

Vibration and Lysis: On the Skin of the Loudspeaker

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Abstract: This article problematizes the ongoing controversy around the politics of recent ontologies of music that centre the “vibratory” and the “sonic,” and then provisionally proposes the “skin” as alternative focus for speculative ontological study, thus reframing the controversy as a question of the political orientation of “anti-literal” practice. The middle section proposes an approach extending the methodological metaphor of “lysis” as imagined by philosopher Daniel Charles as a non-representational alternative to “analysis” in the manner of his colleague Jean-François Lyotard’s experimental aesthetics. The final section hypothesizes about an application of lysis to an interpretation of the phonographic function of the loudspeaker that illustrates how reason and culture always already evade the constraints of a universalizing humanism.

Keywords: sound studies, music analysis, phonography, ontology, Daniel Charles

It should come as no surprise that, as the now dominant metadiscipline of “music and sound studies” struggles to stay relevant upon the latest waves of austerity sweeping anglophone universities, justifications for the enthusiastic turn to “materiality” that was widely celebrated as aurality’s inexorable destiny in the early years of the 21st century have begun to sound less and less certain (Chung 2021; Blaszkiewicz 2021). Anxieties are rising around the residues of colonial ontologies that inhabit not only the abstract, cognitive, and/or linguistic “discourse” that the new materialisms set out to avoid, but also the embodied, material, situated social life of the aesthetic and cultural institutions that still bear responsibility for advancing “Western civilization.” Materialist ontologies are increasingly accused of policing reinstated boundaries of universal order by pronouncing on the “nature” of the sonic, especially in the noumenal form of the “vibratory,” and hence, conceived as a complex of forces operating independently from human culture, history, and the senses (Thompson 2017). Such ontologies have been said to enforce colonial governance, that is, not only of the qualities of particular musical objects and practices, but of the boundary that produces the very opposition between nature and culture, and by extension that between human and nonhuman as well. And yet, however terrifying colonialism’s effects have been on the Earth and its inhabitants over the past few centuries of European hegemony, its power also engenders the possibility of an “understudy” orientated toward the production of what Fred Moten calls “para-ontologies,” uprooted and scattered across the outside of white ontology’s universalizing campaigns of domination and extraction (Thompson 267–8, citing Moten 2008). Indeed, Black and feminist music scholars have shown that one can approach questions of ontology without abandoning questions of culture, class, gender, race and subjectivity (cf. Watkins and Esse 2013; Born 2018; Mathes 2022).

Most importantly, and contrary to the assumptions of the belated Kittlerians whose work dominates the self-styled “critical organology” and the recent media-philosophical turn in American music theory (Tresch and Dolan 2013; Rehding et al 2017; Chua and Rehding 2021), the “real” of para-ontological understudy need in no way remain limited to the beings of the products of applied scientific “acoustics” or its subject-articulated subdiscipline “psychoacoustics.” For Moten, what is essential to para-ontology is “a general critique of calculation” (2008, 187) borne by “fugitive

ontologues” (189) upon “the political phonochoreography of being’s words” (180). In this view, the process of decolonizing the discipline of music and sound studies begins with a recognition that the realities of its objects encompass a great many things that are neither vibratory, nor unequivocally “physical” (cf. Kim-Cohen 2009; Barrett 2016; Eidsheim 2019).

Prominent “speculative realist” Graham Harman (2022) himself has recently responded to these anti-colonial critics, accepting unreservedly their proposition that vibrational materialism cannot exhaust the ontological possibilities for the objects of sound and listening. For Harman, however, what is at stake in the controversy concerning the ontological turn’s intersection with colonialism is not any prescriptive account of music’s sonorous being, but rather the critical power of an “anti-literalism” that distinguishes speculative approaches as instruments in a struggle against the reestablishment of transcendent, universalizing hierarchies of objects, particularly the old “onto-taxonomy” of European enlightenment, which imposes an unjustifiable distinction, completely lacking in empirical support, between human thought and all other kinds of objects. For Harman, ultimately, “it is possible to [commit] to social justice without assenting to the host of philosophical rejections and dismissals” that critics of the ontological turn have claimed to derive from that commitment (2022, 197). The key ethical decision, then, lies in pursuing an ontology that is, as Iain Campbell (2020) suggests, “practical” rather than “doctrinal,” and thus also disposed to embodied, ethical, and epistemological partiality in the manners endorsed by para-ontologists like Moten and Thompson.

