

## BOOK REVIEWS

**Mark A. Cheetham, *Kant, Art, and Art History: Moments of Discipline*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 222.**

Immanuel Kant's influence on almost all the branches of speculation that structure the history of Western philosophy during his time and later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is simply picturesque. His approach to transcendental aesthetic judgment is still a vast source of critical explorations and elaborations. His contributions to the reflections on the nature of aesthetic experience, aesthetic attitude and aesthetic symbolism are more than legendary. The present author, Mark Cheetham, explores yet another aspect of the Kantian contribution to the theories of art history, as exemplified in the works of Heinrich Wölfflin, Erwin Panofsky, and Clement Greenberg.

Cheetham notices that it is very difficult to discern any important effect of Kant's philosophy outside its own field, particularly in the field of visual arts. "The reception and influence of Kant's thought in art history and the visual arts conforms remarkably to what Derrida has described as the logic of *parergon*," i.e., "the whole analytic of aesthetic judgment forever assumes that one can distinguish rigorously between intrinsic and the extrinsic" an assumption that Derrida rejects as he rejects all other binary hierarchies. Derrida rejects Kant's notion that art is an ornament (extrinsic) in the structures of buildings. Cheetham does not hold that philosophy is necessary to literature, art or art history, as was Kant's philosophy in general for the Romantics, in an *a priori* fashion, but it has historically been the primary fulcrum around which these fields have turned and defined themselves. Disciplinary definition and change is not "the process by which something from outside penetrates and alters the inside of a community... when a community is provoked to change by something outside it, that something will already have been inside." Thus when philosophy effects art and art history, it is no more entering to it, it is already an organic part, a plasma of it, Cheetham argues.

Five decisive "moments" of Kant's reception in and influence on the visual arts and art history are traced by the author: The first moment is the circle of Carl Ludwig Fernow (1763-1808) who lived in Rome for a decade only, but circulating there Kant's ideas profusely promoting German classicism in Italy through John Winckelmann and Anton Mengs. This Fernow circle is the major channel to influence the German speaking artists in Rome. Cheetham traces an interesting heritage of intellectual association of Fernow with Schiller at the University of Jena, and also traces his zeal for politics that he shared with Kant's republicanism, his support for French revolution and Napoleon. In Fernow's opinion Kant's aesthetics of beauty and political ideas are indeed correlated. Thereafter, Kant's influence is felt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Panofsky and Greenberg invoked Kant's authority to develop their contextual rather than formal understanding of art. Panofsky's humanism was interlocked with the Kantian freedom of the judging subject. Panofsky's uses of Kantian concepts and nomenclature around cubism, and Greenberg's around formalism are committedly Kantian. Panofsky's claim that artistic perception is no more faced with a "thing-in-itself" than is the process of recognition is notably Kantian in spirit. Artist's free choice of perspective is analogous to Kant's *a priori* intuition of space itself. In the early years of twentieth century there were two Kantian streams—the neo-Kantian stream culminated in Cassirer and the radical division by Heidegger—the two philosophers debating publicly over the appropriate reception and use of Kant. Panofsky's preference to Cassirer had the important consequence that "the explicit problematic of historicity recedes" in Panofsky's art theory and art-historical writings. He prefers the historicity of Kant (Cassirer) to the interest in history, and by this preference he turns away from both Hegel and Heidegger for whom history as a problem was fundamental. (p. 71)

Another moment of Kant's influence is felt in Daniel-Henry Kahnweilu, the most important historian of Cubism representing the works of Braque, Gris and Picasso claiming that the new language of cubism has given an unprecedented freedom to painting—"instead of an analytical description, the painter can ... also create in this way a synthesis of the object, or in the words of Kant, put together the

various conceptions and comprehend their variety in our perception.” (p. 78) In this regard Cheetham disputes Paul Crowther who denied any link between Kant and cubism. Similarly, Clement Greenberg’s formalism is also notably Kantian.

