

Imaginarium of Aesthetics and Poetic Language: Reconciling Axiomatic Thoughts and Semiotics of the Abstract through Representation and Deconstruction

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Abstract: Philosophy has incessantly probed the enigma of imagination singularity. Evolution is sympathetic to us in infusing the powers of creative cognition – the access to imaginative perception. The semiotic, cognitive, and metaphysical are ways of theorising that unique faculty which comes naturally to the inventive mind. It is common knowledge that what we see is quite distinct from what we realise or objectively correlate. Dynamic objects inadvertently create a *representamen*, and in our subconscious plane produces a translatable immediate object. Imaginarium is our repository of all our emotions, the only gift that makes us human and the only path from debates to consensus.

Keywords: Aesthetic representation, imagination, inventive mind, objective correlation, semiotic deconstruction, reconciliation of opposites

Conundrum of the Readable and the Unreadable

The quest for a reconciliation between poetry and philosophy germinated with the confusion, how are they different? Is it the approach to answer life's simple questions, or is it seeing at life in a mirror? Why is a mirror relevant? Is the relevance congenital or the relevance is by choice? Why do people run behind the illusion of freedom, when we are born in the innate slavery of nature's calls? Are we Active, Passive, Actively Passive, or Passively Active? The simplicity of the questions can be baffling to us in the face of their complex answers.

In the heart of object-correlations lies its randomness – assigning of meaning that produces semiosis. Semiosis is not the big bang of cognitive process, but a downstream of *presemiotic* or *protosemiotic* process, also called *indexicals*, commonly signified as context-sensitive expressions:

The indexicals that philosophers have studied most are the pronouns 'I', 'he', 'she', 'it', 'this', and 'that'; the adverbs 'here', 'now', 'today', 'yesterday', 'tomorrow', and 'actually'; and the adjectives 'my', 'his', 'her', 'present', 'past', and 'actual'. (Kaplan 489-90).

Imaginative faculty also incorporates an extrapolated process of *indexicals* proposing a more sophisticated theory of sociolinguistic identity. Imagination is not altogether abstract because it draws from the objectivity infused not only by social categories such as gender, ethnicity, age, or location, but also by the development of the persona by multiple exposure to variable orientation and stimuli. Imaginative "contextuality" (Silverstein) is bound by meaning and the "comprehension of stylistic methods" (Eckert) of expression guides the meaning.

The wave and particle paradox confronts in the concepts of aesthetics: the antinomy between art being abstract or concrete. The knowledge that the poet/artist has, waiting for expression, already has an imaginative contextuality. Kant asserts that "we cannot think of a line without tracing it in our thoughts; we cannot think of a circle without describing it" (Eco 67). But, to trace any figure in our thoughts we must have presemiotic knowledge or at least axioms to comprehend the points of constructing a figure: in case of a circle, all points on the circumference of the circle must be equidistant from the center. So, if a work of art or poetry is judgemental that work of art is concrete and is schemed as *perceptual judgement*. Yet, it is extremely difficult to establish that a

work of expression is inadvertently *finality of judgement*. But a work of art or poetry is one of the many spurts of a volcano; one explosion does not bring finality of the process of creation. Creation is a fluid phenomenon, the mythical “churning of ocean” to find the ‘elixir of life.’

The troublesome question is what instigates the imaginative singularity? There is a *definitive singularity* of destination for anyone seeking knowledge by whatever path one follows. The existence of matter becomes a reality only in its phenomenon and by the process of perception. If we accept that perception, as Pierce claims, is a semiotic phenomenon, it becomes a cloudy affair. Phenomenological derivatives speak of *perceptual meaning* only by referring to something that inadvertently precedes the form and content of meaning of a word and the coalesced expressions. A quadruped beyond our focal length clarity could turn out to be any of the species. When we can perceive the animal as a *hyena*, for instance, we apply *cognitive schema*, the data from our correlative *indexicals*. The unknown becomes the known, and we make an *inference*.

But words mislead us, deceive us by the incisiveness of binary oppositions of our finite consciousness. There is too much reliance on indexical distinctions as if these distinctions perfectly represent the ultimate truths and achieve a finality of judgment. The existence of the *Nothing* is something beyond our purist conceptions because the *Nothing* is the uncertainty or the probable trajectory of something that is moving randomly across space. The philosophical dilemma in trying to explain that *Nothing* exists because it implies a method of total exclusion from all that we know and consciously are. The unknown and the unknowable are confused. In trying to decipher the *Unknowable*, theorists tend to bypass the precept that it is *Unknowable* not because it is universally so but because the mind grasps only finite constructions and perceives it as the only true existence. We may be able to formulate a *zero*, but it is difficult to realize a *zero* by using cognates that are based on positive or negative indexical.