Crucially, there is no question here of resolving the implicit partiality: neither by simply rebalancing attention toward representations in the form of “auditory culture” and “audile technique” (cf. Kane 2015), nor by merely expanding ontology to include subjects as distinct from objects (cf. Barrett 2023; Born 2018). Brian Kane is correct to show that “sonicity” and “vibration” are irreducibly predicated upon the culture- and subjectivity-bound domain of “listening” and thus escape from the grasp of any “onto-aesthete” who claims to evade confrontation with objects’ cultural and historical contexts (Kane 2015, 13). On this basis, Kane concludes that *any* “shift toward ontology, despite... distinct ontological projects, is an attempt to outwit the so-called linguistic turn or the privileging of cognition, consciousness, anthropocentrism, phenomenology, or culture” (Kane 2014, 4). However, by taking a practical, para-ontological outlook we can immediately dissolve Kane’s starting premise. In this perspective, there can be no ontology of music at all without embracing “the relevance of research into auditory culture, audile techniques, and the technological mediation of sound”; to presume otherwise is to *completely misrepresent* “the nature of sound, the body, and media” (cf. Kane 2015, 3). The analyst’s ability to distinguish nature and culture in the abstract does not govern the potential variety of nature-culture hybrids that can exist.

Notice that Kane makes no mention of the “speculative” aspect of the ontologies he criticizes, as if he does not recognize musical reality’s freedom to be other than what normative listeners can make sense of and directly perceive. Like the logical positivists who were the targets of the linguistic turn in the first place (Rorty 1967, 12), Kane claims to have no method to understand questions of feeling, knowledge, or signification as referring to anything but a special language of transcendent human subjectivity, the existence of which is only intelligible as “other than ontology” (7). However, to distinguish non-ontological “others” in this way is to impose the very constraints that afford speculative, para-ontological practice: a universal ontology presupposes and engenders by negative reaction the very plurality it excludes. Clearly, the challenge is to explain realities that include the beings of both cultures *and* natures, and is therefore both rational *and* material.

Whirlpool of the disjunctive bar

To assume a basic distinction between the objects inside and outside human reason is to enunciate an ontology of the frontier that keeps the two domains apart, even the vibrating surface itself, such as the *membrane* of a loudspeaker or a drum. Daniel Charles extends an apt metaphor for this approach in his 1976 article “Chair et lyse,” critiquing Jean-François Lyotard’s attempt to experimen-

tally dissect the “figure” of the signifier in *Économie libidinale* (Lyotard 1974; cf. Leipert 2013). Charles likens Lyotard’s method to the biochemical operation of “lysis”—breaking down a cell membrane in order to pass molecules through it, perhaps a disruption of the membrane using detergents or high-frequency vibrations for the extraction of molecules like DNA from inside the cell. The etymology of lysis extends back to a Greek root meaning “loosening” in the sense of “unfastening.”¹ In medical terminology, lysis refers to abatement of symptoms, as in the relaxation or decline after a state of “crisis,” the threshold across which disorder returns to order. In English translation, lysis is also the name of the Platonic interlocutor who learns in an eponymous dialogue to appreciate the complex practical and moral virtues of reciprocal friendship (Plato 2010). Socrates teaches Lysis that, although he is beautiful and his parents are rich, he must understand his love’s meaning as arising from the singular goodness of each participant, and not from the quality of their relation.

For Charles at this time, responding to his teachers Emmanuel Levinas and Mikel Dufrenne at Nanterre while also establishing a new experimental music department at Vincennes, the contemporary musicological situation was interesting insofar as it opened up exactly this challenge of an “an-archic” [*an-archique*] orientation toward its objects—an inquiry no longer limited to relations with musical utterances or works, but rather set free to explore the production of the musical *a priori* itself, in whatever form it may take (Charles et al 1971; cf. Levinas 1968, Dufrenne 1966). At the centre of Charles’s work was the untimely discovery that, no matter how deep one digs into the ontic beings of music in the world, one never locates a fundamental ground upon which non-music retreats to reveal actual *music* in some purified, original form: the boundaries that divide objects and subjects from their contexts are themselves always interdependent with a pre-ontological ethics of observation. We can think of the metaphor of lysis as problematizing this aporia, focusing interpretation on the very material power to separate transcendent insides from crude outsides.