In the chapters four and five Cheetham explores the Kantian influence in the postmodernist treatment of the “sublime,” particularly by Derrida and Lyotard. “Derrida and Kant are obsessed with the borders and the legislation of conceptual boundaries. Both thinkers... employ the term ‘sublime’—despite its putative boundlessness and uncontrollability... Derrida uses Kant’s sublime in *The Truth in Painting* as a way to think about the authority that philosophical aesthetics and philosophy have had historically over the visual arts... Jean-Francois Lyotard claims, too, that it has been with the vehicle of the “sublime that aesthetics asserted its critical rights over art.” (p. 102) Cheetham exemplifies the remarkable range of contemporary visualizations of the sublime in France as well as in other horizons of the Western world.

Tracing the impact of Kantian philosophy in the modern and postmodern art historical writings is an extremely fruitful scholarly venture that was due long since, and the way Mark Cheetham has tackled the issue exhibits the lot of insight and exercise not possible ordinarily unless one has both zeal and sincerity in probing into this serious field. Cheetham’s book is the result of a sincere intellectual exercise that extends over a decade and a half. One can easily note the success of the author in correlating history and historical progress of philosophy with the study of art and art history, and can easily find out here a model for investigating other disciplines in their creative and critical moments of healthy and happy correlations.

**Haun Saussy (ed.), *Comparative Literature in an Age of Globalization*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, pp. 261.**

The present anthology is a report on the state of the discipline of comparative literature as prepared by the editor in response to the invitation by the outgoing and incoming presidents of the American Comparative Literature Association, 2003. Unlike its predecessor, the precious ten-year report *Comparative Literature in the Age of Multiculturalism* (1996), the present report is of a different design, unlike any conventional form of report, very much suitable to the anti-authoritarian formlessness of the unconventional states of intellectual activities in the present century in general, it presents some reflections by the forefront practitioner of comparative literature who have vitalized the current issues in the discipline such as post colonialism, art history, literary theory, violation of discipline, terrorism, gender politics and politics of culture that defy the ‘death of the discipline’ that the controversial comparatist Gayatri Spivak announced simultaneously. The volume is lively and enlivening with its profound interest and energy in enlarging the scope and horizons of comparative literature for the coming decade—Long live the Discipline!

Contributors to the volume include the editor himself and sixteen others that are organized into two parts: 1. The State of the Discipline, 2004 and 2. Responses the first part covers the editor himself, David Damrosch, Emily Apter, Richard Rorty, Dielal Kadir, David Ferris, Françoise Lionnet, Gail Finney, Steven Ungar, Caroline Eckhardt, Christopher Braider and Fedwa Malti-Douglas; the second part—Katie Trumpener, Caryl Emerson, Roland Greene, Linda Hutcheon, Zhang Longxi, Jonathan Culler and Marshall Brown.

Richard Rorty’s essay “Looking Back at ‘Literary Theory’” reflects the loss of disciplinary barrier among disciplines at the American universities beginning already in the 1970s referring to the academic positions he held himself—from professor of Philosophy at Princeton to professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford through professor of Humanities at Virginia. This loss of barrier, Rorty observes, marks the distinction of Comparative Literature in its very flexibility of disciplinarity that it was very much prone to since its foundations by literary scholars like René Wellek. Comparative Literature, since its birth, was not simply comparison among literatures of various nations, not the German “world literature,” but a completely new mode of studying literature set upon the very foundation of interdisciplinarity, a mode that was debated Leavis and Wellek in the late 1930s. Literary study joined

hands with philosophy as early as that period, not in the flexible academic, positions of Rorty after half a century. Wellek's *History of Modern Criticism: 1750-1950* reflects this interdisciplinarity of literary study on its critical path that can pick up any discipline relevant for appreciating and evaluating literary works—a mode founded by Aristotle the father of Western Literary Criticism. The medieval notion of humanities and its compartmentalization of knowledge was decompartmentalized during the postwar period, when the war broken European scholars gathered in the United States and found Comparative Literature that walked with its full vigor despite Lane Cooper's calling it "bogus." Against this background, it is not a surprise that the teachers and students of literature opted for Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault during the 1970s. The growing interest in these authors was not due to their offering a new theory about the nature of literature—"... the unhappy term 'literary theory,'" writes Rorty, it deceived some hapless graduate students thinking that they could write a worthwhile article or book just by "applying theory" to a text. This belief generated a great mass of beauty readable amazingly boring articles and books." (65) Rorty is, however, relieved that the tradition of deconstructing texts is now as absolute as spotting Christ-figures or vagina-symbols. At the same time, Rorty is bared with the curricular inertia that compels the philosophy graduates comparing Kierkegaard with Levinas, to know something about Gödel's results before they clear their Ph. D. dissertation.