Art, especially poetry, implements a distortion of the regular cognates to re-morph their semantic attributes in newer correlative variations. Aestheticism in art, thus, stands apart from the statement that “leaves are green,” because that is one paradigm of realization which is entirely dependent on the theory of perception of what our eyes see. Factuality is a tiny part of objective perception until the perception expands, and art shapes itself on this expansion of multiple planes of perception. This paper creates parallel probes into the multiverse of *imagination singularities* both from the inclusive methods of Philosophy and Deconstructive methods of literature, especially poetry.

Black Rain And Fire

Art thrives in the presemiotic cognitive phase and thrives by the faculty of imagination. The discussion of the opposition between the abstract and the concrete nature of art leads to yet another problem: can art be signified as intuitive and perceptual or intellectual and conceptual? If the artist has a purpose, then there is a conceptualization in the context of the art. A whole is made up of parts, like the base figure of triangles to form a circle; but we cannot discern the whole without looking at the relationship between one part and another and between the parts and the whole that forms out of it.

If the abstract and the concrete are opposites and are so binary, then art is the medium that performs the act of *balancing the opposites*. This fine balance is the undercurrent phenomena working as intuitive knowledge in every single work of art even though, they are individualistic in design of the abstract and the concrete, I suppose, are quite as *Content and Form*. The final goal of the artist then is the expression of the imaginative context and the outcome is the appeal which the work of art can impress. This appeal in aesthetics is the sense of beauty, whether it is true to life or a distortion of reality. If the rationale of that appeal plays upon the pulses of the observer, then that art is beautiful because it has fulfilled its purpose. If it draws criticism of sorts, it has fulfilled the purpose more. The tendencies of gloomy or macabre art from Rembrandt’s *Slaughterhouse* to the Pre-Raphaelites liberates Beauty from the clutches of Classical dogma.

The ugliness then is no more a negation of Beauty but the other construct of Beauty. The artist's vision is as abstract as that of any rational person who does not live life on mere imaginative contextuality. The true content of a work of art consists of the artists feelings and ideas, the emotional and the intellectual reactions to life, and these regulate the activities of formative imagination that breeds life into the work of art. Even the size of a canvas or the design of a poem with all its stylistics has but one particular purpose: creating a perfect or ideal impression by an ideal actuation of expression. This is the *deconstruction* of the formalist assertion that form is finality.

The idea that form is *logocentric* fails to proceed its argument when it achieves a non-geometrical freedom of artistic expression. The dystopic realities in novels establishing its own semiosis in a post-apocalyptic world breaks the formalities of Form as *priori*. The development of cinematic art form, and André Bazin's argument claiming cinema as a live genre in his *Cahiers du cinema*, makes an impressionistic argument of individuality of art forms. But it was not the impressionists neither the later absurdists who by *balancing* the *opposites* deconstructed objectivity of *proposition* in art. It was S.T. Coleridge with exposition of a surreal landscape in *Kubla Khan*, who achieved a near perfection of correlating binary opposites into an amalgam of unified impressions:

The shadow of the dome of pleasure
 Floated midway on the waves;
 Where was heard the mingled measure
 From the fountain and the caves.
 It was a miracle of rare device,
 A sunny pleasure-dome with caves of ice! (lines 31-36)

Coleridge's *Kubla Khan* is an incessantly enigmatic, stealth narrative poem – in ways that engage with questions of autobiography, politics, religion, and literature, among so many others. It leaves us, on every new reading, with a sense of 'the impossibility of assenting to its proper imaginative context, a meaning within a meaning.' *Kubla Khan* carries a symbiotic relationship with Derrida's notion of the 'enigmatic kinship between...nuclear waste and the "masterpiece"' (Bio 845).¹ The corpus of criticism on *Kubla Khan* attained maturity only during the twentieth century when the value-rejection of the poem as a *fragment* was seen as remarkably and cognitively coherent. There are metrical blips in the lucidity of its esemplastic imagination, but the poem was not meant to be lucid. Imagination seldom is lucid. The poem is about what Derrida's work professes: *the account of unreadability*. This unreadability carries as undercurrent the paper's initial undercurrent of priority of *presemiotic stage of aesthetic sense, the creative cloud*. "Unreadability," Derrida argues, "does not arrest reading, does not leave it paralyzed in the face of an opaque surface: rather, it starts reading and writing and translation moving again" (LO 116).²

