Dasein in Translation: Untranslatable as Equivalence?

SABINA FOLNOVIĆ JAITNER

Abstract: The majority of scientific research dedicated to the translation of Martin Heidegger’s thinking analyses English translations and other major world languages. However, there is a paucity of rigorous research focused on translating Heidegger’s philosophy into Slavic languages, especially in the context of Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian (BCMS). This lack of scholarship is striking, especially when one takes into account the influence of Heidegger’s thinking on the Slavic philosophical tradition. The paper explores a perspective on the translation of a term that is often referred to as “untranslatable:” Dasein. By analysing how Dasein is translated into Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian, this paper will investigate the specific linguistic and cultural conditions that make something inherently translatable or untranslatable.

Unlike in English translations, in which the word is printed in German, Dasein is actually translated into BCMS. By analysing how translators decided to transform this abstract term into BCMS, this paper will challenge the concept of “untranslatability” in relation to the concept of “equivalence.” In doing so, the concept of “untranslatability” becomes an alternative to the monolingualism of world literature.

Keywords: Untranslatability, equivalence, Dasein, philosophy, world literature

Introduction

If we consider the fact that translation of philosophy plays a crucial part in world literature, then it is necessary to understand how philosophical texts fluctuate within an international literary network. In order to do so, we must first ask ourselves: do philosophical texts fluctuate the same way as texts in other literary genres? In his book How to Read World Literature (2009), David Damrosh states one obvious fact; most literature circulates around the world precisely due to translation. However, world literature is often criticized for showing little interest in translation studies as a field of research (Bassnet 2019: 1). The feeling appears to be mutual; Susan Bassnet argues that one of the reasons why translation has a weak reputation in literary studies is due to translation studies' own critical attitude towards the “monolingualization of literary history” (Bassnet 2019: 4).

When it comes to the strangeness of philosophical language or the difficulties of translating philosophy, Martin Heidegger's use of language is often taken as an emblematic example. Especially in regards to his use of specific terminology, Heidegger’s writing tends to be labeled as “untranslatable.” One such work, devoted exclusively to the analysis of the translations of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, is the Romanian journal of Phenomenology: „Studiae Phaenomenologica: Translating Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit“ (2005). The editor of the publication, Christian Ciocan, points out that only a few philosophical works achieved international fame in such a short time as Sein und Zeit, a fear that is partially due to its rate of translation. Even more, most scholars find Heidegger one of the few writers whose texts actually become clearer through translation. Thus, Heidegger's translators played an extremely valuable role in both the scholarship and dissemination.
of Heidegger's philosophy (Ciocan 2005: 9). The publication itself presents the work of translators and editors of Heidegger's work, describing how they faced the formidable challenges of trying to introduce his lexicon into an entirely different language. However, the publication does not include the experiences of Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian translators.\footnote{In addition to the aforementioned publication, devoted exclusively to Sein und Zeit translations, numerous papers have been published on Heidegger's translations in general. Those of more recent date include: Translating Heidegger (Groth 2004) and Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking (Schalow ed. 2011). In his book, Miles Groth analyses how early translations of Heidegger's thought influenced various interpretations of his philosophy, which was extremely helpful in making Heidegger's thoughts more digestible to the reading public in mostly American academia. In Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking, Frank Schalow collected essays dedicated to the translator Parvis Emad, whose translations greatly contributed to a better understanding of Heidegger's philosophy in the United States (Schalow 2011: vii). Schalow, much like Ciocan (2005), emphasizes the importance of translation in philosophy, announcing a new period in Heidegger's research in which more significance would be placed on the role of translation: Now the question of translation, which had been considered only peripherally, had to be addressed seriously. Suddenly, the concern for translation as a task vaults into the forefront of the study of Heidegger's thinking, in a way which had never occurred before. A new era in the study of Heidegger's philosophy is born (Schalow 2011: viii).}

Another valuable work dedicated to the translation of Heidegger, especially dedicated to the translation of his terminology into English, is Die Übersetzbarkeit philosophischer Diskurse. Eine Übersetzungskritik an den beiden englischen Übersetzungen von Heideggers Sein und Zeit (Wenzel 2015). Xenia Wenzel, in this remarkable translational analysis of English translations of Sein und Zeit, provides an interdisciplinary approach to the topic by bringing philosophy, linguistics, and literature into dialogue with one another.