Rorty is also unwilling to accept Haun Saussy's suggestion that literariness is central to comparative literature, an idea that Roman Jakobson and his colleagues of the Formalist group developed by following Husserl's eidetic meaning in the 1920s. Rorty observes that this search for literariness in literature is as misleading as the search for conceptual clarity in philosophical texts. It seems Rorty is wise in pointing out the limitations of both "disciplines" and "interdisciplinarity" that often ignore some vital, if not foundational or essential, sense of "differences"—one can not compare just anything with any other thing—"The difference between Aurbach and Spivak is as great as the difference between Heidegger and Carnap," (67) although it is impossible to identify anything central to an academic phenomenon or discipline as it is to identify the "core" of a human self.

Jonathan Culler, on the other wing of the report, seeks for the differences in disciplines following the Saussurean semiological principles of differential identity—"Their most precise characteristic is to be what others are not." But Culler feels unhappy and uncomfortable about the broadening sphere of comparative literature deviating widely and wildly from its original function of studying the sources and influence "bringing together works where there seemed to be a direct link of transmission that subtended and served to justify comparison." But comparative literature in its wild adventures has lost its commercial feasibility—"though comparative literature has triumphed, and many others are comparativists now, the jobs are still in the national language and literature departments." One might do comparative literature, but without losing one's base in national literature, this interjection being only a commercial one without any logical ground. This commercial scepticism due to a severely uncontrolled indiscipline or multidisciplinary in this discipline that has caused even the ironic announcement of suicide by a comparativist like Spivak, is not to be dispelled without a serious consideration. But, at the same time, commercial viability maybe of a pragmatic importance without telling upon the intellectual criterion of the broadening scenario of comparative literature, admitting the disadvantageous gap between Auerbach and Spivak.

The essays in the collection are so highly provocative that several other volumes might be written as notes on them. A reviewer's limitations only highlights the scope of the work under review. The essays by Damrosch, Greene and Apter focusing the issues of post colonialism and hyper colonialism in today's comparative literature are definitely intoxicating. The geopoliticity of world literature has been attractively exhibited by Trumpener. Although Saussy has been himself the target of attack by some of the contributors, his method of stimulating ideas in them is nevertheless most innovative. Awaiting the adventure of comparative literature a decade ahead, the reviewer offers his sincere thanks to both the editors and contributors of the volume.

**Mazhar Hussain and Robert Wilkinson (Eds.), *The Pursuit of Comparative Aesthetics: An Interface between East and West*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006, pp. IX + 264.**

The editors of the volume claim that aesthetics is a branch of philosophy, and, therefore comparative aesthetics is a branch of comparative or intercultural philosophical knowledge, and the present collection of essays on the topic is, to their knowledge, the first one to be published in the U.K.

Aesthetics is no more a branch of philosophy, having already asserted its independence as an interdisciplinary cultural discipline inviting and engaging scholars from several branches of knowledge such as literary theory and criticism, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, logic, metaphysics, physics, art history and from any other discipline that might be called for, as the point in question is justified very much by the very intellectual identities of the editors themselves—Mazhar belonging to the discipline of literature and Wilkinson to philosophy. In an age of globalization, where philosophy itself is identified as a branch of politics—“a cultural politics” by one of the most influential thinker of this branch such as Richard Rorty once a professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia, now a Professor of Comparative Literature at Standard University, and conversely Christopher Norris who was a Professor of English Literature at the University of Wales (Cardiff) preferred to be a Professor of philosophy at the same university, there is no justification in calling aesthetics a branch of philosophy. However, aesthetics has extended over a much wider space than its identifiers thought of several centuries ago—still widening more and more its self-defined and self-determined atmosphere and environment.

