

An Ontology of Nothingness: From a Matrixial Dialectic to a Multivalent Ontology of Matrixial Materialism, Endo Interior-Relation Toward an Ontological Multivalence Versus Substantive Immaterialism

ARANTZAZU SARATXAGA ARREGI

The American literary critic Nancy Katharine Hayles uses a book chapter from Anne Balsamo's *Technologies of Gendered Body* entitled "My mother was a computer" as the title of her monograph on the materiality of literary texts in the age of digital cultures (Hayles 2005). This examination is less an assertion than an indication of a post-biological future in which the body and its constitution, namely corporeality, explode into new forms of expression if they do not disintegrate due to digital disembodiment processes. The reduction of corporeality to the mere computational operators of a cognitive machine was also addressed in Hayles' book *How We Became Posthuman* (Hayles 1999). The author's position on posthumanist approaches is undoubtedly skeptical, even decidedly opposed: "a call to contest for versions of the posthuman that would acknowledge the importance of embodiment and be conducive to enhancing human and nonhuman life on the planet" (Hayles 2005, Prologue 2). Digital media control a process of dematerialization of communication channels, the after-effects of which on social systems have led to posthumanist theories. Thus, they describe the human of the digital age as characterized by the dissolution of the mind/body duality in a hybrid assemblage of power flows. The model for the posthumanist Anthropos is Donna Haraway's cyborg manifesto, which, beyond being a metaphor of the cybernetic human, is intended to address a program that completely abolishes the demarcations defining humanity vis-à-vis other species through the control procedures of information flows (Wiener 1985,1-30).

The chapter "My Mother Was a Computer" should be understood as an objection to reducing the corporeal to a mere operative functionality and the degradation of matter underlying this, which favors symbolically formal statements about cognition. Nevertheless, the young discipline of cybernetics that emerged in the post-war period aimed at the dissolution of classical dualities on which the Western culture of humanism had relied so heavily. The laws of control in a machine system are supposed to overcome dichotomies such as mind vs. body as well as nature vs. culture in favor of a new kind of reality cognition (Max Bense 1951, pp.429-449) whereby each particle of a system presupposes its entity, connections, and relations with the others are perceived and thought. Personal realities are determined by the flow of information produced in net-like connections. In this way, reality becomes a complex (dis) organized phenomenon woven together from non-linear dynamic assemblages. The implementation of cybernetic knowledge in the sciences aims to redefine matter. It is not only the information sciences and cybernetics that have subjected the concept of matter to a new interpretation. The

transformation of physics into complex science had likewise already put materiality on the path to dematerialization. Information is neither matter nor energy (Wiener 1948, 166). Signal transmission is an entropic process dependent on probability calculations. Since the thermodynamic turn in the natural and engineering sciences, the classical concept of matter has disintegrated into a distribution order of particles whose nature is not determined by their built material but by their position in the physical system.

New materialism takes up the challenge of reinterpreting matter based on the turn in physics and information sciences. Although materialism in its respective expressions, whether historical or naturalistic, goes back to a substance doctrine, New Materialism seeks to give some substance to materials realities. This challenge means a rejection of the hylemorphic schemes of Aristotelian metaphysics, which imply that something is underlying matter, namely raw material (*hylé*). This concept can be informed by the ideas from which the form arises. Even phenomenology, which has raised such massive objections against substantialism, uses *hylé* to reference something underlying.

In this context, Hayles' "My mother was a computer" corresponds to the requirement of matter to give significance to corporeality in the digital age and beyond the hylemorphic dichotomy, namely, matter vs. form. She seeks new forms of literary materiality in the tension between embodiment/body/physicality and information: "From my perspective, this development requires repositioning materiality as distinct from physicality and re-envisioning the material basis for hybrid texts and subjectivities" (Hayles 1999, Prologue 2). For Hayles, materiality is "an emergent property created through dynamic interactions between physical characteristics and signifying strategies" (Hayles 1999, Prologue 3). This description is very close to the nature of operationally closed systems, the organizational principle based on recursive dynamics from which new properties are created, resulting from the system assuming new states of change. With the equation of materiality and emergent organizational structure, for Katharine Hayles, the computational universe remains a metaphorical expression for matter, "that is, the claim that the universe is generated through computational processes running on a vast computational mechanism underlying all of physical reality" (Hayles 1999, Prologue 3). With this, we want to introduce the question of whether there cannot be the inverse relationship between the model of a computational universe and observed reality (Foerster, von Heinz, 1987, p.142), namely whether the computational universe is not the model of autopoietic processes of the respective systems such as biological, social, anthropological, and psychological.

