

Reformulating the Notion of ‘Life’ within Life Narratives through a Reading of Tek Nath Rizal’s *Nirbasan*

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Abstract: This study will read Tek Nath Rizal’s memoir, *Nirbasan*, which recounts his journey from being a citizen of Bhutan to being imprisoned overnight under fabricated charges and held without trial for ten years, till eventually finding release, while simultaneously also being exiled from Bhutan. As the conditions of existence change for Rizal, it also impacts the understanding of ‘life’ within his memoir. This study will engage with Judith Butler’s argument of frames which help to qualify and ‘recognize’ lives while being prone to breakage themselves and also with Agamben’s notion of ‘bare life,’ that aids in arriving at the central question of mobility, that seeks to define life at the border. The essay will then examine how mobility as a state-imposed condition provides a conceptual framework for determining the agency of the refugee.

Keywords: Bhutan, Refugee, Life writing, mobility, bare life

How do we understand life narratives without considering how the idea of life itself can never have a static or universal meaning? Theories that study life narrative either from the perspective of memory or experience seem to rest on the process of self-making or self-fashioning that these forms of writing termed ‘life writing’ engage with (Smith and Watson 15–49). How do we understand the self as an agential being without engaging with the idea of life, of which the self is a part? If Judith Butler, states that it is “frames” which determine the understanding of lives, then it becomes crucial to ask as to what happens to those lives who do not fit within the frames (10)? Butler’s answer is to homogenize all lives through the shared condition of precarity (19–23). As a member of the Bhutanese Parliament and as a citizen of Bhutan, Tek Nath Rizal finds these old certainties come crashing down when he is stripped of his citizenship and exiled from the land of his birth. What happens to a life without a nation-state of one’s own? What kind of self can emerge through this experience of “bare life” (Agamben 6)? As Rizal moves from Bhutan to India to Nepal, forging solidarities in these lands, he inhabits that border zone between nations, informing his framing of the self. This study will analyse Tek Nath Rizal’s memoir *Nirbasan*, to explore the relationship between life and life writing.

Life, Self, and the Study of Life Writing

Theories on life writing, while making a distinction between its different forms like a memoir, autobiography, biography, diary and so on, usually have established an easy congruity between life and the idea of self. George Gusford’s seminal essay, “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography,” tries to develop the concept of an ‘inner life’ that the autobiography is supposed to lay bare. Gusford explains that the autobiography is nothing but the individual seen in his inner privacy, not as he was, not as he is, but as he believes and wishes himself to be and to have been” (Gusford 44). Stephen Spender’s reading of Rousseau’s autobiography leads him to the conclusion that though there is a desire to search for some inner life, that life is never really revealed. (Spender 122). If the idea of an

“inner life” hints at the performative aspect of autobiographies, then Udaya Kumar’s study on life writings from nineteenth-century Kerala claims that the autobiographies “rarely speak of private interiorities” (Kumar 14). Rather, these are:

Narratives of personal life, set against a background of changing times, acquired prominence and came to shape the genre’s principal features. In these texts, a narrative about one’s own life– a self narrative– became the means of documenting a world rapidly receding into the past, and for recording personal testimonies of social change. (Kumar 2)

External markers of caste and gender then become a means of framing subjectivity within these works.

Of Lives Outside the Frame: A Case of Bhutan

The idea of self-fashioning through an autobiography aims to give a lot of agency to the human subject. However, theories on what life is, as demonstrated by Judith Butler, rarely invest the human with the same kind of agency. Butler gets to the heart of the question of what life is by stating that while something may be “living,” it is not always recognized as a life.” (Butler 8). In Butler’s formulation, it is certain “frames” that help one identify life as a life, as she states, “The ‘frames’ that work to differentiate the lives we can apprehend from those we cannot (or that produce lives across a continuum of life) not only organize visual experience but also generate specific ontologies of the subject (3).” If frames are embedded in relations of power, then Butler is quick to reveal that the frames themselves are hardly complete or invincible:

The frame that seek to contain, convey, and determine what is seen (and sometimes, for a stretch succeeds in doing precisely that) depends upon the conditions of reproducibility in order to succeed. And yet, this very reproducibility entails a constant breaking from context, which means that the “frame” does not quite contain what it conveys, but breaks apart every time it seeks to definitive organization to its content. In other words, the frame does not hold anything together in one place, but itself becomes a kind of perpetual breakage, subject to a temporal logic by which it moves from place to place. As the frame constantly breaks from its context, this self- breaking becomes part of the very definition. (Butler 10)

The example given by Butler of frames breaking is that of the circulation of photos of Guantanamo prisoners kneeling, which sparks outrage in the international sphere (Butler 11).