The mode of presentation that flows most naturally from lysis is not esoteric but *exoteric*. The point is to escape from the modernist assumption that the “highest” aesthetic events are those which exceed the common abilities and understandings of their publics. Lysis produces knowing as a question of quantity and not of quality. Its aim is not to generate assent among a circle of experts, but to throw open the technique of aesthetic reflection across disciplines and toward new concerns. The skin’s normal function, to follow the metaphor, is to present the body as one organ with unified channels of action and intention. As Alexander Weheliye writes of Black “flesh” conceived in the feminist phenomenologies of Sylvia Wynter and Hortense Spillers, skin “rests at that precarious threshold where the person metamorphoses into the group” and thus “resists the legal idiom of personhood as property” (Weheliye 2014, 44). Lysis further evokes Black thought by problematizing the skin as a system of embodiment “cleaved by the working together of deprivatization and deprivation” (Weheliye 2014, 39). Law inscribes the being of the body on the skin, while lysis describes the skin as extensive becoming of the body as collective event.

To understand lysis as a “realism” is thus not to assume some Harmanian conviction about the universal nature of independent existences: on the contrary, realism here takes the form of a quasi-Lacanian doubt or anxiety about the very possibility of access to “the real,” which then becomes the foundation for an inescapable injunction to take every external detail into account. Unlike Charles’s and Lyotard’s well-meaning and far more popular musical contemporaries the “acoustic ecologists,” whose work rests upon on a binary morality distinguishing human from natural sounds, and also unlike the “acousmaticians,” who saw no relevant alternative to a relational epistemology dividing being into irreducible subjects and objects on the basis of conservative common sense—no matter what local nature-cultures they needed to erase in the process—lysis suggests a directing of attention toward the “whirlpool of the disjunctive bar itself,” the form of the impossibility of any natural separation between observers and observed.² Its compositional (or decompositional) form would have had to tend toward the situated auditory awareness of Pauline Oliveros’s “deep listening” (Oliveros 2005; cf. Thompson 2018). Lysis figures knowledge about reality as mythopoetic rather than empirical:

under lysis, the advance of science (or “music history”) abandons cumulative empirical measurement to become a question of iterative formalization and interpretation (cf. Miller 1979).

In psychoanalytic terms, then, we can think of lysis as requiring its subject to hesitate mid-way along the required course from analysand to analyst (cf. Rose 2004). Responding to Lyotard, Charles focuses on interpreting “lysis” as a methodological activity *prior to analysis*. Analysis addresses patterns in a set of data in the hope of deriving rational insights about its internal composition (cf. Rorty 1967, 12). Lysis hinders the analyst’s efforts to distinguish inside from outside, or foreground from background. It requires the observer to stop before analysis, first of all, in the sense of seeking to encapsulate the inner quality of a work or technique. In lysis, contrastingly, we artificially and arbitrarily remove the screens separating works from their “contexts,” allowing coincident patterns and pathologies to swim together in a common medium. Analysis sets out in search of special internal relations that should prove universal in a sense independent of external relations, whereas lysis sets out to understand all relations as multiversal or pluriversal, in William James’s sense—that is, prevailing differently absolutely everywhere (Charles 1978, 27; cf. Putnam 1990). As in biochemical lysis, the goal of lytic reading can either be to reorganize an object’s inside parts, or to study how inside and outside parts interact when held together. The former whole is cast in exploded, diagrammatic perspective, its relations stretched out “flat,” almost in Bruno Latour’s sense. To illustrate the operation, Charles proposes M. C. Escher’s 1961 drawing “Waterfall” (Charles 1978, 143–144). The problem that Escher presents to viewers, Charles reminds us, is not simply to break with normal order, shifting from order to disorder, or from objective to subjective order. Rather, Escher’s drawing displaces order from the imaginary space of architectural perspective *back onto the surface of the paper*, the materiality of which naturally affords depictions of all possible vanishing points and lines of flight at once: the an-archic, “real” surface makes possible a multiplication of imaginary surfaces and a break with the symbolic contract of “perspective.”³