A Computational Universe denotes the absoluteness of the computational techno milieu, encompassing all functions of the sphere of life. With the same claim to include a specific nature, namely nature in all spheres of the social and cultural sphere, Romanticism used the signifier mother to ascribe to her the role of nurturer and even a kind of primordality and untamed authenticity. Katherine Hayles bridges the distance between the romantic mother-nature to a computational mother-universe: "so now the Universal Computer is envisioned as the Motherboard of us all" (Hayles 1999, Prologue 3). The shift from the mother to the universal computer, in analogy to the Romantic conceptions of a mother nature that naturalizes the world and nurtures all creatures inherent in the world, is drawn from the concepts of the Romantic worldview. The mother-computer is a composite, with the computer-based on the signifier mother, just as with mother-nature. This notion neither forms a metaphor nor an idea. Now, the question remains: what is meant by mother?

Mother signifiers (along with all kinds of mothers) can be synthesized into the philosophical term “the matrixial.” Far from being historical-cultural research on the concept of the matrix in the histories of cultures, the present philosophical approach rejects a merely diachronic reading (Saussure 1967) of the word matrix. Instead, it is a matter of “creating concepts” (Deleuze 1991, p.8), a process located at the blurred interface between the artistic practice of creation and the scientific rigor of an analytical and synthetic process. The matrixial is not the matrix but its philosophical nature.

This article aims to explain in detail the concept of the matrixial with particular reference to the dialectical structure determined by it, called “perinatal dialectics. “In this respect, birth, the core dialectical movement, is the determinant for the conceptualization of the matrixial, which means a transition from a prenatal to a postnatal world. The perinatal dialectic of childbearing, or that an attachment to the world follows the dis-binding from the maternal body is kinetic. What sort of materiality is to be assigned to the kinetics of a transitional process of becoming? The philosophical category of the matrixial refers to a philosophical problem: the difference between the prenatal and the postnatal instinct of formation. In this way, the matrixial is a means to understand better (im)material transference related to conditions of birth and rebirth, physically and philosophically.

The semantic meaning of the word “matrix” requires an explanation of terms. The word matrix is polysemic because it contains several meanings. Its applicability, therefore, extends to a wide range of fields of knowledge, such as mathematics, geology, botany, biology, technical language, and linguistics. The word matrix has different meanings in German, depending on the semantic context used. In biology, a matrix is understood as “a shell of chromosomes, “an “amorphous basic substance “(connective tissue), and the “germinal layer from which something is created. “In mathematics, it has the meaning of a scheme of mathematical quantities representing linear images and describing linear systems of equations. In linguistics, it refers to a scheme for the assignment of characteristics to linguistic units, especially for representing the sound structure—definition of the word Matrix in Duden. In the first place, the word “mother” stands for the root word that can be based on various qualities (mother-human, mother-animal). Here is the first conclusion to be drawn: The Matrix can be described as a set encompassing all types of mothers (Saratxaga 2019, 22).

Nevertheless, it is necessary to identify the specific characteristic of the respective types of mothers. For this purpose, an etymological analysis must be carried out. The matrix contains the Indo-European root -ma, which means to form (bilden) or generate (erzeugen), and a drive that is one of the life forces (Blumenbach 1789, 25) such as procreation, nourishment, and reproduction of living organisms. The anthropologist and anatomist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach defined this life force as the formative instinct, *nisus formativus*, responsible for the ontogenetic development of living beings and drove the formation of their forms. Secondly, it should be noted that the Latin word matrix is borrowed from the Greek word for uterus, so that the semantic value of the term matrix, namely mother, is accompanied by a second one, uterus. Strictly speaking, the word “uterus” represents a tautology: it describes a mother who has the property to give birth. However, this expression is not redundant because not all women who give birth have the qualities that constitute a mother. Accordingly (as already explained in the semantic-analytical explanation of the word matrix), giving birth encompasses that specific difference by which the group of all kinds of mothers differs from other sets and is consequently defined as such.

The matrixial characterizes the general nature of a *nisus formativus*, namely a formative instinct, which exerts its effect both intrauterinally and extrauterinally. As already indicated above, childbearing is the formative instinct, the *nisus formativus par excellence*. The philosophical and ontological features of the generative power of childbearing culminate in an ontological translocalization: birth, childbearing beyond a multiplication of the species, signifies an onto-topological relocation whereby the new individuals continue their morphogenesis under altered environmental conditions. Birth results from a “gestational period” in the mother’s body; the ontogenetic formation, achieving maturation, must be continued extrauterinally. The leap from the intrauterine to the extrauterine environment takes on the significance of an ontological translocalization, as already explained since *Dasein* is and has become essentially formed under environmental conditions.