What happens to lives that fall outside the frame but continue to live? Butler’s solution does not rest with recognizing the frames or with creating newer ones. Rather, she puts forth her concept of precarious lives, which is about understanding the “social ontology” of existence (Butler 19). Butler is not dealing with a mere biological existence as she clarifies, “The question is not whether a given being is living or not, nor whether the being in question has the status of a ‘person’; it is rather, whether the social conditions of persistence and flourishing are or are not possible (20).” Butler’s argument about precarity dealing with the interconnectedness of lives, seems to be directed towards the onlookers who are in a position to watch wars unfold, and decide how and where affect is to be bestowed upon victims of war. This study is concerned with analysing how the shift, and break down of frames is envisioned from the perspective of the human agent subject to such changes.

What happens when frames for recognizing lives shift, when people who have been identified as citizens are suddenly regarded as the enemy of the state and transformed into refugees overnight. Moreover, how do these refugees then comprehend their own lives? What happened in Bhutan during the 1990s was similar to totalitarian regimes in various parts of the world. As ethnic nationalism took hold of Bhutan, Nepalis who inhabited southern Bhutan were stripped of their citizenship almost overnight, forcing them to become refugees who now remain scattered as migrants in various parts of the world.

Michael Hutt's socio-historical account, *Unbecoming Citizens*, traces the history of Bhutan, right from its formation, to its relationship with the Nepali population, leading to their eviction from the state in the 1990s. Hutt's history points towards the fact that the linkage between ethnicity and identity is a recent formulation within the Bhutanese state. It was in the early twentieth century that Jigme Dorje Wangchuk brought about stability into Bhutan by unifying the various clans under his leadership. The Wangchuck's did not just manage to subside factionalism between clans but also create a kind of peace with the British Empire down south in India. With the Treaty of Sinchula (1865), they had to secede large portions of the state in southern Bhutan to the British Government in India (Hutt 20-23). The land of Bhutan had been divided into the three dominant ethnic groups, "the Ngalong (Tib. sNga-slong or sNgan-lung) in the west; the Sharchop (Tib. Shar-phyogs-pa) in the east; and the Lhotshampa (Tib. lHo-mtshams-pa) in the south (4)." What is interesting to note here is that the term Lhotshampa which was often a derogatory term used for the Nepali population in Southern Bhutan, actually only means "Southern Borderlander," just as Sharchop means "Easterner (4)." Identity then is tied to one's position within the land rather than to ethnicity.

The question of linking identity with ethnicity rises with the establishment of ethnic nationalism in Bhutan. Hutt's history points out that not only did a free mobility exist between the Lhotshampas in the south of Bhutan and the northerners, but also between the Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal, either for trade, marriage or livelihood (Hutt 62, 27-29). Nepali migration itself dates back to the mid-eighteenth when the Gorkha kingdom levied high taxation policies upon the peasants of rural Nepal. The British requirement for labour in the tea plantations of Darjeeling and in the British forces also provided a catalyst to this emigration from Nepal (22-24). However, Hutt is quick to point out the role and importance of the Nepalis within the Bhutanese cultural matrix, "However, the demographic fact of the matter is that the section of the twentieth century population of Bhutan which has Nepali as its principal language and is still identifiably of Nepalese origin inhabits the kingdom's southern districts, where it constituted a majority when the socio-political convulsion of the late 1980s and 1990s began (31-32)." The association of Nepalis with their ethnicity meant linking them to various political movements in India and Nepal. The joining of Sikkim into the Indian Union, which was attributed to the growing Nepali population within the state, the Maoist movement in Nepal, along with the demand for a separate state of Gorkhland by Nepalis in North Bengal in India, was sufficient to plant the seeds of doubt regarding the Nepalis in Bhutan (193-197). While the Bhutanese media began framing the Nepalis as anti-national, the Bhutanese government executed its plan of evicting the Nepalis by changing the citizenship law from 1958. Thus followed the new population Census of 1988 to "identify foreigners" along with ever-changing rules and criteria for being considered a Bhutanese national (152-159). The new Census rules were explicitly targeted towards Bhutan's Nepali population, who were connected with Nepal and India through marriages as Bhutan shared a porous border with these two states. This was an attempt not only to curb such mobility but also to delegitimise the Nepali women who had married Bhutanese nationals, along with any progeny they might have had over the years (147-159). This came at the heels of the imposition of cultural homogenization in Bhutan through laws known as *Driglam Namzha*, whose purpose was to eradicate Nepali cultural identity from the Bhutanese public sphere (160-192). In the face of Lhotshampa resistance, the government issued brutal measures, which included creating a category of *Nalongs* (anti-nationals) for the Lotshampas (211-226). While the Bhutanese Government and newspapers claimed that emigration of Nepalis from Bhutan was voluntary, Hutt's testimonies collected from amongst the members of the refugee camp told him a different story "...up