Lytic reasoning falls short (Charles uses the expression *en deçà*) of both analysis and synthesis. If, as for Immanuel Kant, an analytic statement is meaningful by virtue of its internal referents alone, while the meaning of a synthetic statement depends upon external referents, then the meanings of lytic statements must conduct reference prior to the inside–outside distinction, in something like the dynamic, holistic field of verdicts and beliefs that Quine (1951) proposed to explain why analyticity appears to happen in spite of the empirical impossibility of internal referents in ordinary language. Lysis approaches statements at a pre-referential level where language recedes into the “visceral abstractions” of voice, gesture, and organ (Charles 1978; cf. Ngai 2015). Lysis looks, to borrow the words of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, for “ways around the topos of depth or hiddenness,” laying affects out “beside” each other rather than erecting normative hierarchies of intensive feeling (Sedgwick 2003, 8–9). Affect is thus the distinguished object of lytic description. “Affects can be, and are,” writes Sedgwick, “attached to things, people, ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions, institutions, and any number of other things, including other affects” (19). Affects are only ever attached to objects partially, however: the essence of affect lies in moving *across* mutually grasping bodies, continually translating the perspectives of one into qualities of another, and vice versa (cf. Massumi 1992, 36). Analysis and synthesis encounter affects only as states of affairs inside *or* outside, respectively, while lysis embraces affect’s relentless urge to be both at once.

Lysis therefore *is* this very experimental opening—this reorganization, to “disinteriorise and dereflexivise”—on the phenomenological body.⁴ At the same time, however, lysis dispels any empiricist fantasy of direct access to material forces and flows. Break the skin and, all at once, all of the knowledges and experiences which were previously “embodied,” in Merleau-Ponty’s sense, become not so much disembodied as *underembodied*. Organs, appendages, and features melt into a metaphorical puddle teeming with smaller bodies. Following Gilbert Simondon, lysis posits as its ground the “pre-originary” fields that afford the translation of the possibility of an “in itself” onto various shifting parts of objects and subjects in a particular medium (Charles 1978, 86; cf. Simondon 2005).

This is clearly a position that Charles derives from the existentialist- and process-informed phenomenological metaphysics which dominated the philosophy departments at Nanterre and the Sorbonne, where he studied and taught respectively over the course of more than a decade – a position that, in the perspective of a speculative history of lysis, both anticipates and transcends Harmanian realism.⁵ Following work by Lyotard, a fellow student of the existentialist aesthetician Dufrenne, Charles digested the metaphysical aspirations that his teachers inherited from Bachelard and Bergson into a unique concern for the “figural” as the non-discursive aspect of the musical signifier.⁶ In a manner not entirely unrelated to Quine’s quarrel with the logical positivists, then, Charles too hoped to move beyond the crude tangibility of things in the ordinary, practical lifeworld, toward the apparently infinite web of ethical, aesthetic, and epistemic mediation that governs the becoming of subjects and objects before any sensory experience can take place. Lysis, following Levinas and Blanchot, discloses the “nomadism” of this pre-ontological flesh (Charles 1978, 145); and thus reveals music as exteriorization of sound itself (cf. Marcelle 2010, 182). Ultimately, Charles suggests, we will never fully remove all of the layers of mediation and find the fundamental ground of signifying internality: like the proverbial nomad of Levinasian mysticism, musical insides are always hiding elsewhere.

Topos of unsayability

What would it mean to lyse the ethico-aesthetic skins separating, for example, the vibratory function of the loudspeaker from the phonographic representation of sound? What other beings could lysis discover in defining an *anobjective* field of musical individuation that cuts across different interpretations of phonographic representation? Remember that the central promise of lysis is to trace figures of representation outside of the safety of the theatre of subjects and objects, allowing these figures to dissolve into the sociomaterial environments where sonic reference first takes shape: the place where representation recedes into affordance. Attention thus shifts from “the” “source” or “performance” and its “texts” as intensively “captured” in the sound object (cf. Katz 2011; Kane 2014)—toward “ordinary,” “everyday,” *underperformed* meanings and uses of the object’s tangible material forms—how the translation of a particular inscription into particular vibrations fits into the networks of economic, social, and technical constraints that govern individual and collective consumption and production of sound commodities, including any abstracted, absented or repressed functions and significations. Lysis redefines phonography as a use of inscriptions of acoustic vibration *not to capture but to represent music*, in virtual spaces defined by technical standards, sound engineering conventions, and the aesthetics of other media (cf. Greene and Porcello 2005). At Vincennes, Charles was particularly interested in the power of this perspective to rationalize an equal pedagogical value for, to borrow George Lewis’s (1996) terms, “afrological” approaches to phonography as well as dominant “eurollogical” approaches. Charles’ vocabulary gives support and perspective to comparison without arranging the two orientations as a dualism.