However, it is striking that the majority of scientific research, dedicated to the translation of Heidegger's thinking, only analyses English translations. Moreover, very little is known about translating Heidegger's philosophy into Slavic languages, especially into Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian (BCMS). This vacuum of research is even more jarring when one considers the importance of Heidegger's thinking within the Slavic philosophical tradition.

So far, Sein und Zeit has been translated into 25 languages. In terms of Slavic language translations, the only translations published are in Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Russian, BCMS, and Slovenian (Ciocan 2005: 11). By examining the specific solutions that the BCMS translators took when confronted with Heidegger's Dasein, this paper aims to examine how concepts, such as „equivalence“ and „untranslatable,“ can offer alternative linguistic methods to the field of world literature, without falling prey to the monolingualism for which it is often criticized.

One of the specific qualities of philosophical texts is that the demarcation between different languages is not clearly defined. In this type of text, different foreign languages are intertwined. This specific approach to language allows us to reconsider the concept of “equivalence” within translation. That is, in the context of the language of philosophy (not to be confused with the philosophy of language!), the question arises: what do the concepts of „untranslatable“ and „equivalence“ actually mean? In this study, this question will be explored through the concrete example of the BCMS translation of Heidegger's term Dasein and, moreover, how the concepts of „equivalence“ and „untranslatables“ have been approached within the specific linguistic context of BCMS.
Equivalence as a Construct

According to Gadamer, in the case of interlingual translation, it is the translator who enables communication. Therefore, every translation is also simultaneously an interpretation, because the meaning that the translator must preserve in the translation depends on how the translator interprets the text. However, a philosophical text, whether original or translated, always already consists of foreign terms or ideas, translated not only words from foreign languages but also concepts from different epochs. According to Ree, the language of philosophy is already a translation in which many languages resound (Cf. Ree 2001). Thus, in exploring the origin of certain philosophical terms, we are actually exploring the history of translation itself. Moreover, philosophical texts often cross national language boundaries. A common example are Greek concepts or phrases that remain untranslated to further contextualize an argument or theory that the philosopher is positing. Here, the task of philosophy translators becomes further complicated, as they must also decide the terms or phrases that can adequately straddle disparate linguistic fields. After all, translation is supposed to separate languages, or, in Naoki Sakai's words, translation becomes “an act of drawing a border, of bordering” (Sakai 2009: 74). In this sense, translation is an act that draws boundaries between languages. The question arises: how do we translate a multilingual philosophical text, without reducing it to a monolingual one through translation?

In this case, it is interesting to consider the questions posed by Sakai: “How do we allow ourselves to tell one language from the other? What allows us to represent language as a unity?” (Sakai 2009: 73). In answering this question, Sakai compares language to Kant's “regulative idea:” what is known as the “Copernican turn” in philosophy. By examining the conditions of human cognition, Kant reversed the traditional subject-object relation, placing the subject in a central position. Trying to discern how cognition of external objects is possible, Kant came to the conclusion that the object's independence from the subject is only an illusion. That is, the external object is not something wholly external to the subject, as our cognition of objects depends on our subjectivity. Therefore, the object is a construct of subjective cognition. Sakai uses Kant’s doctrine to show how the unity of the national language is also only a construct:

It is not possible to know whether a particular language as a unity exists or not. It is the other way around: by subscribing to the idea of the unity of language, it becomes possible for us to systematically organize knowledge about languages in a modern, scientific manner (Sakai 2009: 73).