there the King is saying ‘You mustn’t leave, you will only suffer’. It’s true that he did say that, but as soon as he left the army and police came at night and harassed and punished people and they had no choice but to leave (qtd. in Hutt 226).” In the face of torture, imprisonment, seizure of land, the Nepalis within Bhutan had no other choice but to exit the country and become refugees, many of whom lived in refugee camps in Nepal.

The Story of Tek Nath Rizal

This history makes it evident that the concept of life can no longer remain static for the Nepalis from Bhutan when the old frames and certainties break down. The journey from being a citizen to a non-citizen has been documented by Teknath Rizal in his memoir *Nirbasan*. Rizal was an elected member of the Bhutanese parliament from the South of Bhutan, who is held under extra-judicial custody for ten years, from 1989. In 1993 charges of being an anti-national rebel leader are levied against him, after which he remains in custody awaiting trial, only to be released and simultaneously exiled from Bhutan in 1999. The memoir charts this journey of Rizal abruptly finding himself under imprisonment and ends with him becoming a refugee in Nepal. While there is a linear trajectory to the work in terms of beginning with Rizal’s imprisonment and ending with his release, it is not so easy to find the same linearity in terms of the shift in frames from being a citizen to a prisoner to a refugee. Rizal continues to hold on to his ardent belief that an audience with the Bhutanese king would solve all misunderstandings regarding him even though his lived experience within jail hints at a different reality. It is his encounter with the non-human world, the animal world, that not only provides a critique of the known human institutions but also hints at radically altering the known structures instead of finding inclusion within them.

What accompanies the loss of citizenship is violence to one’s body, one’s life. As Rizal gets held under extra-judicial custody under charges he has no idea about, this is how he recounts that journey:

After I got arrested, they kept me in hotels, guest houses, state guest houses, army messes, residences of Aagi Pempem and Varun Gurung. They kept me locked up in rooms without a bite to eat or drink during the day, while at night, I was shifted from one location to another so I would have no idea of my current location. When I think about it now, after these fifteen years have passed, I realise that it was an attempt to affect my psyche. (Rizal 97)

Rizal thus writes about the torture that he experiences in jail:

There would be nails, pieces of glass, fish bones, insects in the food served to me. I would often not eat as food would make me more unwell. They also did not allow me to meet anyone or listen to the radio or read the newspaper. In those long two years, all I could do was chant god’s name. (Rizal 111)

This makes it evident that Rizal is not tried under laws that fall within the purview of the state, but instead, he falls prey to the violence that becomes an intrinsic part of law and which gets unleashed during the ‘state of exception’ in Bhutan.

Georgia Agamben’s theory on ‘bare life’ provides a way for thinking about such life that has been discarded or disowned by the state while being subject to its relentless violence. Rather than understanding such lives in terms of the humanitarian discourse, Agamben gets to the heart of the connection between life and politics that the state of exception unravels. What is bare life, but “life exposed to death” as Agamben states, “There is no clearer way to say that the first foundation of political life is a life that may be killed, which is politicized through its very capacity to be killed (Agamben 44).” Agamben states, “Contrary to our modern habit of representing the political realm in terms of citizens’ rights, free will, and social contract, from the point of view of sovereignty only bare life

is authentically political. (53).” What this means is that if the sovereign contains within himself the power to suspend the law, to call upon the state of exception, then this power comes from this power over death. Agamben states that “In modern biopolitics, sovereign is he who decides on the value or the non value of life as such. Life – which, with the declaration of rights, had as such been invested with the principle of sovereignty—now itself becomes the place of a sovereign decision. (70).” Later, in the context of Nazism, Agamben goes on to write about how the “biopolitical program” is actually a “thanatopolitical” one (73).