The perpetual fluidity of the expressionless is not an opaque state and the unreadability is not a hidden contextuality that can be formulated in principle. The formalist approach, the geometrical explicit fails because the creative cloud thrives in *randomness*. The very concepts of exactness, epistemic certainty, in fact, is meaningless in nature. If literary and artistic expression indeed imitates and re-constitutes impressions of nature, then all literature and art in *inexact*. The *inexact* is constituted by *randomness*, the true essence of creativity. Excavating one discernible meaning of an artistic or literary work denies the *unpredictability of the unreadability* of that work. Philosophical approaches and formulations are inadequate to contemplate multiplicity of meaning so long there is a certain concreteness in the creative process. But the *creative cloud* is too variable:

"literature...always is, says, does something other, something other than itself, and itself which moreover is only that, something other than itself" (POO 33).³

The recurrent tendency to associate axiomatic beliefs as conclusions inadvertently drives the reading of literary works, in this case *Kubla Khan*. Why is there an impossibility of acceding to the appropriate significance of the poem? What does *Kubla Khan* mean – a name or a metaphor?

These are questions that open on to the knowledge of what Derrida calls ‘the absolute inviolability of the secret’ (GT 153).⁴ What is cryptic or secret about *Kubla Khan* is not something that could one day, epistemologically, be ‘explained away,’ ‘solved,’ ‘revealed.’ It is quite a matter of a ‘superficial’ yet ‘inaccessible’ unreadability. Derrida asserts:

“There is something secret. But it does not conceal itself” (POO 21).

Or, as he puts it in *Given Time*:

“the readability of the text is structured by the unreadability of the secret” (GT 152).

Literature has a consistent inconsistency: a text or a poetic creation has, as Derrida observes in *Before the Law*:

“a text ‘has its own identity, singularity and unit’ (B 184).⁵

As with the example of Kafka’s text (*Vor dem Gesetz*), we presuppose that *Kubla Khan* is “unique and self-identical’ and ‘exist[s] as an original version incorporated in its birthplace within the [English] language” (B 185).

The inference becomes quite simple – the words in the text, are not written post-sensation of the dream; the words are formed as poem in the dream, the state of trance. We do not require a nebulous hypothesis to comprehend that there are presemiotic supplements. The words are the replaceable to the irreplaceability of a singular vision. The synaesthesia of method and flashes of madness – “Beware! Beware! / His flashing eyes, his floating hair!” – are juxtaposed only to justify that the *deviance* of poetic creativity is the only tool that can fuse the “sunny pleasure dome” and “caves of ice.” The image figures as an irreplaceable singularity. But this irreplaceable singularity is always already compromised. The image is as fragile as its strongest emotion – the tentative balance among the cognates conjuring the image is fascinatingly intricate; that it may break anytime is its beauty – utterly perishable.

Our perception of the real world also morphs by participating in conditions and circumstances. Consciousness then is a collage of frames of experiences, and the imaginative singularities are the extensions of each of those experiential frames, yet distinct, because it guides its own existence by its own principles. If the world is a dream, an illusion, or a misnomer, it is a dream created in its totality and supported by a virtual life of its own.

Here, we come face to face with the enigma of consistent restructuring of an image – fragility is not the weakness of imagination but its immense strength of morphing into the other – *inconsistently consistent* shape shifting. The *deviance* is what Derrida calls *Differance*, and it does not define what *is* but what it is simultaneously *not*; the multitude of the contrary (Sanskrit: *itara*; the antithetical other). Derrida calls it *Iterability* (Sec 7).⁶ The antithetical ‘other’ is one of many ‘others’ that have not been expressed by the artist because one expression is one context and without the context, it falls into the artist’s *plenitude* of uncertainties. Keats in his *Ode on a Grecian Urn* became the singular proponent of plenitude of the ‘other,’ the yet to be formulated poem residing in the uncertainties:

Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear’d,
Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone: (lines 11–14)⁷

The “unheard” is the *unreadable*, yet as vivid as it could be because it is transient and must be related to an expansive reality which in all probability is permanent and complete and thus realizable. Keats’ heightened senses give substance and significance to this idealistic *perceptual judgement* of perfection – a most sought-after plane of fusions and fissions – touched only by imaginative faculty. Great works of art suggest transcending the *temporal perceptions* to reach the *indefinable other*: the call from that work of art speaks not the “sensual ear” but to the “spirit.” The

essential paradox of all art is in giving permanence to fleeting moments before the image is morphed into another uncertainty. The *perishable temporality* that time asserts has no control over the imaginative perceptions.