The term *nisus formativus*, which Johann Friedrich Blumenbach explained in detail in his book “Über den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschäft” (On the Formative Instinct and the Procreative Business) in 1781, is ultimately about a biological concept of self-organization. According to Blumenbach, the *nisus formativus*, namely the instinct of formation, is interpreted as the inner force of organized matter. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, a representative of German idealism, expanded the concept of self-organization into a general systemic philosophy of nature. The dynamics at work in nature are owed to no external motor or metaphysical cause; instead, matter has self-organizing powers that correspond to the dynamics of nature (Schelling 1799, pp.63-271). Self-organization assumed a new interpretation in cybernetics after World War II, when it became increasingly urgent to develop a general theory of the circular (recursive) causality of feedback mechanisms and self-reference. Self-organization—a process in which some form of total order emerges from the local interactions between the parts of an initially disordered system. The concept had another revival towards the end of the 1960s in explaining phenomena of dissipative structures.

In addition, however, all types of mothers differ from one another. The difference lies in each mother’s reference to the framework in which she is placed; in other words, she is embedded in a specific environment. The mother-animal refers to the animal world, the mother-plant to the plant world, and the mother-metal to the metal world. A synthetic conclusion from the inductive semantic and etymological process used so far may be drawn: matrix is composed of the genetic equality of bearing (the same characteristic attributed to the genus), which is complementary to the eidetic difference (the respective specific difference of all types of mothers), and the referentiality in which the formation force of the respective singular mother is carried out (the environment in which each individual is formed).

The ambiguity of matrix is based on the singularity of any sort of mother is not due to her formation force. Instead, each kind of mother is determined by a relation to the respective individual’s environment. This notion leads to semantics being pushed into the background and semiotics coming to the foreground to clarify the term further. The meaning of any kind of mother is derived from the relation of the respective mother to her environment so that the reference determines it. In this way, a problem can be revealed, which transcends language boundaries and tackles a philosophical question.

The problem, therefore, has an ontological and logical-categorical nature. Firstly, the etymological origin of the word matrix, namely mother and uterus, refers to an ontological difference, especially since the mother stands for a postnatal and the uterus for the prenatal

formation force. Prenatal and postnatal environments determine the extreme values of an ontological difference: the postnatal environment is called the world instead of prenatal, which cannot be assigned to the category world. Secondly, categorical and logical consequences can be derived from the ontological dimension. Starting from the assumption that the determination of different types of mothers can be attributed to the environments in which they are and will be, one may conclude that there are as many environments as there are types of mothers.

At this point, and beyond its etymological meaning, a matrix is a threefold concept consisting of the difference between mother (formative instinct in the world) and womb (formative instinct in the non-world). Accordingly, it includes a reference to the difference between the extrauterine and the intrauterine formative instinct under which it operates, which we have called the degree of worldliness. The difference between the world-internal and the world-external formative instincts is that the extrauterine formative instinct is dedicated to the productive forces of the world (following on from this, according to our thesis, the mother plays a world-formative role), and processes of de-differentiation and differentiation characterize the intrauterine formative instinct in a non-worldly space in which, however, life occurs. The triad of mother—womb—the world is thus at the center of intellectual apprehension of the concept of a matrix in which the semantic differentiation of mother/womb points to relatedness to the world and simultaneously to the correspondence of womb/mother as a productive force of the intra- and extrauterine field.

As already indicated, the mother-animal refers to the animal world, just as the mother-human refers to the human world or the mother-computer refers to the computer world. A multivalent worldliness stands against a single-valued substantialist immaterialism of the idea of a “big Other” (Lacan 1997). The mother-X, denoting the mother which contains all kinds of mothers in itself, is considered from the point of view of matrixial exclusively as a formalism to refer to the incompleteness of the set of all kinds of mothers. However, the relation of the respective mothers to the environment is a prerequisite of possibility. Individual realities only arise in and through relations because that entity is embedded in a particular environment or, in the words of New Materialism, connected to an assemblage. In this respect, the matrixial shares with New Materialism the characteristic of relations. The accusation against the materialist approach that “there must be something for the relation to exist” can be countered by analogy with Gilbert Simondon’s approach to the principle of individuation (Simondon 1964), according to which the relation precedes a principle of relation, pure resonance and possibility-prerequisite of the same. Thus, relations apply to the place or topology in which they arise. If an individual is to be so developed in the intrauterine field that its adaptation to the outside does not require elaborate support, the degree of maternity is lower than that of species that possess a higher cooperative rearing system for adaptation to worldliness. Consequently, the theorem could state that the degree of maternalism correlates with the degree of worldliness. Accordingly, the ontological difference between mother and uterus unfolds in polyvalent ontologies, insofar as there are infinite environments, however incomplete the set of all types of mothers may be.