While Butler makes it clear that her idea of precarious life is very far removed from Agamben’s notion of “bare life,” as she states:

This is not the same as “bare life,” since the lives in question are not cast outside the polis in a state of radical exposure, but bound and constrained by power relations in a situation of forcible exposure. It is not the withdrawal or absence of law that produces precariousness, but the very effects of illegitimate legal coercion itself, or the exercise of state power freed from the constraints of all law. (Butler 29)

However, what Agamben seeks to decode is the idea that the *homo sacer* or the refugee is not a deviation from, or a by-product of, the modern nation-state. Rather, their existence takes us to the very heart of the connection between life and politics. Agamben’s formulation is useful to this study for his work where the bare life remains rooted within the state, displays the lack of fixity of the institutions that make up the state thereby pointing towards their mobility. Such mobility is what characterizes the sovereign himself, who is the “. . . the werewolf, the wolf-man of man, dwells permanently in the city,” and has the power to arbitrarily call upon the state of exception at will (Agamben 53). What this suspension does is that it imposes mobility unto the life of the refugee, whose implications on the idea of life needs to be understood, which this study aims to do through a reading of Rizal’s memoir.

The camp, then, is a profoundly political space that becomes a sort of threshold as Agamben states, “Precisely because they were lacking almost all the rights and expectations that we customarily attribute to human existence, and yet were still biologically alive, they came to be situated in a limit zone between life and death, inside and outside, in which they were no longer anything but bare life. (Agamben 78).” Rizal’s experience from being imprisoned in make shift prisons under no charges initially but just through a state of exception when law becomes violence, his journey to becoming a Bhutanese refugee, demonstrates the idea of the camp as a liminal space. The prison experience leads to a radical overhauling of his idea of the state of Bhutan and of his conception of the relationship between the citizen and a leader as he states, “But is life in jail only about recounting hardships? If I accept that, then I would be lying to the readers. This story would be incomplete if I did not include the lessons that I learnt from the unique experiences in jail. (116).” These ‘unique experiences’ that take up the central part of the memoir while also being its most noteworthy section from Rizal’s journey stems from his relationship with creatures from the animal world that he encounters while being jailed.

Rizal’s then goes on to describe the bonds forged in jail with creatures from the animal world. A horse, cow, mice, insects, frogs and dogs go on to populate the rest of the chapter, as Rizal writes about his close encounters with them. Of them, the encounter with the mice and dogs is particularly noteworthy. The interaction between Rizal and the animals allows the reader to witness a different image of the political prisoner. A different and most intimate aspect of the personal life emerges, as he decides to trick the mice who enter his room at a scheduled time, waiting for their food, which happens to be rice rolled into tiny balls by Rizal. Instead of leaving the rice balls scattered around the room, Rizal decides to tie them up with a cloth and hang them under the table. He watches as the mice scramble around, searching for food. While some eventually retreat into their hole in exasperation, he observes one mouse which not only manages to pull

the rice ball from the table but also manages to tear the cloth covering it with its teeth. He then states, "Seeing this mouse struggle and fight its way to victory was like watching an entertaining movie. For me, this was simply an experiment. But from the perspective of the hard-working mouse, this was a great event (Rizal 119-120)." Another incident narrated is that of dogs who act as his guardians. He feeds these dogs and states, "Isolated from home and family, these twenty-two dogs had become my family of sorts" (126). When the authorities came to visit the jail, the dogs scared them to such an extent that they had to return back hurriedly. After an hour or so of their return, Rizal heard gunshots outside the jail. He saw the dogs falling to their death at the hands of the same authority. He states, "After chaos, there was a kind of deathly silence. No dog was spared. I felt numb, like as if I had witnessed the death of my children" (127)."