Probabilities And Necessities

Axiomatic beliefs and formulations do not work on poetic endeavour because the need to find meaning in the entire evolutionary process to answer life's simplest questions needs a *deviant* approach, or a mindset. The balancing of opposites has not been reconciled even by the most ruthless of religious stigmatism, giving birth, in the process, to the equal balanced view of *good* and *evil*, "eternal light" and the opposed "e'vr burning sulphur;"⁸ binary opposites as they are, yet equated on the same cognitive plane. The reconciliation of opposites expands itself with artistic endeavour towards states of singularities; each singularity is a complete impression and is immutable. Infinite states of immutability engender variations and too many variations create *chaos effect*.

The associative connection between the infinite elements of *chaos* or the abstract, *dislocated* images are reconciled through imagination. A disassociation from the objects of perceptual judgement engenders the probability of not ever reconciling the chaos. The artist struggles to keep the associative connection intact even to the extent of subduing the conscious limitations. Although art is artifice, fictitious, and bypasses scientific axioms, yet it must impress a vital flow. It is not necessary for art to be life-like, but it must have associative connection with life and by that connection reconcile the opposites.

It is possible to create a train of reasoning to formulate an argument that explains the *ideological content* of art. But what any work of art achieves is immediate conviction because the cognitive bubble that it creates has laws of its own which can be explained scientifically and philosophically. Scientific logic and philosophy equally apply in this parallel world, a real existence gets justified because it has its own necessities and probabilities. It is here we can ascertain that a *finality of judgement* cannot be reached for human existence because the human mind lies not only in the *perceived real* but also in the *purposive virtual*.

The artist's work is purposive; even when the purpose is a distortion. But again, distortion and deviation is the lifeblood of creativity. The entire world of advertisement draws ontological inspiration for its being from this simple understanding of *deviance*. Each deviance is a neon-sign, the bright digital billboard, the striking ideological premise that achieves fulfillment by its *deviant* syntactic. But deviance comes with its own unreadability and the success of advertising art form is in stirring the lethargic cognates. The poetic justice lies in this ability of its semiosis to pique newer perceptual singularities breaking the stalemate of regular syntactic and semantic.

Phantasmic Organization

Perceptual singularity has no relation to moral principles – it is not time bound to go or arrive – a transience of it being the singular is a perception of it. Perceptual singularity is not entirely distinct from that of integral Knowledge, which presupposes integral Reality. This precept of integral Reality is Truth consciousness that validates itself on the consciousness of the Reality. The phenomenon of semiosis is limited by its functionalities of indications leading to the inference that Knowledge is a higher degree of Ignorance because it stays shy of the Absolute or Ideal.

The cross-genitive approach towards the ghost construct works in the same manner – every distortion of the natural order emanates from the natural order. The breakdown of familiarity is the cause of primal fear, but when it comes to literary creations, the signs of fear may be entirely morphed into aesthetic appeal. A statement seems exuding out of this reasoning:

The birth of super-men/women, mutant characters ate into the need for a ghost or a supernatural entity, or for that matter devils, demons, or the bizarre.

Macbeth would be brewing his criminal intentions keeping his mission clandestine. Hamlet, a scholar of the Wittenburg University, would have seen through the ruse of the ‘supernatural soliciting,’ have his suspicions confirmed, and this confirmation would be made through devious ways.