In *Économie libidinale*, Lyotard glibly recounts his realization, “one evening... between a piece of music by Kagel and a piece by Boulez... in the deserted urinals in the Donaueschingen Konzerthalle,” that, in fact, all of the unconnected, repressed parts of the modernist body were still present in the immediate experience of everyone in attendance: one had only to leave the room to perform the fact that nothing at all can be hidden, evacuated, or transformed, even in an institution of such high “critical” intensity, as far from “primitive” music as human beings could reasonably claim to be (Lyotard 1993, 122). When we dissect and stretch out flat the arborescent theatre of representations that audiences pay to attend even today at the Donaueschingen festival, we discover amongst its lurid folds the figure of its production as “the general metamorphosis of everything which takes place on bodies and inscribes itself into the social body, haunted by the idea of a ceaseless general metamorphosis, or of a general production without inscription, which is nothing other than the great skin” (Lyotard 1993, 123). Peel back the delicate membrane of “reproductions” of “works,” and with it all distinctions between “literate” and “oral” cultures; or rather, disclose the membrane as

that which was really at the centre of the avant-garde's attention all along. Thus philosophy can finally "liquidate" the notion of the composition as a government of relations among sounds, producers, and listeners (During 2000, 753). Under lysis, Cage's mythic moment of insight in the anechoic chamber becomes a positive account of the multiple overlapping *silences* providing substrates for both Cage's embodied auditory space and the ephemeral sequence of vibrations that Cage claims to distinguish into the sounds of two separate processes "inside" his body. The "real" event of intensified silence is functionalized on the body through a fictional transgression of the morality by which "good" insides are always absent from polite attention (cf. Lyotard 1984, 98–99).

A lysis of the function of the loudspeaker in eurological phonography draws attention from inscriptions and vibrations to the often invisible objects that transduce energy *between* inscription and vibration. In spite of the technical fact that the loudspeaker can only produce sound by transferring electromagnetic energy onto some kind of vibrating membrane, it is difficult in a eurological context to hear the loudspeaker as anything but a void from which individual listening subjects must retrieve the acousmatic sounds "of" other things. A eurological account of loudspeaker history begins naturally with the ear and thus with transparent (acousmatic) "reproducers" or "amplifiers" of putatively original musical, verbal, or environmental signals, emerging through the work of engineers preoccupied with eurocentric notions of "intelligibility" and "normal human hearing" into a pre-existing capitalist listening formation which governed both markets for and discourses about the usefulness of representations of sound as commodities (cf. Devine 2014). European modernity imposes a foundational myth of sound recording as "container" (cf. Sophia 2000) and thus as a thing that *displaces, carries, or conserves* voices and musics that also have some transcendent existence, if not as texts or performances (cf. Abbate 2004), then at least as what Langer called "forms of human feeling" (e.g. Langer 1957, 235), clearly distinct from the vibrations themselves. Hearing the sound of the loudspeaker itself, its "colour," is always a problem in this context. The only exceptions are limit cases like those featured in otherwise traditional concert works by Alvin Lucier, Gordon Monahan, and Cathy van Eck, where loudspeakers feature as instruments of diffusion, spectacle, or timbral modification.

Foregrounding the transductive membrane redirects media archaeology toward an alternative afrological context where loudspeakers bear closer kinship with drums as instruments organising human and nonhuman movements and vocalities in the folds of their vibrating skins (cf. Pacéré 1991). A membranophonic history of the loudspeaker would orient the history of phonography toward the vibratory genius of Black Atlantic sound system cultures, where recordings conventionally operate as modular parts of a public technical apparatus mediating an isochronous complex of lyrical, sonic, culinary, and choreological representations, all with relatively independent, situated social functions. Contrary to the naïve and patronizing accounts of Christopher Small (1977) and Charles Keil (1966) in popular ethnographies published just before Charles's thesis, lysis underlines the fundamental falsity of the conclusion that afrological musics are more "embodied" and thus "material" while eurological musics are more "disembodied" and thus more "rational." Since then, American scholars like Barbara Christian (1987) and her student Daphne A. Brooks (2021) have shown how especially Black women's sonic expression has been forced to evade the distinction between theory and practice in order to hide its capacity for critique. Paul Gilroy theorizes the "special power" of modern Black Atlantic sonic expression as deriving from this capacity for "double-ness," defined both in historical terms as "anti-modernity" and in spatial terms as "topos of unsayability produced from the slaves' experiences of racial terror," set apart by the community as a site of moral and poetic "battle" with the oppressor (1993, 73–74).