What is the nature of the relationship that Rizal forges with the animals? Animals find a significance in Agamben's theorization of bare life as well, for the *homo sacer* represents just such a crossing of the "... zone of indistinction between the human and the animal, a werewolf, a man who is transformed into a wolf and a wolf who is transformed into a man ... (Agamben 52)" However, while Agamben emphasizes on the mobility of the *homo sacer*, he does not radically rethink the position of the animals themselves caught within this anthropocentric hierarchy. In case of Rizal's text, the animals have the ability to trespass between the world of the prison and the outside order, thereby displaying a rejection of these human categories. The animals, therefore always already embody the 'bare life' of the *homo sacer*. Derrida elaborates upon Bentham's idea of suffering and not logos which can provide a way to think about the human and animal relationship (Derrida 27). What is the significance of this connection that is forged through the ability to suffer? In case of Rizal's memoir, as these animal lives swing between the daily struggle of life and death, are we to read this connection forged between them and Rizal, simply along the plane of victimhood where all of them are subject to the cruelty of the human world? Derrida however, is looking beyond such anthropocentric concerns when he claims that this "abyssal rupture" alters the anthropocentric subjectivity that has been founded on a human and animal divide, while claiming that (Derrida 31):

Beyond the edge of the so-called human, beyond it but by no means on a single opposing side, rather than 'The Animal' or 'Animal Life' there is already a heterogenous multiplicity of the living, or more precisely ... a multiplicity of organizations of relations between living and dead, relations of organization or lack of organisation among realms that are more and more difficult to dissociate by means of the figures of the organic and inorganic, of life and/or death. These relations are at once intertwined and abyssal, and they can never be totally objectified. (Derrida 31)

Rizal's text never radically alters the anthropocentric vision as suggested by Derrida by venturing into the multiplicity of perspectives provided by animal life. However, the fact that he never explains or compares his situation with that of the animals opens a new field of visuality for the reader, who is then in a position to compare these lives. The reader is able to see that while the animals trespass human categories, so does Rizal, in his role as a refugee, move between the boundaries demarcated by the nation-states of Bhutan, India, and Nepal. What marks this mobility is not the same sense of triumph and agency that perhaps one can find in other accounts of life at the borderland, like in case of Gloria Anzaldúa's seminal work, *Borderlands*. Anzaldúa writes from her experience of belonging to a Chicana heritage in America and its impact on the psyche. While Anzaldúa begins her text by showing an understanding of the material reality of life at the border, the border soon takes on a symbolic import in her work. Anzaldúa's narrative, though arising from the psychological trauma of living with the conflicted identity of being a woman of Mexican descent within the United States, nevertheless emerges into an powerful narrative

of empowerment as Anzaldúa writes about celebrating this unique heritage of the Chicana that draws from the oral cultures of the Aztecs and Indians and from the forms of Western anthropology. She states:

These numerous possibilities leave La mestiza floundering in uncharted seas . . . In perceiving conflicting information and points of view, she is subjected to a swamping of her psychological borders. She has discovered that she can't hold concepts or ideas in rigid boundaries. The borders and walls that are supposed to keep the undesirable ideas out are entrenched habits and patterns of behaviour; these habits and patterns are the, enemy within . . . She learns to be an Indian in Mexican culture, to be Mexican from an Anglo point of view . . . She learns to juggle cultures. She has a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode—nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does she sustain contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else. (Anzaldúa 79)

Most significantly, Anzaldúa points towards her heritage as a repository of cultures from where she has the agency to pick and choose or rather navigate between multiple identities. The problem with Anzaldúa's formulation is that it refuses to look into the material conditions of existence at the border where this celebratory agency of the mestiza is no longer available. Pablo Vila on the other hand, provides a more materialistic understanding of life at the U.S.- Mexico border. Vila's work aims to capture the anxieties, possibilities, differences that stem from the uniqueness of each border habitation, rather than reducing everything into a glorious celebration of hybridity (Vila 6).