Shakespeare introduced the Ghost of Hamlet’s father effectuating the dispense of several non-effective significations. The aesthetic torque that the Ghost achieves consequently intensifies Hamlet’s psychological vacillations. The aesthetic appeal is strengthened by the dramatic truth that the ghost comes to the man who is susceptible to metaphysical doubts and broods, “To be or not to be....” The witches in *Macbeth* too enforce the same dramatic relevancy. The ghost and witches are the *Ugly* and the bizarre, the chaotic fulcrum which is necessary to exercise the semiotic *Other*. They are that *drug*, as Derrida puts it:

“We will always have unclassified or unclassifiable supplements of drugs or narcotics. Basically, everyone has his [or her] own” (RD 245).⁹

Thus, he offers what is his most concisely formulated proposition regarding the unbounded generalization in this context:

“Every phantasmatic organization, whether collective or individual, is the invention of a drug, or of a rhetoric of drugs, be it aphrodisiac or not” (RD 247).

He foregrounds the crucial role of language and especially performative speech acts in “the regime of the concept [of drugs]” (RD 229), starting out with the ‘diction’ in ‘addiction’ (from the Latin *dicere*, ‘to declare’, ‘to say’). In doing so, he is especially attentive to the relations between drugs and literature, and between drugs and poetry. There are striking correspondences between the worlds of fiction or poetry and the world of drugs, as regards the sense of a sort of dreaminess or what he elsewhere describes as ‘a suspended relation to meaning and reference’ (TSICL 48).¹⁰

Poetry has in its philosophical workings a mechanism to amalgamate the variations: it manifests itself towards a reconciliation of the diverse. Each diverse state of existence, perception, creative cloud is true, and each existence of imaginative state intensely compels “the willing suspension of disbelief” (*Lyrical Ballads*, 1798) into *truth*. The truth that poets have sought is not a philosophy of life, but a theory of art intended to explain the creative process. Each creative conclusion is a singularity that is successful in resolving disagreeable dissonances. A collation of multiple singularities carrying their own rationale of truths because they are compelling conclusions, create further planes of chaos. Simply put, an infinite collation of orders does not create another plane of *order* but *chaos*. *Chaos*, then, is *multiple valid possibilities*, each with its own semiotic principle. Every petal of a multifoliate rose is true in its existence, appeal, shape–form duality, but meaningless when detached from their context of *being* the rose. The *rose* is an indexical, a signification of a certain order that stimulates and recalls a certain image. The indexical, parallelly, could recall the face of a person sharing the same call sign (*name*). This multiplicity in response is entirely personal and justifies the *chaos effect* despite its existential truth as *singular*. Conversely, other attributes of perception of a flower, such as fragrance, may recall the same image of a certain order representing a rose, even though the indexical is unknown:

What’s in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;” (*Romeo and Juliet*, II. II. 43–44)¹¹

The premise of Derrida’s *unreadability* is not in the words but in the intention, the reversal of perspective, and in the failure of axiomatic approaches to comprehend the multiplicity of semiotic possibilities. These semiotic possibilities appeal to us as true, though they are formations of imagination, because their constituents are familiar, emanating from natural elements. The truth of every work of art is in its capability of deconstructing the organization of language, objects, and patterns of appearances in natural reality to reconstruct a *protosemiotic realism*, an innovative design, or designs, each as real in its infinite variations of realism and yet can connect empathetically to

our response mechanism. Coleridge found this *imaginative realism* cohesive with what he felt about dreams:

“In ordinary dreams we do not judge the objects to be real, – we simply do not determine that they are unreal.” (Coleridge 164)¹²

The conclusions of aesthetic appeal reinforce a maxim, *Art transcends rather than reproduces nature*. The regicide in *Macbeth* is horrible, but the sensory appeal of tragedy is entrancing. The trance is sensuous; the trance is *protosemiotic*, the *emotional empathetic cloud*, received by the senses. The intellectual appreciation of the work of art or literature comes from recalling the original experience, once the intensity of the trance gets a closure, a catharsis, though true catharsis, I believe, is an ideal, a perceptual judgement of closure.

The philosophical quest for the closure was achieved by the impressionistic revolution in art. Impressionism as an artistic movement is instrumental to the development of cinematic art and forms of expression that were not possible otherwise, the relating of the subconscious to dialect, has become true. Impressionism was a scientific approach towards a meticulous study of light and colors and the interrelationships that are possible between the macabre and the harmonious.

