment; in short, in what is depicted by the preceding strata. The useful term *transparency* (Transparenz) therefore is to be understood as a shining of the last level through the first ones.

Why does the poet have to choose this detour, as **Goethe** demanded so emphatically ("Shape, artist! Don't talk!")? Why can s/he not state directly, what s/he wishes to tell us? Because he can only make us "see" whatever s/he wants to show. The strata become increasingly more abstract as they recede. If s/he supplies us merely with psychological *concepts*, *we* have to flesh them out with intuition and imagination.

What about the seemingly shrewd distinction of "intention of the author" and "intention of the work,"[38] if we understand "intention" here in the sense of our ninth stratum? - It proves to be false and misleading, since it intimates the notion, that anything could "flow into" the work that does not come (consciously or unconsciously) from the author. Assuming a basic conformity of strata in the author and in his work, it becomes easily understandable that not only the conscious levels of the poet's personality shape the work, but also the unconscious ones (in varying degrees according to the type of author). This unconscious transference can even be extended: the poet is shaped by unconscious influences from his environment. In turn he shapes his work, which in its turn projects unconscious stimuli back into its social environment (the audience).

IX. Genre

Structures that qualify especially well as vehicles for expression of our standard experiences are repeated with slight variations. We call them "genres" or "kinds". The strata of the literary work of art solidify at the same time into the *individual* structure of the specific work and into the relatively *constant* structure of the genre, depending on one's point of view. Therefore, genres can be defined as *groupings of literature having resemblances in the structure of their strata that especially qualify them for expressing basic human attitudes (Grundhaltungen) and experiences (Grunderlebnisse)*. From their only *relative* constancy (as opposed to classes in the natural sciences), it follows that they are not limiting, but rather *accentuating* or "ideal" concepts. Various genres are fixed structurally in varying degrees, e.g., the sonnet more so than the novel.

The strata of a genre are held together by the same double dependency which also characterizes each single literary work: on the one hand, each level can only exist on the foundation of those under it; on the other hand, its character is determined by higher ones.[39]

Only literature of a grand scope (epic poem, novel, drama) develops all levels. But it seems that, in the single work as well as in a genre, no intermediate level may be omitted totally, since the next higher one always has to rest upon it. Even *lyrical* poetry, which does not contain action and conflict and which goes directly from the sphere of the external (2) or the representational (3) to the stratum of moods and emotions (5), only *seems* to constitute

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an exception. In reality even here the level of actions or life in movement (4) is not omitted totally: the voice assumed by the poet (das "sprechende Ich") with which we identify as much as with the epic or dramatic figure, substitutes for the missing level. Without it, the literary work could not exist. For even if it often seems so, it is impossible that things speak to us *directly*. They are dead without the personal perspective of the "lyrical I", however much the latter may be fused with them. Nevertheless, the characteristic manner and intensity in which the lyrical speaker is still present does contribute to the distinction of lyrical genres like sonnet and song. (New perspectives may be gained from these views for the examination of so-called "concrete poesy."[40])

"Ontological", "phenomenological", or "psychological" descriptions of genre do not exclude the *historical* one; rather they found and complement it. If one knows *how* something is constituted (ontological description) and *why* (psychological), the question of the historical and sociological circumstances under which it developed in a specific way is still not made superfluous. On the other hand, one only *fully* understands the history and environmental relation of any phenomenon following an examination under the aspects mentioned earlier.

X. The "Three Unities"

One aspect of the stratified formation of tragedy can be seen in the "three unities" much discussed since **Aristotle**. Their purpose is to aid concentration on a main effect (catharsis). In light of what has been said, we now instead of discussing only *three* unities have to discuss the unity of the linguistic "material", the style, the representational formation of a segment of the world depicted, and the unity of the characters, together with their mimetic and linguistic delineation and psychological motivation, the unity of their actions and fates, and finally, that of their exemplary significance, which in turn reveals the unified world view of the author through theme and content.- All of these strata, if executed improperly, can distract the concentration of the audience.- The *unity of action,* which **Lessing** considered to be most important, is primarily related to the sixth and seventh strata, which directly sustain the stratum of symbolic representation. - The *unity of place* simply indicates that important energies in the drama can remain free for concentration on higher strata, if the objective aspect of the third stratum needs to be executed only once, and then remains unchanged. The *unity of time* takes into consideration the loss of interest, which may occur if characters are presented in overly long time intervals. Our identification with the protagonist is endangered if we must first ascertain whether he/she is still the same and his/her situation has not changed decisively.

XI. Artistic and Aesthetic Value:

Value categories like "immanent truth". "appropriateness to the material", "adequacy", "functionality". "economy", "honesty", "verisimilitude", "genuineness". etc. (partly overlapping as they are), may be assigned to certain strata as criteria for their formation.