As Julian Henriques argues, the sound system MC's work is not primarily "intuitive," "instinctive," or "natural," as contemporary European musicians have traditionally been taught by their peers, instruments, and institutions to assume, but rather expounds a sophisticated critical challenge to imperialistic notions of control over colonized technological media and sociocultural space.⁷ Sound

system practice communicates, for Henriques, across at least three vibratory “wavebands” at once: the *material* propagating through the air and the built environment; the *corporeal* of crew and crowd performance and experience; the *sociocultural* of collective understanding, morality, and sense-making. In cybernetic terms, the vibration of a particular gathering of bodies is the medium and “vibe” is the encoded message for trained receivers to interpret (xxxii–xxxiii; cf. Garcia 2020). The ontological thinking involved is inherently both sonic and auditory, addressing

energetic fields rather than separate static objects [...] the patterning of intensities through time, rather than the pattern of symmetries, systems and codes in space. The foundation of this auditory epistemology is the crowd’s visceral immersive experience of *sonic dominance* in the dancehall session. (xxviii)

Evidently, the difference between the matter and reason is rarely, if ever, identical to the difference between embodied and disembodied (cf. Cimini 2012). Vibration folds into the collective phronesis of sound system practice so deeply that it confounds the mistaken eurological assumption that matter can only exist on the outside of mind. The naïve search for a musical “real” that exists beyond questions of feeling and culture (cf. Kane 2015) articulates a hierarchy of relations to the skin of the loudspeaker that diffuses and undermines sonic dominance and thereby distorts the ontologies, cultures, and histories of the colonized and enslaved across European empires. As Nina Sun Eidsheim explains, building upon Piekut’s (2014) music historical translation of ANT, not only do racialized voices circulate across networks of individual listeners, singers, and speakers; they also call upon a “network 2” of infrastructural channels governing access to care, resources, and power; and a “network 3” or “phantom network” comprising the drifting, non-physical, “associative fabric of naturalized musical and cultural genealogy” that supports the ascription of racializing qualities to vocal timbre (Eidsheim 2019, 63–67). Lysis frees us from the need to reduce vocal circuits to their “relations” and thus relativizes the priority of the first network, henceforth allowing us to understand subjects and objects not as natural agents or elements, but as representations inscribed in a dominant “hieroglyphics” (Weheilye 2014) on particular folds of the material limit between two dynamic milieux (cf. Simondon 1958, 65).

Charles’s speculative ethico-aesthetics positions musical listening on the skin, and thereby both removes the barriers that protect the universal onto-taxonomy of European enlightenment from the challenge of alternate horizons, and suggests a practical model for the kind of understudy required to make sense of the resulting plurality.

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Notes

¹ The 2018 edition of *Le Robert* associates the endings *-lyse* and *-lytique* with scientific “dissolution” as in *électrolyse*.

² The quote is from Charles 1978, 143. Schaeffer’s response to Charles’s February 1971 SFP seminar “Musique en an-archie” is apposite here: “Pour moi, il y a des relations entre quelqu’un qui perçoit et quelque chose qui lui est donné à percevoir. Et je ne peux pas sortir, quoi qu’on me dise, de la relation sujet-objet. Et tout le reste, pour moi, est du baratin.” [For me, there are relations between someone who perceives and something which is given to him to perceive. And I cannot escape, whatever I am told, from the subject-object relation. And all the rest, for me, is just hot air.] Charles et al. 1971, 95, my translation. On the intersection of nature and culture as conceived in acoustic ecology see Kelman 2010.

³ Compare also Deleuze’s account of perspective and the Leibnizian subject in 1993, 19–22.

⁴ Charles 1978, 146; Note the contrast with Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics, which places music “at the other extreme” from the embodied orientations of the painter or the writer, such that music “falls short” (*en deçà*)

of inhabiting Being (1964, 3). In this view, music is akin to science in its *dissociation* from the embodied subject. Note also how Charles's notion of lysis resolves the problem that rises to the surface of Amy Cimini's (2012, 369) reading of Merleau-Ponty, namely the residual musicological tendency to conceive analysis and embodiment as opposed and mutually exclusive.

⁵ Cf. Wahl 1965; Dufrenne 1966; Levinas 1978; Zahavi 2016.

⁶ Lyotard 1971; cf. Deleuze 2004, 214–215. On Lyotard's related engagements with analytic philosophy, see also Enaudeau and Fruteau de Laclos 2017.

⁷ Henriques 2011, xix. On questions of racialization among the instruments of eurological music research, see Sofer 2020.

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