Inhabiting the border does not just mean a chameleon-like ability to imbibe aspects from one's cultural heritage at will. Mobility, along with its threats and possibilities, defines life at the border. There is a grave threat to Rizal's life as he tries to seek refuge in India and Nepal. The governments of both these states prove hostile to Rizal as they would rather maintain diplomatic ties with Bhutan (Rizal 60, 78). Mobility allows Rizal to reformulate the notions of ethnicity as fixed by the Bhutanese state where the Nepalis are discriminated against for their ethnicity. While Rizal seeks refuge in Nepal, this is no triumphant celebration of homecoming. Rather, he records this journey in the following manner, "Now where should I go? I then thought of Nepal. Having allowed more than one lakh Bhutanese to remain within Nepal, would it have space for one more? I thought about the answer to this question and then decided to go ahead with the plan (185-6)." What does it mean to think about Bhutan from his position of being a condemned figure of Bhutan? Rizal frames his life story in terms of a linear trajectory which begins from his early years in Southern Bhutan to his imprisonment, followed by release and exile into Nepal but there is a constant amalgamation of his own story with the story of Bhutan. Thus, while he recounts the history of his childhood, he also simultaneously recounts the history of Bhutan, which challenges the official historiography of the state as belonging to one ethnic group. He says that primarily the Indian and British authors have attributed such a homogenous history to Bhutan (Rizal 43). So he focuses on a history of Bhutan tied with other nations like Tibet and hints at erstwhile easy mobility between these lands (42). He writes about the history of the Indian town of Kalimpong, which fell under Bhutan "The administration in the whole of southern Bhutan was looked after by S.T Dorjee of Kalimpong, when the British ruled over India. S.T Dorjee was appointed by the Bhutanese Government to set up a Bhutanese settlement in Kalimpong (46)." Rizal also writes about how many people continued to have houses in both Bhutan and India for an extended period, even after Kalimpong seceded to India (50)." This history, while pointing towards the arbitrariness of the current state of the Bhutanese border, becomes a means of mobilizing the spatial history of Bhutan itself. While in prison, he continues to think about the unfair judicial system of Bhutan and wonders about its reformation. When the nation is no longer available to Rizal in its materiality, reconstructing the history of the land, becomes a means for reframing the history of the self.

Mobility also allows Rizal to reframe the notion of ethnicity, framed from within the narrow confines of the nation-state. Rizal's life experiences allows him to think of solidarity as being forged not just through the idea of a shared kinship but through a shared history of suffering. Rizal warmly writes about the solidarities he develops with sympathizers in India and certain sections of the Nepali press. He writes about the plight of the Nepalis in Assam and identifies with their struggle (Rizal 77). Towards the end of the work, Rizal writes about how porous borders work in state developmental activities where cheap labour from India is used to rebuild Bhutan. He states, "These migrant labourers did not have proper living conditions in Bhutan. (172).

What such mobility then accords Rizal is an idea of the self that transcends his framing. Other's outside Bhutan, in India and Nepal, seep in to define Rizal's life story. His story crosses over into India and gets published in the Nepali newspaper from North Bengal, *Sunchari*, in 1996, which states, "Twenty- seventh March is extremely significant for Bhutan as it is the birth date of Tek Nath Rizal, a prisoner of conscience. There are very few people whose personal lives go on to inform the history of a nation (Chhetri)." The article then elaborates upon how Rizal is the leader of the Bhutanese Nepalis in their fight against the injustices wreaked upon them by this Shangrila of Bhutan. "His persona is much larger than his person as he now becomes the symbol of human rights and democracy (Chhetri)." The article then goes on to critique the leaders of the Gorkhaland movement in India and the Indian state for their apathy towards the cause of the Nepalis in Bhutan. Not just for dissonance within Bhutan, Rizal becomes a symbol that speaks against injustice, speaking for the marginalized in India and Nepal. As Judith Butler states, the framing of Rizal as a Nepali anti-national within Bhutan gets exposed as the story of his inhuman torture crosses over into India and Nepal. Thus, Rizal's story, in this fashion, also succeeds in breaking outside the frame of the memoir, as it gets circulated in other forms.

Thus, this study has sought to demonstrate how the idea of life is crucial to determining the framing of the self in Rizal's memoir. Where the meaning of life changes as drastically as it does for Rizal when he becomes a Bhutanese refugee, this study has sought to understand how these changes affect the framing of the self. If mobility as an imposed condition determines the experience of life for Rizal, then it also becomes a conceptual category that impacts the framing of the self. The self that emerges, as a result can never be a unitary, coherent self, for the very idea of an imposed physical mobility leads one to reformulate the frames of nation and ethnicity that impact the experience of life.

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