The present volume has its noteworthy and timely appearance indeed. The rationale of the collection of essays apart, the introduction to the volume warrants the warm attention of aestheticians of both the Western and Eastern hemispheres. “By and large,” the editors write, “the essays in this book presuppose that we can (moving eastward) usefully identify something that can meaningfully be called a European aesthetic tradition; an Indian tradition; a Chinese tradition; a Japanese tradition (and so forth) and the comparisons take as their starting points an element or elements within one or more of these traditions: for example, attitudes to natural beauty, beliefs about the nature and function of drama, and so on. These elements are then compared, usually within a language native to one of the cultures, concerned.” (P. 1) All the thirteen essays published in the volume are reproduced from different sources written and published in different times spanning over a period of about the last four decades. Ramendra Sen’s essay was published during the 1950s where the author correlated the *rasa* concept in dramatology of Bharata and in the medical treatises of Caraka (1<sup>st</sup> c. A.D.) and Susruta, correlating again the concept of *rasa* in these two different areas with that of Aristotle’s *katharsis* (The Sanskrit equivalent *vi-recana*=purgation). Sen had meticulously dealt with this comparison differing from the galaxy of the Western Greek scholars regarding the homoeopathic interpretation of the concept of *katharsis* in the Greek writings. But Sen was unable to distinguish between the Aristotelian concept of *katharsis* and Bharata’s concept of *rasa*, although both the concepts aim at explaining the experience of drama. Bharata’s use of *rasa* is clearly a gustatory metaphor (literally “food”) and its correlation with the medical concept that developed later than Bharata’s treatise, appears far-fetched. Bharata rather draws upon the Upanishadic concept of the Absolute as *Rasa* (*raso vaisah*) which refers clearly to the sense of relish (*āśvādana*). Sen was also wrong to compare Aristotle’s *Poetics* with Bharata’s *Nāṭyaśāstra* as texts of the same order, whereas the truth is that the former is a treatise on the literary aspect of the drama, and the latter’s on its performing aspect.

The editors are undoubtedly accurate in stating that Coomaraswamy was the first Indian scholar to study Indian aesthetics in comparative perspectives and have traced the development of this discipline since then through the last century till now. But along with many other scholars they should have counted very eminent scholars such as Professor V.K. Chari whose contribution to this field remains substantially prolific, S.K. Saxena whose studies in Hindustani music and Kathak dance along the line of Neo-Kantian aesthetics remain monumental, particularly in the discipline of comparative aesthetics. Both Chari and Saxena are extremely perceptive and profoundly deep in their probe into the subjects they have undertaken for comparative analysis.

As it appears, the editors have been in a hurry to publish something on comparative aesthetics (East and West) with a mark of a U.K. publisher (as they have claimed) without paying necessary attention to the conformity, integrity and contemporaneity of such an important topic as they have handled—no need of only reproducing the essays already printed without any historical sequence, thematic coherence, or critical perspective. The loss of unity in this design of anthology is only too transparent to be illustrated.

Paul Gordon, *Tragedy after Nietzsche: Rapturous Super Abundance*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001, pp. 162.

Yuval Lurie, *Tracking the Meaning of Life: A Philosophical Journey*, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006, pp. 337.

Both the books appeared almost simultaneously, the second one in its original Hebrew form in 2002, and relevantly, they need a simultaneous reading as the central theme they deal with is art and/as the meaning of life. To write a book on Nietzsche's theory of tragedy is risky indeed, because *The Birth of Tragedy* deceptively surpasses all attempts at explanation. The ambiguity of Nietzsche's critical vocabulary apart, this book written with youthful exuberance is a category by itself that needs only reading dispelling all deconstructions that simply distort it. The fact is only self-evident as it reappears in Gordon's work tries that best to represent what the author has experienced in reading Nietzsche's *BT*. If Terry Eagleton discovers a link between the pessimist origin of tragedy with an anti-democratic elitism, Gordon denies that Nietzsche's views on tragedy originates in pessimism. In explaining Nietzsche's coinage "Strong Pessimism" Gordon writes, "The Greeks' strong pessimism is not to be confused with the defeatist mentality of which examples may be found among virtually every generation of the modern world... Indeed strong pessimism is not really pessimism at all. The early Greeks' contempt for life is quite different; it arises, says Nietzsche, from a rapturous "feeling of superabundance," a Dionysiac intoxication in contrast to the Apollonian principle of individuation not available to the common man who is veiled under the Vedantic illusion (*Māyā* as referred to by Schopenhauer) and relishes the rapture in the terror of tragedy that exceeds the conventional limitations of life. Evidently, Nietzsche's language is highly rhetorical in the context, Gordon refers to, and it is futile to expect any Aristotelian precision in formulating a critical theory of the tragic rapture excepting the point that Apollonian experience is a philosophical wisdom whereas the Dionysian one is an intoxicating rapture that can be compared to the aesthetic experience of tragedy otherwise unavailable to a common man incapable of raising the veil of *Māyā* by metaphysical meditations. Roughly speaking, Nietzsche's ideas, influenced by Schopenhauer, tend toward an Indian *rasa* theory of dramatic experience that has nothing to do only with the experience of tragedy.