More important is Ingarden's differentiation between *artistic* and *aesthetic* values based in artistic and aesthetic objects. The artistic object (or artifact) contains "spots of

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indeterminacy" in all of its strata (e.g., the poet cannot tell or describe everything, the painter cannot depict everything, etc.). The recipient has to fill these in, which amounts to a "quasi-creative" act and can account to a large degree for the pleasure in experiencing art. Of course, this act of "concretizing" (konkretisieren) the spots of indeterminacy will be different in each case, depending on the personality structure and "horizon of expectations" (**Jauss**[41]) of the recipients. We know that the latter can change even within the same viewer in different stages of his/her development. For example, works that did not appeal to us in our youth later "open up" after we have acquired the maturity needed for their appreciation. We can therefore say that to each "artistic object" belong as many "aesthetic objects" as the former finds recipients.

Artistic *values* are only *potential* ones, since they (or better: some of them) have to be realized as *aesthetic* values in each individual act of "concretization" of an artistic artifact through a receiver. Even this act can be analyzed in terms of the strata model if we ask, for example, which strata have been determined ("filled in") more strongly by the author, and which leave more freedom for the creativity of the recipient (e.g., naturalism, leaving less freedom in the middle strata than symbolism, and so forth).

XII. "Strata Poetics" and the Question of Literary Value

What we often take to be value criteria (e. g., Roman Ingarden's or Nicolai Hartmann's description of the stratification of a "literary work of art", the concept of "autonomy", or the criterion of "unity" or "wholeness" of a work of literature) are in reality merely structural, ontological, or phenomenological characterizations of a very general nature, which can also be applied to "kitsch" or trivial literature. "Strata Poetics" has universal validity, but does not penetrate to an adequate aesthetical evaluation of literature. It might have done so, if its proponents would have succeeded in a more detailed and precise description of our *experience* of the stratification of literature. This, however, seems to be only possible for individual cases and not in general. Strata theory only describes pre-conditions for the aesthetical impact of literature in the process of the foreground-strata becoming transparent for the background-strata. (Nicolai Hartmann describes it as our "penetrating" the strata.)

Literary value, just as aesthetic value in general, seems to be a culturally determined projection. Strictly speaking, instead of "values" we should only speak of "possibilities" or "pre-conditions for the projection of values." We always have to ask: Value *for whom?* Value is something that *we* endow artifacts with; not groups (or genres) of artifacts, but rather individual ones. Therefore, it does not make sense to talk about "values of the novel" (in general or as a genre), but rather of the value of a certain novel for a certain (type of) reader. Evaluation is not the task of poetics, but rather of individual interpretation.

In conclusion, we would be hard pressed to decide whether the strata model has been more fruitful for observations *within* literature or for comparing the latter with the other arts. Both endeavors have profited immensely from the application of the strata model. Neither Hartmann nor Ingarden, its two initiators, limited his observations to literature. Both enlarged the scope of "strata poetics" to that of "strata aesthetics," providing

us with profound insights into the mode of being as well as into various other aspects of the arts.

Notes

[1] Parts of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the Japanese Society for Germanistics in Tokyo (20.5.1999).

[2] H. Wagner: "Die Schichtentheoreme bei Platon, Aristoteles und Plotin" in *Studium Generale*, 9/6 (1957) 283-291.

[3] Sigmund Freud: *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* (1917); *Das Ich und das Es* (1923); *Ges. Schriften* (12 vols., since 1924).

[4] *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Halle 1916; Berne 1966) 332-345.

[5] *Der Aufbau der realen Welt. Grundriss der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre*. Berlin ³1964. - *Ästhetik*. Berlin 1953; ²1966. - *Einführung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungsnachschrift* (Hannover 1949) 121-122.- Comp. Timotheus Barth: „Zur Ästhetik Nicolai Hartmanns" in: *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, 17 (1954) 137-140; Friedrich Löw: „L'estetica de Nicolai Hartmann" in *Aut aut* (1954) 377-383.
Hartmann (1882-1950) studied in St. Petersburg, Dorpat and Marburg. He taught in Marburg (1920-25), Cologne (1925-31), Berlin (1931-45) and Göttingen (1945-50). His basic ideas concerning a strata model for aesthetics were already published (two years after Ingarden's first book) in 1933, in *Das Problem des geistigen Seins. Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Geschichtsphilosophie und der Geisteswissenschaften* (in its 3rd section: "Der objektivierte Geist", pp. 406-515). According to his wife, his strata-aesthetics was completed in 1945, but published only posthumously in 1953 (2nd. ed. 1966), at a time when German scholarship was only starting to re-connect to international exchange of ideas. That may be one reason, why his strata-aesthetics has been almost completely (and undeservedly) forgotten. Rene Wellek, e.g., does not mention Hartman, even in his annotations or bibliography, in: Four Critics: *Croce, Valery, Lukacs, and Ingarden* (Seattle: U. of Washington Press 1981). See also an.13.