The transition from closed, worldless space to open worldliness has the radical result that fetal genesis is becoming human. The phenomenon of childbearing is thus an ontological event. It consists of transferring from one environment to another or transferring the mother’s inner body into the world. Accordingly, something is only about

worldliness from the moment it is transferred from one environment, the mother's inner body, into worldliness, wherein the mother already exists as a being and is consequently there, in alterity to her world, the new being must relate to worldliness. The matrixial dialectic is called perinatal. This notion means that every connection, like assemblages, goes back to an unbinding, so that connections, assemblages mean a completely new arrangement of the inner organizational structure of the system. In this context, we want to present the principles of matrixial dialectics in this chapter: on the one hand, the kinetic process of birth and, secondly, the liminal as medial space and epitome of the maternal body.

From a matrixial perspective, birth knows neither beginning nor end, but only a transition between two worlds. Birth is a central fact for shaping existence; however, it should not be understood as the beginning of a development or the return point of a path but as a transition. The transition into the world is a fact: the fetus moves into an externality that is an open world compared to the intrauterine closed space. The transition into the outside is a necessary fact of development. Hannah Arendt refers to the carelessness of natality in philosophy. Arriving in the world is not opposed to the "finitude of the facticity of existence" (Heidegger 1953, pp.237-241), but the miracle "that one may have confidence in the world, and that one may hope for the world" (Arendt 2002, p.316) is part of and the result of being born. Being born means beginning in the extrauterine milieu, the execution of a new beginning that is set again and again, and this exclusively through human action. The miracle that repeatedly interrupts the course of the world and the course of human things and saves them from ruin "[...] is ultimately the fact of natality, of being born [...]". The "miracle," even if now only written in quotation marks, "consists in the fact that people are born at all, and with them the new beginning that they can realize in action by virtue of their being born [...]" (Arendt 1998, pp.442)

The ontological dimension of motherliness lies in a transcendental conditionality: only in alterity to the mother can what has arrived relate to worldliness. The mother-X is in an intermediate position. She is an intermediary between inside and outside or between the pre- and postnatal environments. Through contact with the mother, the offspring is aware of the difference between the inside and outside of the world and is aware of its existence because it makes it wonder where the "I" is. The mother now plays the role of an iteration in this estrangement (*Entäußerung*). Now the two ontological possibilities – inside and outside – unfold in three potential worldness: the worldhood of the newborn (the ontomorphogenetic worldhood of the newborn), the worldness of the mother (a worldly formation force), and inwardly in the pre-worldness of the mother's body (the worldly formation force).

This ontological development has specific psychoanalytical consequences. The mother's figure is fundamental for the self-realization of the ego, even its condition of possibility. In contrast to Freud's theory pattern, according to which separation from the mother's body places the offspring in an unfulfillable longing for the impossible re-merging (a pattern Lacan follows and completes in his mirror stage), here the primary approach of the object relationship theories should be emphasized. British object relationship theory, to which Sándor Ferenczi, Michael Balint, and William R. D. Fairbairn, among others, have contributed, has promoted a Copernican turn in the psychoanalytic tradition. Within the framework of this theory, the analysis of the psyche was carried out based on the drive theory regarding observation and the basis of the environmental conditions of a relational need regarding participation. The actual relationship of the maternal bond contributes

to the child's personality development and entangles it. The homeostatic model of mother and child (Bowlby 1982) replaces Lacan's mirror stage "matrix" (1949, pp. 449-455).