In Nietzsche's writing *BT*, there is a jumble of critical ideas without any precise framework that evades all attempts for systematization. Nietzsche's attribution of pessimism or strong pessimism (is there any weak pessimism?) to the Greeks is certainly anachronistic. Nor have his ideas of tragedy any historical or critical link with the Greek genre appreciated by Aristotle altogether on a different ground. Pessimism does neither explain the nature of tragedy nor does it provide any necessary ground for the genre. It refers to a view of human existence that is fundamentally temporal, and therefore temporary, a view that provokes the ultimate futility of human life, meaninglessness, one might say, or even "absurd"—"Time and that perishability of all things," writes Schopenhauer, "existing in time that time itself brings about... Time is that by virtue of which everything becomes nothingness in our hands and loses all real value."

This sense of temporality, Schopenhauer's Buddhist counterpart of *ḥṣāṇīkavāda* questions the meaning or value of human life, a question that has been put by a galaxy of creative writers including Tolstoy, Wittgenstein, Sartre and Camus, and answered variously. Yuval Lurie is not the only or the first author to deal with this question, but he has put up the matter more comprehensively palpable for the common readers as well as the specialized scholars.

Pessimism, as viewed by Nietzsche, does not cause the meaninglessness of life. He speaks of a "courageous pessimism" that makes life meaningful in paving "the way of 'myself', to my task"—the type of pessimism that he calls Dionysian, and it is not very difficult to understand the meaningfulness of his Dionysian pessimism. Apollonian view of life as *Māyā* or illusion makes the phenomenal life with its vicissitudes valuable. But the Dionysian view of life (and hence futility) encourages man to survive the Apollonian pessimism by experiencing the aesthetic rapture, destroying the limits imposed by the Apollonian *principle of individuation*. There is nothing transcendental in this rapture "which is brought home to us most intimately by the analogy of intoxication." Thus life itself is not meaningless, it is the view of life, the way of life that is either meaningful or meaningless. Almost along the similar line Albert Camus views life meaningfully. His *Sisyphus-man's* engagement in the monotonous lifting of the load to the top of the mountain that slips down the moment it reaches the peak symbolizes the absurdity or meaninglessness of life, but his heroism or meaningfulness of his action lies in his facing the absurdity of life courageously. Following Nietzsche's phrase *courageous pessimism* one might coin a phrase for Camus' idea—*courageous absurdity*. Nietzsche and Camus thus share the common idea that life's temporality or impermanence, or life in itself is neither meaningful, nor meaningless. They do not search for a Platonic permanence nor for a Schopenhauerian "real value" for identifying the meaning of life. Neither pessimism, nor tragedy reveals the meaningfulness of life, rather, on the contrary, tragedy the predominant genre of Western literature uncovers the truth or meaning of human life that against all impermanence, all absurdity, all suffering and all monotony man is courageous enough for his will to live, for his struggle to survive.

The nineteenth-century writers like Dostoyevsky, Ibsen and Strindberg do not participate in any pessimism as such, although they all exhibit man's zest for life amidst the fire of suffering that explains the very nature of life; and this is the very seriousness of human action that, Aristotle observes, tragedy represents.