[6] *Die Schichten der Persönlichkeit*. Bonn 1938; ⁸1969. - There, we read in the "Foreword to the Sixth Edition" (III): "The frequent comparisons of my theories ... with the ontology of Nicolai Hartmann surprisingly suggest, because we both use the word 'stratum'. a deeper connection, which is not well considered."- On pages 109 and 167, however, Rothacker uses Hartmann's ontological laws in order to support his own theories. Compare also the first attempt at establishing a strata-model in Hermann Hoffmann's *Die Schichtentheorie* (Stuttgart 1935) and the comprehensive synthesis in Philipp Lersch's *Der Aufbau der Person* (München ⁷1956).

[7] In 1974, I published a comprehensive, annotated, international bibliography: *Typologien und Schichtenlehren. Bibliographie des internationalen Schrifttums bis 1970*. Beschreibende Bibliographien 5 (ed. C. Minis, Rodopi N.V., Amsterdam).

[8] *Das literarische Kunstwerk*. Tübingen, 1931; ³1965; Engl. transl. by George G. Grabowicz: *The Literary Work of Art*. Evanston 1973 - *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks* (1937 in Polish) Darmstadt 1968; Engl. Transl. By Ruth Ann Crowley and Kennet Olson: *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern U. Press 1973. - *Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst*. Tübingen 1962. - *Erlebnis. Kunstwerk und Wert*. 1969. - His attempt at establishing individual strata-models for the other arts cannot be discussed in detail here. Compare my book (1978) and Hans H. Rudnick: "Roman Ingarden's Literary Theory" in: *Ingardenia* (ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975) 105-119, as well as Eugene Hannes Falk: *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*. Chapel Hill U. of NO Press. 1931.

[9] "Die Idee der Phänomenologie" in *Husserliana*. vol.2, 1958.

[10] See my book (*Typen und Schichten. Zur Einteilung des Menschen und seiner Produkte*. Berne-Munich 1978) which, among other things, was an attempt to lay a foundation for strata-aesthetics, based on Ingarden's and Hartmann's works, though differing somewhat from their findings. The book contains several chapters dealing with the stratification of literature, but always in comparison with that of the other arts.

[11] Emil Staiger: *Die Kunst der Interpretation* 1955; Johannes Pfeiffer: *Wege zur Dichtung*. 1952; Wolfgang Kayser: *Das sprachliche Kunstwerk* 1948.

[12] e.g., Wolfgang Iser: *Die Appellstruktur der Texte. Unbestimmtheit als Wirkungsbedingung*

literarischer Prosa. Konstanz: G. Hess, 1970; *The Implied Reader.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. Press 1974; *The Act of Reading.* Baltimore. Johns Hopkins U. Press 1978. - Iser utilizes Ingarden's terms *concretization, schematic views, intentionality.* and *points of indeterminacy* of the work of art. Comp. Also Jane P. Tompkins, ed.: *Reader-Response Criticism.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. Press 1980.

[13] It seems to be characteristic that he is not mentioned once in a study like Robert Detweiler's *Story, Sign, and Self. Phenomenology and Structuralism as Literary Critical Methods* (Philadelphia 1978). which devotes many pages to Ingarden.

[14]Comp. Katharina Kanthack: *Nicolai Hartmann und das Ende der Ontologie.* 1952; Ingeborg Wirth: *Realismus und Apriorismus in Nicolai Hartmanns Erkenntnistheorie.* 1965.

[15]E g. in *Der Aufbau der realen Welt.* Berlin 1940.

[16]Comp. The article by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. "Essence et existence. Etude a propos de la philosophie de Roman Ingarden et Nicolai Hartmann" in: *Philosophie et l'esprit* (Paris 1957) 255.

[17]Comp. The article by Walter Cerf on Hartmann in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol. III* (new York: Macmillan 1967 ff.) 421 ff.

[18]Comp. the article by Henryk Skolimowski on Ingarden, ibid Vol. IV, S. 193 f.

[19]One of the reasons why Hartmann's thoughts on literature have gone widely ignored may be the fact that they are imbedded in general observations on aesthetics and descriptions of other kinds of art (painting, sculpture, music. architecture. ornamental design) and have to be isolated from these by the careful reader. Of the 475 pages in Hartmann's *Ästhetik* (2nd unchanged edition. 1966), only one fifth (roughly 85, if we count isolated paragraphs) deal with literature expressly and exclusively. Nevertheless, the reader gains a comprehensive insight into the position of literature *within* (and in comparison to) the other arts.