Just as matriarchy and social theories prove, the medial position of the mother defines a critical figure in the formation process of social units (Claessens 1985). An examination of the mother's figure in societies traces her back to the elementary structure, which can be seen in the strategies of bonding and alliance systems. The mother-child bond is the first cohesive force, a microsocial structure of the social system. A social system is characterized by its difference from the environment in this respect (Luhmann 1979): its difference from that which does not belong to it, namely the first nature before all else (Claessens 1985, p.15). In general, as the word implies, socialization is a process that does not consist of structures at the natural level but their supersession (*Aufhebung*). The prefix *exo-* can indicate the reference to what exists externally in the natural bond core. Social, ethno- and anthropological research agree that *exo-gamy* is constitutive for the formation of social groups. Although the *matrixial* determines the *exogamic* strategy of social education processes, it does so in the context of a balance with the *endo-gamic* order (Reich 1972). The generic term *matrix* indicates all kinds of mothers and thus comprises the genetic reference to the mother within itself and accordingly introduces her reference to "first nature" into the social entity. Socialization succeeds *exogamically* to the mother species but *endogamically* to the *matrix* *genos*. In summary, the ontological dimension of motherliness lies in a transcendental conditionality: only in alterity to the mother can what has arrived relate to worldliness. Against the backdrop of this synthesis of educational drive and worldliness, the question can be asked whether alteration processes in worldlessness are perceptible.

As the *nisus formativus* characterizes the *matrixial*, its materiality is characterized by self-organization. The materialist interpretation of emergent processes does not lie in a kind of self-reproductivity of the system, as in Katherine Hayles's attribution of the computer to the mother: "Computer gives birth and digital subjects" (Hayles 1999, Prologue 5). The assemblage between those particles to which they are connected then becomes crucial to the question of connections rather than the organization of a structure, that is, first, what is the relation of the mother to the world, and second, what is the relation of the womb and the world? As shown in the previous chapter, the assemblage constitutes the bonds and connections: in the dialectical core of the concept lies the *matrixial*. The first question can be explained with the axiom that the mother is internal to the world. The inwardness relation determines the mother-world bond. However, the *endo*-relation between mother and world can be further transferred to the respective mother-signifiers, for the mother-cell is internal to the mother-man, who is internal to the mother-earth. The offspring is housed in the mother's body, and both individual beings form a co-evolutionary space in which the extrauterine progression of the offspring succeeds. The second question can be answered with the axiom that the uterus is external to the world. The uterus fulfills the function of a milieu for onto- and embryogenetic processes up to the transition of the birth-ready fetus into the new milieu. It encompasses a space with the peculiar characteristic that it cannot be determined in the temporal and spatial dimension of the exorcised world. From this problem, the processes of differentiation in a closed environment and consequent lack of alterity derive the womb's description as a non-externalized environment. The alterity-lessness of the uterine sphere can be described as a worldless space from a *matrixial* perspective due to its closedness

and world externality. The womb is only in the world because the mother's body surrounds it—as such, it is external to the world. In this respect, it forms a speculative space, the experience of interiority of which can only be remembered through externalized signifiers.

A strong argument that justifies the mother-animals' inwardness concerning the world can be found in the evolutionary-biological function of mother animals. The role of mother-animals contributes to the self-preservation of mother-animals phylogeny and the environment in which the individual mothers are embedded. With this argument, anthropologist, behavioral scientist, and primatologist Sarah Blaffer-Hrdy has turned the Darwinian theory of selective adaptation upside down (Blaffer-Hrdy 1999). Darwin's theory of selective adaptation hardly pays any attention to the female side of evolution, especially since, according to him, positive reproductive success is exclusively due to adaptability. On the other hand, in her many years of research, the primatologist based on all behavioral ecologies.

According to Blaffer-Hrdy, David Lack is one of the “first evolutionary biologists to study the reproductive behavior of mothers. “His contribution to the behavior of mothers in biological systems was followed by the American biologists George Williams and Robert Trivers have put forward the thesis that positive reproductive success is actually due to concern for developing and conserving the species in question. The agents that contribute to guaranteeing extrauterine ontomorphogenetic development are called mothers, as long as they are the source of supply for the offspring. The more the mother is concerned about ensuring safe conditions for the growth and development of the offspring (Sloterdijk 2008), the greater the reproductive success and the greater the adaptability of the offspring to the environment. In this respect, the mother is the very first environment in which the offspring are housed. She is the offspring's first link to the world because she cares for it and houses it in her body. The relationship is one-sided and asymmetrical because the cycle of goods begins where something is already there. This very first one-sided and asymmetrical relationship is parasitic (Serres 1980) from the point of view of a communicative relation. It lays the basis of every exchange, especially since the act of communication is an attempt to compensate and a regulatory mechanism to bring the respective inequality into balance. The asymmetrical position of mothers should not be confused with sacrificial behavior. The opposite is the case. Behavioral biologists have proven that selfless mothers positively affect reproductive success in the long term (Blaffer-Hrdy 1999). In this respect, the care system is concerned with neutralizing the uneven gift of mothers to their offspring in the cycle of response and exchange.