What is mentioned above might be considered as an existentialist deal with the nature of meaning of life. But viewed from the analysts' angle, the very quest for the meaning of life is itself meaningless—a wrong use of the metaphor of meaning—what kind of question is the question "What is the meaning of life? What is the meaning of meaning in the contest of human life? Philosophical, religious, linguistic, ethical, general or personal?" (p. 21) Tolstoy's answer to this question, as suggested in his character of Ivan Ilych is more or less a correlation of Schopenhauer's fear for temporality with the Nietzschean/Dionysian rapture that relieves this fear. Lurie devotes the whole of the second part of his book to Wittgenstein who makes an attempt for answering the question philosophically, by logical, epistemic and ethical analysis of the limits of life. A reader finds this section of the book shedding a fresh light on the subject. For Sartre, in a different wing from his existentialist compatriots Nietzsche and Camus, there is no meaning of human life. It is the personal self-identity that explains the meaning of a personal life. So, there is no common meaning of life valid for all individuals. Lurie's analysis of the positions of Sartre and Camus with their critics are extremely informative in all their details and subtleties, offering keys for opening the treasury of ideas that perturbs the modern man and the academic disciplines.

**Braja M. Mishra, *The Poetry of T.S. Eliot*, New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2003. pp. 269.**

Thomas Eliot has been one of the most attractive literary figures of the last century to cover the bibliography on modernist poetry, criticism and cultural theory. The present writer claims to have added to this bibliography by studying Eliot's poetry in the Indian context. Mishra summarizes in his preface: "Eliot's early poetry records the struggle between two contrary faces such as the self and Self. The middle makes his strong religious faith in trying to reconcile these contraries by submitting himself to God in whom all dialectics ends. Eliot's later poetry namely, *Four Quartets* achieves this reconciliation. My analysis is primarily done in the context."

There seems to be some confusion in this summary, although it is clear that Mishra wants to project Eliot's quest for the meaning of life against the background of a spiritual sterility that the entire humanity suffered from during the Wars and their aftermath. Material prosperity fails to make human life a meaningful existence without a spiritual elevation, and this spiritual elevation is accomplished only by a reconciliation of the phenomenal self with the transcendental self (in the language of orthodox Indian philosophy—*jivātman* and *paramātman*). This reconciliation, as Mishra writes, is a religious reconciliation, i.e., submission/surrender to God in the second phase of his poetic career. Then in what way, in the later period or the third phase, what kind of reconciliation is achieved? Reconciliation is certainly a wrong word in this context. Dialectics or the tension, the crisis of human life is resolved. But in what way the religious resolution by submission to God is insufficient that warrants a different kind of resolution in the later period (third phase?) that produces the *Four Quartets*? The meaning is not clear. How to distinguish the religious experience from the spiritual one?

Now, coming to the "Indian context:" Eliot was certainly influenced by the Indian philosophical culture during his graduate days at Harvard where he studied two courses in primary Sanskrit including some popular Upaniṣads. His references to the Sanskrit traditions are only too strong to reject his intense association with both the orthodox and heterodox schools of thought, Hindu and Buddhist, to specify it. Kearns' observations are most healthy in the context, although it is futile to debate over the issue whether Eliot was a Hindu/Buddhist poet or a Christian poet. The debate makes obviously, no sense, and there is no justification in Moody's obsessed efforts in rejecting the Indianness of Eliot (1996- Chap-2). On the other hand, it is equally ridiculous to appreciate Sharma: "no modern English or Western man seems to have touched the Indian imagination as T.S. Eliot has done." What gain on either or both sides? Is Eliot great because he touched the Indian imagination, or is Indian imagination great because Eliot has touched it? But the point of critical relevance is that there are sufficient references to the Indian ideas in Eliot's poetry that even a common reader would appreciate their impact upon the formation of the poet's reflections and imagination. This does not mean that request for spiritualism is there only in the Indian philosophical texts, but Eliot's clear reference to the Ganges, the voice of Prajāpati, and the *Ḡīṭā* in the crucial moments of his poetic events that provokes one rightly to appreciate Eliot in terms of the Indian philosophy, his drawing upon several other cultural sources apart Mishra does not claim that he is the first scholar to work in the area of Eliot-criticism that has traced Eliot's Indic legacy as he himself has produced a long list of his predecessors. Nevertheless, his work is not simply a rehash of the earlier critics. He is widely read, and is aware of the original sources that he has consulted in structuring his ideas on Eliot's poetry, although he does not specify the exact points on which his work is innovative in comparison to other scholars in the area, and what was the specific need for writing a book on the area already traveled by others, apart from his ambiguities in distinguishing between the religious and spiritual experiences, demarcating the vital lines that, he thinks, distinguish Eliot's final phase from the middle one. Besides, the author should not have forgotten to add an index to the book.

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