What Sakai actually claims, with the help of Kant’s doctrine, is that, if the cognition of external objects is only a construct of the subject's cognition, then the unity of a particular language must also only be a construct. With this subjective (in Kant's sense) approach, Sakai provides a new perspective on national languages. According to him, the unity of the national language is a “schema for nationality” (Sakai 2009: 73), which has the function of "national integration" (Sakai 2009: 73). The supposed unity of a national language, viewed as a regulative idea, further manifests itself as a complex construct of ethnic identity. Considering the nation and national languages as subjective constructs, Sakai approaches the question of translation with these ideas in mind. In this context, translation functions as a way of demarcating national languages, that is: “… the representation of translation (…) serves as a schema of co-figuration: only when translation is represented by the schematism of co-figuration does the putative unity of a national language as a regulative idea ensue“ (Sakai 2009: 75). In this sense, Sakai speaks of translation in the sense of a border: “The unity of a national or ethnic language as a scheme is already accompanied by another scheme for the unity of a different language” (Sakai 2009: 75).
Sakai's perspective on language and translation allows us to look at the problem outside the binary relationship between translatability and "untranslatability." The concept of "equivalence" has always been considered as an unattainable, unrealistic goal of translation, the quality of is too often analysed in a dichotomous relationship, as represented in Derrida's translatability-untranslatability or Ricoeur's faithfulness-betrayal (Leal: 237). However, how do such dichotomous definitions help us in practical translation or in translation analysis? Alice Leal, as a way of forging a way out of such a binary opposition, suggests that we look at "equivalence" as a "construct made possible by translation rather than as a prerequisite for translation to take place or as an all-embracing measure to assess translation quality" (Leal: 239). Sakai's and Leal's positions lead to the question: who determines that something is "untranslatable?" In other words, who declares that a certain term is untranslatable and from which position? If we look at the tradition of translation in Slavic languages, a different approach and attitude to translation is revealed, one that differs from those found in Germanic languages. Thereby, Slavic translations also reveal a uniquely different attitude towards the concept of "untranslatability."

Translation in Slavic Languages

In Slavic languages, there is a tradition of trying to find an equivalent for each term in the target language of the translation. For example, unlike in English-language editions in which Heidegger's Dasein is simply kept as Dasein, BCMS translators utilize several translational solutions for this term, as shown later in the text. Philosopher and Slavist, Anto Knežević, provides an explanation for this different strategy. Slavic translators from IX. century translated philosophical texts directly from the Greek language, without the mediation of Latin (Knežević 1991: 70) as was done by German, Italian, Spanish and French philosophical traditions. Moreover, "Slavic religious teachers, knowing the Greek language well, tried to transfer all the ambiguity of abstract Greek words and names into the Slavic language that they also knew" (Knežević 1988: 26).

In such a tradition of translation, where supposed untranslatable words are translated, untranslatables are often seen as something that reflects negatively on the target language. For example, the philosopher Damir Barbarić believes that foreign words are "the product of complete submission when in contact with another, historically stronger and superior language" (Barbarić 1992: 179):

The overpowered language takes over the finished words-concepts of the other, but remains essentially indifferent to them and untouched by them, and it draws its own into the more hidden interior and preserves it at the cost of deeper repression into the unarticulated indeterminacy of some fluid prelude. Along with that then comes the closedness and essential blindness to the real power and full meaningful reach of the taken word, its world-opening power remains unknown and, in fact, silent. Likewise, on the other hand, the foreign word itself remains within the conquered language-speech in a kind of victorious isolation; it does not enter into a living relationship with other words and does not participate in that living all-conveying meaning, which we previously met as a universal metaphor of natural speech. Thus, a foreign word remains in a way a dead body in the living tissue of language-speech […] (Barbarić 1992: 179-180).

What does it actually mean to compare an untranslatable word to a dead body? It could be said that Barbarić introduces another dichotomous relationship: a translated word is seen as part of a living body, while an untranslatable word represents a dead organ in a living organism. According to Barbarić, only a translated word enables the transfer of meaning and significance, something that can only occur from the free encounter of two languages (Barbarić 1992: 181), and not from a situation in which a larger language conquers a smaller, weaker one, as is the case with keeping source-language words in
translation. According to him, the translated term in the language of translation not only “opens a new field of meaning” but new possibilities for philosophizing as well (Barbarić 1992: 180–181).