In summary, the parasitic economy of offspring can be described by the following equivalence formulae between concern and assistance: care arouses concern, and concern regulates care (Trivers 1974, pp.249-264). According to Sarah Blaffer-Hrdy, mother-centered worlds are the most robust worlds in which a higher level of care is created, the costs of which are distributed between a large number of helpers so that the benefits outweigh the costs. A mother-centered world is a robust rearing system with very high reproductive success. The parasitic interaction between the host, mother, or all-motherly instance and the guest is ontologically determined. The offspring arrives in a world as a concern (*besorgten Welt*) (Heidegger 1953, pp-211-212). In this way, the mother's existence not only signifies her relation to the world she inhabits.

Instead, her body provides an environment that is a prerequisite for the extrauterine continuation of the offspring's formation. According to the biologist Jakob Johann von

Uexküll, only the interior of the individual being is connected to the environment of its surroundings (Uexküll 2014). The parasitic relationship between guest and host finds its equilibrium in the interactive relationship between the inner world and the environment; this co-evolutionary field is where the formation force takes shape. The ontological proof of the matrixial cannot be exhausted in an internal and external relationship between two elements because the relationship between mother and offspring forms a co-evolutionary field embedded in the broader environment. This juncture is where the structural, logical proof of a multi-valued (Günther 1991) matrixiology comes into play. It blurs the sharp distinction between that which falls within the classification universal and falls under particular. According to the doctrine of the matrixial, which serves as a basis for ontological polyvalence, the metaphysical distinction between universals and individuals contains a misconception (Whitehead 1929). Every so-called universal is particular in so far as it is what it is.

Moreover, each individual is universal because it enters into the nature of other existing individuals. Universal relativity thus determines the ontological polyvalence of the matrixial system. Accordingly, the infinity of types of mothers does not enter into any hierarchical structure. This axiom is devoted to the description of the womb as a whole. As a whole, it possesses a formative instinct, but it is withdrawn from the world. It is deprived of the formative power of the world, but processes of differentiation and formation take place within it. In the context of how processes of differentiation and formation can succeed without alterity in an organism that has not been excreted, this axiom addresses three essential characteristics of the uterus in the background. The prenatal field is anticipated; it is removed from the language, from consciousness, it is always world-determined according to the logocentric principles on which philosophy is based (Derrida 1967). The example of the allegorical motif of the uterus to explain a pre-cosmic state and the ontogenetic process of embryonic development proves the invalidity and failure of the metaphysical identity logic and substantial program for the matrixial.

Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim (called Paracelsus) used the allegory of the womb as an explanation of the high abstraction of a pre-cosmic state for his astromedical and alchemical research (Paracelsus 1926, p.188). Carl Gustav Jung's depth psychology takes up the pictorial symbol of the iconography of ancient Egypt, Ouroboros, the womb. It is supposed to represent the embryonic state of consciousness by standing as a symbol for all the potentialities contained in it and assigned the meaning of perfection and completeness. Alchemical writings use the symbolic meaning of Ouroboros, the original state of transformation wherein all possibilities are contained in a differentiated and amorphous state. The metaphysical interpretation of a pre-cosmic state of the universe came to light, especially with Plato. He had called the pre-cosmic order the genus of all contained possibilities. He calls it *chora* (Platon, *Timaeus* 49a.b), and it contains possibilities in a de-differentiated state in which everything is one, namely complete and perfect. A third genus is ascribed to it, which is not equal to being or not being and whose access requires a "certain bastard thinking" (Platon, *Timaeus* 52b).

The metaphysical perfection of a pre-cosmic order is a paradox (Derrida 1993) from the point of view of fundamental logic. The order withdrawing from the world becomes entangled in a contradiction to an excluded third party, namely between being and not-being (Platon, *Timaeus*. 52b). The metaphysical conclusion is that the matrixial ontology necessarily becomes entangled in a logical paradox. The intrauterine space is withdrawn

from the world; it is worldliness. Does ontology legitimate the worldlessness? Heidegger's existential ontology analysis provides no answer; an ontology of worldlessness would turn it upside down even more. In this ontology, being is superior to nothingness, so that the negation has an exclusively predictive value (Heidegger 2004). Being can be predicted with a negation. Non-being is indeed a kind of being, but without being, remaining negated in its totality. Its worldlessness has to be assigned to a speculative genus: The womb is a genus that cannot be understood in the sense of the Aristotelian schema as the "sum of all species," but as a surreal genus that contains the possible, pure possibility and de-differentiated oaths. If the becoming of the ontological principle of the matrix remains to be proven, hylomorphism— a derivative of Aristotle's identity logic—can not explain ontogenesis (Simondon 1964, pp.1-64).