The imaginative contextuality of horrors and feeling of disgust that the witches carry is exploited by Shakespeare towards creating the appeal of the entire play of *Macbeth*. The ambiguity of sex-identity is purposefully maintained to cloud any *finality of judgement* as against the social construct of hatred and persecution of witches. A deliberate confusion, “Fair is Foul, Foul is Fair” (line 12) with its trochee, does not allow for a *perceptual pre-judice*. The success of art is in its power of exchanging, altering the dynamic objective correlations, which is only possible if art can create a parallel plane of existence, equally appealing in intuitive context but maintaining the necessary semiosis through its indexical. That is how the witches in *Macbeth* have their dramatic relevance. But for them, the dormant ambition of Macbeth would have never been awakened into activity, and so by sacrificing the superficial realism of factuality, Shakespeare secures the greater realism of character development. That this esemplastic world is appealing even after 450 years is ample evidence that art has its own contextuality, distinct from epistemological definitions.

Reason usually deals with abstract generalities, but when it is dominated by imaginative perception, the universal appeal is found implicit in the individual. The liveliness or truth of art negates the superficial resemblance often called *verisimilitude*; it does not seek factual support as history does; neither does it enunciate general laws as that with scientific logic. To appreciate such art, one must believe in love as heroic, chastity as noble, and evil as real, tangible, only to be ready for the deviant.

Flights of Negation

Art originates from the personality of an artist. The restoring experience transforms from the factual interrelated images in the memory—fused in the vicinity of content and form, respectively altered by the artist’s egotistical self—towards a final expression. And artists have their individual progression of symbols, according to their cogito, which remunerates to distinctive emancipation of feelings. Artistic self is a separate entity, which elutriates the mind from trivial authority. The debate on the relative priority of ‘form’ and ‘content’ is insoluble as the question whether the hen came first or the egg. Form and content aren’t two separate camps but represents an almost double-helical structure of twined chains, supportive towards a final expression. The paradox is quantitative and up to some degree, figurative. The voice is the ‘form’, which carries the ‘content’ of music, or mere words—as W. B. Yeats justifies in his *Among School Children: VIII*

O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance? (lines 7–8)¹³

The “dancer” and the “dance” qualify each other in impersonating the meaning of its physiognomy.

The first characteristic of form is adequacy; it must depict the ideological content in full satiety. This concept of adequacy, though, is partly misleading; because they qualify each other may fail as an artistic vision due to weak synthesis. Our deepest concern is to reduce this entropy around us. Dissatisfaction in the available elements of nature and psychological pursuits increase the necessity for harmony. Content is the seed, or the singularity and form is the variation of its growth. I generally agree that the fulcrum behind the sensible appearance is the eternity of Being, as Virginia Woolf puts it. "...our apparitions, the things you know us by, are simply childish. Beneath it is all dark, it is all spreading; it is unfathomably deep; but now and again we rise to the surface and that is what you see us by."¹⁴ This, in its partiality, is poetic imagination—which does not abjure flesh-eye appearances, and sympathising to blind impulsive cognition, reasons its entity—that can alone grasp the “nature of each thing as it is in itself”.¹⁵ To Keats’ observation, the purpose of imagination is to “dissolve” discordant properties of things and bring in absolute harmony, through balancing the “opposites”; in the sense that the beetle is as beautiful as the butterfly—that “A thing of beauty is a joy for ever:.” As in his preface to *Endymion*¹⁶ Keats writes: “The imagination of a boy is healthy, and the mature imagination of a man is healthy; but there is a space of life between, in which the soul is a ferment, the character undecided, the way of life uncertain, the ambition thick-sighted...” —

— not by mere rendering of value through artistic endeavours but an assurance of truth, a sense by which we should interpret Keats’ famous lines from *Ode on a Grecian Urn*:¹⁷

Beauty is truth, truth beauty, —that is all

Ye know on earth, and that is all ye need to know. (lines 49-50)

Often are these lines read and quoted out of its rendering context. The question of the “truth” being true and whether “beauty” is the only truth exposes us to a greater question: What is meant by Truth? It is the truth of a ranging harmony, the capacity of the term “beauty” to be a transient quality of reflective emotions, which finds the common nature of Being that pervades the superficiality of relative existences; beauty as overwhelming on the mind and the soul of reasoning rationality—the aesthetic of such beauty, as in the power of Art, true in its own accord: having a truth of its own in Wordsworth’s *Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey, On Revisiting the Banks of the Wye during a Tour. July 13, 1798*:

Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul,
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things. (lines 46-50)¹⁸

This enigma of transcendentalism is a generic attribute of aesthetic values where Art presides. But such transcendental rhythms’, being true to its functionality, is restored in its purity of expressions. The philosophy of Wordsworth is proclaimed in the colours of Blake’s hermetical exclusiveness as much as Coleridge in drinking the “milk of paradise” is praised in the awesome worship of the “dancing rocks”—creativity portrayed with such powerful vision as the reading of poetic genius, suffers the Byronian pangs—losing its earthly blood to mere dusty demise, yet achieving the valour of the “blithe spirit” to fly to the serenity of seasons of “mellow fruitfulness”. Yet this process of dying into life for a painful rebirth of the soul is the artistic satiety. And it is this painful consciousness of death, which comes out the creative gestures of utter solitude: the agony of unrequited love and the pain of holding to the creative genius.