However, why should the untranslated word in translation have to be seen as the by-product of a great language enslaving a smaller, weaker one? If we look at English example, the precedent for translating the already mentioned term, Dasein, calls into question this statement made by Barbarić, because it is hard to imagine the English language as small or weak. Furthermore, according to Barbarić, the conquest of a smaller, weaker language by a larger one would then result in the death of the weaker language. If an untranslated word functions as a dead body in the living organism of language, then that dead body will infect the living tissue around it, leading to the death of that living tissue – if we are to follow Barbarić’s metaphor to its logical end. Such a binary position seems to presuppose a clear distinction between the original language of philosophy and the language of philosophy in translation. However, if we return to both the assumption that it is difficult to distinguish all the languages that resonate within philosophical texts and the position of language as a construct of the subject (Sakai), then such a binary position is questionable. For a philosophical text is not monolingual, and the same should hold true for the translation of philosophy. If, to borrow Barbarić’s terminology, the language of philosophy in translation represents living tissue, while both languages resonate in both the original language and the translation (cf. Ree), then the boundary between the original and the translation is not easy to determine. Barbarić argues for a discernible dichotomy between the living tissue of the translated language of philosophy and the untranslated word as a dead body. However, this “living tissue” of the translated language of philosophy is also already a translation. Thus, this “living tissue” is by no means homogeneous, and the non–translated word is a crucial part of maintaining that heterogeneous and multilingual whole. As an element that is constantly in the process of translation, untranslatable words are an open concept that the reader of a philosophical text is able to identify as such, and, therefore, work to understand.

According to Barbara Cassin, untranslatable terms are not words that have stopped being translated. Rather, they are words that are constantly undergoing the flux of the translation process (Cf. Cassin 2016: 243). According to Rada Iveković, untranslatable words represent “the guarantee of the polysemic values” (Iveković 2007). She argues that “untranslatables do not prevent translation: they are, on the contrary, its fuel, and we are lucky to have them. We translate thanks to, and in spite of, the untranslatables. Therefore, we have the context” (Iveković 2007). Therefore, we are provided with an understanding of the “untranslatable” as something that is dead and finite. On the other hand, we have the opposite attitude about the “untranslatable” as a living and open category of language. According to Iveković, untranslatable words are not isolated in the text. Rather, they provide significant context for the greater understanding of the text as a whole. In this way, untranslatable words can still play a crucial role in the translator’s task of creating a kind of “equivalence” between source and target languages.

**Dasein in The Dictionary of Untranslatables and in the BCMS Translations**

If much can be learned about the history of philosophy through the history of translating philosophical thought, then the small example of how Dasein is translated, as discussed in The Dictionary of Untranslatables, shows how the history of translation is not linear. However, there are various traditions of translation that approach the issue of “untranslatables” differently. Dasein is probably one of the most famous terms carrying the status of “untranslatable.” The Dictionary of Untranslatables lists the meanings of this philosophical term in English, French, Italian, and Latin.
Dasein’s resistance to any translation emerged in the twentieth century as an outcome of the Germanization of the Latin *existentia* into *Dasein*, as if *Dasein* had ultimately never recovered from this blow and continued to point toward an entirely different area of meaning from the one to which the metaphysical term *existentia* tried to assign it (Cassin 2014: 195).

However, The Dictionary does not provide any example of how this term is translated into Slavic languages. We can argue whether it is better to translate this term or keep it in the original, but it is undeniable that various BCMS translations of this term, as well as translations of Heidegger’s works in general, opened new perspectives in the research of Heidegger’s philosophy. BCMS’ translational approach – translating philosophical terms rather than leaving them in the original (as is the case with *Dasein* in English translations) – sheds new light on the concept of “the untranslatable.” What distinguishes Slavic philosophical terminology from German philosophical terminology is that the transfer of terms from Greek did not take place through Latin, due to the translation work of St. Cyril and Methodius (Knezevic 1989 and 1991; Komel 2005). Although, it should be emphasized that The Dictionary of Untranslatables is primarily a dictionary of Western terms. Thus, the concern arises on the status of Slavic languages within the Western treasury of knowledge if, as the example of *Dasein* shows, they are excluded from the discussion. Let us now examine how this term is translated into the BCMS language.

According to the German, Croatian or Serbian Dictionary, the German verb *dasein* means “to be present” or “to be there” (Hurm 1974: 129). However, The Dictionary lists the corresponding noun, *das Dasein*, as *bivovanje*, *bitak*, *život*, *opstanak* (“being,” “existing,” “life,” “existence”) (Hurm 1974: 129). As a philosophical concept, *Dasein* first appears in the German language in Kant’s translation of the Latin *existentia* in the text Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God). Kant’s term was later adopted by Hegel (Cassin 2014: 195), who distinguished *Dasein* from *Existenz*. However, it was Heidegger who made a clear difference between the two concepts in his attempt to transcend classic, Western metaphysical thought:

> “Das Wesen des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz” (SZ: 42).
> “Bit tubitka leži u njegovoj egzistenciji” (Šarinić: 46). [“The core of there-being is in its existence.”]
> “Suština” tubitka leži u njegovoj egzistenciji” (Todorović: 69). [“The essence of there-being is in its existence.”]