The philosophical system presented here aims to establish a philosophical category, the matrixial. For this purpose, the system uses three axioms, employing which the ontological nature of "the matrixial" concept is shown in all its breadth. Indeed, these unambiguous statements were not affirmed as accurate, but the truthfulness was proven with the help of propositions and problems. With this, I want to summarise the core interpretation of the philosophical term "the matrixial." It represents a multivalent ontology that states that there are as many milieus as there are kinds of mothers. The set of all kinds of mothers is incomplete, so the multiplicity of ontologies expands as far as the multiplicity of kinds expands. It corresponds to heterarchical axiology.

In contrast to the hierarchical system value of ontological conditions, which Heidegger's fundamental analytics of being established in that *Dasein* is world-forming vis-à-vis worldless being, the matrixial perceives this order of being as equal. According to the matrixial, no identity-logical being is superior to another. All kinds of being are equal since the respective conditions of existence are equally interpretative. Accordingly, the matrixial extends the meaning of ontology beyond *Dasein*. The world, however, does not exhaust ontological multivalence; rather, it constitutes an anthropological problem for philosophy and its justification for fundamental ontology. From the perspective of matrixial philosophy, the world is an anthropological problem, not an ontological condition. To this end, the environment becomes a general ontology of immediacy. Based on Uexküll's thesis that the inner structure of individual living beings is in a bond with the environment, the philosophical category of the matrixial aims to establish the educational drive in the immediate relation by creating a co-evolutionary ontological field through the inner/environmental interaction. The matrixial is an ontologically determined philosophical category that demonstrates the formative generative power of these manifold worldlinesses. The matrixial is a category of co-relations and endo-relations; it dissolves the boundary outside/inside for an immediate multivalency of the bond between environment and inner self.

Notes

1. See Das große Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, <http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Matrix>. Matrix is borrowed from Latin and derived from the feminization of mother (mater); See also “mater, matris,” in Vaan Michiel, A. (ed.): *Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages*. Boston: Brill 2008, p. 367. Its feminization refers less to the feminine characteristic of mothers, which would be a tautology, but rather to a classification that includes different types of mothers. Matrix refers to plant-mother, animal-mother, or machine-mother. Definition Matrix: late 14c., from O.Fr. Matrice, from L. matrix (gen. matricis) “pregnant animal,” in L.L. “womb,” also “source, origin,” from mater (gen. matris) “mother.” The sense of “place or medium where something is developed” is first recorded in the 1550s; a sense of “embedding or enclosing mass” was first recorded 1640s. The logical sense of “array of possible combinations of truth-values” is attested from 1914. Cf. <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?searchmode=none&search=matrix>. The Latin flexion from Latin matrix, basic form, scheme, frame including its substance; especially: uterus; hardly interpretable”, in: Robert, R. Anderson/ Reichmann, Ulrich G. (eds): *Frühneuhochdeutsches Wörterbuch*, 9 vol., Berlin: W. de Gruyter 2013, p. 1996. Latin etymological description of the word matrix: “Matrixicis. Mother, breeding animal; progenitor mother, uterus; stem roll, matricle”. (since Varro, rom., also matricialis, ‘belonging to the mother (womb)’ (since Zeno) and matricula f.” ‘Matricula’ since Inscri. 2. century and veg. $\lambda\acute{o}\nu\eta\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\lambda$ Lyd. mens. 1, 28; cf. also matricarius a troop since Inscri. 3. century, matricularius ‘included in the register of the poor’ Greg. Tur.) is added to mater after nutrix. (Leumann-Stolz 244); in Walde, Alois: *Latin Etymological Dictionary*, two volumes, Heidelberg: Winter 1954, p. 50.
2. Seit ihm ist es, als haben die Menschen [...] das Faktum des Geborens nicht ernst nehmen können [...] nur das des Sterbens.” Cf. Arendt, Hannah: *Denktagebuch. 1950 bis 1973*, p. 463, quoted from Lütkehaus, *ibid.*, p. 28. Cf. also: „Plato ist sozusagen der Vater der Geburtsvergessenheit. Das Defizit gilt indes generell: ‚Merkwürdigerweise hat [...] noch keine Philosophie, auch keine politische Philosophie dazu vermocht, den Menschen auf seine ‚Geburtlichkeit‘ hin anzusprechen, nämlich darauf hin, dass mit jedem von uns ein Anfang in die Welt kam und dass Handeln im Sinne des Einselbst ein Anfang ist.“ Arendt, Hannah: *Über die Revolution*. Munich: Piper 1994, p. 276.
3. R. Briffault: *The Mothers*, vol. 1-4, 1927. L.H. Morgan: *Ancient Society*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964; Bachofen, J.: *Das Mutterrecht und Urreligion*. Malinowski, B.: *The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia. An Ethnographic Account of Courtship, Marriage, and Family Life Among the Natives of the Trobriand Islands*, British New Guinea. London 1929.
4. See Sarah Blaffer-Hrdy: *Mother Nature*.