Ingarden, on the other hand, went the opposite way. He first published an analysis of the *literary* work of art exclusively, which already in its title announced to literary scholars that the book fell within their realm of competence. Only afterwards did he extend his model to other kinds of art. However, the focus of one philosopher complements that of the other: While Hartmann offers the "large perspective", Ingarden supplies the detailed analysis of literature.

[20] *Einführung.* p. 204.

[21] See note 8

[22] Rothacker (1938) 170.

[23] In my book (1978), I also needed to insure that Hartmann's ontological strata were harmonized with the psychological ones established in the literature to date. Thus, I had to compare all-important psychological and anthropological strata-models and find their common denominators in order to combine these with Hartmann's categories. - Since I discovered that strata-theories are closely connected to type-theories (e. g.. the various "Typologien" of German "Charakterologie"). I also had to find a synthesis for the latter. This endeavor occupies roughly the first half of the book.

[24] Described in English in my article: "The Main Differences Between Roman Ingarden's and Nicolai Hartmann's Strata Systems" in: *Acta Humanistica et Scientifica Universitatis Sangio Kyotiensis* 19/3. Foreign. Lang. and Lit. Series, No.17 (June 1990) 64-82.

[25] Ingarden's stratum of "manifold schematized views" (his third): It is not comparable to the others since it does not organize phenomena as such. but rather refers to our recognition of them (point of view). Ingarden s observations on the concretization of the literary work of art and on the important role of hazy spots or "spots of indeterminacy" ("Unbestimmtheitsstellen") are very valuable. They say. however, more about our assimilation of literature than about its ontological structure. This is ironic. since Ingarden and most "phenomenologists" were quite hostile to psychology. But this is also what made Ingarden the father (or at least forerunner) of today's "reception-aesthetics".

[26] See my article "Our Concept of Art in Light of the Strata Theory" in: *Acta Humanistica et Scientifica* 26/3. Foreign. Lang. and Lit. Series. No.23 (March 1996) 50-61

[27] See my article "Das Schichtenverhaltnis im Musikkunstwerk" in: *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und lllgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 24/1 (1979) 5-10

[28] Starting from considerations of this kind I have analyzed the possibilities and limitations of Japanese brush paintings and calligraphy always in comparison to the other arts and within the framework of the strata

model in "Über ostasiatische Tuschmalerei" in: *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 22/2 (1977) 193-199.

[29] in *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, Vorwort, 1859; my translation.

[30] Die deutsche Ideologie (1845) in *Frühschriften*, p. 474; my translation.

[31] W.I. Lenin: "Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus" In: *Über Kultur und Kunst* (1960) p.10.

[32] *Marx, Engels, and the Poets* (Chicago-London 1967) p 151.

[33] *Kunst* (1955) 337-338.

[34] *Der Marxismus und die Fragen der Sprachwissenschaft*, quoted in H. N. Fügen: *Die Hauptrichtungen der Literatursoziologie* (Bonn 1964) p.44.

[35] "Über den Begriff Struktur in der Dichtung" in: *Neue Deutsche Hefte* 92 (1963) 12.

[36] *Ästhetik*, pp.235, 238, 240 and 249.

[37] *Ibid.*, p.240.

[38] This question was discussed at the Fourth Amherst Colloquium on Modern German Literature: Psychologie in der Literaturwissenschaft (May 1. and 2., 1970, University of Massachusetts) and no agreement was reached; see my "Nachträglicher Diskussionsbeitrag" in *Poesie und Wissenschaft* Bd.32 (Heidelberg 1971) 227-230.

[39] N. Hartmann (Ästhetik, pp. 238-239): " ... in appearance the formation of the anterior stratum always stipulates the appearance of the one behind; in the composition of the work of art, however, and in the productive process of the artist the formation of the last strata determines the first. For the exterior is shaped as it is in order to let the formation of the interior shine through. Therefore, it is determined by the last strata. The exterior levels exist for them. And in this sense the formation of the concrete foreground is determined by the last background-stratum." (My translations.)- I would like to add: the "interior" can be unconscious to the poet at least initially. It can exist in hazy form and evolve during the creative process. See my article: "On Beardsley's View of the Artistic Process" in: Acta Humanistica et Scientifica 24/1, Humanities Series no. 21 (1994) 334-340.

[40] Discussed in detail in my article "Grenzen der 'Aussparung' in der Literatur. Das Problem der konkreten Poesie" in: *Acta Humanistica*. 18/3, Foreign Langs. and Lit. Series. No. 3 (1989) 145-186. For the visual arts, compare with my article "Über ostasiatische Tuschemalerei" in: *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik* 22/2 (1977) 193-199.

[41] Hans Robert Jauss: *Literaturgeschichte als Provokation* [1970] Frankfurt/M.. Suhrkamp 1992.

Faculty of Foreign Languages
Kyoto Sangyo University
Kamigamo-Motoyama,
Kita-Ku, Kyoto 603, Japan

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