*Existenz* is, therefore, the essence of *Dasein* (tubitak), but by no means is it an equivalent of *Dasein* (tubitak). Hence, German philosophy, from Kant through Fichte and Jacobi to Hegel, already distinguished between the two concepts (Heidegger 1985: xxvi). In his later text Der Satz vom Grund (The Principle of Reason), Heidegger would claim that *Dasein* is a translation of Latin’s *praesentia*: “Auch die uns geläufigen Worte wie “Absicht” für intentio, “Ausdruck für expressio, “Gegenstand” für objectum, “Dasein” für praesentia werden erst im 18. Jahrhundert gebildet” (Heidegger 1978: 32).

In both BCMS translations of *Sein und Zeit*, Dasein is translated as tubitak. The first translation into BCMS (1985) includes an “Introduction,” written by philosopher Gajo Petrović, who uses the term tubivstvovanje instead of tubitak. His decision, which contradicts the decision made by translator Šarinić, is based around the argument that tubitak lacks a sense of temporality. Hence, Petrović used the term tubivstvovanje, which is an imperfect verb that emphasizes both the spatial and temporal dimensions contained in Heidegger’s *Dasein* (Cf. Folnović Jaitner 2016). Furthermore, when Petrović refers to a sentence from *Sein und Zeit* in his introduction, he quotes neither the German original nor Šarinić’s translation. Instead, he provides his own translation for the sentence in question. For example, Petrović in his “Introduction” to Šarinić’s translation quotes from Heidegger.

[“The average everydayness of Dasein can therefore be determined as decaying-exposed, thrown-throwing, projecting, geworfenentwerfende being-in-the-world, to whom its being by “the world” and in with-being with others are the most proper form of could-be [the most proper form itself of being, um das eigenste Seinkönnen selbst”].]

Unfortunately, neither Petrović nor Šarinić question this translational disparity. Petrović gives the following explanation for his translation of Dasein as tubivstvovanje (“there-being“ verbal noun):

The component Da, which we have here translated as tu (there), suggests much more than that. German da does not only refer to the spatial tu but also to tada (then), among other things. Hence, it indicates a temporal aspect of interpreting man’s existence and existence in general (Heidegger 1985: xxv-xxvi, my translation).6

As early as 1965, Petrović, in his work titled: Filozofija i marksizam (Philosophy and Marxism), explained why he considered the suffix -ak to be not the right choice for the imperfective aspect of verbs (Petrović 1965: 331). Translating Dasein as tubivstvovanje, in Petrović’s view, allows one to grasp not only the word’s spatial dimension but its temporal inferences as well. A similar opinion is also held by the Bulgarian translator of Sein und Zeit, Dimiter Georgiev Saschew, who believes that the word Dasein should be read as a verb, not as a noun, precisely because the concept encompasses both space and time (Saschew 2005: 39). However, translating Dasein as a verb in the infinitive form or a noun causes a paradoxical situation:

... the more someone strives again and again to determine Dasein as a noun and substance, the more the temporality of the tempora; word Sein comes to the fore and indicates the impossibility of finding Sein as a substance and the meaning of Sein as a content. (Sa Calvacante Schuback 2005: 211) (my translation).7

In addition, Todorović translates Dasein as tubitak, except in those cases where Heidegger uses the term in the Kantian or Hegelian sense. In such cases, he translates it as postojanje (“existence,” “subsistence”). In the collection of essays and translations of some paragraphs of Sein und Zeit (Barbarić 2013), Dasein is also translated as tubitak. In any case, regardless of whether translators choose to translate this concept or leave it untranslated, hardly any translation solution can satisfy the translators or, for that matter, their readers: “Keine Übersetzung des Wortes Dasein kann das Übersetzen unseres ganzen Wesens in den Bereich einer gewandelten Wahrheit zustandebringen, weil Dasein gerade diese Übersetzung bedeutet” (Sá Cavalcante Schuback 2005: 213).