Works Cited

- Arendt, Hannah (2002): *Vita activa oder vom tätigen Leben*, München: Piper.
 Arendt, Hannah (1998): *Vom Leben des Geistes: das Denken, das Wollen*, München: Piper.
 Arendt, Hannah (1994): *Über die Revolution*, München: Piper.
 Bense, Max (1951): *Kybernetik oder die metaphysik eienr Maschine* in: Walther, E (ed.) (1998): *Asugewählte Schriften in vier Bänden Bd. 2: Stuttgart/Weimar. J.B. Metzler.*
 Blaffer- Hrdy, Sarah (1999): *Mother Nature: A History of Mothers, Infants, and Natural Selection*. New York: Pantheon.
 Blumenbach, Joh. Fr.(1789): *Über den Bildungstrieb*. Göttingen: Johann Christian Dieterich, 1789.

- Bowlby, John (1982): *Bildung. Eine Analyse der Mutter-Kind-Beziehung*, München: Kindler Verlag.
- Claessens, Dieter (1985): *Das Konkrete und das Abstrakte*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Felix (2009): *What is Philosophy?* London. New York: Verso.
- Derrida, Jacques (1990): *Chôra*, Wien: Passagen.
- Foerster, von Heinz (1987): *Erkenntnistheorien und Selbstorganisation in Schmidt, S (Hrsg.): Der Diskurs des Radikalen Konstruktivismus*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Graham, Harman (2016): *Immaterialism Objects and Social Theory*. Cambridge: Polity Press
- Hayles, Katherine (2005): "My Mother was a Computer." Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press
- Hayles, Katherine (1999). "How We Became Posthuman." *Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics and Informatics*. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Heidegger, Martin (1953): *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer 1953.
- Heidegger, Martin (2004): *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit*, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann.
- Lacan, Jacques (1997): *The Seminar. Book III. The Psychoses, 1955-1956*. York: W.W. Norton & Company
- Luhmann, Niklas (1979): *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Lütkehaus, Ludger (2006): *Natalität: Philosophie der Geburt*, Zug/Schweiz: Die Graue Edition
- Platon: *Timaios* in: Schleiermacher, Friedrich/Eigler, Günther (Hg.)/Müller, Hiernonymus (Übers.), *Werke in Acht Bänden*, Bd. 7, Darmstadt: WBG, 2001.
- Reich, Wilhelm (1972): *Der Einbruch der sexuellen Zwangsmoral: Zur Geschichte der sexuellen Ökonomie*, Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.
- Saussure, Ferdinand (1967): *Grundfragen der Allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Schelling, F.W.J (1979): *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* in: *Werke* Bd. 7, Stuttgart 2001.
- Saratxaga Arregi, Arantzazu (2019): *Eine matrixiale Philosophie. Mutter-welt-Gebärmutter*. Bielefeld: Transcript.
- Serres, Michel (1980): *Le Parasité*. Paris: Grasset.
- Simondon, Gilbert (1964): *L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Sloterdijk, Peter (2008): "Negative Gynäkologie und transindividuelle Immunität" in: J. Janus (Hg.): *Kunst als kulturelles Bewusstsein vorgeburtlicher und geburtlicher Erfahrungen*. Heidelberg: Mattes.
- Trivers, Robert (1974): "Parent –Offspring Conflict" in *American Zoologist* 14, pp. 249-264.
- Uexküll, Jakob von (2014): *Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere*, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.
- Wiener, Norbert (1985): *Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*. Cambridge, M.I.T Press.