Conclusion

How does one separate activity from passivity or the other way round. The phrase “passive smoking” is a queer usage – there is no passivity in smoking because every smoking is effectively

active inhaling. Passivity is a *perceptual reverse* of active action. So, it is with pornography – pleasure without involvement into the act but at the same time involved by imagination. The immediate connect or the retrospective pleasure is so strong that it generates physiological impact, culminating in responses that are most times involuntary. If primary experience is a tangible library, then *Imaginarium* is equally tangible because it is physiologically *true*. Because it involves sensory and meta-sensory impulses, the overall physiological impact is at times more fulfilling. The sense of fulfillment is satisfactory only because it is self-manipulated and can involve an infinite array of characters, who are beyond reach or dissatisfaction. This is the beginning of *de corpore experientia*¹⁹, a proto-humorous tract. Most times it is *apocalyptic*, dying into the self only to be liberated from the gravitated state of reality.

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Notes

- ¹ See ‘Biodegradables’ translated by Peggy Kamuf (12–73), *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 15, no. 4, 1989.
- ² See ‘Living On’ translated by James Hulbert (75–176), in Harold Bloom *et al.*, *Deconstruction and Criticism*, New York: Seabury Press, 1979.
- ³ See ‘Passions: “An Oblique Offering”’ translated by David Wood (5–22), in *Derrida: A Critical Reader*, ed. David Wood, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1992.
- ⁴ See *Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money*, translated by Peggy Kamuf, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992.
- ⁵ See ‘Before the Law’, translated by Avital Ronell and Christine Roulston (181–220), in *Acts of Literature*, ed. Derek Attridge, London and New York: Routledge, 1992.
- ⁶ See ‘Signature Event Context’, translated by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman (1–23), in *Limited Inc*, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988.
- ⁷ *Ode on a Grecian Urn* is a poem written by the English Romantic poet John Keats in May 1819, first published anonymously in *Annals of the Fine Arts* for 1819.
- ⁸ See. *Paradise Lost* Book I. United Kingdom: Penguin Books Limited, 2003.
 – *A dungeon horrible, on all sides round,* (61)
 As one great furnace flamed; yet from those flames
 No light; but rather darkness visible
 Served only to discover sights of woe,
 Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace (65)
 And rest can never dwell, hope never comes
 That comes to all, but torture without end
 Still urges, and a fiery deluge, fed
 With ever-burning sulphur unconsumed. (69)
- ⁹ See ‘The Rhetoric of Drugs’, translated by Michael Israel, in *Points Interviews*, 1974–94, ed. Elisabeth Weber, translated by Peggy Kamuf (228–254) and others, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
- ¹⁰ See ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’ translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, in *Acts of Literature*, ed. Derek Attridge, London and New York: Routledge, 1992, 33–75.
- ¹¹ See Shakespeare, William. *Romeo and Juliet*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005.
- ¹² See Coleridge, Samuel. Taylor. *Miscellanies, Aesthetic, and Literary*. London, 1885.
- ¹³ See Pericles Lewis’s *Cambridge Introduction to Modernism* (58–59), Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- ¹⁴ See *To the Lighthouse* (1932), p. 100.
- ¹⁵ “What distinguishes poetic from religious or philosophical apprehension is not that it turns away from reality, but that it lies open to and eager in watch for reality at doors and windows which with them are barred or blind.” (Herford).

- ¹⁶ See Keats, John. *Endymion*. Spain: CreateSpace Independent Pub, 2014.
- ¹⁷ See Keats, John. *Ode on a Grecian Urn* (Complete Edition). Germany: E-Artnow, 2019.
- ¹⁸ See *Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey, On Revisiting the Banks of the Wye during a Tour*. July 13, 1798.
- ¹⁹ Out of the body experience.

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