Both translations distinguish Heidegger’s use of the concept of Dasein in the Hegelian sense, whereby Šarinić translates it as opstojanje (“survival”) and Todorović as postojanje (“subsistence”), with the addition of the original term in square brackets: postojanje [Dasein]:
Example:
»Ich ist der reine Begriff selbst, der als Begriff zum Dasein gekommen ist«. (433)  
»Ja je sam čisti pojam, koji je kao pojam došao do opstojanja«. (Š: 493)  
»Ja je sam čisti pojam, koji je kao pojam došao do postojanja [Dasein]«. (T: 495) 

In BCMS, Dasein is also translated as egzistencija (existence) i život (life). These solutions were made by translator Dunja Melčić in her translation of Heidegger’s Rectoral Address. She explained her decision as follows:

The original verbal meaning of the noun ‘Dasein’ is da sein; for example, “ich bin da”, which can be translated as “here I am” or “I am here” in an ordinary linguistic context. No matter how many different interpretations of Heidegger’s philosophy and his terms exist, it is undeniable that this original verbal meaning, the meaning of everyday speech, is crucial for his thought. However, in the Croatian language, in contrast to English and French, we can substantiate this “I am here”, but tubitak is, of course, to some extent, an invented word that is difficult to accept… (Melčić in Heidegger 1999: 44) (my translation)

By translating Dasein as egzistencija (existence) or život (life), Melčić probably wanted to avoid a neologism, such as tubitak, while still following Heidegger’s preference for bestowing colloquial words with new philosophical meanings. However, translating Dasein as egzistencija creates confusion, because Heidegger also uses this term Existenz. Thus, it is not always clear whether, in translation, existence is necessarily Heidegger’s existence or his Dasein.

Yet, another of Heidegger’s term is translated as egzistencija (existence) in the BCMS language: Daßsein. The BCMS translator of the first translation of the Sein und Zeit, Hrvoje Šarinić, translated Daßsein as egzistencija (existence). However, in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger uses the term Existenz, which Šarinić also translated as egzistencija. Such a translational decision by Šarinić alludes to the fact that, within translation, there is no difference between Heidegger’s terms Daßsein and Existenz, as he uses both in Sein und Zeit. Leaving the term Daßsein in the text of the translation as untranslated may contradict the Slavic tradition of translation, but it may guarantee a better understanding of Heidegger’s terminology. In other words, the untranslated term would show the difference between Heidegger’s terms: Dasein, Daßsein and Existenz.

Conclusion

The example of Dasein’s BCMS translation shows that, in some cases, an untranslatable word guarantees a better understanding than through the translation of the term itself, and, therefore, it should not be seen as intruder but more as a foreign word that gives readers a different perspective. Moreover, an untranslatable word can take the role of “equivalence” (Cf. Fohnović Jaitner 2020). Thus, untranslatable words are never isolated in the text. As Iveković pointed out, they exist within a context that helps us to better understand them.

This example raises one more important question: who and by what criteria declares a certain term to be untranslatable? It seems to me that the tradition of translation in Slavonic languages illustrates how the concept of “untranslatability” should be taken with some caution, because the inference of such a status always depends on one’s perspective. In other words, we should always be asking ourselves: for whom is a certain term untranslatable? With that being said, we should keep in mind that The Dictionary of Untranslatables derives from a uniquely French perspective on translation. In the preface to The Dictionary of Untranslatables Apter says:
Accordingly, entries compare and meditate on the specific difference furnished to concepts by the Arabic, Basque, Catalan, Danish, English, French, German, Greek (classical and modern), Hebrew, Hungarian, Latin, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, and Spanish languages (Cassin 2014: vii).

Yet, these terms are not treated in mutual interrelation through which a complex network of travel and intersection of terms, listed in the lexicon, would be outlined. Rather, the terms are processed in a one-sided relation to French culture. Apter argues that the lexicon is intended for anyone who is interested "in the cartography of languages or the impact of translation history on the course of philosophy" (Cassin 2014: vii). However, this map is extremely centralized, where all roads lead to France. Moreover, The Dictionary of Untranslatables, on the one hand, celebrates multilingualism while, on the other hand, emphasizes linguistic nationality by stereotyping the culture of certain languages: “PORTUGUESE becomes a hymn to the sensibility of the baroque, with Fado (fate, lassitude, melancholia) its emblematic figure. GERMAN hews to the language of Kant and Hegel "(Cassin 2014: xiii). Therefore, the question remains unsolved: can this kind of approach in The Dictionary of Untranslatable be called philosophizing in tongues? Finally, does such an approach really challenge the monoligualism of world literature?

University of Vienna, Austria

Notes

1 The use of the expression “Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian language” requires a detailed explanation. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the subsequent emergence of independent national states in this region, the official language called Serbo-Croatian disintegrated as well. Due to nationalist language politics, Serbo–Croatian became separated into Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian languages. However, these national languages still belong to one common language field. In this specific language frame, I am examining the topic of philosophical translation. Until the 1990s, foreign philosophical texts, mostly translated into Serbo–Croatian, strongly influenced philosophical ideas in the respective language field of BCMS as a whole. Keeping this in mind, it is futile to analyse any philosophical translation in these particular languages without understanding how they all belong to one language field: BCMS (Cf. Folnović Jaitner 2016).

2 Napravljani jezik preuzima gotove riječi-pojmove onog drugog, ali ostaje u bitnome spram njih ravnodušan i njima netaknut te ono svoje i vlastito povlači u skriveniju unutrašnjost i očuvava ga pod cijenu sve dublje potisnutosti u neartikuliranu neodređenost nekog fluidnog praugođaja. S tim zajedno onda ide i zatvorenost i bitno sljepilo za pravu snagu i puni smisao nespoznata, njena svijet otvarajuća izbora i izvora. Jednakako tako, s druge strane, sama tuđica ostaje ubitno netaknutog jezika-govora u svojevrsnoj izolaciji, ne ulazi u živo odnošenje s drugim riječima i ne učestvuje u onom živom svepremošćenju značenja, koje smo kao sveopću metaforičnost prirodnoga govora i izvorište njegove vječno nove životnosti bili ranije upoznali. Tako ostaje tuđica na neki način mrtvo tijelo u živom tkivu jezika-govora [...]. (Barbarić 1992: 179-180)

3 There are two complete translations of Sein und Zeit. The first one was published in Zagreb (1985), translated by Hrvoje Sarinić and the second one was published in Belgrade (2007), translated by Miloš Todorović.

4 The examples given below are taken from two existing BCMS translations of Sein und Zeit. The first translation was published in 1985 in Zagreb, translated by Hrvoje Sarinić (the second, unchanged edition follows in 1988), and the second by Miloš Todorović in 2007 in Belgrade.

Original quote: “Komponenta Da, koju smo ovdje preveli sa tu, sugerira i mnogo više od toga. Njemačko da ne znači samo prostorno tu, nego, među ostalim i tada, pa je njim već nagovijestena i temporalna interpretacija čovjeka bivstvovanja i bivstvovanja uopće” (Heidegger 1985: xxv–xxvi).

Original quote: „… je mehr Jemand immer wieder danach trachtet, Dasein als Substantiv und Substanz bestimmen, desto mehr trifft die Zeitlichkeit des Zeitwortes Sein hervor und die Unmöglichkeit anzeigt, das Sein als Substanz und den Sinn von Sein als Gehalt zu finden.” (Sa Calvacante Schuback 2005: 211).

Original quote: „Izvorno glagolsko značenje imenice “Dasein” je da sein; npr. “Ich bin da”, što bismo u normalnom jezičnom kontekstu preveli s „evo me” ili „tu sam”. Koliko god različita bila mnogobrojna tumačenja Heideggerove filozofije i njezinih pojmov, nepobitnim se može smatrati da je za njegovo mišljenje temeljno ovo izvorno glagolsko značenje, značenje svakodnevnoga govora. Mi doduše u hrvatskome, za razliku od engleskog i francuskog, to „tu sam” možemo substantivirati, ali je „tubitak” naravno donekle izmišljena riječ, koja se teško prihvaća.” (Melčić in Heidegger 1999: 44).

Works Cited


